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
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A selection from the letters and despatches



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A SELECTION FROM
THE LETTERS AND DESPATCHES
OF THE
FIRST NAPOLEON.

VOL. II.

A SELECTION FROM
THE LETTERS AND DESPATCHES
OF THE
FIRST NAPOLEON.

With Explanatory Notes.

Napoleon I, Emperor of the French. 1799-1821.

BY
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IN THREE VOLUMES.

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A SELECTION FROM
THE LETTERS AND DESPATCHES
OF THE
FIRST NAPOLEON.

THE CORRESPONDENCE OF NAPOLEON.

CHAPTER I.

THE YEAR 1803.

THE principal event of this year was undoubtedly the rupture of the treaty of Amiens—a treaty which had been hailed with such delight on both sides of the Channel, but which, thanks to the restless ambition of Bonaparte, was never more than a truce. Immediately after the rupture the “army of England” was reorganised, six large camps were formed along the coasts of France and Holland, and active preparations were made for the invasion of England. It is still a moot point whether Bonaparte ever really intended to cross the Channel, although he had medals struck in commemoration of the conquest of Great Britain, and had caused a report to be made of the treasures he would be likely to find in Oxford, which ancient seat of learning was to be pillaged as the chief towns of Italy had been pillaged. In making this grand display, he flattered the feeling of antipathy of the French nation against England, who was accused of having broken the treaty; he was furnished with an excuse for asking for more conscripts and for maintaining an enormous army which kept England in a fever of apprehension, and drained her resources.

But would Bonaparte have ventured across the Channel in spite of the remonstrances of his admirals, of Ganteaume, of Bruix, of Decrès, and of Villeneuve? Would he have risked so dangerous an operation, leaving behind him Austria, Russia, and Italy, which would soon have taken advantage of his absence, and Spain, Portugal and Switzerland, which would have seized the opportunity to break their fetters? Perhaps if the British fleet had been annihilated, Bonaparte might have carried out his threats; he knew that his lust for universal dominion would never be satisfied until Carthage had been destroyed. With England in his grasp, the Continent was his, and, as he expressed it himself, he would be able to garrison Strasburg with old women. It was his invariable custom, however, to keep several irons in the fire at the same time, and then, when a propitious moment arrived, to adopt one out of several schemes all worked out beforehand. It was therefore impossible to know where he really intended to strike, and difficult to say now what portion of his policy was feigned, and what portion was real. All we know for certain is that the blow which was apparently aimed at England eventually fell upon Austria.

On the rupture of the treaty of Amiens, Bonaparte, contrary to the law of nations, had all the English travelling upon the Continent arrested. The *Annual Register* sets down their number at 11,000, and says that "the great consul, like a politic shepherd, continued removing the pen of his bleating English flock from spot to spot, well knowing that the soil will be everywhere enriched by their temporary residence."

In the month of May, Nelson sailed in the *Victory* to take command of the Mediterranean squadron.

In the month of June we see that the poor King of Etruria, who had been so terribly ill treated by Bonaparte, died. He was buried with great splendour at Florence; his funeral is said to have cost 300,000 livres; two gold medals of great value were placed in his coffin; the

buckles of his shoes were richly set in brilliants, and he had on his finger a costly diamond ring.

Before the end of the year, St. Lucia, Tobago, Demerara, and Esequibo fell into our hands, and the position of the French in St. Domingo became untenable, what with yellow fever and the determination of the blacks to revenge the fate of Toussaint Louverture.

TO REAR-ADMIRAL DECRES.

“ST. CLOUD, 15th *January*, 1803.

“ The Captain-General (of East Indian possessions) will arrive in a country where our rivals dominate. . . . He must not give them any subject for alarm. He must confine himself to indispensable negotiations, and in his relations with the people and princes, who support with impatience the English yoke, he must carefully avoid causing uneasiness. They are the tyrants of India ; they are suspicious and jealous ; the Captain-General must act with gentleness, dissimulation, and simplicity. Six months after his arrival in India he must furnish me with full details of the situation, the feelings of the various peoples of India, and the strength of the different English establishments. He must make known his views, and what hope there would be of obtaining support in the event of war. . . . He must pay the greatest attention to every phrase, as they will all be weighed, and as they may determine the decision of the government.”

After examining rather superficially the prospect of being able to undertake a campaign in India, Bonaparte terminated his letter thus—

“ But the First Consul, well informed by the Captain-General, and aided by the punctual execution of his instructions, may some day place him in the position of acquiring that great glory which causes the memory of man to last beyond the duration of ages.

“BONAPARTE.”

No doubt, had a favourable opportunity occurred, Bonaparte would not have treated his Captain-General as the Bourbons treated Dupleix, Labourdonnais, and Lally.

On the 16th January, the weather being very severe, Bonaparte ordered 5,000 francs to be sent to the Bishop of Arras for the poor of his diocese. The same day the Minister of Finance was directed to pay to Madame d'Orleans the sum of 100,000 francs in addition to the ordinary 100,000. This money was to be remitted secretly.

Madame d'Orleans was an amiable woman better known as Madame de Montesson. After the death of her first husband she had been secretly married to the Duke of Orleans. During the Revolution she had been thrown into prison where she had made the acquaintance and acquired the friendship of Josephine de Beauharnais, which was the real cause of her favour with Bonaparte.

On the 20th February, 1803, Bonaparte addressed a long message to the Chambers. Referring to the Concordat, he said,

“The principles of our enlightened religion, the voice of the sovereign Pontiff, and the firmness of the government, have triumphed over all obstacles. Mutual sacrifices have reunited the ministers of the gospel; *the Gallican Church* is restored, thanks to intelligence and concord; there is already a happy change in public morality; children listen with more docility to the voice of their parents; youth is more submissive to the authority of the magistrate, *and the conscription is now effected in places where its very name used to arouse resistance.*”

After drawing a brilliant picture of domestic prosperity, Bonaparte added—

“The Isle of Elba has been ceded to France; it brings her a mild and industrious population, two superb harbours and a rich mine; but, separated from France, it could not be intimately connected with any of her departments, nor subjected to the ordinary administrative regulations. . . .

"The abdication of the sovereign, the wishes of the people, the necessity of things have placed Piedmont in the power of France. In the midst of the nations which surrounded her she could not support the weight of her own independence nor the expenses of a monarchy. United to France she will enjoy, &c., &c.

"Old means of communication have been repaired, and new ones constructed. The Simplon, the Mount Cenis, and the Mount Geneva, will soon open up a triple and easy access to Italy ; a high road will run from Genoa to Marseilles, &c.

"The islands of Martinique, Tobago, and St. Lucia, have been restored to us with all their old elements of prosperity. Guadeloupe has been reconquered and pacified. Guiana is increasing in importance. St. Domingo has been subdued, and the author of its troubles is in the power of France. . . ."

But yellow fever came and decimated the French hosts, and the "gallant blacks," infuriated by the perfidious treatment of Toussaint Louverture, once more resumed the offensive.¹

¹ The treatment of Toussaint Louverture and the blacks of St. Domingo is one of the darkest pages of French history. That the "rebel" leader was himself basely betrayed is proved by the following letter from General Rochambeau :

"HEAD-QUARTERS, 8th May, 1802.

" . . . I informed Toussaint that if he would repair to the Cape pardon might yet be extended to him. He did not hesitate—came to me, implored pardon, and promised fidelity to France. I accepted his submission. . . ."

The greatest horrors ensued. The whites erected a gallows on one hill, the blacks upon another, and hourly executions took place in sight of each other. The French bayoneted and poisoned the blacks by thousands, and, renewing one of the terrible episodes of the Revolution, sent four hundred prisoners to sea in an old vessel, in the hold of which they were stifled with brimstone. The ship was then scuttled. The blacks retaliated by drawing the eyes out of Frenchmen with corkscrews, and similar cruelties.

"A French ambassador is at Constantinople with orders to strengthen the bonds that attach us to a *seemingly tottering power* which it is our interest to support and place on a solid basis.

"British troops still occupy Alexandria and Malta; the government would be justified in complaining of this, but it has learned that the vessels which are to take them home are in the Mediterranean."

Bonaparte then expressed his want of confidence in England, and said that the Republic, as a measure of prudence, had 500,000 *men ready to defend and to avenge it*. "Strange necessity which miserable passions impose upon two nations attached to peace by an equal interest."

This message touched upon several of the questions which led to the rupture of the treaty of Amiens, the signature of which had been hailed with such unfeigned delight by the people on both sides of the Channel just a year before. It referred to the acquisition of the Isle of Elba which had been evacuated by England; to the annexation of Piedmont; to the establishment of France in Switzerland; to the mission of Sebastiani to Constantinople, Egypt, Palestine, &c., on commercial affairs! and, finally, to those armaments along the French, Belgian, and Dutch coasts which had commenced to inspire alarm and distrust even in the breast of Mr. Addington. The fact of Bonaparte publicly declaring that he had 500,000 men ready to avenge himself on a nation with which he was at peace, was a statement too bold and too menacing to be lightly explained away.

TO BRIGADIER COLBERT.

"PARIS, 15th March, 1803.

"You will go to Russia and hand the inclosed letter to the Emperor. You will talk to him of the esteem enjoyed by Russians in Paris. . . . You will discuss liberal and philosophical ideas in preference to other subjects, in speaking with his majesty. If you see the Grand Duke

Constantine, tell him that I regret he did not come to Paris. You will speak to the Empress of the pleasure I experienced on seeing her uncle here, and how he amused himself in Paris. . . . *If war with England be spoken about, you will say that the French nation desires nothing better than to measure swords with her, seeing the amount of antipathy which exists.* You will treat the diplomatic body with civility, the English ambassador like the others. You will speak well of the one now in Paris, who is very well known.¹ You will represent the First Consul as very busy tracing canals, establishing manufactures, and settling the details of public instruction. "BONAPARTE."

The letter to the Emperor of Russia was directed against England, and her refusal to evacuate Malta. Bonaparte declared that he would never consent to such dishonour, that he was resolved to resist the English occupation of that island at no matter what price. Owing to the interest which Alexander was supposed to take in the Order, he was asked to concern himself in this affair. A similar letter was addressed to the King of Prussia.

On the 11th of March, the First Consul addressed a long letter to his faithful ally, the King of Spain, filled with reproaches. As usual his chief grievance bore reference to England. In accordance with treaty the British troops had been withdrawn from Minorca, but he complained that since the evacuation the Spanish Government had not only neglected to fortify a port coveted by England, but had reinstated the officials, owing to whose treason the island had fallen into the hands of the enemy. Bonaparte then complained of the condition into which the Spanish navy had been permitted to fall, adding—

"I beg your Majesty to pardon me for taking so much interest in a matter which specially concerns you ; but

¹ This was Lord Whitworth, who was British ambassador at St. Petersburg when Paul was assassinated, and who had been accused by Bonaparte of complicity in that crime.

England is not asleep ; she is always on the watch, and will not rest until she has seized upon all the colonies and all the commerce of the world [having just restored Martinique, Tobago, St. Lucia, and Minorca]. France can alone prevent this. . . .

“BONAPARTE.”

INSTRUCTIONS.

“PARIS, 12th March, 1803.

“General Duroc will repair to Berlin with all diligence, and will hand the inclosed letter to the King of Prussia.” [Letter already referred to.]

After portraying the conduct of England in the darkest colours, the Instructions added—

“Should war take place, the First Consul will be able to appeal to God and man, and nothing shall hinder him from pursuing the British Cabinet wherever its standard may be hoisted. To speak plainly, his intention is, should the British Cabinet persevere, immediately to invade Hanover.”

Bonaparte appeared to suppose that by threatening Hanover the King of Prussia would be induced to persuade England to evacuate Malta.

The Duc de Richelieu having been struck off the list of *émigrés*, asked permission to remain in the service of Russia.

DECISION.

“PARIS, 27th March, 1803.

“Referred to the Grand Judge in order that he may forward letters of permission to remain in the service of Russia, and remove the sequestration attached to the property.¹

“BONAPARTE.”

¹ In the Nelson despatches may be found the following letter :—

TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY ADDINGTON.

“OFF TOULON, 16th July, 1803.

“I send you some papers relative to letters from Odessa, a Russian port in the Black Sea, of which the Duke of Richelieu is governor.

The Duc de Richelieu had been in the Russian service before the breaking out of the French Revolution, and had served under Suwarrow at the siege of Ismail. He afterwards rendered eminent services to both Russia and France—to Russia as Governor of Odessa, where his statue still stands, and where his name is still remembered with gratitude; to France as a minister, by procuring the liberation of the territory in 1818, at an earlier date than that originally fixed by the allies. The chambers voted him 2,000*l.* a year, but the Duke—although his pecuniary circumstances were anything but brilliant—refused to accept the pension. He conceived that he had merely done his duty in exerting his influence with the Emperor Alexandre for the benefit of his native land.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

“PARIS, 31st *March*, 1803.

“I beg you will order Brigadier-General Monnet to go to Flushing, and to assume the command of that town and of the Isle of Walcheren. . . . Order General Belliard to arm the battery opposite Flushing, which protects the entry of the Escant. . . . He must be instructed to assume full authority, and not to allow any interference on the part of the Dutch commandant. . . . This place being common to France and Holland, the intention of the Government is that everything shall be done in the name of France. . . . General Monnet must treat the Batavian inhabitants and troops well, show civility to the officers, and frequently talk to them of the conduct of the English at the Cape. . . .

“BONAPARTE.”

You will know much better than I can tell you how this emigrant duke has been courted by Buonaparte, through his minister in Russia. We must recollect that he is a Frenchman, and his ultimate views probably turn to getting back some of his estates in France. . . . I cannot help thinking that France and Russia understand each other about the Turkish dominions. If so, Egypt will be the price. . . .

“NELSON AND BRONTE.”

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, 9th April, 1803.

"You will find inclosed the nomination of the Cardinal of Lyons to the embassy at Rome. . . . You will inform Citizen Cacault that I have always been satisfied with him, and that if he leaves Rome it is because circumstances oblige me to send a cardinal there. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

At one moment Bonaparte threatened to send a Protestant ambassador to the Holy See, but at present his uncle, Fesch, was to represent the French Republic. Citizen Cacault, though he had been several times called upon to perform disagreeable duties, had always acted with great personal deference towards the Pope.

On the 23rd April was drawn up the secret convention by which France ceded Louisiana to the United States for the sum of 80,000,000 francs, and certain commercial advantages to be enjoyed by French and Spanish vessels in the ports and cities of the ceded territory.

The money was required for the approaching war with England.

NOTE.

"PARIS, 20th April, 1803.

"The minister will draw up a plan for placing the statue of Charlemagne on the Place de la Concorde, or on the so-called Place Vendôme.

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte had an unbounded admiration for Charlemagne, but no doubt wished that instead of contenting himself with writing the Caroline Books against the worship of images, he had proclaimed himself Pope as well as Emperor. The precedent would have been handy. As for the "so-called Place Vendôme," where the statue

of Louis XIV. had stood for one hundred years and one day, it was not the graven image of Charlemagne but that of Bonaparte which was destined to stand there, and to see many strange vicissitudes. In 1815 it was pulled down by the Royalists, and in 1871 the whole column was thrown to the ground by the Communists, to be re-erected by the Third Republic.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

“ST. CLOUD, *1st May*, 1803.

“Your letter reached me at the Malmaison. I desire that the conference should not degenerate into a conversation. Show yourself cold, haughty, and even somewhat proud.

If the note contains the word ultimatum, make him (Lord Whitworth) understand that that word means war, and that this is the way in which a superior negotiates with an inferior ; if the note does not contain this word, make him insert it, remarking that we must really know whereabouts we are, and that we are weary of this state of uncertainty. . . . Frighten him as to the consequences of this note ; if he remains firm, accompany him into the drawing-room, and when leaving him, say, ‘But the Cape and the island of Gorea, have they been evacuated ?’ Soften down a little at the end of the conference, and invite him to return before writing to his court, so that you may be able to inform him of the impression made upon me, which may be diminished by the assurance that the Cape and the island of Gorea shall be evacuated.

“BONAPARTE.”

NOTE FOR THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR.

“PARIS, *4th May*, 1803.

“After the last communication addressed to your Excellency, it is difficult to conceive how a great, powerful, and sensitive nation can undertake to declare a war

which will necessitate such terrible misfortunes, the cause of which will be so small since it merely concerns a miserable rock. . . .

“BONAPARTE.”

Only a short time before this, Bonaparte had declared that he would sooner see the British fleet moored at Chaillot, or the English in possession of the Faubourg St. Antoine than of Malta.

Lord Whitworth, Mr. Addington, Lord Hawkesbury, and perhaps Fox were beginning to think they had been sufficiently trifled with, and that the national honour was opposed to any further compromise or delay.

After a few more ineffectual attempts to come to terms, the British ambassador, after having been treated with singular rudeness by the First Consul, left Paris.

We have already referred, in connection with Bonaparte's message of the 20th February, to some of the causes which led to the rupture of the treaty of Amiens—to the 500,000 men prepared to avenge the Republic; to Sebastiani's report filled with insults and taunts directed against the British army and clearly showing that another attack upon Egypt was meditated, to the annexation of Elba and Piedmont and the French invasion of Switzerland.

In addition to the above causes were the creation of the Italian Republic with Bonaparte for president, the acquisition of Louisiana, the annexation of Parma, encroachments in Germany, Portugal, and Italy, the secret treaties concluded with Turkey and Portugal, the appointment of French agents in English ports, the protection accorded to Irish Jacobins, the insulting tone of the French official press, the discovery of the private instructions addressed to Fauvelet, and the treatment of British ships. The treaty of Amiens, too, had hardly been signed when a French fleet appeared off Tunis and terrified the Bey into signing a treaty by which French goods were to pay lower

duties than those of other nations throughout the Regency.

Seeing that France had ever since the treaty of Amiens been engaged in violating it in letter and in spirit, it is not astonishing that at the last moment England should have refused to evacuate Malta, and to restore the Cape of Good Hope to the Dutch, who were no longer free but bond. Bonaparte naturally did what he could to throw the whole blame of this rupture on England. Count Miot de Melito relates that when Lord Whitworth left Paris, the First Consul summoned a cabinet council, at which the Count was present. Bonaparte, he said, spoke with great vehemence, and roundly abused his brother Joseph and Talleyrand, who were in favour of peace. The majority of the council, however, voted whatever the First Consul desired. This fact disposes of the assertions made by Bonaparte that he wished for peace. The Count also remarked that the First Consul passed very lightly over the French aggrandisements since the signature of the treaty, and that he said not a single word about Sebastiani's mission; Joseph, a few days afterwards, denounced this "extravagant mission," and talked of uniting himself with Moreau and Siéyes, and all the friends of liberty, in order to prevent a war which might be avoided. Joseph had a right to complain; he had negotiated the treaty with England, and was aware of the sacrifices to which she had consented, whereas France had sacrificed nothing but her allies, and occupied a splendid position on the continent. As Sheridan said, "Prussia is at his beck; Italy is his vassal; Spain is at his nod; Portugal at his feet; Holland in his grasp; Turkey in his toils;" adding that the ambition of the ruler of France was principally directed against England.

Bonaparte made great capital out of the fact that while he had evacuated Tarentum and Otranto, England had refused to evacuate Malta. This was no doubt a strong point when addressed to persons not aware that the evacuation of Tarentum and Otranto had nothing to do

with Malta, but was due to a treaty concluded between the First Consul and the King of Naples, thanks to the intervention of the Emperor of Russia.

As for the English press, he forfeited all right of complaining of its attacks, by himself dictating the most scurrilous articles against George III. and the British Government. In one article he asserted that Georges Cadoudal had received the Order of the Bath for attempting to assassinate him, and that he would have been honoured with the garter had he succeeded. It was in vain that Galois reminded him of the volumes of libels which had been directed against Louis XIV., and how nothing had survived but the recollection of the fretful sensibility of that monarch, and the false political steps to which they provoked him. It is curious that Bonaparte should have thought it worth his while to keep Mounier and twelve clerks at work, extracting, translating, abridging, and arranging the contents of English newspapers, which so greatly irritated him. He might as well have worn a hair shirt next his skin.

The manner in which our ships were treated during the peace was most intolerable. Under the cover of a law passed during the Reign of Terror, an English vessel which had been driven into Cherbourg by stress of weather was seized and confiscated, nor could any redress be obtained. Another vessel in the Charente engaged in taking in a cargo of brandy suffered the same fate, because some prohibited English merchandise, in the shape of the knives, forks, and plates used by the crew, was found on board, the value of the said merchandise being 4*l*.

That we acted in a different spirit is proved by this fact :—

Captain Fyffe, of the *Cyclops*, having captured a vessel in the Bay of Naples, Nelson at once wrote to Sir John Acton, saying—"I have ordered her to be released ; for as I would not permit the French to break the neutrality of any power with impunity, so I will never suffer such an improper

thing to be done by any of his Majesty's ships under my command."

And yet we find Nelson writing—

TO LADY HAMILTON.

"‘AMPHION,’ *July 5th*, 1803. [Off Corsica.]

" . . . I have made up my mind that it is part of the plan of that Corsican scoundrel to conquer the kingdom of Naples."

On the 13th May Bonaparte directed Talleyrand to forward the following instructions to General Andréossy, who was empowered to offer these conditions—1st, The British troops to occupy Malta for ten years. 2nd, The French troops during the same period to occupy the positions at Tarentum and Otranto which they evacuated in virtue of the treaty of Amiens, Art. xi.

The General was told that if these conditions were not deemed acceptable, he was to take care that no trace should remain of their having been made, so that the French Government might be able to deny having consented to them. . . . "In speaking to Lord Hawkesbury, he was to say that he had no precise authorisation, but that he was prepared to sign on his own responsibility, without any fear of being disavowed."

On the same day the following despatch was forwarded to General Clarke, the French ambassador at Florence:—

"The English ambassador has just left Paris. War has not yet been declared, but the conduct of the ambassador, acting on the orders of his government, necessitates precautions. . . .

"In consequence, the First Consul desires me to inform you that it is his intention that an embargo be laid on all the ports subject to the King of Etruria. . . ."

Similar instructions were forwarded to the French representatives in the Batavian and Ligurian Republics—instructions important to remember, because Bonaparte, the

moment war was declared, and contrary to the usages of civilised countries, ordered the arrest of all Englishmen travelling in France, and in the countries dependent on France, on the false charge that an English frigate had captured two French merchantmen before hostilities broke out. It is true that he afterwards confessed that he resorted to this cruel and arbitrary measure in order to disgust the English, not with the French, but with their own government.

TO THE PRINCE REGENT OF PORTUGAL.

“ST. CLOUD, 17th May, 1803.

“I have received the different letters which it has pleased your majesty to write to me. . . . Circumstances become more and more serious, and war is about to be rekindled between France and England. I have done all in my power to spare the world this calamity, but England has refused to execute the treaty of Amiens. . . . All the Powers interested in the independence of the Order of Malta ought to unite their efforts, and I am authorised to count upon the sentiments which your Royal Highness has been good enough to express, &c. &c.

“BONAPARTE.”

On the 22nd May instructions were forwarded to Citizen Marescalchi, Foreign Minister of the Italian Republic, to confiscate all the English merchandise upon which he could lay hands, and to arrest all the Englishmen in the Republic. On the same day instructions were sent to Ganteaume that he was to keep all his ships in Toulon ready to sail at a moment's notice. All the officers were to dine and sleep on board their vessels.

The First Consul then called upon the Minister of Marine to furnish the model of a flat-bottomed boat, capable of carrying one gun and 100 men across the channel. In the meantime, the Grand Judge was directed to silence certain journals guilty of expressing their

opinion on the march of events. The *Débats* and the *Publiciste* were to be warned not to give any more accounts of armaments in Russian ports calculated to alarm the friends of the Republic, and to cool the noble ardour manifested in the French departments and cities. "Journalists," wrote the First Consul, "will be free to copy the news published in the official journal."

On the 4th June, Bonaparte, ill at ease in spite of the Concordat, wrote to Citizen Regnier—"Georges has two brothers at Auray, *one or more* brothers-in-law and several uncles. They are all scamps, and you must have them all arrested and sent to the fort of Saumur."

The *Débats* and the *Publiciste* were correctly informed with regard to Russian preparations; but there was to be no more freedom of speech or thought in France. With a free press, Bonaparte admitted that his rule would not endure for six weeks.

TO CITIZEN REGNIER.

"ST. CLOUD, 11th June, 1803.

"I beg you will hand 100,000 francs to Colonel Sebastiani for secret expenses; 25,000 francs to M. Chatillon; 30,000 to the Bishop of Orleans, and 25,000 to the Prefect of the Loire-Inferieure.

"BONAPARTE."

The Bishop of Orleans was the ex-Abbé Bernier, ex-*chouan*, now attached to the sacred gendarmerie.¹

On the 18th June Bonaparte expressed to Decrès his discontent at the capture of the frigate *L'Uranie*, and declared it to be exceedingly shameful that English frigates should be allowed to cruise off Toulon and to make prizes along the coast.

¹ One of the oaths which the bishop took after the signing of the Concordat was—"If I learn anything prejudicial to the welfare of the state I will reveal it!" "The Bishop of Orleans," says Lanfrey, "rivalled Fouché in his zeal."

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

“ST. CLOUD, 19th June, 1803.

“Orders have been sent to General Mortier to inform the Hanoverian army that the King of England has refused to ratify the convention of the 14th Prairial, and that consequently it must capitulate. I have directed this general to make the army defile with the honours of war, to disarm it, to dismount the cavalry, and to send it prisoner to France.

“As General Mortier will be obliged, before this signification, to make a movement of troops, and as this movement can be executed only five or six days after the reception of the order, it appears to me necessary to warn Citizen Laforest (French minister at Berlin), who ought, in course of conversation, to inform the Prussian court that I have not ratified the convention, and that I have sent it to London, stating my readiness to ratify it as soon as his Britannic Majesty announces his intention to do the same. Four days after this communication Citizen Laforest can state that the King of England has refused to approve of the convention. He will dwell on the bad faith of this refusal on the part of England. . . .

“BONAPARTE.”

War was no sooner declared than, as he had threatened, Bonaparte invaded Hanover. He had hoped to be able to barter that country, or Portugal, or Ireland, for Malta, but none of these schemes had succeeded. In 1795, on the occasion of the treaty of Bale, the French Republic had recognised the neutrality of Hanover while at war with England, and, in fact, Hanover was independent of the British cabinet, formed part of the German confederation, and governed itself. Bonaparte refused to recognise this neutrality, and risked a conflict with Prussia by flooding Hanover with troops, seizing on Cuxhaven, and threatening the existence of Denmark. The inhabitants of

Hanover were not at all disposed to oppose the French ; but Mortier had no sooner made himself master of the country than he laid it under contribution ; his soldiers, too, behaved with the most wanton barbarity, plundering villages and violating women. Altogether the whole German confederation paid heavily for not at once resisting the aggression of Bonaparte. By this invasion of Hanover, France forfeited the goodwill of Prussia, which had been her warm ally, and also provoked the remonstrances of Russia, and it was all in vain that Bonaparte protested that his only intention was to levy war on the Elector of Hanover, the King of England. The convention referred to above was a convention by which General Walmoden consented to capitulate with his army on the condition of its receiving the signature of George III. One thing which greatly aggravated the British monarch was to see Mortier taking up his headquarters at the palace which he had just repaired for the Duke of Cambridge at a cost of 50,000*l.* !

TO CONSUL CAMBACÉRES.

“ ABBEVILLE, 29th *June*, 1803.

“ I left Amiens yesterday morning, after going to the cathedral in pomp to say parting prayers. I afterwards went to St. Valery, where I remained six hours on horseback examining the most important points of the coast. . . .

“ BONAPARTE.”

TO CONSUL CAMBACÉRÈS.

“ CALAIS, 1st *July*, 1803.

“ Extreme fatigue prevented me sending you a courier yesterday. From Abbeville I went to breakfast at Etaples, and, after inspecting the bay, I rode to Boulogne, where I arrived at 10 P.M. I employed the day, from 3 A.M., in visiting the port ; I sent out some gun-boats, which had a warm affair with two English frigates, which

finished by sheering off; one of them left her anchor behind.

"To-day I breakfasted at Ambleteuse, and from thence I rode along the coast. I have found an important spot for my projects situated at a point of the cape (Grisnez) nearest England. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

This progress through the provinces and along the coast was undertaken because Paris had shown no enthusiasm for the war. Bonaparte deemed that it would be more easy to excite the Chauvinism of the country; nor was he mistaken. At Amiens he was received with transports of delight; flowers were strewn in his path, and on a triumphal arch he read this inscription—"The road to England." That road, as Lanfrey remarks, was a long one, and at the end of it, Bonaparte, had he been gifted with second sight, might have perceived the *Bellerophon* patiently awaiting its guest.

Never had adulation been carried further. The bishops rendered themselves conspicuous by their servility and their abuse of "that great nation tormented by spleen rushing blindly to destruction," as Bonaparte called England. "Most of these venerable personages," says a French historian, "had been welcomed in England during the emigration, where they had received not only an asylum and protection, but the most generous aid and attention; for ten years they had eaten the bread of British hospitality. To-day they showed their gratitude by calling down the scourges of God on the people who had nourished them. They preached hatred and fury; they invoked Heaven; they excited the people in favour of a war with the iniquity of which they were better acquainted than any one else; they knowingly deceived those simple minds who confided in their words. But it was necessary to pay the price of the Concordat to the new Constantine. Such were the edifying fruits of the

celebrated reconciliation between Church and State." No wonder that Bonaparte, on his return to Paris, was convinced that he might venture on anything he pleased, in spite of the opinion of the capital.

TO GENERAL MORTIER.

"BRUGES, 11th July, 1803.

"I approve of the convention you have made with Hanover. . . . I recommend you to be inflexible as regards its execution, and not to permit the introduction of any English goods or couriers. . . . This will prove a dreadful blow to England; a number of houses have become bankrupt. . . . Send us horses, especially for the heavy cavalry. . . . Take care to disarm the country. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

It was not only in England but in Germany that a number of mercantile houses were ruined by this attack upon Hanover, and this order respecting English goods. By way of retaliation, the British Government, to the great indignation of Bonaparte, and to the material damage of the German confederation, which had offered no resistance to his policy, blockaded the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser. To Bonaparte it appeared beyond comprehension that a civilised power should blockade the mouths of rivers! The action of England in this matter greatly influenced the creation of that party in Prussia which was soon destined to condemn that alliance with France which brought with it too little profit and too much humiliation.

On the 26th July Bonaparte wrote to Talleyrand from Brussels ordering him to send a special courier to Madrid with instructions for General Beurnonville. The General was to demand explanations on the subject of the raising of twelve militia regiments, and to say that this levy, made at a moment when Spain was disarming her marine, was equivalent to a commencement of hostilities.

A French vessel having been cut out under the fort of Carnero, Spain was to be called on to make good the loss, as she had allowed her territory to be violated.

TO THE QUEEN OF NAPLES.

“BRUSSELS, 28th July, 1803.

“I have read your Majesty’s letter with great attention, and I beg you will be persuaded that after having done you a great deal of harm, I desire to make myself agreeable.

“At the present juncture it is the policy of France to consolidate tranquillity among her neighbours, and to aid a feeble state whose welfare is useful to the prosperity of French commerce.

“I desire to reply to your Majesty in the most unreserved manner. In what light must I consider the kingdom of Naples, geographically and politically speaking, when I see at the head of the administration a foreigner who has centred all his affections and invested all his wealth in England? And yet the kingdom of Naples is governed less by the will and the principles of its sovereign than by those of its first minister.

“I have therefore decided by way of precaution to look upon Naples as a country governed by an English minister. *It is repugnant to my feelings to meddle with the internal affairs of other states*; it is only in order to be sincere towards your Majesty that I have acquainted you with the real reason which justifies all the measures adopted towards Naples, &c.

“BONAPARTE.”

A similar letter was addressed to the King of Naples on the same day, the First Consul thus displaying a total disregard for the predilections of the court of St. Petersburg and the promises made to Alexander.

Two letters, the first addressed to the King of Prussia, and the second to the Emperor of Russia, show a certain

amount of uneasiness on the part of Bonaparte at this moment. In his letter to the King of Prussia explaining his conduct in Hanover, and declaring that no matter what right the English might have to close the Elbe and the Weser to French vessels, they had no right to close them to Prussian and Danish vessels, he called on his majesty to uphold the sacred rights of his subjects, &c., &c. He then said—

“I know not how long a war, which promises to be waged with peculiar animosity, will last, I believe that England will not be able to carry it on long without the support of the Continent ; and this support she can only find in Prussia, in Austria, or in Russia.

“I cannot but be satisfied with the sentiments expressed by the court of Vienna, and with the conduct of the cabinet at this moment ; but times may change, and your majesty cannot disapprove of my resolution to have some guarantee insuring the tranquillity of the continent during the war with England. The personal character of your majesty, and that of the Emperor of Russia, are sufficient guarantees ; but then the court of Vienna may be easily induced to recall to mind a recently extinguished war ; and Russia herself may be led astray having so many men easily corrupted.

“Your majesty will perceive that I disguise none of my thoughts, &c., &c.

“BONAPARTE.”

Bonaparte's letter to the Emperor of Russia contained expressions of confidence, but its chief purport was to get the Czar to recall Count Markoff, who had become personally disagreeable to the First Consul. Only a short time before Bonaparte had procured the recall of M. de Kalitscheff, whose haughty manner of demanding the fulfilment of French promises had been considered most unpardonable. Count Markoff had been guilty of prying

into French affairs, and of refusing to be led astray by the plausible but insincere declarations of the First Consul, who, deeming that he had nothing to apprehend from Austria or Prussia, now treated the Russian ambassador with marked incivility.

TO REAR-ADMIRAL DECRÈS.

“BRUSSELS, 29th July, 1803.

“You will find inclosed a letter from Admiral Truguet.¹ Inform him that it is not my intention to make a Lord High Admiral . . . nor is it my intention to see O'Connor or any other Irish chief. . . . Citizen Olivier has informed General Mortier that in order to build sixty flat-bottomed boats he must purchase at Hamburg 60,000*l.* worth of seasoned timber. Send him an order to cut down the necessary timber in the forests of Hanover and not to spend a farthing. . . .

“BONAPARTE.”

TO CONSUL CAMBACÉRÈS.

“NAMUR, 4th August, 1803.

“I shall arrive at St. Cloud when least expected, perhaps during the night. The next day I shall receive the authorities. I am not the less sensible of the *empressement* of the Tribunalate. . . .

“BONAPARTE.”

“Mortier has sent me a Latin manuscript addressed by Leibniz to Louis XIV. proposing the conquest of Egypt. This work is very curious.

“BONAPARTE.”

¹ Two years later Bonaparte made his brother-in-law, Murat, Lord High Admiral, a post held only once since, by the Duc d'Angoulême, the son of Charles X. The office of Lord High Admiral appears to have been created by St. Louis; it was abolished by Richelieu, re-established by Louis XIV., abolished again by the Revolution, and once more re-established by Napoleon. It was held at one time by Anne of Austria, who was *surintendante des mers*, and afterwards by the Comte de Vermandois, a natural son of Louis XIV., when two years of age.

As Bonaparte objected to the presence of M. de Kalitscheff, M. de Markoff, and Admiral Mazeredo in Paris, to the presence of the Prince of the Peace at Madrid and of Mr. Acton at Naples, so he objected to M. d'Almeida at Lisbon. On the 4th August he informed the Prince Regent that as long as that minister, who was "devoted to England" remained in office, the First Consul could not consider Portugal as a neutral or friendly Power.

TO REAR-ADMIRAL DECRÈS.

"SEDAN, 8th August, 1803.

"The affairs of Ireland make me feel the necessity of your having some private conferences with the chiefs of the United Irishmen now in Paris. You can offer them 25,000 men, 40,000 muskets, with artillery and ammunition, and assure them that the Government will undertake not to make peace with England until the independence of Ireland has been proclaimed; provided that 20,000 United Irishmen join the French army on its landing. . . .¹

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte cared little for the independence of Ireland, but he would have much liked to have been able to wrest that country from England in order to have offered it in exchange for Malta. "During one of his voyages to

¹ Nearly at the same date Nelson wrote:—

TO HIS EXCELLENCY MR. DRUMMOND, CONSTANTINOPLE.

"'VICTORY,' OFF TOULON,

"27th August, 1803.

"According to the reports of vessels from Marseilles and Genoa the war is very unpopular, and I hope it will end in the destruction of that man of tyranny, Buonaparte; but I detest Europe for being so mean-spirited as to submit to the mandates of the Corsican. I blush for their meanness. In Ireland the Militia have vied with the Regulars who should act best. If we are but true to ourselves a fig for the great Buonaparte, &c., &c.

"NELSON AND BRONTE.²

Boulogne," wrote Miot de Melito, "Bonaparte said in conversation with Joseph—'Well! I shall not go to England. I shall send Ney there. Besides, I have another plan; I shall undertake only the expedition to Ireland, thus reducing the war to ordinary dimensions. I shall restore Ireland in exchange for Malta and conclude peace.'"

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"ST. CLOUD, 14th August, 1803.

"The most important matter with regard to our relations with Spain is not the question of subsidies; it is not the execution of the treaty by which we are bound, but it is—1st, The strange conduct of having allowed two vessels anchored at Algeiras to be cut out, and not offering an indemnity. 2nd, It is to see four French vessels of war arriving at Corunna, left exposed to the attacks of the enemy, and treated as if they belonged to Barbary Rovers. 3rd, It is the impertinence with which the Spanish Government dares to declare that 100,000 militia men, evidently not intended to attack the British fleets, have been armed...

"BONAPARTE."

In this very long and violent letter Talleyrand was instructed to ask Charles IV., "if he means to observe the treaty of Amiens which he signed, and which England violated. If he will declare war against England, or, in case of neutrality, grant France the subsidy demanded. Or if his majesty, blinded by the vertigo which has seized upon his ministers, wishes for war with France."

The French ambassador was to demand immediate satisfaction, and to inform the court at Madrid that 80,000 men would invade the country unless the following conditions were accepted—"The Governor of Cadiz dismissed; the officer commanding the artillery at Algeiras punished; the arrears of subsidies amounting to over 6,000,000*l.* paid up." In default of the above, and a few other conditions, Spain was to dismiss the British ambassador; to lay an

embargo on all British vessels in her ports ; to furnish France with from fifteen to twenty armed vessels, and to attack Portugal and Gibraltar in concert with a French army. "Between this double alternative and war with France," added Bonaparte, "I know of no fourth."

In fact Spain, Portugal, and all their rich possessions in South America had become the property of the First Consul. Such was the result, not of war, but of peace.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"ST. CLOUD, 23rd August, 1803.

"I think it will be useful to send the last note from Russia to Laforest. He can communicate it to M. de Haugwitz, pointing out all its absurdity. He can declare at the same time that England will never obtain from me anything but the treaty of Amiens. I will never allow her to possess anything in the Mediterranean. . . . I have made up my mind to evacuate Holland and Switzerland. . . . All that I will consent to is the evacuation of Otranto, of Tarentum, and of Hanover, but at the same time that England evacuates Malta.

"BONAPARTE."

After throwing cold water on the idea of Russian mediation, and abusing M. de Markoff and M. de Woronsow, the First Consul said that Russia talked a great deal about the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, while she continually violated that integrity. He returned to the subject of the Russian note in a second letter to Talleyrand, of the same date, and to this letter, in which he referred to M. de Markoff as that scamp (*polisson*), he added pages of observations which however do not appear to have had much effect at St. Petersburg. Russia in fact was becoming painfully aware of the duplicity of Bonaparte, and rather ashamed of having permitted herself to be deceived for such a length of time, and this in spite of the representations of her own ambassadors.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

“ST. CLOUD, *23rd August*, 1803.

“I beg you will have an analysis made of all the descents which the English have made on our coasts since 1700, mentioning the object proposed and the result obtained.

“BONAPARTE.”

A few days afterwards Bonaparte, writing to Admiral Bruix for information concerning the capacities of Etaples, said—“In the month of August, 1708, Admiral Byng with fourteen vessels of the line and sixty transports anchored in the bay and landed 500 men. Let me know if there are any traditions with regard to the spot where he anchored, and if there would be any danger there for a portion of the flotilla.”

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

“LA MALMAISON, *12th September*, 1803.

“I return you the despatch from Madrid of the 13th Fructidor. I am surprised that we have no other news. Make out a list of all the complaints we have against Spain, so that we may have materials ready in the event of requiring them.

“BONAPARTE.”

And on the 18th the First Consul wrote a long tirade to the King of Spain begging him to open his eyes to the gulf which British intrigue was hollowing out under his throne. All Europe, he said, was afflicted and indignant at his sort of dethronement by the Prince of the Peace, who was the real King of Spain; he foresaw with pain that he should have to wage war with this new monarch.

. . . “But,” added Bonaparte, “if continuing to show confidence in me, you ask for a remedy against approaching calamities, I have only one answer to make, in which you will recognise my sincerity and friendship; re-ascend your throne and dismiss the man who by degrees has usurped

the royal power ; who, in spite of his rank, preserves the base passions of his character ; who exists only for his vices, and who will be always governed entirely by his thirst of gold."

The First Consul was greatly grieved, so he said, to write to his Majesty in this strain.

The French alliance had already produced the most disastrous consequences, but many more indignities were in store for Charles, his family, and his advisers. The above letter was sent to Madrid by a courier, a copy of it was to be shown to the Prince of the Peace, and that minister was to be informed that if he did not consent to the conditions of the First Consul the original would be placed in the hands of the King. A few days later General Beurnonville gave the letter to his Majesty, but the King, warned that it contained the most insulting language, refused to open it, saying it would be useless to read it, as the Spanish ambassador in Paris had received orders to sign the treaty.

Bonaparte thought that by exacting 240,000*l.* a month from Spain instead of the land and sea forces to which he was entitled by the offensive and defensive treaty of St. Ildefonso, Spain might avoid being drawn into the war with England and thus retain colonies which furnished precious metals, and which were to all intents and purposes French property. England refused to be the dupe of this arrangement ; she at once seized upon some Spanish galleons, and war ensued.

DECISION.

"PARIS, 24th September, 1803.

"The Grand Judge will send her (Mlle. Robespierre) the sum of 600 francs, and pay her 150 francs a month.

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte owed a good deal to the Robespierres. Ingratitude was not one of his failings where private individuals were concerned.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

“PARIS, 28th September, 1803.

“You will write to our agent at Aleppo and say that Consul Bonaparte wishes to know if the French navigating the Red Sea or passing through the countries occupied by the Wahabites will be protected by their chief? and if so, whether in the event of their coming to Syria or Egypt they will be secured from pillage and looked upon as friends. Our agent must endeavour to procure information with regard to the force and situation of this new sect.

“You will direct Citizen Rousseau to open up correspondence with Persia, and express my dissatisfaction that he does not write more often. Ask General Brune to find out at Constantinople who commands in Persia, and, if it be safe, let him send some one to compliment him. General Brune will prepare the way for a minister which I wish to have at Ispahan.

“BONAPARTE.”

The following letter is of peculiar interest, seeing what befell our fatal expedition to the Low Countries.

TO GENERAL DAVOUST.

“PARIS, 28th September, 1803.

“CITIZEN GENERAL,—I am informed that you have placed a demi-brigade on the Isle of Cadzand. If this be the case I beg you will withdraw it, for the troops will fall ill. Should the English attempt an attack on the Isle of Walcheren you will have time to succour it. I recommend to you, above all, the health of the troops. If they be quartered in unhealthy spots the army will melt away and be reduced to nothing. This is the first of all military considerations. You perceive what the unfortunate situation of Walcheren costs us, but it is an island, and this

has obliged me to send a strong force there. It is doubtful, however, whether, in giving this order, I have not committed a fault, for you see all the men are ill.

“BONAPARTE.”

On the 29th September Napoleon sent some instructions to Melzi, Vice-President of the Italian Republic, who was told to encourage military pride among Italian youths, “which will enable them to beat an equal number of Austrians.”

TO CITIZEN REGNIER.

“PARIS, 30th September, 1803.

“It is not suitable, Citizen Minister, that d’Avary should remain in Paris. Have him arrested, so as to be able to seize his papers; and if nothing be found in them (for he no doubt keeps a sharp look-out), you will send him sixty leagues away from Paris to a small town where he will be under supervision.

“Send a clever man to Besauçon to make friends with Courvoisier in order to find out his connections and how it will be possible to seize his correspondence with the enemies of the State.

“BONAPARTE.”

DECREE.

1st. There shall be raised in Paris, in the centre of the Place Vendôme, a column similar to that erected at Rome in honour of Trajan.

2nd. This column shall be two metres seventy-three centimetres in diameter, and twenty metres seventy-eight centimetres high.

The shaft was to be ornamented with so many allegorical figures in bronze representing the departments of the Republic, and on the top was to be placed the statue of Charlemagne.

As before mentioned, the bronze figure of Bonaparte,

in the garb of a Roman emperor, now occupies the top of this column, the shaft of which, regardless of the anachronism, is ornamented with muskets, field-pieces, and other instruments of slaughter which did not exist in the days of the Roman Cæsars.

TO CITIZEN REGNIER.

“PARIS, *3rd October*, 1803.

“I am informed, Citizen Minister, that Madame de Stael has arrived at Maffiers. Let her be informed through one of her friends, without making a scandal, that if on the 8th she has not taken her departure she shall be escorted to the frontier by the gendarmery. The arrival of this woman, like that of a bird of ill omen, has always been the signal for some trouble. It is not my intention to allow her to remain in France.

“BONAPARTE.”

TO REAR-ADMIRAL DECRÈS.

“ST. CLOUD, *4th October*, 1803.

“It results from the returns that we have a flotilla composed of 29 sloops, 300 armed launches, 475 gun-boats, 536 pinnaces, 27 yawls, &c.

“BONAPARTE.”

And Admiral Bruix was instructed to select three or four hardy and daring corsair captains to slip over to the English coast during the long nights in order to capture fishermen and peasants, and to obtain from them information concerning the coast from the Thames to Portsmouth, league by league. The formation of a company of guide-interpreters was ordered. Irishmen might apply. Bonaparte minutely described the uniform, &c., of this corps—dragon-green coats with red lining, scarlet facings, white buttons, a waistcoat of white cloth with white buttons, white leather breeches, American boots, black bronzed spurs. The armament was to consist of carabine,

with the bayonet and dragoon sabre. There were to be two drummers in this corps of 117 men.

A small French sloop having been captured by an English launch, Bonaparte was exceeding wrath. The sloop had got aground, and was therefore taken close to the shore. This fact, as Bonaparte said, though not very important in itself, was a misfortune, as exhibiting a want of vigilance. He wrote to Soult on this subject three times—on the 6th and 11th October and again on the 13th December; also three letters to Davoust and a long despatch to Admiral Bruix.

In numerous letters and orders of the day Bonaparte gave directions that the troops should be practised in rowing. Each soldier was to labour at the oar for two hours a day. The first three lessons were to be given in the port, and then the men were to be taken into the roads. One sees that dragoons quartered at Compiègne were taught to row on the sluggish waters of the Oise.

The most minute instructions on technical details were poured forth by Bonaparte. His "Instructions for the Crews of Pinnaces" extend over seven printed pages. They begin by explaining the fore and aft, the starboard and larboard; that the oar is divided into three parts—the handle, the shaft, and the blade; that the handle is that extremity of the oar which is the thinnest, and which is rounded so that it may be clutched by the hands of the rower, &c., &c.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"ST. CLOUD, *October 13th*, 1803.

"I was very much surprised to learn, Citizen Minister, that the Spanish ambassador *had the indecency* to dispute precedence with the minister of France at Florence. Let me know if General Clarke has written anything on this subject. It is not my intention, no matter what the pretext, to allow this ridiculous pretension to exist. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

A song having made its appearance intitled *Invitation to start for England*, Bonaparte decided—

“It is suitable to know the name of the author of this song. Although it appears to have been inspired by praiseworthy motives, the authority of the police should not remain foreign to any movement.”

DECREE.

“ST. CLOUD, 14th October, 1803.

“Art. 1st. A marble bust of Jean Bart shall be placed in the principal hall of the town of Dunkirk, the birthplace of that gallant sailor. . . .

“BONAPARTE.”

Considering all the naval preparations along the coast of Holland for the invasion of England, the moment was ill-chosen for doing public honour to a sailor who served first in the Dutch navy under De Ruyter, and whose most brilliant achievement, after entering the French service, was the defeat of the Dutch admiral Vries.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER, *War Minister*.

“ST. CLOUD, 20th October, 1803.

“It cannot be disguised that a great number of English prisoners *desert* before reaching their depots. This service is very badly organised.

“BONAPARTE.”

After complaining that the English had time to plunder a vessel which went ashore between Gravelines and Calais, Bonaparte ordered that cavalry pickets should constantly cross each other all along the coast.

TO REAR-ADMIRAL DECRÈS.

“ST. CLOUD, 30th October, 1803.

“CITIZEN MINISTER,—I wish you to assemble at Brest and Rochefort the means of transport for the expedition to Ireland. Transport for 1,500 horses and 3,000 men,

independently of what may be embarked on board the State vessels, appears to me sufficient. I wish to have at Rochefort transports for 500 horses and 2,000 men.

“BONAPARTE.”

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

“ST. CLOUD, *1st November*, 1803.

“It will be important to have a secret agent at Munich, who will keep an eye on Drake and note all the Frenchmen who repair to that city. . . . I wish . . . to write to Drake, and to tell him, in order to inspire confidence, that while waiting for the great blow to be struck, he thinks he can promise to have taken, from the table of the First Consul, in his secret cabinet, and written with his own hand, notes relative to the great expedition and other important papers; that this hope reposes on an usher of the cabinet, who, having been a member of the Jacobin Club, but to-day having the care of the cabinet of the First Consul and being honoured with his confidence, nevertheless belongs to the Secret Committee. But two things are necessary—1st, the promise of 100,000*l.* if the papers have the importance attributed to them; 2nd, a French agent belonging to the Royalist party must be sent here with means to hide the usher, who would naturally be arrested on the disappearance of such documents.

“It may be added that the same usher promises to communicate other notes of lesser interest subtracted from Meneval—minutes, &c. In addition to these details care must be taken to say that the First Consul is surrounded by persons in whom he has the greatest confidence, and that this circumstance alone renders it easy to get access to his secrets. . . .

“BONAPARTE.”

Drake was the British chargé d'affaires at Munich, and the object of Bonaparte was to try and mix him up in the

Georges conspiracy, so that he might accuse the English Government of wishing to assassinate him, and of the fearful crime of stirring up civil war in France.¹

With regard to the charge of taking advantage of internal disaffection in France, Lord Hawkesbury pointed to the agitation kept up in Ireland, and to the corps of Irish rebels assembled on the French coast with a view of invading England, and he justified the conduct of British ministers abroad who corresponded with French malcontents, adding: "But of all governments which pretend to be civilised governments that of France is the one which has the least right to appeal to the law of nations."

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"BOULOGNE, 8th November, 1803.

"I return you your despatches, Citizen Minister. Tell Citizen Laforest that I have read his despatch with great interest. It will be well to warn the Turkish ambassador that the English, who evidently encourage the Beys, intend to seize upon Egypt. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

TO CONSUL CAMBACÉRÈS.

"BOULOGNE, 10th November, 1803.

"I have received your letter, Citizen Consul. You must turn your attention to inserting in the little journals

¹ Duruy, who was Minister of Public Instruction under the Second Empire, says, in a note in his *History of France* (p. 441): "The letters of the English ministers at Munich and Stuttgart were seized; they proved that those agents paid men to assassinate the First Consul, to kindle civil war, to blow up powder magazines, &c., &c. The English minister publicly avowed his agents. Constant (Bonaparte's *valet de chambre*) declares in his *Memoirs*, that one day at the Malmaison the First Consul found on his table a snuff-box in every way similar to the one which he used, and which was filled with poisoned tobacco."

articles turning the bearers of false news into ridicule. What could be more stupid than the report of a regiment of hussars having been captured by a vessel of war?

“BONAPARTE.”

French hussars, a few years before, had performed the curious feat of capturing the Dutch fleet.

TO GENERAL AUGEREAU.

“BOULOGNE, *12th November*, 1803.

“CITIZEN GENERAL,—I have received your letter, and have given orders for hoods to be served out to all the men forming part of the expedition to Ireland, of which you shall have the command. Affairs are settled with Spain and Portugal. . . . Measures have been taken against desertion, which reduces the army. . . . I have been here for the last ten days, and I have reason to hope that I shall soon attain the end which Europe awaits. We have six centuries of insults to avenge.

“BONAPARTE.”

TO CONSUL CAMBACÉRÈS.

“BOULOGNE, *16th November*, 1803.

“The Minister of Marine arrived here yesterday. I spent three hours in the midst of the camps and the port. Everything commences to take a favourable turn. I saw from the heights of Ambleteuse the coasts of England as one sees Calvary from the Tuileries. One could distinguish the houses and the movement. It is a ditch (the Channel) which will be crossed when one has the audacity to attempt it. . . .

“BONAPARTE.”

The Calvary above alluded to is better known now as Mont Valerien.

In a letter to Citizen Talleyrand of the 16th November, we find the following paragraph :—

“The despatches of Citizen Beurnonville do not deserve any reply ”

The Marquis de Beurnonville, who served under the Revolution, will ever retain a page in French history as the author of the famous bulletin, "After three hours tremendous fighting the enemy lost 10,000 men; the loss of the French was confined to the little finger of a drummer." No wonder Bonaparte paid little attention to his despatches, and the only wonder is that he should have made him an ambassador. He was made a senator in 1805, a count in 1809, a peer by the Bourbons in 1814, a commander of the Order of St. Louis in 1816, a marshal the same year, and a marquis in 1817.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"BOULOGNE, 17th November, 1803.

"The affair of General Ney does not merit much attention. For a great length of time people have occupied themselves with the means of propelling boats without men. The solution of this problem offers such immense advantages that it is improbable anything reasonable can have been imagined by a Swiss mountaineer.

"The despatch from Prussia is quite another matter. . . . Do they wish us to evacuate Hanover? Do they wish to obtain a great preponderance in Germany?

"BONAPARTE."

It was at the camp of Boulogne that Bonaparte studied the proposal of Fulton and recommended it to the Academy of Sciences, and he must have had some better reason than that given above for rejecting plans of the Swiss mountaineer.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"ST. CLOUD, 19th November, 1803.

"I beg you will cause to be inserted in the *Moniteur* some details respecting the war now being waged in India by the English against the Mahrattas.

"I send you a letter which will acquaint you with Russian affairs.

"BONAPARTE."

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

“PARIS, 21st November, 1803.

“It is time for you to propose the formation of the Irish battalions. I wish you to hand me a return of the Irish who are here, and who count upon joining the expedition, to settle their rank, &c.

“BONAPARTE.”

TO GENERAL (ADMIRAL) GANTEAUME.

“PARIS, 23rd November, 1803.

“I send you General Rapp, one of my aides-de-camp. . . . I wrote to you two months ago that I wished to have in the course of Frimaire (latter half of November and first half of December) ten ships of the line, four frigates, and four corvettes ready to sail from Toulon. . . . Let me know the precise day upon which this squadron can put to sea. . . . I have just arrived from Boulogne, where the greatest activity reigns. By January I hope to have 300 launches, 500 gun-boats, and 500 pinnaces assembled. . . . What are your ideas concerning this flotilla? Do you think it will convey us to England? It can carry 100,000 men. Eight hours of night in our favour would decide the fate of the universe. The Minister of Marine is at Flushing; he will visit the Batavian flotilla, which consists of 100 launches and 300 gun-boats, capable of carrying 30,000 men. The Texel fleet could also transport 30,000 men. . . .¹

“BONAPARTE.”

¹ A few days previously Nelson, who never believed in the possibility of an invasion, wrote:—

TO SIR ALEXANDER BALL, BART., MALTA.

“‘VICTORY,’ MADALENA ISLANDS,
November 7th, 1803.”

“ . . . We are more likely to go to war with Spain for her complaisance to the French; but the French can gain nothing, but be great losers by forcing Spain to go to war with us; therefore, I never

TO CITIZEN PERREGAUX.

"PARIS, 24th November, 1803.

"I perfectly understand your note. 1st, That there were transactions pending between the Bank and the Treasury ; I have ordered them to be settled, my intention being, under no circumstances, to borrow money from the bank. 2nd, That the bank does not enjoy the capital to which it is entitled. I have directed Consul Lebrun to propose various means for enabling the bank to act with more confidence, my intention being to aid the bank under all circumstances, &c.

"BONAPARTE."

NOTE FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER.

"PARIS, 24th November, 1803.

"It appears from the last despatches from Spain that Azara is only trying to gain time. However, I am pressed for money : sixteen millions were due on the 21st September. The Minister of Finance will draw upon the Spanish Treasury for that sum. If the letters of change are not honoured, this will furnish a motive for quarrelling with Spain. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, 24th November, 1803.

"I beg you will write to Citizen Sémonville at the Hague that I have great confidence in the Dutch Admiral Ver Huell, whom I have appointed to the command of the Batavian flotilla.

"BONAPARTE."

expect that the Spaniards will begin, unless Buonaparte is absolutely *mad*, as many say he is. What! he begins to find excuses! I thought he would invade England in the face of the sun. Now he wants a three-days' fog, that never yet happened! and if it did, how is his craft to be kept together? He will soon find more excuses, or there will be an end of Buonaparte, and may the devil take him!"

When Louis Bonaparte was King of Holland Admiral Ver Huell was so well received by the Queen Hortense that doubts have never ceased to exist on the subject of the paternity of the child who afterwards became Napoleon III.

TO CITIZEN CHAPTAL.

“PARIS, 24th November, 1803.

“I beg you will have a song written for the invasion of England to the tune of the *Chant du départ*. Have several songs written upon this subject, to different airs.

“I know that several comedies appropriate to the circumstance have been presented. A choice should be made so that they may be played in the various theatres of Paris, and especially at the camps of Boulogne, Bruges, and other places where the army is quartered.

“BONAPARTE.”

NOTE FOR THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE.

“PARIS, 2nd December, 1803.

“It is not my intention to show indulgence towards the sixty conscripts who appeared in arms at Beaupreau. Forestier and Morin and any other instigators must be tried by court martial and condemned to death. . . .

“BONAPARTE.”

It was a frequent habit on the part of Bonaparte to order not only the arrest and trial of individuals, but to indicate at the same time the sentence to be pronounced by the court, a system which strongly resembled Jedburg justice.

TO CITIZEN REGNIER.

“PARIS, 9th December, 1803.

“Give orders at Besançon for Bourmont to be placed in solitary confinement. Let Madame Bourmont be examined as to the foreigner who paid her a visit a month ago. Let

her understand that the result of her examination may have important consequences, and that she ought to tell the truth clearly.

“BONAPARTE.”

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

“PARIS, 12th December, 1803.

“M. de Coucy, the ex-Bishop of La Rochelle, is in Spain, where he is behaving very badly. His incendiary pastorals encourage the civil war in La Vendée. Send an extraordinary courier to Madrid with instructions for him to be arrested and handed over to the gendarmery at Bayonne. Write to General Beurnonville that this is no vain formality; that the pastorals of this wretch have a baneful influence on the public tranquillity; that he is evidently paid by the English; that I cannot believe His Most Catholic Majesty, in so important a matter, will refuse to deliver the bishop into my hands. Recommend General Beurnonville to take care that this affair succeeds.

“BONAPARTE.”

ORGANISATION OF THE GRAND EXPEDITION.

“PARIS, 12th December, 1803.

“The army is divided into four grand corps :

“The camp of St. Omer ;

“The camp of Bruges ;

“The camp of Montreuil ;

“The reserve.”

Then follows an infinity of details. A general of brigade was to take four servants with him ; a colonel, two ; a captain, one, &c., &c. The war minister (Berthier) was to act as chief of the staff.

THE BISHOP OF ORLEANS.

“PARIS, 16th December, 1803.

“I have received your letter of the 12th, which was handed to me by the Councillor of State Portalis. I thank

you for the details you have furnished me concerning La Vendée. I recognise in this matter the zeal of which you have already given several proofs. . . . Signals have been exchanged between the English fleet and St. Hilaire. Let me know your opinion with regard to the villages, *curés* and notables you consider capable of corresponding with the enemy. There must be some understanding among these brigands (!). . . .

“BONAPARTE.”

The above letter and others show to what a state of servility and degradation Bonaparte had reduced the ministers of that religion which he had just re-established in France. He well knew what he was about when he signed the Concordat—that he was becoming the virtual head of the Church in France.

TO ADMIRAL BRUIX.

“PARIS, 19th December, 1803.

“I have received the letter in which you announce the arrival of forty sail in the Somme. I have also received the report of the visit made to the *Prince de Galles*. You can have her fitted up as you propose. As soon as she is ready hand her over to the sailors of the Guard. Have three other vessels fitted up in a suitable manner destined for the non-military persons who will follow me. If you can place a howitzer on board without inconvenience, do so. . . .

“BONAPARTE.”

And General Berthier was directed to form in each battalion a light company to be called—Horse Company, or Expedition Company, or Company of Partisans; these companies to be composed of strongly built, active men of small stature. They were to be lightly armed, and to receive musketry instruction. Bonaparte added :

“The men of these companies will be exercised to follow the cavalry at the trot, sometimes holding the boot of the

trooper, and at other times the tail of the horse ; also to jump up behind the trooper in order to be rapidly transported. . . . These companies will be always kept up on a war establishment. . . .

“BONAPARTE.”

These companies were not persevered with, it being found that the infantry were soon knocked up, and the movements of the cavalry greatly impeded.

TO CITIZEN PORTALIS.

“PARIS, 22nd December, 1803.

“Write to the Bishop of Orleans for information concerning a man called Lecocq, and to know what kind of person he is. Tell him I believe Préjean is in the west ; let him see if he cannot have him arrested.

“BONAPARTE.”

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

“PARIS, 23rd December, 1803.

“I beg you will have made me out a summary of the campaigns which took place when the war of 1790 broke out between Gustavus III. and the Russians.

“BONAPARTE.”

This was the Gustavus who, in 1792, was preparing to march upon France at the head of a large army when he was assassinated at Anharstroem. The probability is that Bonaparte wished to know more about the Russians now his friend Paul was dead.

TO CITIZEN REGNIER.

“PARIS, 26th December, 1803.

“The *Débats* has published two articles dated from Germany. I wish to know whence these articles were derived, and who paid for alarming the nation with the echo of rumours spread by England. Order the *Débats* to

contradict these false reports in a suitable manner. I am not more satisfied with the politics of the *Mercure*. I wish to know if the brothers Bertin, who have been constantly in English pay, own the *Débats* and the *Mercure*. Do not conceal the fact that this is the last time I shall make known my displeasure, and that they will next learn the disapprobation of the Government by the suppression of their journals; that I know everything; that the brothers Bertin are paid by England, as is proved by the tone of their articles; that it is my intention to allow only those journals which excite the nation against England and encourage it to support the vicissitudes of war, to exist.

“BONAPARTE.”

The Bertin family still own the *Débats* (1883). Lanfrey writes upon this subject that the press and the tribune were alike silent, and that only one voice was heard. “The situation of the press,” he adds, “was even more humiliating and deplorable than that of the public assemblies. . . . Of the twelve journals to which the Paris press had been reduced in the year VIII., there only remained eight, with 18,630 subscribers between them!” The unfortunate papers which were allowed to exist were prohibited from borrowing from foreign gazettes, and the only foreign news that they were permitted to print was what they chose to take from the columns of the *Moniteur*. “Nelson,” continues Lanfrey, “might annihilate our navy at Trafalgar; this insolent fact was ignored, and woe to any one who dared to allude to it!”

No book could be published without permission. A consular decree ran—“*In order to ensure the liberty of the press*, no bookseller can place a book on sale before it has been submitted to a committee of revision. . . .” No wonder that a staunch Republican should have exclaimed, on reading this decree—“We have fought for ten years to be citizens, and we are nothing but subjects.”

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

“PARIS, 26th December, 1803.

“The proposals of Citizen Reinhard are inadmissible. The Government is master to send whom it chooses without giving information to any one. It appears that Colleville was formerly employed by Citizen Reinhard [when Foreign Minister] as a spy; to-day he is employed by the Grand Judge, and his mission has nothing in common with the patent diplomatic and important functions of Citizen Reinhard. The conduct of Citizen Reinhard is foolish. If he supposes Colleville to be a spy sent to Hamburg he should not see him. . . . In a city like Hamburg the police ought to have not one, but ten spies. These spies are not agents of the Government, are not public functionaries, and are not strictly speaking charged with missions; they are men who are there as Frenchmen, who receive pay, and who write what is required. Citizen Reinhard did wrong to compromise himself by sending for Colleville. . . .

“BONAPARTE.”

It was a trick of Bonaparte to have private as well as public agents at various important places—men capable of performing any dirty work, and who cared little for being disavowed as long as they were paid.

CHAPTER II.

THE YEAR 1804.

ONE of the chief events of this year was the assassination of the Duc d'Enghien. A serious rising was anticipated, under the direction of a Bourbon prince, and Savary had been despatched to the cliffs at Biville to lie in wait for the Comte d'Artois and the Duc de Berri, whose landing was hourly expected. This scheme having broken down, Bonaparte, determined at any price to shed Bourbon blood, sent a detachment of cavalry across the Baden frontier and seized on the son of the Prince de Condé, who for two years past had been living a retired life at Ettenheim, absorbed in a romantic passion for the Princess Charlotte de Rohan, to whom he had been secretly married, and hunting in the Black Forest.

To justify this arbitrary act, and this violation of territory, Bonaparte pretended that the Duc d'Enghien was the prince who was to head the projected rising, and that he was the mysterious person called *Charles*, whose presence in Paris had been reported to the police. In reality Bonaparte knew that the Duc d'Enghien had nothing to say to the threatened movement; that it was to be headed by the Comte d'Artois, and that *Charles* was no other than Charles Pichegru, his old tutor of Brienne, and the conqueror of Holland, who had turned conspirator.

Murat, Savary, Réal, Caulaincourt, and Hullin were the chief instruments employed in this infamous affair. Once kidnapped, the unfortunate duke was hurried to Vincennes, and tried by court-martial. There was not the slightest evidence of his having been engaged in any plot against the life of the First Consul, or of any crime beyond having borne arms against the Revolution, for which crime an amnesty had been granted. Half an hour after his sentence was pronounced the duke was shot by torchlight in the ditch of Vincennes.

There were several motives for this crime. Bonaparte wished to reassure both the Jacobins, who suspected him of plotting a restoration, and also those Royalists who, like Talleyrand, had deserted the Bourbons, and dreaded their return. He also desired to strike terror into the hearts of all his enemies. Bonaparte is accused, too, of having been instigated to commit this crime through jealousy of the high military reputation of the last of the Condés, whose name was extremely popular with the troops.

The effect of this sanguinary drama was immense. The court of Russia went into mourning. The Pope, who a few months afterwards consented to crown the murderer, wept over the fate of "that great and innocent victim," as he called the duke. Great was the irritation and horror inspired throughout Germany. A feeling of consternation reigned in Paris, which was in no humour to see the establishment of another reign of terror. This crime, in fact, was greeted with universal reprobation, and every one concerned endeavoured to get rid of his share of responsibility. Bonaparte threw the blame upon Talleyrand, and even upon Picot.¹ Savary said to Madame de Rémusat, "The Emperor and I were deceived on this occasion." And he went on to relate how Picot, after leading them to believe that the Duc d'Enghien had been in Paris, afterwards, on seeing Pichegru, recognised in that General the mysterious personage treated with so

¹ Georges Cadoudal's valet !

much respect by his brother conspirators. "On learning this," said Savary, "Bonaparte stamped with his foot, and exclaimed, 'Ah, the wretch! what has he caused me to do?'"

There can be little doubt, however, about Bonaparte having been entirely to blame. When Josephine appealed to him to spare the duke, he said that his policy demanded this *coup d'état*, that impunity would encourage parties, that the prince troubled France and served the vengeance of the English, that his military reputation might influence the army, but that once dead the only tie between the army and the Bourbons would be broken.

To his brother Joseph he spoke in a manner equally candid and cold-blooded. He said:—

"I cannot repent of my decision with regard to the Duc d'Enghien. This was the only means I had of leaving no doubt as to my real intentions, and of annihilating the hopes of the partisans of the Bourbons. Then I cannot conceal the fact that I shall never be tranquil on the throne as long as a single Bourbon exists, and this Bourbon is one the less. It is what remains of the blood of the great Condé, the last heir of the finest name of that house. He was young, brilliant, brave, and consequently my most redoubtable enemy. It was the sacrifice the most necessary to my safety and grandeur. . . . Not only if what I have done were still to be done, I would do it again, but if I had a favourable opportunity to-morrow of getting rid of the two last scions of that family (the two sons of the Comte d'Artois, the Duc d'Angoulême and the Duc de Berri), I would not allow it to escape."

Bonaparte, too, in his will attempted to justify his conduct, saying that under similar circumstances he would act again as he acted in 1804.

There can be little doubt, therefore, as to the real author of this crime.

Madame de Rémusat has summed up her opinion in these words—"It was with the coolness of calculation, or rather of sophism, that Bonaparte covered himself with illustrious and innocent blood." Talleyrand she excuses to a certain extent, on the ground that he saw it was useless to interfere. Both M. de Caulaincourt, who had played the chief part in the arrest of the duke, and Hullin, who was president of the court-martial which tried and condemned him, were persuaded that Bonaparte did not intend to shed blood. It was some time before De Caulaincourt, after the execution, would speak to the First Consul, whom he upbraided with having branded him with infamy. General Hullin told Lucien Bonaparte that the First Consul had assured the members of the court-martial that he merely wished to make a display of power, and that his intention was to pardon the Duc d'Enghien. Looking at what afterwards took place in the case of Moreau, there is every probability that this story is true.

Madame de Rémusat relates that on the evening before the execution, while she was playing at chess with Bonaparte, he said in a low voice, "Soyons amis Cinna," and then repeated the following lines from *Alzire* :—

"Des dieux que nous servons connais la difference :
Les tiens t'ont commandé le meurtre et la vengeance ;
Et le mien, quand ton bras vient de m'assassiner,
M'ordonne de te plaindre et de te pardonner."

She could not believe after this that the duke would be executed.

According to General Hullin these lines were recited to some of the members of the court-martial before the trial.

One of the most bitter accusations brought against England was that the papers had reprinted a pamphlet written in the time of Cromwell, called, *Killing no Murder*. But what did Bonaparte say to Josephine when she pleaded on behalf of the Duc d'Enghien? "In

politics, a death destined to give repose is not a crime. The orders have been given; there is no possibility of drawing back."

In Paris and elsewhere this political assassination created the most painful sensation, and it was some days before the First Consul ventured to show himself in public, and then he was received with remarkable coldness. In London a high mass was celebrated for the late duke in the French chapel in King Street, at which were present, in addition to the Dukes of Berry, Orleans, and Montpensier, a large number of the French and English nobility, together with the Archbishop of Narbonne, and the Bishops of Montpellier, Arras, Avranches, Nantes, Angoulême, Noyon, Rhodes, and Uzez.

In the *Memorial of St. Helena* one finds Napoleon saying: "The duke wrote me a letter offering me his services, and asking for the command of an army, and that wretch, Talleyrand, did not hand me the letter until two days after the death of the prince." It is almost needless to say that this letter never existed except in the imagination of Bonaparte. The duke wrote one letter, and that was to the Princess Charlotte de Rohan.

In addition to the political assassination of the Duc d'Enghien, other acts of violence were committed during 1804. There was the trial of Moreau and his transportation, that of Pichegru and his dubious suicide, that of Georges Cadoudal, who was executed with eleven of his companions. There was the capture of Captain Wright and his mysterious death in the temple; there was the seizure of Sir G. Rumbold at Hamburg; the robbery of Mr. Wagstaffe as he was conveying despatches to St. Petersburg; while the Pope was forced to give up the *émigré* Vernègues, who had become a naturalised Russian, and who was acting in a diplomatic capacity in Rome.

The trial of the hero of Hohenlinden on a charge of conspiracy created both surprise and indignation, and there can be no doubt that the accusation was due to the hatred

and jealousy of Bonaparte. Moreau was the only soldier left whose services could be compared to those of the First Consul. According to Lanfrey, Bonaparte hated Moreau as a probable successor. We have already seen how he got rid of the army of the Rhine by sending it to perish at St. Domingo. Bonaparte still disliked and distrusted all the officers of that army, not one of whom received the bâton of Marshal when the Empire was proclaimed. There was no ground for implicating Moreau in the conspiracy against Bonaparte, beyond the fact that he had met Pichegru; but at the same time it was clearly proved that he had refused all the offers made to him. The only real charge which could be proved against Moreau was that he had not denounced Pichegru. His defence was that he was not an informer, and that he had tried to turn Pichegru from his purpose. Accused of having wished to secure the supreme power for himself, Moreau had only to reply that when he had been offered the dictatorship on the 18th Brumaire, by Sieyes, he had rejected it. One of the chief witnesses against Moreau was Picot, the *valet de chambre* of Georges Cadoudal. His evidence was relied upon to confound Moreau. But on the trial Picot recanted; he declared in court that the accusations which he had made against the General had been wrung from him by torture, and he held up his hands all covered with bruises to prove the truth of his statement. Although the jury had been suspended in the department of the Seine, and although the judges had been packed, trembled before Bonaparte, were aware of his wishes, and had been assured that if they returned a verdict of death the sentence would not be carried out, still the majority refused to find Moreau guilty of the crimes imputed to him. Clavier, one of the judges, when told that if Moreau were condemned to death the Emperor would pardon him, exclaimed, "And who will pardon us?" Out of the twelve judges before whom Moreau appeared seven were in favour of an acquittal, five of a condemnation. In the

end a compromise was agreed to, and Moreau was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. Moreau naturally complained of this sentence, which he said was at variance with evidence and with common sense. "If," he said, "I played the part of a conspirator, I should be condemned to death as a chief. No one will believe that I acted as a corporal."

When the sentence of the court was communicated to Bonaparte he flew into a violent passion—a passion which makes one doubt the assertion that he would have pardoned his rival had he been condemned to death. A few days later when Lacourbe, one of the judges who had all along maintained the innocence of Moreau, presented himself at the Tuileries with his colleagues, Bonaparte advanced towards him, and violently exclaimed—"How dare you sully *my palace* with your presence?" The sentence against Moreau was changed into one of banishment, and he left France.

In the whole of this affair, as in that of the Duc d'Enghien, Murat played a prominent part, encouraging Bonaparte in his evil instincts. It is said, too, that the new Emperor had been violently irritated by the mother-in-law of Moreau, who had made some bitter remarks on a rumour then current of a scandalous connection between Bonaparte and his sister Caroline, who afterwards married Murat. Madame de Rémusat mentions this.

The case against Pichegru, the conqueror of Holland, was clear enough. He was a disappointed man; he had been transported to Cayenne at the time of the Fructidor business, and had made his escape. From being the friend of St. Just, he went over to Condé, and he is said to have asked as the price of his treason for the governorship of Alsace, the castle of Chambord, 8,000*l.* a year, &c. &c. He was found dead in prison, and the supposition is that he was strangled by the orders of Bonaparte. There were several suspicious points in connection with his suicide, as it was called. He was found strangled with a silk hand-

kerchief, which he had tightened round his throat by twisting it with a stick, and he was discovered lying with the stick placed behind his ear to prevent it from moving. It has been remarked that in the convulsions of death Pichegru could not have remained in the position in which he was found; he would have raised his head, and the handkerchief would have been loosened. Then a noise was heard in Pichegru's cell, on the night of the "suicide," by some of the General's fellow-prisoners, and on his table, said the *Moniteur*, was found a volume of *Seneca*, opened at the page where the moralist says that "he who conspires should not fear death." It is not considered likely that Pichegru, who was yearning for revenge, would have taken the trouble to remove all appearances of an assassination. The strangling seemed to indicate the employment of some of the Mamelukes, whom Bonaparte had brought back from the East, while the *Seneca* lying on the table was a theatrical arrangement which was no doubt due to the fertile imagination of the First Consul. We shall find a very similar *mise en scène* when we come to the "suicides" of Admiral Villeneuve and of Captain Wright. There is nothing to show that Pichegru intended suicide. On the contrary, he had declared that he meant to speak out at his trial, and it was suspected that this was the reason of his sudden removal. What if he were to prove the innocence of Moreau, and to declare in court that Bonaparte and himself had both conspired to restore the Bourbons on a former occasion? Colonel Jung, in his *Bonaparte et son Temps*, quotes a curious letter (vol. iii. p. 197), in which the Comte d'Avaray,¹ writing to the Comte d'Antraigues, concerning some despatches which had been taken from him, and partially printed, said—"You should promptly enlighten public opinion on this bit of perfidy, which has mutilated facts in order to select

¹ The chief of the political cabinet of the Comte de Provence (Louis XVIII.).

a victim between two generals equally sold to royalism." If Bonaparte was not serious in 1797, if he never intended to accept the hereditary vice-royalty of Corsica, with the title of duke, a seat in the House of Peers, a marshal's bâton and the blue ribbon, still he knew that Pichegru was in the plot, and he allowed two months to pass without giving information to the Government. He was guilty of the same crime in 1797 as Moreau was in 1804. Talleyrand, asked what he thought of the death of Pichegru, said—"It was very sudden and very opportune." There was a report that Pichegru, like Picot and others, had been tortured.

As for Georges Cadoudal, he behaved after his arrest, and especially at his trial, with an amount of courage and energy which elicited the admiration of Bonaparte. He indignantly denied that it was his intention to assassinate the First Consul. His idea was to attack him openly when surrounded by his escort, and to fight it out fairly. Twelve persons were executed in connection with this Royalist plot, and one can understand the discontent of Murat, who complained that the only culprits reprieved were the Marquis de Rivière, the Polignacs, and other sprigs of the nobility.

In this year France saw many other wonderful sights, such as the establishment of the Empire, and the coronation of Napoleon Bonaparte by the Pope, who, to the great scandal of the Catholic world, allowed himself to be coaxed to Paris, in the hope of obtaining from "the restorer of the altar" certain spiritual and temporal advantages. The "Code Napoléon" was promulgated, the Legion of Honour created, and eagles were distributed to the army.

As regards the general state of Europe at this period, Lanfrey says: "We have seen how Bonaparte, after the rupture of the Treaty of Amiens, had managed by his unbearable exactions to exasperate the states best disposed towards us. We have seen how he estranged the hearts of allies by his depredations, oppressing without pity

independent nations, humiliating conquered Austria beyond measure, irritating Russia, and rejecting with blind infatuation the hand offered by Prussia."

In the month of February the session was opened, and in his message the Emperor said, *à propos* to the blockade of the French ports—"The fleets of our enemies are wearing themselves out against the winds and the tempests, whilst ours, without destroying themselves, are learning how to fight them."

This was the euphemistic manner in which the forced inaction of the French fleets was explained away.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

"PARIS, 11th January, 1804.

"I forward you a letter from the Minister of the Republic at Genoa. Give orders for Papaccini, Bruni, and Cinni, English spies, to be arrested, tried by a court-martial composed of five officers, *and sentenced to be shot.* . . .

"BONAPARTE."

TO CITIZEN TASCHER.¹

"PARIS, 13th January, 1804.

"CITIZEN TASCHER, officer of the Guard, you will start to-morrow for Rome. You will alight at the residence of Cardinal Fesch, Ambassador of the Republic, who will present you to the Pope, into whose hands you will deliver the inclosed letter. You will remain at Rome until His Holiness has handed you an answer. At all events, you will remain eight or ten days in that city.

"BONAPARTE."

TO HIS HOLINESS THE POPE.

"PARIS, 13th January, 1804.

"MOST HOLY FATHER,—I have communicated to the Diet of Ratisbon the last brief which your Holiness sent

¹ One of Josephine's nephews.

me, and I have informed it of my desire that nothing should be done in matters of religion without your participation, so that your Holiness may have no cause for affliction or pain. Your Holiness can rely upon my support, and it will be sufficient for you to acquaint me, through Cardinal Caprara,¹ of the state of affairs, and the steps to be taken.

"The conclusion of the Concordat with the Italian Republic has afforded me great consolation, and your Holiness may rest assured of my desire to render your pontificate happy and prosperous.

"In general, I have nothing to complain of in the conduct of the clergy in France. The bishops, the canons, the curés, and the churches are in a satisfactory condition, and my intention is to set aside certain sums for the benefit of the clergy, to build seminaries, &c.

"I recommend Cardinal Caselli to your Holiness; he has been honoured with your confidence, and I cannot forget the amiability and purity of the principles I have recognised in him during our theological discussions.

"I beg your Holiness will show some kindness to Madame Paulette [Sister Pauline Borghese], and sometimes give her advice.

"I have received a great number of petitions from the Catholics of Ireland, who are oppressed in an intolerable manner quite incompatible with those principles of philosophy which the English affect. *I should like to know if your Holiness has any information on this matter, or any means of action, and how you exercise influence on the said Catholics. I cannot suppose that they are altogether deprived of corresponding with the Holy See.* "BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte did not despair of enlisting the Pope in his sacred gendarmery, and of turning him into a police spy, and this while complaining that English agents were stirring up Frenchmen to fight against his own iniquitous government.

¹ One of Bonaparte's creatures, as was Cardinal Caselli also.

TO CARDINAL FESCH.

"PARIS, 13th January, 1804.

"I am glad to hear of the arrest of Vernégues. Let him be sent to the first French posts at Rimini, and conveyed under escort to Paris. No attention should be paid to the steps taken by the Russians, because they have not been approved of by the Emperor. But some intriguers in the cabinet, bribed by England, may meddle with what does not concern them. The best way to avoid all discussion will be to pack him off at once. *Russia is beyond the sphere of Europe*, and besides that, Vernégues is a Frenchman.

"BONAPARTE."

Vernégues was a Frenchman who had taken service in Russia, just as Napper Tandy had taken service in France. It was made a terrible crime on the part of Hamburg to have delivered the latter into the hands of the English under threat of bombardment, but it was only natural for Rome to deliver up the former.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

"PARIS, 13th January, 1804.

"Send for Emmet, Thomson, and the other Irish chiefs, and let them know that I have read the inclosed memorial with the greatest attention; that I can make no proclamation before landing in Ireland; but that the General in command of the expedition will be furnished with sealed orders, by which I shall declare that I shall not make peace with England until the independence of Ireland be recognised. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

In a message to the Senate, Bonaparte said that in all the departments he had traversed he had heard accents of indignation, truly French; that he had perceived in their hatred of a government hostile to their prosperity, still more than in their burst of public joy and personal

affection, their attachment to their country. "In all the departments the clergy have exerted their religious influence to consecrate this spontaneous movement"!

The fact is that the press and the clergy were ordered to preach up war against England, which was far from being popular. As a French historian has written—"The bishops were invited by a short note, emanating from the cabinet of the First Consul, to order prayers for the success of the war against the King of England, '*who had violated the faith of treaties in refusing to restore Malta to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem.*' Malta was, in fact, Church property, but how could the first despoiler of the Order dare to employ this argument? The bishops obeyed the invitation with un hoped-for zeal, using their ministry of peace to transform this war into a crusade." Considering the generous treatment they had received in England during the days of the Revolution, this was an instance of the most unchristian ingratitude which was perfectly unwarrantable and which has since been severely and honestly rebuked. The conduct of the Press was odious and servile enough, but it owed England nothing, it had no divine mission to fulfil, and it was far more dependent even than the Church on the favour of the First Consul, who vigilantly scrutinised every article that made its appearance.

The message naturally contained the most terrible invectives against England. But it alluded also to other matters, showing a close attention on the part of the Government to the internal welfare of the country—to the building of bridges, the reclaiming of marshes and sands, the construction of canals and of roads. "Carriages," it said, "can now cross the Simplon and the Mount Cenis." Harbours were improved, and the works at Cherbourg recommenced. "The ravages of time and neglect" had been repaired at La Rochelle, Cette, Marseilles, and Nice. From Boulogne to Havre the coast was iron bound. The civil, judicial, and criminal codes were nearly terminated. Civil and military schools had been created. Medical

reforms had been operated, and the finances were in a flourishing condition. The French possessions in the West Indies had been placed in a position of defence. Hanover had been occupied, and 25,000 of the enemy's best troops had been made prisoners of war. Louisiana¹ was henceforward associated with the independence of the United States, which owed that independence to France, &c. Bonaparte certainly infused new life into the country, and showed himself as wonderful an administrator as he was a soldier.

TO CITIZEN REGNIER.

"PARIS, 24th January, 1804.

"Drake's letters appear most important. I wish Mehée to say in his next bulletin that the Committee was delighted at the idea of Bonaparte embarking at Boulogne ; but to-day it is persuaded that the preparations at Boulogne are false demonstrations which, however costly, are less so than would appear at first sight ; that the launches are so constructed that they can be turned into merchant vessels, &c., &c. ; that the First Consul is too crafty, and considers his position too firmly established to-day, to attempt a doubtful operation where a mass of troops would be compromised ; that his real intention is to undertake an expedition to Ireland which will be accomplished by the squadrons collected at Brest and the Texel ; that General Angereau has arrived at Brest ; that the Irish battalions have been formed ; that it is on political grounds that a large number of troops have been assembled in camps, Bonaparte being glad to have them under his hand, ready to take the field, and, by a quarter change of front, to fall on Germany, should he deem it necessary to undertake a continental war.

"The affair of the portfolio must not be dropped ; it must be said that the usher has presented several bits of

¹ Louisiana had been sold to the United States for 80,000,000 francs to the great disgust of Spain, who had ceded that colony to France in exchange for Tuscany, which was never handed over to her.

letters in the handwriting of Bonaparte ; that this man may be of the greatest use, but that he wants a large sum of money. The idea is to hand over this portfolio, into which the First Consul will put all the information he wishes to be believed. But in order that a great importance should be attached to this portfolio, at least 50,000*l.* must be asked for it.

“BONAPARTE.”

The above letter furnishes a good specimen of the duplicity of Bonaparte. “His whole policy,” says Lanfrey (vol. iii. p. 99), “consists in the art of imputing conspiracies, invented by himself, to those governments which he wishes to strike. . . . Drake knew nothing about the Georges conspiracy, and his ignorance prevented him from falling into the trap which had been laid for him. . . . The letters of Drake published with such a flourish in the *Moniteur* merely show the perfect innocence of that diplomatic agent in the Georges conspiracy.”

“PARIS, 24th January, 1804.

“MOST HOLY FATHER,—I have received the letter of your Holiness, and thank you for your kind reception of M. de Clermont-Tonnerre. I have sent a letter to Tunis to persuade the Bey to respect the states of your Holiness ; he has promised to give instructions on this subject, upon which however it would not be prudent to rely. When peace is re-established on the seas, it will be possible to insist with more authority on his respecting not only your states but your flag ; for it is afflicting, and indeed a dishonour for Christendom, that wretched brigands who inhabit a fine country cannot live peacefully. Let us hope that a day will come when all this will cease.

“BONAPARTE.”

TO CITIZEN PORTALIS.

“PARIS, 29th January, 1804.

“I beg you will inform the Bishop of Orleans that it being my intention to have a person in Paris thoroughly

acquainted with the *chouans*, I have thought of employing Barbot, who was formerly a chief of *chouans*. He will enjoy a salary very secretly in Paris, and will be able to find out all suspicious people coming from the west.

“BONAPARTE.”

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

“PARIS, 10th February, 1804.

“I wish you to send a note to M. d'Hervas saying that I cannot see without indignation a Spanish *envoyé* persisting in protecting M. de Coucy the ex-Bishop of La Rochelle, and M. de Thémînes the ex-Bishop of Blois, who are rebels to the Pope and to the Government, and who continually foment discord in their old dioceses; that I insist on him sending a courier to Madrid to demand their arrest and extradition to France. . . . Write to General Beurnonville to speak in the same way to the Prince of the Peace, saying that I shall see by this if the Spanish ministry desire to live on good terms with me. He must tell him that if he wishes to foment troubles in France, he will find he has to do with a man who will know how to carry trouble into Spain; that I expect these two men to be arrested, their papers seized, and that they be handed over to me. However, I may possibly consent to their being sent to the penal establishments in Africa instead of being sent to France.

“BONAPARTE.”

TO GENERAL SOULT.

“THE MALMAISON, 13th February, 1804.

“For the last week we have been in pursuit of forty brigands composed of Georges and his band, who disembarked at three different places. Another band is to disembark; we have arrested all the men who were to make signals. Savary awaits them at Biville. Have the crew of the fishing-boat which communicated with the English arrested. . . . More than thirteen of the first

brigands have been arrested. That wretch Pichegru, with Georges and his brigands, ventured to Paris, where they slept on Sunday night. The depositions of men who have been arrested compromise generals of more note to-day. Should this be confirmed, I shall mete out justice to them. . . .

“BONAPARTE.”

The Generals of “more note” referred to above were Moreau and Dumouriez. Thus three of the most renowned generals which the revolution had produced were mixed up, more or less, in this attempt to overturn the existing order of things in France.

TO CITIZEN REGNIER.

“PARIS, 15th February, 1804.

“It is necessary at the same time to arrest General Moreau, and to place seals on his papers both at Grosbois and in Paris.

“BONAPARTE.”

The next day the arrest of General Liébarts and of General and Madame Souham, was ordered, and Madame Damas was directed to take up her residence at from thirty to forty leagues from Paris, while the woman Pocheton, who kept an inn at Mans, was to leave that place, and her *auberge* was to be handed over to some more trustworthy person.

DECISION.

“PARIS, 19th February, 1804.

“Citizen Talleyrand will reply that the Queen of Etruria must pay the French troops in Tuscany; that the town of Leghorn is in a state of siege; that these measures are due to the fact that England has not recognised the kingdom of Etruria.

“BONAPARTE.”

And this was the flimsy excuse given for breaking the solemn engagement entered into with his late Majesty and the King of Spain !

To GENERAL SOULT, *commanding the Camp of St. Omer.*

"PARIS, 19th February, 1804.

" You must not attach more importance to the affairs of Paris than they deserve. Moreau, misled by I know not what passion, called Pichegru to Paris. Pichegru has arrived, and with him Georges and forty other brigands. Moreau and fifteen brigands have been arrested. The police seized fifteen horses and uniforms which were to be used in attacking me on the road between Paris and the Malmaison. I have had the examination read to the Senate and the Council of State, who are indignant. Moreau shall be tried before the tribunals; during his examination he showed the greatest consternation. This is one more ungrateful traitor that France has to punish.

"BONAPARTE."

To GENERAL MURAT.

"PARIS, 20th February, 1804.

"CITIZEN GENERAL,—The Bishop of Orleans will send you a man called Piquantin, from La Vendée; you will employ him as a secret agent, and give him a suitable salary. You will promise him 2,000 francs for each *chouan* whom he delivers over, and more for Georges.

"BONAPARTE."

To GENERAL SOULT.

"PARIS, 1st March, 1804.

"You have no doubt heard that Pichegru was arrested yesterday. He was unable to make use of his pistols or of his sabre. He fought with his fists for half an hour with three or four gendarmes. The pleasure experienced by the people of Paris at this arrest does them credit. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

The arrest of Moreau having created a painful impression at Brest, Cafferelli, the prefect of that port, was ordered to send the General's brother, who was a lieutenant in the navy, to Morlaix, where he was to remain with his family.

TO REAR-ADMIRAL DECRÈS.

"PARIS, 2nd March, 1804.

"I am informed, Citizen Minister, that Nelson has written to Admiral Latouche to propose an exchange of prisoners. I wish to know what answer you made. At all events, let him know that an exchange is impossible; that the King of England would not sanction any exchange without appending unusual and arbitrary conditions. It is my intention that no flag of truce should be received at Toulon.¹ . . .

"BONAPARTE."

In several letters written at this epoch to Melzi, Soult, Davoust, and others, Bonaparte insisted upon the guilt of Moreau, his consternation before the authorities charged with conducting the preliminary inquiry, and the ingratitude of this traitor.

On the 8th March Bonaparte ordered General Dessolles commanding in Hanover, to keep a sharp look out for

¹ The following letter from Nelson* allows one to doubt the above statement :—

TO THE FRENCH OFFICERS PRISONERS OF WAR AT
MALTA.

"'VICTORY,' OFF TOULON, August 13th, 1803.

"GENTLEMEN,—I sent to offer the French Admiral in Toulon an exchange of prisoners. After keeping the boat waiting three hours, a message come down that the French Admiral would receive no letter or message, therefore you must blame the cruelty of your own Admiral for keeping you prisoners. At the same time, I shall be happy to do all in my power to render your captivity as easy as possible, always remembering—*Do as you would be done by.* . . .

"NELSON AND BRONTE."

English spies, adding: "The correspondence of Drake, the English minister at Munich, which I have intercepted, shows me that the English are doing all they can to make dupes in your direction. If, under these painful circumstances, you should ruin men who are attached to you, remain persuaded that I have always considered myself entitled to enjoy the first place in your affection. Nothing can equal the intense stupidity of this plot, if it be not its wickedness. The human heart is an abyss which deceives all calculations, and cannot be fathomed by the most penetrating."¹

On the 9th March, in a long despatch to Davoust, Bonaparte was able to announce the capture of Georges Cadoudal.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

"PARIS, 10th March, 1804.

"You will direct General Ordener to start for Strasburg to-night. He will travel under a false name. The object of his mission is to repair to Ettenheim, to surround the town, and to carry off the Duc d'Enghien, Dumouriez, an English colonel, and all the persons attached to them.

"... You will also order General Caulaincourt to go to Offenbourg with 200 dragoons, to surround the town, and to arrest the Baroness de Reich and other English agents. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Five days afterwards General Ordener crossed the Rhine and carried off the duke, who at first wished to resist, but was dissuaded from so doing by a German officer. There was no Dumouriez found at Ettenheim, no English colonel, nor any papers showing that the duke was implicated in the Georges conspiracy or in the military designs imputed to him.

¹ General Dessolles was an old friend and comrade of Moreau, and was one of the only officers who dared to protest against his arrest. He was now called upon to betray his old friend.

TO CITIZEN RÉAL.

"LA MALMAISON, 11th March, 1804.

"CITIZEN RÉAL,—I beg that you will forward the last letter written by Drake to Citizen Maret, so that he may have it printed. . . . It will be necessary to add two notes—one making known that the aide-de-camp of the supposed General was none other than an officer sent by the prefect of Strasburg; the second, stating that the whole story of the usher is a fabrication; that there are no ushers or persons employed by the Government whose sentiments of honour do not place them above receiving the corrupting gold of England.

"BONAPARTE."

TO GENERAL MARMONT.

"LA MALMAISON, 12th March, 1804.

". . . See a great deal of the soldiers, and in detail. When you arrive in camp inspect the men one by one, eight hours at a time; receive their complaints, inspect their arms, and make sure that they want for nothing. There is a great advantage in holding these inspections of seven or eight hours; they accustom the soldier to remain under arms, and prove that the chief, instead of indulging in dissipation, pays attention to him. This gives the soldier great confidence. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

TO HIS HOLINESS THE POPE.

"LA MALMAISON, 13th March, 1804.

"MOST HOLY FATHER,—The Senator Lucien Bonaparte, my brother, wishes to stay in Rome, in order to study history and antiquities. I beg your Holiness will receive him with that kindness which is peculiar to you.

"BONAPARTE."

And thus was Lucien driven into exile. He told his brother Joseph that he left France with his heart full of

hatred for the First Consul, whom he did not see again, except during a few minutes at Mantua, until 1815.

On the 14th March, in a letter addressed to General Brune, ambassador at Constantinople, Bonaparte said—

“I desire to support the Empire, so that it may recover some energy. . . . In the present position of Europe all my thoughts are directed towards England. . . . We have news from India. Our squadron has arrived there safely, and has formed its junction with the Dutch. They do England immense damage: Ceylon has revolted, the King is mad, and England is greatly agitated.

“Your mission is most important, whether I march upon London or whether I make peace. . . . Send me some information as soon as possible on Persian affairs.”

On the 17th March, in a letter addressed to Davoust, Bonaparte expressed great indignation at the idea of his old adversary, Sidney Smith, having managed to capture a *patache* in Holland. He considered that this was a disgrace which might have been avoided.

TO CITIZEN RÉAL.

“LA MALMAISON, 19th March, 1804.

“I send you the papers of the Duc d'Enghien. I have kept his correspondence with the Comte de Lille (afterwards Louis XVIII.), which contains nothing of importance beyond two letters on the occasion of the new year, and one relative to the pretended propositions made by Prussia that they should renounce their rights to the throne. . . .

“BONAPARTE.”

TO GENERAL MURAT, *Governor of Paris.*

“LA MALMAISON, 19th March, 1804.

“If the Duc de Berri were in Paris staying with M. de Cobentzel, and the Duc d'Orleans at the residence of the Marquis de Gallo, I should not only have them arrested this very night and shot, but I should also have the two

ambassadors arrested and treated in the same way. But as it is impossible that these ministers, at the risk of losing their heads, can have committed such an insane act, and as, far from authorising this conduct, the Cabinet of Vienna will not allow any French prince to remain at Vienna, I do not wish their houses to be searched. You will do well to arrest the person who gave you this information, for he can be nothing but a scamp. Every one knows, but the *badauds*, that ambassadors' houses are not sanctuaries when it is a question of crimes against the State. Do not allow yourself to be taken in by such absurdities. As for the second part, concerning Prince Charles, you must feel what shocking nonsense it is. Prince Charles is a brave and loyal man, to whom I am much attached, and Cobentzel and Gallo are incapable of conspiring against me.

“BONAPARTE.”

On the next day Bonaparte himself wrote to Ney:—“I am informed that the English have flung bales of cotton on our coasts.” These bales were supposed to have come from the Levant, and the idea was that we wished to spread the plague in France. It made Bonaparte quite sad to think that we should so far have forgotten all principle as to resort to such diabolical tricks as these. As for the French people, they were perfectly ready to believe us capable of any crimes, from political assassination to the stowing away of plague-stricken goods in our vessels.

DECREE.

“PARIS, 20th March, 1804.

“Art. 1. The ci-devant Duc d'Enghien, accused of having borne arms against the Republic, of having been, and of still being, in the pay of England, &c., shall be tried by court-martial. . . .

“BONAPARTE.”

TO GENERAL MURAT.

“LA MALMAISON, 20th March, 1804.

“The Duc d’Enghien is to be taken to the castle of Vincennes, where arrangements have been made for his reception. . . . The First Consul desires that the name of this prisoner, and everything concerning him, may be kept secret. . . . he travels under the name of Plessis. . . .

“BONAPARTE.”

The commandant of Vincennes was also ordered to keep everything a profound secret. He himself was to be ignorant of the name of his prisoner. Citizen Réal was furnished with a list of eleven questions which he was to put to the Prince. None of these questions referred to the presence of the prisoner in Paris!

TO PAULINE BORGHESE.

“PARIS, 6th April, 1804.

“MADAME AND DEAR SISTER,—I have learned with pain that you have not the good sense to conform to the manners and customs of the city of Rome; that you show contempt for the inhabitants, and that your eyes are unceasingly turned towards Paris. Although occupied with vast affairs I nevertheless desire to make known my wishes, and I hope that you will conform to them.

“Love your husband and his family, be amiable, accustom yourself to the usages of Rome, and put this in your head, that if you follow bad advice you will no longer be able to count upon me. You may be sure that you will find no support in Paris, and that I shall never receive you there without your husband. If you quarrel with him it will be your fault, and France will be closed to you. You will sacrifice your happiness and my esteem.

“BONAPARTE.”

Bonaparte wrote a somewhat similar letter to Cardinal Fesch, his ambassador at Rome, on the subject of “Madame

Paulette." "Tell her," he added, "on my behalf, that she is no longer pretty [which was a fib], that she will be much less so in a few years, and that all her life she ought to be good and amiable. . . . She should not indulge in those bad manners which *bon ton* reproves, even in the most frivolous society of the capital."

TO GENERAL SOULT.

"ST. CLOUD, 14th April, 1804.

" The general councils, the great bodies of the State, &c., &c., demand that an end should be put to the hopes of the Bourbons. . . . Let me know in detail the opinion of the army on a measure of this nature.¹ You must feel sure that I would only undertake it in the interest of the nation, for the French people have made me so great and so powerful that I have nothing more to desire.

"You will inform the colonel of the 4th regiment that I have appointed him general of brigade. To replace him as colonel I send my brother Joseph; during the first campaigns of the Revolution he served as a major; he is anxious to become a soldier, for, in the days in which we live, it is not sufficient to serve the State in negotiations, more or less difficult, one must be able, in case of necessity, to use the sword. He must pay strict attention to his duties. When he arrives you may receive him with the honours due to a grand officer of the Legion

¹ At a Council of State, which was held at St. Cloud, to consider the propriety of investing the First Consul with the purple, Bonaparte said—"It is necessary to make haste if you wish this to be accomplished by civilians, for I know that the army is on the point of proclaiming me Emperor. I have already received petitions signed by 30,000 soldiers, and it is for this reason that I am not with the army at present." Count Miot de Melito throws doubt upon this story; he says that he shortly afterwards went to Boulogne, and was able to convince himself that the soldiers had no idea of proclaiming Bonaparte Emperor.

of Honour, a senator, and a person who is dear to me. But once these honours paid, he must put on his uniform. . . .

“BONAPARTE.”

When the above letter was written the fate of the Duc d'Enghien was already sealed, and Bonaparte contemplated assuming the purple. With regard to Joseph, the statement that he served during the first campaigns of the Revolution as a *chef de bataillon*, was false. The commission given to Joseph Bonaparte upon this occasion ran thus :—

BREVET OF COLONEL TO THE CITIZEN JOSEPH
BONAPARTE.

“Artillery cadet 1768.

“Staff officer 1793.

“*Chef de bataillon* 1793.

“Present at campaigns of 1793 and 1794; slightly wounded at the siege of Toulon.”

All these statements were equally false. Joseph had no connection with the army before he became colonel of the 4th Regiment, except as an army contractor in Italy.

Miot de Melito, the friend and counsellor of Joseph, says in his *Memoirs* (vol. ii. p. 173), that “Joseph braved the ridicule to which a man exposes himself, who, at the age of thirty-six years, commences the career of arms, and started in the first days of Floreal to take command of the regiment of which he had been named colonel.”

On the 18th April Bonaparte did something more than repeat his false statements respecting his brother Joseph's military career.

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE.

“ST. CLOUD, 18th April, 1804.

“CITIZEN SENATORS,—Citizen Joseph Bonaparte, grand officer of the Legion of Honour, has expressed the desire

of sharing the perils of the army encamped at Boulogne, in order to take part in its glory.

"I consider it for the welfare of the State that Senator Joseph Bonaparte, who displayed such skill and talent in successively negotiating the treaty of Mortefontaine, which brought our difficulties with the United States to a close, that of Luneville which pacified the Continent, and recently that of Amiens, which re-established peace between France and England, should be allowed to contribute to the vengeance which the French people propose to take for the violation of this last treaty, and that he should be afforded an opportunity of acquiring fresh titles to the esteem of the nation.

"Having already served under my eyes during the first campaigns in this war, and having given proofs of courage and a taste for the career of arms, I have appointed him colonel of the 4th regiment. . . . "BONAPARTE."

The statement with regard to the treaty of Amiens was too perfidious. No one, as we are aware, more severely blamed Bonaparte for the rupture of that treaty than did Joseph, who in his wrath said to Miot de Melito (*Memoirs*, vol. ii. p. 107), "Let him once more deluge Europe in blood by a war which might have been avoided but for the extravagant mission of his Sebastiani! And I, I shall join with Sieyes, even with Moreau if necessary, and with all the patriots and lovers of liberty remaining in France, to escape so much tyranny." Unfortunately the above, like many of Joseph's finest sentiments, was not durable.

TO GENERAL MARMONT, *Camp of Utrecht*.

"ST. CLOUD, 17th April, 1804.

". . . . I tremble at your idea of forming camps in Holland; sickness did us a great deal of damage last year, and I prefer allowing the English to land and driving them out afterwards to losing all our troops in hospital. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Several letters at this epoch direct proceedings to be taken against priests who refused to accept the new bishops and against female conspirators. On the 19th April Bonaparte wrote to the Grand Judge :—

“Send the Demoiselles Monsigny and Lange away from Calais for corresponding with rebel bishops ; place them under supervision at forty leagues from the coast. I am surprised to learn that Mdle. de Circé has left Aix ; she was allowed out of prison on the condition of not coming to Paris. . . .”

WORDS ADDRESSED TO CITIZEN PICHON BY THE
FIRST CONSUL,

On the occasion of Jerome Bonaparte's Marriage.

“ST. CLOUD, 20th April, 1804.

“ . . . Jerome is wrong to think that he will be able to count upon any weakness on my part, for, not having the rights of a father, I cannot entertain for him the feeling of a father ; a father allows himself to be blinded, and it pleases him to be blinded because he identifies his son with himself. . . . But what am I to Jerome ? Sole instrument of my destiny, I owe nothing to my brothers ; they have made an abundant harvest out of what I have accomplished in the way of glory, but for all that they must not abandon the field and deprive me of the aid I have a right to expect from them. They will cease to be anything for me directly they take a road opposed to mine. If I exact so much from my brothers who have already rendered many services, if I have abandoned the one who, in mature age [Lucien], refused to follow my advice, what must not Jerome, who is still young, and who is known only for his neglect of duty, expect ? If he does nothing for me I shall see in this the decree of destiny, which has decided that I shall do nothing for him ! . . . ”

There are strange contradictions and mis-statements in the above letter. There can be no doubt that Joseph, and

more especially Lucien, rendered the most important services to their brother, and it is shrewdly supposed that the services rendered by Lucien were the cause of his disgrace, for Bonaparte disliked being constantly reminded of them. He wished it to be believed that he owed nothing to any one, and the recollection of what happened on the 18th Brumaire, when but for the courage and presence of mind of Lucien, he would probably have shared the fate of his old friends the Robespierres, weighed heavily on his mind.

TO HIS HOLINESS THE POPE.

“ST. CLOUD, 22nd April, 1804.

“I thank your Holiness for having given a cardinal’s hat to the Archbishop of Bologna. . . . I have come to the determination to take into my own hands all that relates to the Concordat with the Italian Republic. . . . I thank your Holiness for the amiable things you say concerning the arrival of my mother in Rome. The climate of Paris is much too damp and cold for her. . . . I am, with filial respect, the most devoted son of your Holiness,
“BONAPARTE.”

This matter of the Italian Concordat was a very sore subject with the Pope, who had already been forced to relinquish a good deal of his hold over the French bishops in favour of the terrible “eldest son of the Church.” He was strongly opposed to extending to Italy what had been accorded to France.

On the 25th April Bonaparte replied at considerable length to an address of the Senate expressing the desire that the office of chief magistrate should be hereditary. The addresses and replies on the part of the First Consul the Senate, the Tribunate, and the Council of State were all arranged beforehand, and resulted in the declaration of the Empire. The excuse for erecting a hereditary form of Government was to mitigate the inconvenience which would ensue from the assassination of the chief of the

State. The settlement of the line of succession gave rise to a great deal of intriguing. Bonaparte wished to make the eldest son of his brother, Louis, his heir, having no children by Josephine. This pretension was violently opposed by Joseph and by Louis. The former, who had no son, objected to being deprived of his chance of the throne, and Louis was indignant for two reasons—because one day his son would take precedence of him, and because the contemplated arrangement would revive the scandal which attributed the paternity of the child in question to Napoleon. In the end it was settled that in default of heirs male of his body the Imperial throne on the death of Napoleon should pass to Joseph, and in default of Joseph, to Louis. Lucien was cut off for having insisted upon marrying Madame Joubertson, and Jerome for marrying Miss Patterson.

Before accepting the Imperial dignity, Bonaparte wrote two important letters to Talleyrand. In the first he said :—

“I am not fond of meddling with the internal affairs of friendly States ; but the wonderful turn which public opinion has taken in Holland attracts my solicitude, and I cannot remain indifferent to all that is passing.”

Bonaparte then complained that although a third of the population was Catholic, the Catholics, who were attached to France, were represented neither in the Government nor in Parliament, that all the members of the Asiatic council were the friends of England, &c., &c. He therefore declared it to be his intention to interfere in the affairs of Holland, which in plain language meant to annex it.

The second letter ran thus :—

“I beg you will send a courier to General Hédouville to tell him to leave St. Petersburg on the pretext of sick leave, and to repair to Berlin. . . . If before leaving he has an opportunity of speaking to the minister, or to the

Emperor, he should use firm language, and say that we are exceedingly hurt to see Russia meddling with our domestic affairs. . . . Repeat that I do not desire war, but that I am afraid of no one. . . . It is enough to have to swallow the insults of England by sea without being forced in addition to swallow the impertinences of Russia."

At this date Napoleon Bonaparte accepted the Imperial dignity.

REPLY OF THE EMPEROR TO THE SENATE.

"ST. CLOUD, 18th May, 1804.

"Everything which can contribute to the welfare of my country is essentially connected with my happiness.

"I accept the title which you believe useful to the glory of the nation.

"I submit to the French people the law concerning the succession. I hope that France will never repent of the honours with which it has surrounded my family.

"At all events my spirit will no longer be with my posterity from the day that it ceases to deserve the love and the confidence of this great nation."

The same day orders were issued regarding the various titles to be borne by the grand dignitaries of the Empire—there was a grand elector, a constable, an arch-chancellor, and arch-treasurer, marshals, &c., and the word citizen was replaced by "monsieur," and nearly every trace of the Republic disappeared. On the 21st May the Emperor wrote to his Grand Judge ordering the arrest of thirteen rebel priests, who were to be thrown into the prison of Poitiers, and his Majesty terminated his letter thus: "Upon which I pray God to have you in His holy keeping." On the same date Talleyrand was directed to despatch a doctor or a *savant* to Persia, by way of Constantinople, under the pretence of studying the flora of that country.

In addition to writing several letters to the Minister of

Marine, despatches were sent to Vice-Admirals Martin, Thevenard, Latouche, and to Admiral Truguet, with the view of pushing on naval preparations, and of inspiring activity. All the officers above mentioned appeared loth to leave port.

TO M. TALLEYRAND.

“ST. CLOUD, 28th May, 1804.

“Steube, the minister of Wirtemberg, is a downright fool, as ill-meaning as ignorant. If you can insinuate in a delicate manner that he ought to be recalled, that would please me.

“Write to General Lannes at Lisbon, and mention the matter to M. de Souza here, so that the Portuguese minister at Berlin, who is our bitter enemy, may be recalled.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. TALLEYRAND.

“ST. CLOUD, 30th May, 1804.

“I desire that the official note of Lord Hawkesbury may be sent to all our agents at foreign courts, those of Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and the Porte excepted, with remarks to this effect—that the French Government calls attention to the note in question; that no matter how gross the insults contained in it against the Government and the French nation, the French Government ought to have treated it with sovereign contempt; but that the principles openly proclaimed by England are so subversive of the established order of things in Europe, that the French Government has deemed it worth while to notice it.

“It is set forth in fact that our ambassador, or any other individual invested with a public character in a neutral court, has a right to conspire against France. The most shameful ignorance, and that want of reflection which has for several years characterised the proceedings of the British Government, have alone induced it to proclaim such a blasphemy. What! the French Government

is authorised to consider all the representatives of the British Cabinet as agents of plots and of war! And the most noble profession which enjoys a kind of sanctity, and which is surrounded by the veneration of men, is for the British Cabinet merely a veil to cover plots, crimes, and subversions!

"An ambassador is a minister of conciliation; his duty is always a holy duty founded upon morality; and the British Cabinet says he is an instrument of war, who has a right to do anything, provided he does nothing against the country to which he is accredited. . . . The English Government has often given proofs of political ferocity, but it now behaves with folly and imbecility. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

Lord Hawkesbury indignantly protested against the idea of encouraging assassination, but insisted on the right of England taking advantage of the internal discords of a nation with which she was at war. The fact of Napoleon stirring up strife in Ireland and raising Irish regiments was naturally referred to. Then especially in Austria and Sweden Napoleon had attempted to kindle civil war.

In a letter to the Minister of Marine of the 31st May, occurs the following paragraph:—

"Direct the admiral to give prizes to the soldiers who go out on the yards, and impress upon the rear-admirals and post-captains that they can obtain anything from the sentiments of honour and emulation with which the French soldier is animated."

Then why these prizes, and why were the necessary funds to be placed at the disposal of the admiral?

TO MARSHAL SOULT.

"ST. CLOUD, 3rd June, 1804.

". . . But for this miserable trial [of Moreau, &c.] I should be in the midst of the camps. I hope everything will be finished in a week. I suppose that in camp as

well as in Paris there are rumours of a continental war. This would be unfortunate, as it would turn our attention from England. Woe to those who seek war! . . . The Germanic Confederation, Austria, and Prussia are with us. Thanks to England, a false step has been taken by Russia, which wears mourning for the Duc d'Enghien, thus reminding Europe of the assassination of Paul I., which it was beginning to forget. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

But Napoleon at the time had accused England of this assassination!

DECREE.

“ST. CLOUD, *6th June*, 1804.

“These vases must be placed at the disposal of the Cardinal Archbishop, as a gift made by the Emperor to the metropolitan church of Paris.

“NAPOLEON.”

These silver vases, fourteen in number, had been taken from the church of Tournay.

In announcing to the Grand Judge that he had pardoned Armand de Polignac, with whom he had been at school at Brienne, Napoleon wrote:—

“The plot which, by the aid of God, your vigilance and that of good citizens, we have foiled, has greatly affected me. Spared during ten years from all kinds of dangers, we have acquired the right of supposing that it will not be in the power of man to take our life until Providence has fixed its term; and we ourselves shall be interested in defending it only as long as we shall consider it necessary to the grand nation. . . .”

TO THE KING OF SPAIN.

“MOST HIGH, MOST EXCELLENT, AND WELL-BELOVED GOOD BROTHER, ALLY, AND CONFEDERATE,—The relations which exist between our two States, and the interest

which your Majesty has always shown in the prosperity of France, induces me to inform you that it has pleased Providence to call me to the government of this Empire. . . . My firm intention is to draw closer the bonds which unite the two countries. . . .

“NAPOLEON.

“GIVEN AT ST. CLOUD, 14th *June*, 1804.”

DECISION.

“ST. CLOUD, 16th *June*, 1804.

“Write to General Jourdan that he must not permit any Corsican *émigré* to remain at Leghorn; that he did well to have them arrested as well as the English; that the Queen of Etruria, not having been recognised by the English, must be considered as at war with them.

“NAPOLEON.”

We have already seen how this much persecuted and widowed queen, daughter of the “most high, excellent, well-beloved,” &c., King of Spain, had to pay for troops quartered in her territory contrary to treaty.

Here follow many despatches on the subject of the new Armada, filled with incentives to display greater activity and daring, with plans for deceiving Nelson and Cornwallis, and suddenly concentrating a formidable naval force in the Channel. We see that the flotilla at this moment numbered 1,831 craft of various descriptions.

TO M. OTTO.

“ST. CLOUD, 12th *July*, 1804.

“I desire that you will give me by return of post some information on the subject of the family of the Elector of Bavaria, especially concerning his daughter, and his intentions with regard to that young princess. I need hardly remind you that an affair of this nature must be kept perfectly secret. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

M. Otto, whose diplomacy was highly appreciated, had been removed from London to Munich.

TO THE EMPRESS JOSEPHINE.

“PONT DE BRIQUES, 21st *July*, 1804.

“MADAM AND DEAR WIFE,—For the last four days since I have been absent from you I have been constantly on horseback, and this exercise has not impaired my health.

“M. Maret tells me that you intend starting on Monday. Travelling by easy stages you will be able to reach the waters without fatigue.

“The wind freshened during the night, and one of our gunboats dragged her anchors and went ashore a league from Boulogne. I thought boat and crew lost, but we managed to save everything. The spectacle was grand; the alarm guns, the coast in a blaze of fire, the sea tossed with fury, and roaring. The soul was suspended between eternity, the ocean, and the night. At 5 A.M. it cleared up, everything was saved, and I went to bed with all the sensations inspired by a romantic and epic dream.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

“PONT DE BRIQUES, 30th *July*, 1804.

“... Inform the different ambassadors of Germany that the conduct of the Court of Vienna at Ratisbon is all the more inconceivable because its ambassador at Paris himself asked the Emperor not to reply to the Russian note,¹ but to allow matters to be settled by way of Baden; then, a fortnight after the arrival of that intemperate and indiscreet note, the Emperor of Germany stated, in a letter to M. de Cobentzel, that he took into account that circumstances had rendered necessary, and he complimented the chief of the state on the happy issue of the events which had just occurred, expressing the pleasure he experienced on seeing him triumph over the plots of his enemies.

¹ On the subject of the Duc d'Enghien.

"I suppose that you have given instructions to my minister in America with respect to the conduct he should pursue towards the so-called Madame Jerome Bonaparte. He must not see her, nor meet her, and must say publicly that I do not recognise the marriage of a young man of nineteen contracted against the laws of his country.

"Send the Turkish ambassador the snuff-box and the sum of money agreed upon.

"As for the Russian note, you may reply in such terms as these. 'I received your note of the I regret that proposals which were susceptible of being admitted were accompanied by insults and threats. However, I am going to lay the note before the Emperor, and I shall send you the orders he gives me without delay.'

"M. Durand, in handing your sealed reply to M. d'Oubril, must take care to tell him that I have seen neither the note nor the reply.

"NAPOLEON."

In a long despatch to Marshal Brune at Constantinople, Napoleon announced that he had withdrawn his ambassador from St. Petersburg in consequence of the Russian court going into mourning. He added—"Our situation with regard to England is most favourable. The war is not felt in France, in consequence of the way in which it weighs upon England, and I have at my disposal nearly 120,000 men and 3,000 launches, &c., which only await a favourable wind in order to plant the imperial eagle on the tower of London. Time and destiny alone know what will happen."

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

"PONT DE BRIQUES, 1st August, 1804.

"I have learnt with pleasure that your health is re-established. I require and hope that you will live for a long time. I am satisfied with all I have seen since my departure from Paris. My health could not be better.

"We have had some bad weather, and a gale caused us

to lose fifteen men and three or four craft. As this event has been exaggerated in Paris, it will be well in writing to our diplomatic agents to say how satisfied I am with the strength and manœuvres of the army, and that I pass whole days superintending its instruction. Add some details respecting the voyage of the Empress and the reception she has met with, recommending that these details should be spread in an unofficial manner. This will be a counter-poison to all the false reports circulated by the English.

“NAPOLEON.”

The coronation having been decided upon, M. de Ségur, Grand Master of the Ceremonies, received full instructions upon this subject. One paragraph ran thus: “If it be indispensable, in order that the cortège may arrive at Notre Dame with greater facility, to pull down some houses, a project to this effect must be presented. . . .”

M. de Ségur, who had been taken into the Imperial service in order to instruct the new dignitaries in the etiquette of the old court, drew out a most elaborate plan of the ceremony in question, with the aid of David the painter. In a very short time the etiquette of the Imperial court rivalled in severity but not in dignity that of Versailles in its palmy days.

In a long and rambling letter written to M. de Talleyrand on the 2nd August, Napoleon, harping on the conduct of Russia and her occupation of Corfu, where they feared an attack on the part of the French, wrote—“This does not show much talent on the part of the Russian War Office, as I am not such a fool as to throw an army into islands which have no importance for me.” Formerly these islands were worth more than the whole of Italy.

On the 3rd August Napoleon wrote a long letter to his ambassador at Vienna complaining of a certain delay in the recognition of his new title. Various excuses had been offered, but his Majesty, expecting that an alliance with

Russia was on the *tapis*, told Champagny to speak with vivacity if necessary. "You will say that there is a coalition being formed, and that I shall not allow time for this to be done; that they are strangely mistaken if they suppose I intend to invade England before the Emperor sends his recognition; that it is not just, by this equivocal conduct, for Austria to keep 300,000 *men* with arms folded, on the shores of the Channel; that the court of Vienna must cease this ambiguous conduct; that if they are mad enough to wish for war at Vienna, and to lend a favourable ear to the proposals of England, so much the worse for the Austrian monarchy."

It is rather curious to find that Napoleon offered no objections to some of the titles assumed by the Emperor of Austria, such as Duke of Burgundy and Lorraine.

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

"CALAIS, 7th August, 1804.

"I see by the *Gazette de France* that Dessalines has created a legion of honour. It will be well to verify this, and see if it is not a bad joke on the part of a journalist. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

This appears to have been the fact, and no sooner had the French been either driven from the island or massacred than the blacks set to work to imitate their institutions and then to proclaim an Empire.

In a letter to Talleyrand on the conduct of Russia, dated the 7th, Napoleon wrote: "There is no court so poor in men as Russia; Markoff is an eagle there; Woronzoff is publicly known to be more of an English than a Russian citizen. For a long time this set have been trying to sell the national interests of Russia to England."

Then followed complaints of the intrigues carried on at Ratisbon, which Napoleon said had been defeated by his prudence.

The complaints against Russia, or Russian impertinences, were that the court had gone into mourning for the Duc d'Enghien, that she had addressed a note to the Diet of Ratisbon, calling on the princes of the Germanic Confederation to demand satisfaction for an unparalleled violation of territory; that she had protested against French aggression, against French troops occupying the shores of the Adriatic, and the Hans towns, and threatening the independence of Denmark.

The eagle Markoff had called upon Napoleon to evacuate Naples, to come to some arrangement for settling the affairs of Italy, to keep his promise with regard to indemnifying the King of Sardinia, to evacuate North Germany, and to respect the Confederation!

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

"DUNKIRK, 10th August, 1804.

"Have the woman Bernet arrested if she is an *émigré* travelling between Paris and St. Petersburg. Send me an account of the escape of Bourmont and Andigné. The commandant of the fort appears to be compromised. The conduct of Moreau, who embarked at Barcelona, proves what I always thought, that he will one day throw off the mask and join our enemies. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

And to a certain extent Napoleon was right, for Moreau was destined to perish at Dresden in the ranks of the allies.

TO M. TALLEYRAND.

"DUNKIRK, 10th August, 1804.

"It would perhaps be *à propos* to draw attention to the immorality of the court of St. Petersburg, where the Emperor confers such extraordinary and unusual marks of favour on the murderer of his father.

"The Austrian ambassador, Cobentzel, at Paris is very false, and very persistent in painting everything here in the

most odious colours. He appears to be imbued with the duplicity of his court. I think it necessary to mention this, in order that you may no longer be the dupe of his assumed openness.

“NAPOLEON.”

Talleyrand was then ordered to draw up a note complaining of the conduct of Russia, and the tone of the despatches received from St. Petersburg. In reply to a note from M. d'Oubril, he was to say—

“‘As for the threats contained in the last note of M. d'Oubril, the Emperor orders me to declare that the history of the past does not authorise any Power, much less Russia, to threaten France; that if Suwarrow obtained successes in Italy, the Austrian army had already gained some before he arrived; and that if his army, instead of having been defeated in Switzerland and in Holland, had continued victorious, and had dictated terms of peace in the plains of Champagne or Lorraine, even then threats would not have succeeded with France. Let Russia comprehend that the French Emperor is not the Emperor of the Turks, or the Emperor of the Persians. . . .’

“NAPOLEON.”

And this was the sharp way in which his Majesty replied to Russian impertinences.

TO GENERAL LACUÉE.

“DUNKIRK, 10th August, 1804.

“. . . I have not inspected a single regiment which has not received 100 lame conscripts, sickly and quite unfit for service. They remain in the dépôts, constitute a dead loss, wear out their uniforms, and cost money. . . . It is complained that the substitutes, directly they get their money, desert. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. TALLEYRAND.

"OSTEND, 14th August, 1804.

"... Reply to M. de Gravina : 'I have laid your letter before the Emperor. The officer Wright was captured by our cruisers while in the act of landing Jean Marie and two other brigands. On three consecutive occasions this officer disembarked brigands charged to assassinate the first magistrate of France. We have acquired the proof that he was placed at the disposal of Lord Hawkesbury by the Admiralty, which had no idea of the duty he was intended for; gallant officers like the Lords of the Admiralty would not have suffered the English flag and the English navy to be thus dishonoured. We are convinced that this dishonourable act is the personal affair of the officer Wright and of Lord Hawkesbury, who himself drew 40,000*l.* out of the Treasury as the price of this crime. However, the present minister of foreign affairs having, through you, claimed Captain Wright, his Majesty, always ready to do all in his power to diminish the evils of war, has ordered me to declare that he cannot consent to exchange M. Wright, who is a criminal, for a brave and loyal officer; but that he has directed him to be placed at the disposal of the English Government so that he may be treated as it deems fit. It is for posterity to affix the brand of infamy on Lord Hawkesbury and those cowards who have adopted assassination and crime as a means of war.' ...

"NAPOLEON."

In the above letter Napoleon says: "I have appointed Lesseps commissary-general of commercial affairs in Egypt."

TO THE EMPRESS JOSEPHINE.

"OSTEND, 14th August, 1804.

"MY FRIEND,—I have not received any news from you for several days; I should, however, have been glad to know what effect the waters have had, and how you pass

your time. I have been here for the last week, and intend going to-morrow to Boulogne. Let me know by courier what you intend doing, and when you will have finished your baths. I am very well satisfied with the flotilla. Eugene is still at Blois. I hear no more of Hortense than if she were in Congo. A thousand amiable things for all.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. CAMBACÈRES.

“PONT DE BRIQUES, 17th August, 1804.

“The *fête* passed off very well yesterday, only there was a little wind. The spectacle was new and imposing. So many bayonets have seldom been seen together.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO MADAME CAROLINE BRESSIEUX.

“PONT DE BRIQUES, 20th August, 1804.

“MADAME,—I was much pleased with your letter. The recollection of your mother and of yourself have always interested me. I shall take the first opportunity of being useful to your brother. I see by your letter that you live near Lyons; I must therefore reproach you with not having come to see me while I was there.

“NAPOLEON.”

Napoleon had paid his addresses to this lady when he was a lieutenant, and when she was Mademoiselle Columbier.

On the 30th July the Emperor gave orders that the Marquis of Tweeddale, who had been arrested with other Englishmen on the rupture of the treaty of Amiens, should be allowed to return to England on parole for a year, “on the demand and as a proof of esteem for the talents and character of M. Fox.” On the 22nd August, however, we find a note to Marshal Berthier to the effect that through consideration for Mr. Fox, permission has

been given to Mr. Phillips to transport the remains of the Marquis of Tweeddale, who died at Verdun, to England.

Matters were looking very gloomy in the North, and notes as sharp as those which passed between the French and British cabinets were exchanged between Paris and St. Petersburg.

TO M. TALLEYRAND.

“PONT DE BRIQUES, 24th August, 1804.

“Enclosed you will find the note which ought to be addressed to M. d'Oubril. He will no doubt ask for an interview. . . . Should he demand his passports, you will grant them, and tell him to leave Paris at once, but that he will not be able to pass the French frontier until my *chargé d'affaires* has crossed the Russian frontier.

“NAPOLEON.”

The note complained of the protection afforded by Russia to *émigrés*. M. de Markoff, when Russian minister in Paris, had openly encouraged the *émigrés* and other agents in the pay of England; the court of Russia had gone into mourning for a man condemned by the French tribunals of having conspired against the security of the French Government, &c. !

TO M. TALLEYRAND.

“PONT DE BRIQUES, 25th August, 1804.

“It is at present the court of Vienna which stands in need of my recognition, since it will in all probability experience difficulties throughout Europe. The vanity of Russia will be wounded, and that of Prussia more so. My intention is not to yield anything to the Emperor of Germany. I will recognise him as Emperor of Austria, but it has always been understood that he should recognise me first. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

Several despatches were exchanged on the subject of the recognition of the Emperor of Germany as hereditary Emperor of Austria, and the etiquette to be observed between the two Emperors.

TO THE KING OF PRUSSIA.

"CAMP OF ARRAS, 30th August, 1804.

"SIR, MY BROTHER,—On recognising my house as Imperial, the House of Austria wished in its turn to be recognised as the Imperial House of Austria. This circumstance affords me the opportunity of expressing to your Majesty how much more I appreciate the conduct of Prussia, and I desire to inform you, through M. d'Arberg, of my firm intention to contribute, as far as I can, to the splendour of your crown. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO VICE-ADMIRAL DECRÈS.

"AIX LA CHAPELLE, 5th September, 1804.

"D'Oubril has gone. Although this departure is not good news, still it does not mean a rupture; but it is incalculable what may happen within two or three months. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

And on the same day Fouché was ordered not to allow any Russians to leave Paris without having paid their debts. "Mention," said his Majesty, "several Russians who have left debts behind them, and select in preference the Dolgoroukis, if they have left any; also mention the names of several well-known shopkeepers in Paris who have been ruined by some of them."

TO VICE-ADMIRAL GANTEAUME.

"AIX LA CHAPELLE, 6th September, 1804.

"I have given orders for the completion of your squadron. . . . With twenty-one vessels I hope that you will be able to do something. Your *sortie* has filled the

English with terror; they know that, having the whole ocean to defend, a squadron escaping from Brest might inflict incalculable damage; and, if you were ready to transport 16,000 men and 500 horses to Ireland, the result would be fatal for our enemies. Tell me when you think you will be ready. See the Irish general, O'Connor, and talk over matters with him. . . . The popinjays of the fleet may laugh at and ridicule grand expeditions. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

“AIX LA CHAPELLE, 9th September, 1804.

“. . . . I see a ‘Letter to the Army’ written by Barrère. The army does not require to be spoken to; it pays no attention to pamphlets, and one word in an order of the day would have more effect than a hundred volumes of Cicero or Demosthenes. The troops can be animated against England without speaking to them. Tell Barrère, whose invectives and sophisms are not in harmony with his colossal reputation, not to write anything more in this style. He believes that it is necessary to galvanise the masses, whereas, on the contrary, they must be guided without knowing it. On the whole he is a man of little talent.

“NAPOLEON.”

That Napoleon should ever have employed, even as a spy, that “Jacobin carrion,” as Macaulay termed Barrère, does not say much for him. “This wretch had been branded with infamy first by the Convention, then by the Council of Five Hundred. The inhabitants of four or five great cities had attempted to tear him limb from limb.”

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

“AIX LA CHAPELLE, 10th September, 1804.

“The report entitled ‘Vendée’ appears interesting. . . . You must in no way annoy Mesdames Lescure and Laroche Jaquelain. The husband of one and the brother

of the other waged war with so much military talent that they will be entitled to a page in history, and will be remembered in the country. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

At this period hardly a day passed without orders being sent to Fouché to arrest or banish this or that *émigré* or *émigrée*, and there was hardly a court of Europe which had not incurred the wrath of Napoleon for sheltering these outcasts. However, Napoleon could now and then be generous. He proved a true prophet as far as Laroche Jaquelain was concerned, for the memory of that young hero is still fresh in the memory of his countrymen, especially of those who cling to the old faith and the old régime.

TO HIS HOLINESS THE POPE.

“COLOGNE, 15th September, 1804.

“MOST HOLY FATHER,—The happy effect which the re-establishment of the Christian religion has had on the morality and character of my people induces me to ask your Holiness to give a new proof of the interest you take in my destiny, and in that of this great nation, in one of the most important circumstances offered by the annals of the world. I beg you will come and give a religious character to the anointing and the coronation of the first Emperor of the French. This ceremony will acquire a new lustre if performed by your Holiness yourself. It will draw down upon us and our people the benediction of the Almighty, whose decrees regulate the fate of empires and of families.

“Your Holiness is aware of the feelings of affection I have long entertained for you, and you will comprehend the pleasure which this circumstance affords me of giving you new proofs of my devotion.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO VICE-ADMIRAL DECRÈS.

“COLOGNE, 15th September, 1804.

“I have already expressed my opinion on the subject of Admiral Linois, who has rendered the French flag the laughing-stock of the universe. The least he can be reproached with is having shown too much prudence. Vessels of war are not merchant ships. It is honour which I wish to preserve, and not a few pieces of wood and some men. In England he is heartily despised by naval officers. I would rather have lost three ships than that this unfortunate event should have happened. If Captain Larupe is the same officer who commanded the *Muiron* when I was in Egypt, I am extremely surprised that a man who was able to approach me for an instant could have behaved so badly. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

Linois was a very gallant officer who distinguished himself at Algesiras, who had twice fallen into our hands, and had twice been exchanged. However, on the occasion referred to above he allowed himself, when in command of an eighty-four gun ship, three frigates, and a brig, to be beaten off by a fleet of East Indiamen. It is calculated that that fleet was worth 8,000,000*l*. The East India Company distributed no less than 50,000*l*. among the officers and crews for their gallant conduct. The share of each common seaman was six guineas. Admiral Linois was captured a third time in 1806, and remained a prisoner until the abdication of Napoleon.

TO M. LE CARDINAL FESCH.

“COLOGNE, 16th September, 1804.

“SIR, MY UNCLE AND COUSIN,—General Cafferelli is the bearer of the enclosed letter for the Pope. . . . The Holy Father will travel in his own carriages to the foot of

Mont Cenis ; arrived there, my carriages will bring him on. All his expenses will be paid from the moment he sets foot in France. You must accompany the Pope but return with him to Rome, my intention being that you continue to reside in that city. I desire that the Pope may reach Paris by the 18th Brumaire. . . . I am very anxious that the King of Sardinia should not return to Rome. It is disagreeable to me to see a Russian agent at Rome, and also that prince, who will end by compromising the Pope. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

The recognition affair having been settled, Napoleon addressed the following letter to his future father-in-law :—

TO THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA.

“MAYENCE, 23rd September, 1804.

“SIR, MY BROTHER,—I feel deeply the amiable things contained in the letter of your Majesty. I beg you will receive my congratulations on the erection of your House into the Imperial Hereditary House of Austria. A long reign to your Majesty, and perpetual peace between us ; and permit me to add that everything which can contribute to the internal happiness of your family are events which will never be foreign to my own welfare. But above all, let your Majesty conceive no doubt as to my constant and sincere desire to maintain the greatest harmony between our two States, nor concerning my sentiments of esteem, friendship, &c., &c.

“NAPOLEON.”

The captain of a Russian merchant ship having refused to take a hawser on board to prevent a gunboat going ashore :

DECISION.

"MAYENCE, 26th September, 1804.

"Referred to the Minister of Marine to have the Russian captain committed to prison in order to give that barbarian a lesson in hospitality.¹

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

"MAYENCE, 27th September, 1804.

"What happens at Bordeaux happens at Turin, at Spa, at Marseilles, &c. The police commissioners derive immense profits from the gaming-tables. My intention is that the towns shall reap the benefit of the tables. I shall employ the 200,000 francs paid by the tables of Bordeaux in building a bridge or a canal. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER.

"MAYENCE, 27th September, 1804.

"MY COUSIN,—The expedition to Ireland has been decided upon. You will have a conference on this subject with Marshal Angereau. We have the means for embarking 18,000 men at Brest. General Marmont, on his side, is ready with 25,000 men. He will endeavour to land in Ireland, and will act under the orders of Marshal Angereau. The grand army of Boulogne will be embarked during the same time, and will do all that is possible to penetrate into the county of Kent. If the information which I have received from Irish refugees and from persons whom I have sent to Ireland is verified,

¹ It is a well-known saying of Napoleon—"Scratch the Russian, and you find the Tartar." Nelson, in a letter to Earl Spencer, dated Palermo, 6th September, 1799, used a somewhat similar expression—"The Russian Admiral," he wrote, "has a polished outside, but the bear is close to the skin. . . . The Turk, who is by no means a fool, on the contrary, has more natural sense than the other, is our brother."

a great number of Irishmen will range themselves under our standard, in which case he will march straight upon Dublin. . . .

. "NAPOLEON."

In a letter dated the 28th September and addressed to M. Cretet, the following paragraph occurs:—"Let me know how it comes that a Benedictine convent (at Mayence) has been turned into a Protestant church—convent which might have served as barracks for 900 men!"

On the 29th September Napoleon sent several pages of instructions to the Minister of Marine on the subject of three expeditions which he contemplated, in addition to those to be directed against England and Ireland. The first expedition was to secure Martinique and Guadeloupe, and to seize upon St. Domingo and Santa Lucia; second expedition, to capture Surinam and other Dutch colonies; third expedition, to capture St. Helena, for which from 1,200 to 1,500 men would be necessary. "As for the expedition to St. Helena," wrote his Majesty, "I handed you a memorandum at Boulogne. Send for the author of that memorandum, who is at Givet. The English have no suspicion of this expedition; it will be very easy to surprise them."

No wonder that the *mirriflores* of the fleet threw ridicule upon these expeditions, most of which were planned as if the winds and the waves were bound to obey the new Emperor.

On the 2nd October Talleyrand was ordered to complain of the Comte de Lille being allowed to remain at Warsaw. The Emperor said he would prefer to see the Pretender take up his residence in Russia or in Sweden.

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

"MAYENCE, 3rd October, 1804.

"M. d'Oubril has left this town. We are not at war with Russia, but on bad terms. Let no Russian who has

not a special passport remain in France. Some favour may be shown to the Poles who are not too bad. Prince Sapieha belongs to this class. As for Count Mozerniski, have him arrested and seize his papers. Do not hesitate to arrest any Swedes whom you may suspect. Send me notes concerning the Poles, Russians, and Swedes living in Paris. Have Dubois, Lamurra, Cerutti, and Rollands arrested directly. . . . For God's sake see that Datry, Lajolais, David, and la Grimaudière do not escape. Have Bosquet, the curé of . . . , arrested, and inquire if the accusations against him are true. If what you say of P. . . . be true, have him arrested. "NAPOLEON."

TO THE EMPRESS JOSEPHINE.

"TREVES, 6th October, 1804.

"MY FRIEND,—I arrive at Treves at the same time that you arrive at St. Cloud. Do not give an audience to T Receive B in public, and do not give him a private audience. Do not promise to sign any marriage contracts before they have been signed by me.

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

"TREVES, 6th October, 1804.

"The Prefecture of Boulogne caught fire two days before the English tried to burn the flotilla. This may have been an accident, but it is also natural to suppose that the fire was due to the English. The young commissioner who is there is not acquainted with the perversity of the human heart.

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. CAMBACÈRES.

"TREVES, 7th October, 1804.

"I have received the proposed decree concerning the lawyers. There is nothing in it which gives the Grand Judge the power of controlling them. I would sooner do

nothing than deprive myself of the means of taking measures against a heap of babblers and revolutionists, who are almost all inspired by crime and corruption. As long as I wear a sword I shall never sign so absurd a decree. What I want is to be able to cut the tongue out of any lawyer who uses it against the Government. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

Always very hard upon lawyers, Napoleon declared, when at St. Helena, that it had been his intention to frame a law by which no barrister or attorney could charge fees in a cause which they lost. This would prevent them taking bad cases into court, and would put a stop to a great deal of expensive and useless litigation.

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

“TREVES, *7th October*, 1804.

“. . . My chief object is to prevent the Jesuits from establishing themselves in France. They assume all sorts of disguises. I will have nothing which resembles an organised religious militia. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. TALLEYRAND.

“TREVES, *7th October*, 1804.

“Write to Spain, saying it would displease me to see the Jesuits re-established; that I will not tolerate them in France or in Italy; that, seeing the nature of our relations, I hope Spain will remain firm in the same principles; that I should like to have this assurance. Write the same to the Queen of Etruria.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

“TREVES, *7th October*, 1804.

“Immediately after the affair of Drake, Lord Hawkesbury had the stupidity to write a circular justifying the conduct of that minister. To make the folly and atrocity of the principles he propounded more apparent, it was my

intention to answer that circular. I have thought better since. I desire that the English minister at Hamburg be carried off, and immediately after the event I will notify the fact to the various courts of Europe. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

Bernadotte was to be charged to execute this fresh violation of German territory. What took place was this :—

On the night of the 25th October, a party of French troops passed the Elbe (in consequence, as it was insultingly said, of orders given by the Minister of Police at Paris), and seized Sir George Rumbold, the British *chargé d'affaires* to the Circle of Lower Saxony and the Hans Towns, at his country house in the vicinity of Hamburg, under the pretext that he was concerned in plans similar to those of Mr. Drake and Mr. Spencer Smith. His house was pillaged, he was sent to Paris, and thrown into the Temple, where he was treated with great harshness.

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

“ST. CLOUD, 13th October, 1804.

“The mother-in-law of the Arch-chancellor has come to Paris. Her object is to trouble the repose of the Arch-chancellor, at the instigation of his enemies. I beg you will see her, and try to persuade her, by gentle means, to return home. You will let me know the result.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

“ST. CLOUD, 29th October, 1804.

“You will see in the *Moniteur* of to-morrow an account of an unheard-of attack by the English on four Spanish frigates. Have several articles inserted in the papers with the object of exciting France to war, and of indisposing as much as possible the other Powers against England.

“NAPOLEON.”

This act of hostility was due to the fact of Napoleon having forced a treaty upon Spain which clearly constituted a *casus belli* as far as England was concerned. We see by the *Annual Register* that "on the 23rd October a despatch from Lord Cornwallis announced that a small squadron of British frigates under the command of Captain Moore of the *Indefatigable* had, after a short action, captured three Spanish treasure-ships and blown up one off Cape St. Mary's. Independently of 4,800,000 dollars, the captured vessels contained the most precious merchandise," a list of which is given in the *Annual Register*, with the observation that this was the first act of hostility against Spain. The English loss was about a dozen killed and wounded. Spain paid dearly for submitting to Napoleon.

But she was only at the beginning of a long series of cruel humiliations.

TO THE KING OF PRUSSIA.

"ST. CLOUD, 10th November, 1804.

"SIR, MY BROTHER,—I received your Majesty's letter this evening, and was much touched by the expressions of confidence and friendship which it contained. My first movement after reading your letter was to give orders for the immediate release of M. Rumbold. . . . Since this Rumbold affair has so deeply affected your Majesty, I must myself consider it as a most unfortunate event, for your personal satisfaction constitutes a portion of my felicity. . . . I have directed my foreign minister to explain to your ambassador here my peculiar position with regard to England, which respects no treaties, no international law, &c. The plots which that cabinet is constantly hatching against my life ought to excite the interest of all who have a horror of crime. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

The fact is that Prussia had addressed so vigorous a note to the French Emperor on this fresh violation of territory

that Napoleon at once released Sir G. Rumbold and sent him to Cherbourg, from which port he was put on board the *Niobe* under a flag of truce.

DECREE.

"PARIS, 16th November, 1804.

"All the furniture belonging to the chateaux of the King of Sardinia is mine.

"NAPOLEON,"

The sister of Mirabeau having asked for a commission in the navy for one grandson, the place of page for another, that of *menin*¹ for a third, and for herself the post of reader in the Imperial household—

DECISION.

"I beg the Arch-chancellor to let me have his opinion on these various demands.

"NAPOLEON."

In the reply of Napoleon to the address of the Senate, congratulating him on the Imperial dignity, occur such paragraphs as these:—

"My descendants will long preserve this throne."

"In camp they will be the first soldiers of the army sacrificing their lives in the defence of the country."

"Magistrates, they will never lose sight of the fact that contempt for the law and the disturbance of social order can arise only from the 'uncertainty' of princes."

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

"ST CLOUD, 11th December, 1804.

"I write you this letter to make known my displeasure in that you have permitted the word 'supper' to be used in the invitations of Wednesday, since the hour for which they are issued is that of my dinner. The date of the old

¹ *Menin* means the page to a dauphin, and there was no dauphin or direct heir to the throne at this period.

calendar has also been substituted for that of the new one, which is the calendar of the Empire. My intention is that in my palace, as elsewhere, the laws shall be obeyed.

“NAPOLEON.”

No wonder that M. de Talleyrand after such a humiliating reprimand as this should have accused his Imperial master of being a very ill-bred person.

A cousin of General Hoche having asked for the place of usher or valet-de-chambre—

DECISION.

“PARIS, 16th December, 1804.

“He is granted a small place in the Inland Revenue Office.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA.

“SERENE AND MOST POWERFUL EMPEROR, SIR, MY BROTHER,—My sister-in-law, the Princess Louis, has just given birth to a second prince (the first Imperial prince born), whom I have named Napoleon Louis. The interest which your Imperial and Royal Majesty has ever shown in all that can please me, and your attachment for my Imperial house, persuade me that you will share the satisfaction I feel on this occasion, &c.

“NAPOLEON.”

Similar letters were addressed to the Pope and other sovereigns.

It having been proposed to commit to prison an Englishman called Gold, because he had fought a duel with the keeper of the gaming table at Verdun, Napoleon decided—

“PARIS, 25th December, 1804.

“This proposal is not just. A prisoner of war on parole may fight duels.

“NAPOLEON.”

CHAPTER III.

THE YEAR 1805.

THE year 1805 was fertile in startling events. It opened with insincere assurances of peace and good will addressed to the sovereigns of Austria and England—assurances based upon the assumption that Napoleon was to be perfectly free to treat the lesser states on the Continent as he liked, and to violate the treaty of Luneville which guaranteed the independence of the Italian, Helvetian, and Batavian republics. The unfavourable reply which Lord Mulgrave returned to the overtures of the French Emperor was read out in the three French chambers, and commented upon in the most violent manner. It was considered necessary to prove to the French people that England raised insuperable obstacles to that peace so ardently desired by Napoleon. Naval and military armaments were being feverishly carried on throughout France; it was evident that the new Emperor meditated striking another blow, extending his dominion, and keeping the countries over which his armies had swept. It might be said of him that—

“He stood like a hawk, with the down on his beak,
And stared, with his foot on the prey.”

His troops lined the shores of the Channel; his flotilla was being daily increased, and his squadrons were preparing for that naval campaign which was to end in the

destruction of England. Had not medals been struck to commemorate the capture of London, and stamped as if cast in London?

In April, England and Russia signed a secret convention similar to that which had been signed between Russia and Austria in November, 1804, and one which had previously been signed between Russia and Prussia. With the view of preventing further encroachments on the part of France the coalition proposed to raise a force of 500,000 men in order to effect—

1st. The evacuation of Hanover and North Germany.

2nd. To establish the independence of Holland and Switzerland.

3rd. To restore the King of Sardinia.

4th. To guarantee the future security of Naples.

5th. To procure the complete evacuation of Italy and the Isle of Elba.

It was determined to open negotiations with France before proceeding to extremities. Alexander, who was anxious to play the part of mediator, and to earn the gratitude of Europe, was desirous for peace, and both Austria and England expressed their readiness to accept any terms compatible with the tranquillity and security of Europe. The Czar sent M. de Novosiltzoff to negotiate with Napoleon. As diplomatic relations had been broken off with Russia he was to ask for passports on arriving at Berlin. Napoleon, on the ground that he had no confidence in the mediation of so fickle a sovereign as Alexander, refused to grant passports before the month of July! This circumstance alone shows that he was bent upon war.

M. de Novosiltzoff never got beyond Berlin. While he was there, news arrived that Napoleon had been crowned King of Italy at Milan, had annexed Genoa, had transformed Lucca into a principality for his sister Eliza, and had indulged in the most outrageous and threatening language towards the Queen of Naples. The Russian

diplomatist was at once ordered to return to St. Petersburg. War became merely a question of time.

It might have been thought that Napoleon would have been satisfied with carrying out his grand scheme for the invasion of England, and would have desisted for the moment from aggravating the other great Powers. This was not the case, and it has been surmised that in the event of the failure of his naval campaign he wished to have an excuse for employing that grand army which he had brought to such a pitch of perfection, and which was ready to go anywhere and do anything.

None of the French naval commanders believed in the possibility of a successful invasion of England. Nelson declared the scheme impracticable owing to the strength of the currents in the Channel, but considered Napoleon equal to attempting the enterprise. The plan of the Emperor was, by deceiving the British admirals to gain the temporary mastery of the Channel, and to throw 130,000 men upon different points of the English coast. In the whole of this affair he betrayed considerable obstinacy. He failed to make any allowance for the instability of the elements ; a fact which led Nelson to write : " I knew that the orders given by Bonaparte on the banks of the Seine would take into consideration neither wind nor weather." Napoleon, as we have seen, thought that the British fleets and their crews would be worn out by remaining at sea, while his squadrons would improve in the harbours where they were blockaded. Nelson wrote to the Admiralty : " Those gentlemen are not accustomed to the storms which we have defied for twenty-one months without losing a mast or a spar." And to Collingwood he wrote : " If truth reaches the ears of Emperors, Napoleon must know to-day that his fleets suffer more damage in one night than ours in a whole year." Admiral Jurien de la Gravière in his *Guerres Maritimes* says that the French ships waited for a storm to blow away the blockading squadron before venturing to sea, and that

more than once the tempest left nothing for the English to do. If French seamanship became bad in port, that of their allies the Spaniards was probably worse. Brenton says: "To unmoor they take twenty-four hours where we take twenty-four minutes," and "when they cross their top-gallant masts in harbour they begin the day before; we cross them in one minute from the deck."

The consequences of Napoleon's policy by land and his policy by sea produced very different results, which may be summed up in two words—Austerlitz, Trafalgar.

His naval campaign completely broke down. Fifty sail of the line were suddenly to assemble in the Channel, and to secure the passage of the flotilla; but Missiessy failed to form his junction with Villeneuve; nor could Ganteaume escape from Brest, which was closely blockaded by Cornwallis. Villeneuve managed to sail to the West Indies, whither he was pursued by Nelson with an inferior force, and to return home. On the 22nd July he fell in with Sir Robert Calder and lost two Spanish ships. Villeneuve and Sir Robert Calder resembled each other, and were placed in a similar position. Both feared to assume responsibility, and both had an important mission to fulfil. The consequence was that neither admiral cared for resuming, on the 23rd July, the combat commenced on the 22nd in a dense fog. Villeneuve conceived it to be his duty not so much to attack Sir Robert as to form his junction with the Brest, Rochefort, and Ferrol squadrons; and Sir Robert considered it more prudent not to renew an engagement with a superior force when at any moment Villeneuve might be joined by twenty-one sail of the line.

Villeneuve was at first complimented by the Emperor for his success; but was afterwards loaded with reproaches. As for Sir Robert Calder, he was tried by court-martial and reprimanded, although as Brenton remarks, Admiral Hotham was made a peer for a similar victory. This decision drew from Dupin the following observation: "If Calder with an inferior force was tried and condemned

for capturing only two ships, what would have been done to him had he commanded the superior force and had lost two?"¹

It is certain that Sir Robert's action, though not brilliant, was fraught with important consequences—that he fulfilled his mission, which was to leave the port of Ferrol open and to intercept Villeneuve; and that the French admiral did not accomplish his, which was to form his junction with the other French fleets, and to convoy the flotilla across the Channel. The affair off Cape Finisterre disheartened both Villeneuve and Gravina. The former became aware that the English were acquainted with his presence, and that he could no longer conceal his movements, and the Spaniards felt deeply the fact that in a naval engagement in which fourteen French and six Spanish ships had taken part they should have lost two vessels, and their allies none. The inference which their pride drew was that the Spanish ships had been sacrificed.

Villeneuve remained at Ferrol to refit until the 11th August, when he once more put to sea with the view of forming his junction with Ganteaume; but, informed by a merchant vessel of the proximity of a British fleet of twenty-five sail of the line—a piece of false intelligence—he went about and stood for Cadiz. In Cadiz he was soon blockaded by Nelson, who, after a brief holiday at Merton, had consented to resume active service. On receiving positive orders from the Emperor to leave Cadiz and to support the operations of General St. Cyr by making a demonstration on the coast of Naples, Villeneuve, threatened with a successor in the person of Admiral Rosily, most reluctantly put to sea. The consequence was the battle of Trafalgar.

After the Calder affair and the flight of Villeneuve to Cadiz, the Emperor, exasperated with his admiral,

¹ Villeneuve had twenty line-of-battle ships and seven frigates; Sir Robert Calder fifteen line-of-battle ships and two frigates.

determined to commence operations against Austria and to disable that power before the Russians could arrive. Hanover was offered to Prussia as the price of her neutrality. By a series of bold and rapid movements the French got between Ulm and Vienna, and forced Mack to capitulate. Napoleon shortly afterwards entered the Austrian capital, and on the 2nd December fought the battle of Austerlitz, which proved a deathblow for the third coalition. Austria was completely crushed; the Czar was only too glad to be able to fall back unmolested, and with the remains of his army to recross his frontier; Prussia ceased to complain of the violation of her territory. In England the news of Austerlitz created universal dismay. Pitt was dying at Bath, and none of the ministers were at their posts. We were at war with France and Spain; our allies had been defeated, and there appeared to be nothing capable of resisting the genius and the force of Napoleon. After the battle of Trafalgar Pitt exclaimed, "England has saved herself by her courage, she will save Europe by her example." After Austerlitz he turned his face to the wall and died, murmuring, "My country! How I leave my country!"

Among the other events of importance to which the correspondence of 1805 refers, may be mentioned the coronation of Napoleon at Milan as King of Italy. The French Emperor had at first proposed, on assuming the Iron Crown, to take the title of King of Lombardy, but he renounced this intention through deference to the Emperor of Austria, who laid claim to that dignity. As in Notre Dame, so in the cathedral of Milan, Napoleon placed the crown on his own head, and in the second instance he glared fiercely round him, saying, "*Il cielo me la diede, guai a chi la toccherà!*" Melzi, Duke of Lodi, had been instigated to offer the crown of Italy to Napoleon, and on the 4th June a similar comedy was performed by the Doge of Genoa, on his arrival at Milan, to implore his new Majesty to unite the ancient Republic to the Empire. Genoa had

furnished France with 6,000 sailors, and had ceded her harbours, her dockyards, her arsenals, &c., to Bonaparte, as the price of its independence, and this was its reward. This annexation created the greatest irritation among the Great Powers ; it brought England and Russia together, and caused Austria to remonstrate twice.

In the beginning of the year the Pope returned to Rome, exceeding sorrowful, and filled with apprehensions lest he should be deprived of the last vestiges of his temporal power, and be driven from his capital by the Russians and the English.

During the march of his troops on Vienna, Napoleon had violated the neutrality of Anspach and Baireuth, and this led to an exchange of very angry despatches between him and the King of Prussia, who had just made up his mind to join the third coalition when the battle of Austerlitz was fought.

In 1805 the construction of the Confederation of the Rhine was commenced, from which Austria and Prussia were excluded ; the Electors of Bavaria and Wirtemberg received the title of King, and Baden became a Grand Duchy. In France the National Guard, destined to be disbanded in 1871, after having been the source of infinite trouble, was created.

The war into which Napoleon plunged was as unpopular in France as it was throughout the rest of Europe. It was productive of widespread ruin. The bank had to suspend payment, and there were numerous failures in Paris and in the provinces. M. Thiers has given a graphic description of the financial crisis of 1805 in his *History* (vol. vi. p. 31), consequent on the dearth of specie. And considering that Napoleon's great object in life was to ruin England, it is amusing to find his historian and panegyrist writing—"A considerable portion of our specie was transported to Hamburg, Amsterdam, Genoa, Leghorn, Venice, and Trieste, to pay for the sugar and coffee which the English landed at those ports either by

free commerce or by smuggling. All the commercial men of the time complained of this state of affairs."

Madame de Rémusat, who has much to say on the subject of the affliction caused by the *bella matribus detestata*, writes (vol. ii. p. 203) that after the capitulation of Ulm the want of specie was severely felt. "Commerce suffered, the theatres were deserted, misery increased, and the people were sustained only by the hope that a brilliant campaign would be followed by a speedy peace." Everything shows that the war was due to the inordinate ambition of Napoleon Bonaparte.

The year ended with the Treaty of Presburg, which was the last diplomatic act of the Revolutionary era, which expired on the 11th Nivose, Year XIV., and with it disappeared the last vestige of that Republic, that freedom of thought and of action, those immortal principles for which so much blood had been shed.

By the Treaty of Presburg Austria abandoned the Venetian States, together with Istria and Dalmatia, which were united to the kingdom of Italy, and the Tyrol and Austrian Swabia, which went to Bavaria and Wirtemberg. All the small German States became his vassals, and he was free to turn his thoughts towards Naples and Prussia, but it never occurred to him to return to Boulogne with his victorious army.

On the 1st January Napoleon wrote to the Emperor of Austria, announcing that he had ceded his rights in Italy to his brother Joseph, whom he had proclaimed hereditary king of that country. He added that there was a clause to the effect that the crowns of France and Italy should never be united on the same head, and said that "having banished all uneasiness which may have been inspired by the reported union of Lombardy to France," he hoped the peace of the Continent would not be disturbed, and that his Majesty would turn a deaf ear to the instigations of the English.

The next day a similar letter was addressed to the

King of England—a letter naturally written to throw dust in the eyes of the French people, with whom the war was highly unpopular. Lord Mulgrave addressed a reply to M. Talleyrand on the 14th January, to the effect that his Britannic Majesty would be delighted to conclude peace on bases compatible with permanent security and the interests of his country, but that before answering more fully it would be necessary for him to communicate with the other Powers, with whom he was engaged in confidential relations, and especially with the Emperor of Russia, who took a lively interest in the safety and independence of the Continent.

To show the insincerity of Napoleon, it is merely necessary to refer to what he said before the Council of State on the subject of the resources of France: "For the last two years France has made great sacrifices. A Continental war would require more. I have a strong army, a complete military organisation, and I am in the same position as if war was about to be declared. But to assemble this force in time of peace, and to have 20,000 horses for artillery and baggage train, required a pretext in order not to alarm the Continental Powers, and this pretext has been furnished by the plan for invading England. I know that to keep all these horses in time of peace is throwing thirty millions into the water; but to-day I am twenty days ahead of my enemies, and I shall be a month in the field before Austria has bought her artillery horses. If I perceive that events in Italy (proposed creation of a kingdom of Lombardy) causes her to move, I shall declare war before she begins her purchases. You now know the explanation of a great many things; but we shall not have war, for I have just opened direct negotiations with the King of England with a view to conclude peace."

Miot de Melito, who gives the above in his *Memoirs* (vol. ii. p. 234), was evidently uncertain as to the real intentions of Napoleon, whether he all along meant to attack Austria, or whether he was bent upon venturing across the

Channel. The probability is that he had prepared everything for a march on Vienna in the event of his being foiled in his attempt on London. "But," adds the count, "the more he desired war the greater was his interest in persuading people that he was anxious for peace, and the object of the step he took with regard to the King of England, was to be able to prove that if he were dragged into a new war he had done all in his power to avoid it. Therefore as soon as the reply of England rejecting the overtures reached Paris, he solemnly communicated it to the Senate, the Legislative Body, and the Tribunate.

His Majesty on the same date wrote to his dear brother the King of Spain, saying, among other things—

"I should have conceived a sovereign contempt for the Spanish Cabinet had it accepted ignominious terms after the insult which Spain has received from England. . . . Your Majesty has adopted the right course; it is only by arms that such sanguinary affronts are revenged. . . . Your Majesty has thirty ships; let them be armed. You have sailors; you require only money, which may be found without difficulty; since you have united to your crown the property of the Knights of Malta, you can sell it; you can also exact from the clergy and the various orders of the State contributions and patriotic gifts. Spain has experienced heavy misfortunes; Heaven wished to chasten your Majesty. Let your Majesty, let the queen your wife, let the princes, the princesses, &c., be the first to make sacrifices. . . ."

When Napoleon wrote the above delectable epistle, one can imagine that he had been reading such a passage as this from the pages of Voltaire: "A preacher ascends the pulpit and says that you have neither good conduct nor courage, and that you were beaten at Ramilies because you did not know how to defend yourself, and he is stoned. But if he said—Your sins have irritated the Almighty, who handed you over to the heretics at Ramilies; but when you returned to the Lord, He blessed your work at

Denain, &c., he would be patiently listened to." As for the poor King of Spain, he had more sanguinary affronts in store for him beyond the loss of his galleons, both at the hands of the English and those of Napoleon.

On the 2nd January Napoleon also wrote to the King of Naples, and at great length to the queen. To the king he said—

"The French troops occupy the kingdom of Naples in virtue of the treaty of Florence ; they will remain there as long as the affairs of the Levant are not settled, and until England has evacuated Malta, and Russia Corfu. . . . Let your Majesty reject the perfidious counsels of England. . . ."

To the queen Napoleon wrote—

"MADAM,—Your letter has been handed to me by the Marquis de Gallo. It is difficult to reconcile the sentiments it contains with the hostile projects current at Naples. I have in my hands several letters written by your Majesty which leave no doubt with regard to your secret intentions. No matter what the hatred which your Majesty bears France, after the experience you have had of the love of your husband, of your children, of your family, and of your subjects, how comes it that you are not more reserved, and do not adopt a line of policy more in conformity with your interests ? Cannot your Majesty, who is distinguished among women for your wit, divest yourself of the prejudices of your sex ? how can you treat the affairs of your kingdom as love affairs ? You have lost your kingdom once already ; twice you have been the cause of a war which threatened the total destruction of your paternal house :¹ you wish then to be the cause of a third war ? Already on the demand of your ambassador at St. Petersburg 10,000 Russians have been sent to Corfu. What ! Your hatred, is it so implacable, and your love for England so ardent, that you wish, although certain to become the first victim, to set the continent in a blaze, in

¹ That of Austria.

order to operate a diversion in favour of England? I acknowledge that I should conceive some esteem for such violent passions did the most simple ideas of common sense not make me feel their frivolity and impotence. . . . Let your Majesty patiently listen to this prophecy: On the occasion of the first war you cause, you and your posterity will cease to reign, and your children, wandering through the different countries of Europe, will demand succour for their parents. . . . I have no intention of paying court to your Majesty in this letter; that would be disagreeable to you. However, you may see in it a mark of my esteem. It is only to a person possessed of a force of character far above the ordinary run that I should give myself the trouble of writing so freely. . . .”

And her Majesty was asked to dismiss Mr. Acton her minister, to expel Mr. Elliot the British ambassador, and the *émigrés*, to recall her ambassador from St. Petersburg, and to disembody the militia!

On the 16th January Napoleon forwarded to the Minister of Marine his ideas on the subject of an expedition to India. He proposed to attack us by means of three squadrons, consisting of twenty-eight French and five Spanish ships of the line, frigates, &c., conveying 20,000 French, 3,000 Spanish, and 3,000 colonial troops. He was convinced that the various princes of India would throw off our yoke, and that he would be able to regain all that Dupleix and Lally had lost.

M. Portalis having proposed to authorise the existence of a religious association at Lyons under the patronage of Cardinal Fesch—

DECISION.

“PARIS, 28th January, 1805.

“I will have no ecclesiastical associations; they are not required. Good *curés*, good bishops, good priests, and well-kept seminaries, are all that are necessary.

“NAPOLÉON.”

Napoleon would have no Jesuits in France. He bore the society an old grudge. Had it not ruined his family in Corsica?

TO THE EMPEROR OF TURKEY.

“PARIS, 30th January, 1805.

“Most high, most excellent, most powerful, most magnanimous and invincible prince, great Emperor of the Mussulmans, Sultan Selim, in whom honour and virtue abound, our very dear and perfect friend, may God augment your grandeur and accord you a happy end. Thou, descendant of the great Ottomans, emperor of one of the greatest kingdoms in the world, hast thou ceased to reign? How comes it that you permit the Russians to dictate to you? If the Russians have 15,000 men at Corfu they do not threaten me; are you so blind as not to perceive that a Russian army, favoured by the Greeks, will one day attack your capital, and that your empire will perish with you? Your dynasty will descend into the night of oblivion. The *reis effendi* is betraying you; half the Divan is sold to Russia. . . . As for me, I desire to be your friend. If you persist in refusing precedence to France at Constantinople, I shall turn against you, and I have never been a feeble adversary. Your Divan is taking no measures to re-establish order in Egypt and Syria. . . . I write to you because you are the only friend which France has preserved in the seraglio. Arouse thyself, Selim! Form a ministry among your friends, and drive out the traitors. Confide in your true friends—France and Prussia. . . . Your real enemies are the Russians, because they wish to reign in the Black Sea. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

On the 31st January Napoleon wrote to Berthier, giving orders for Marshals Soult, Davoust, Jourdan, Bernadotte, Augereau, and General Marmont to rejoin their respective corps, for war was becoming more and more imminent.

On the 16th February Napoleon addressed a long letter to the Shah of Persia, in which he said—

“Fame, which publishes everything, has informed you who I am and what I have done; how I have raised France above all the nations of the West, and in what a startling manner I have displayed the interest I feel in the kings of the East.”

After dipping into the history of Persia, praising its climate, the fertility of its soil, the talent and bravery of its inhabitants, and such great warriors as Nadir and Mehemet Shah, the Emperor added—

“You will imitate and surpass the examples they have left behind. Like them you will distrust the counsels of a nation of shop-keepers, who, in India, traffic the lives and crowns of sovereigns; and you will oppose the valour of your people to the incursions of the Russians.”

And in conclusion Napoleon announced the despatch of a confidential messenger to the Shah.

TO THE PRINCE REGENT OF PORTUGAL.

“LA MALMAISON, *February 19th*, 1805.

“The present letter will be presented to your royal highness by General Junot, my ambassador. I have charged him specially to assure you of the interest I take in the welfare of Portugal, and the hopes I entertain that the two states will march together in order to attain that great result, the equilibrium of the seas, threatened by the way in which England abuses her power, and by her vexatious conduct, not only as regards Spain, but towards all the neutral powers. The assurances which I have received from your royal highness are a certain guarantee that we shall come to an understanding in order to inflict the greatest possible damage on England, and to force her to adopt more healthy and moderate measures.

“NAPOLEON.”

On the 21st February the Emperor having received a reply from the Queen of Naples wrote once more a long letter to her Majesty reiterating his previous complaints, especially concerning those Russian troops at Corfu (which threatened not him but the Sultan). In this strange epistle Napoleon said—

“A direct correspondence with your Majesty would be agreeable to me even should it lead to nothing. You must pardon me, madame, the frankness with which I shall sometimes be obliged to write to you. Your ambassador was greatly embarrassed when I acquainted him with the nature of the documents in my possession which could leave no doubt with regard to your secret sentiments a few months ago. But God forbid that I should think these cannot change! The affections change, and common sense and the rules of an enlightened policy are the only things which never change. All the persons who arrive from Naples agree that your Majesty does not hide your hatred towards France. . . . All that M. de Gallo says induces me to believe that you will soon entertain different feelings towards us, and when I can boast of having brought about this change I shall feel proud of the conquest.”

Napoleon never did effect the conquest of the spirited sister of the unfortunate Marie Antoinette.

On the 23rd of February, 1805, Napoleon addressed several pages of instruction to General Junot, who was to see the Prince of the Peace at Madrid. He wrote in this manner—

“You will inform the king that I count upon all the energy of Spain to enable me to re-establish the equilibrium of the seas; that I am too well acquainted with his elevated character to doubt that he will use every effort to avenge Spanish honour so violently insulted. You will speak to the queen in the same strain. . . . You will see the Prince of the Peace several times, and tell him that I have confidence in him; that I have seen his exhibition of energy

with pleasure ; that all my prejudices with regard to him have disappeared, &c., &c.

“You will tell the Prince of the Peace, that according to your instructions you are to employ gentle means for a fortnight, but that should Portugal refuse to close her ports to England and to lay an embargo on English merchandise, the two ambassadors should leave Lisbon simultaneously. War will be immediately declared against Portugal, and the property belonging to Portugal in the two States will be confiscated. In this case I will furnish all the troops Spain may require, in the autumn, and we will seize upon Portugal. . . .

“You will tell him that the King of Prussia has sent me twelve grand cordons of the Prussian eagle to distribute among the most considerable persons in France ; that I should see with pleasure the King of Spain, on his own impulse [!] do the same with the order of the Golden Fleece. . . . You will give him to understand that Beurnonville (the French ambassador at Madrid), although he enjoys my confidence in ordinary matters, does not enjoy it in private affairs. . . . You will add that I intend making the Prince of the Peace a present in order to prove my esteem, but that I shall wait until the Spanish squadron has done something.”

During the first months of 1805 Napoleon addressed frequent despatches to his minister of marine and to his various admirals on the subject of putting to sea, eluding the vigilance of the British squadron, forming a junction with the Spanish fleet, and, by means of skilful combinations, destroying our naval supremacy. These despatches, most of which ran to a considerable length, entered into the most minute details, but fortunately Napoleon had no naval commander capable of carrying out the vast schemes intended to annihilate our sovereignty of the seas. The year 1805 witnessed the destruction of all his carefully elaborated plans of invasion and naval conquest, and

settled the question between *Mare Clausum* and *Mare Liberum*, not in favour of Grotius but in favour of Selden.

TO M. DE CHAMPAGNY.

“ST. CLOUD, 9th March, 1805.

“A great many persons complain that classics are too dear. It would be well to appoint a commission to tax the price of books adopted by the lyceums at so much a page.

“It is also complained that as the shop-fronts are advanced by degrees, so the stone pillars which protected foot-passengers against carriages have become useless. It will be sufficient to have these placed in a more salient position.

“NAPOLEON.”

In some of the old streets of Paris these stone pillars, intended to protect foot-passengers, may still be seen, and they were absolutely necessary before the introduction of raised sidewalks.

On the 17th March Napoleon, who had a month previously solemnly declared in the senate that he had no intention of incorporating any more territory, wrote to the Emperor of Austria on the subject of Italy, saying—

“I had the very natural desire of relieving myself of so weighty a burden. But the Government of the Italian Republic considers that as long as there are Russian troops at Corfu and English troops at Malta the separation of the crowns of France and Italy is illusory, for there can be no separation of crowns wherever there is any army belonging to one of those crowns. There is no possibility of the French army evacuating the territory of the Italian Republic before the affairs of the Levant are settled.”

And Napoleon went on to promise that as soon as Corfu and Malta were evacuated, the crowns of France and Italy would be separated.

The fact was that he had offered the crown of Italy to his brother Joseph, on condition of his renouncing all

claims to the throne of France ; but, contrary to the advice of his friends, Joseph had refused. Napoleon then proposed to settle the crown of Italy on the eldest son of Louis, concerning whose birth there were such strange rumours, Louis to govern the country until his son came of age. This arrangement was indignantly rejected by the future King of Holland, who was well aware what a scandal would ensue and how evil tongues would wag. Napoleon was so angry at thus being thwarted by his brothers that he took Louis by the shoulders and flung him out of the room. Finally he determined to assume the Iron Crown himself, and to make Eugene Beauharnais his viceroy in Italy.

REPLY TRANSMITTED BY THE EMPEROR TO HIS
HOLINESS THE POPE.

“ LA MALMAISON, 21st March, 1805.

“Your Holiness declares that the dispositions of the civil code on the question of divorce are not in harmony with the religious dogma concerning the indissolubility of marriage, and you desire a change to be made in this portion of French legislation.

“The civil code could not proscribe divorce in a country which tolerates religions which admit of it. Besides, it would hardly have been wise suddenly to change a jurisprudence which fifteen years of revolution has naturalised in France, when the new civil code was drawn up.”

This reply, which extends over several pages and recapitulates all that Napoleon had done for the Church, also contains such paragraphs as these :—

“It is the intention of his Majesty that no married ecclesiastics shall be employed in public instruction, nor any priest who is not in communion with his bishop. . . .”

“The reconciliation of the constitutional bishops with your Holiness having been effected,” &c.

His Majesty would not consent to the re-establishment

of religious orders of men; but he “hastened to re-establish the sisters of charity and *sœurs hospitalières*, devoted to the service of the sick and to the education of poor girls. As a sign of his peculiar protection he named *Madame* (the mother of the emperor), the protectress of these establishments so useful to humanity. . . .”

“Your Holiness demands that the Catholic religion be declared dominant in France. It is dominant *de facto*, because it is the religion professed by his Majesty, by all the members of the Imperial family, and by the large majority of Frenchmen. . . .

“Circumstances have not permitted his Majesty to maintain the various colleges and seminaries founded in France for the benefit of Irish Catholics. None of these establishments could maintain themselves, as, during the Revolution, all lost considerable resources.”

It may be easily imagined how dissatisfied the Holy See was with a reply which eluded all its demands, and which recognised divorce, and those constitutional bishops more hateful to Rome than the disciples of Luther and Calvin.

The Elector of Baden having demanded the maintenance of his principality in Germany—

DECISION.

“PARIS, 24th March, 1805.

“Referred to M. Talleyrand. I desire M. Talleyrand will write to M. Laforest at Berlin to make overtures on this subject, which must be kept secret in consequence of Russia.

“NAPOLEON.”

The Elector had expressed himself satisfied with the explanations given with regard to the arrest of the Duc d'Enghien on his territory, and now asked for his reward.

The inhabitants of the quarter of the Petits Pères having asked that the church of that name should be restored to its primitive destination—

DECISION.

“ST. CLOUD, 27th March, 1805.

“Referred to the Minister of Finance. I desire that this church be restored for the purpose of public worship, and that the Bourse be held in a theatre. There are several vacant, and every one will gain by the arrangement.

“NAPOLEON.”

The money-changers driven out of the temple by Napoleon, took refuge in the Palais Royal. The present Bourse commenced by the Emperor in 1808, was not finished until 1826.

On the 30th March, Napoleon again addressed the Shah. He said, among other things—“One must allow oneself to be guided by the inspirations of Heaven, which has established princes in order to render people happy ; and when, from century to century, it causes some great men to appear, it imposes upon them the obligation of disseminating themselves so that the joint action of their designs may give greater splendour to their glory, and greater force to their desire to do good.

“What other object can we have? Persia is the most noble country in Asia ; France is the first empire of the West. Reign over the inhabitants of countries which nature has been pleased to embellish, and to enrich with abundant productions ; command the industrious, talented, and brave men who inhabit them. Is not this the finest of all destinies ?

“But there are upon the earth empires where nature has been sterile and harsh, and which produce only with regret what is necessary for existence. In these countries men are born restless, greedy, envious ; and woe to the countries which Heaven favours, if, in loading them with bounties, it does not accord them vigilant and courageous princes capable of defending them against the enterprises of ambition, of rapacity, and of misery !

"The Russians, fretting in their deserts, encroach upon the most fertile portions of the Ottoman Empire; the English, shut up in an island, which is not worth the smallest province of your empire, excited by the thirst of wealth, have established a power in India which becomes every day more formidable."

And Napoleon finally announced that General Romien was the bearer of this missive, which strongly recommended the Shah to form a well-drilled army, to cast guns, to make muskets, to construct forts, and to build a fleet for the Caspian Sea. General Romien would aid him in these matters.

TO M. TALLEYRAND.

"CHALON-SUR-SAÔNE, *7th April*, 1805.

"... I beg you will inform M. de Moustier that I cannot conceive how a man of so much judgment allows 30,000 Russians to alarm him for Prussia which has 300,000 men. The artillery, cavalry, and officers of the Prussian army are worth thirty times those of Russia. ...

"NAPOLEON."

Napoleon was now on his road to Italy to get crowned, and to divert the attention of Europe from the camp at Boulogne, and his war-like armaments.

TO GENERAL MARMONT.

"LYONS, *12th April*, 1805.

"Your courier has informed me of the capture of Dominica. ... My Toulon squadron sailed on the 9th (Germinal), or thirteen days ago, and I have no news of it. It had a division on board under the command of Lauriston. The English are in a bad way in India. Decaen has sent several batteries of light artillery and staff and engineer officers to the Mahrattas. ... An expedition to Walcheren is absurd. ... I shall always

repent having listened in the year XI. to General Monnet, and having lost a number of men by sickness. Do not keep any French troops in the Isle of Walcheren.

“NAPOLEON.”

The ulterior intentions of Sweden being suspected, an embargo was laid upon some Swedish vessels lying in French ports. In a letter to Decrès, Napoleon wrote—“The negotiation of a treaty of subsidies is a commencement of hostilities.” This being the opinion of the Emperor, he was not justified in loading us with invectives for declaring war against Spain.

During the period that Napoleon passed at Lyons he kept an anxious eye on the doings of his admirals, and mentioned more than once the hope that shortly after his return to Boulogne a combined French and Spanish fleet of fifty sail of the line would make its apparition and give him for a time the mastery of the Channel. From Lyons, Napoleon went to Chambéry and from thence to Turin, where he learned that Villeneuve had managed to elude the vigilance of Nelson, and to sail for the West Indies.

On the 23rd April, Napoleon informed the Minister of Marine that M. Jerome had arrived at Lisbon with Mdle. Paterson, his mistress, but that she was not to be allowed to land in France or in Holland. To Fouché the Emperor wrote that he had ordered M. Jerome to meet him at Turin; he was to travel by Perpignan, Toulouse, Grenoble, &c., and if he deviated from the road he was to be arrested and conveyed to Milan by the gendarmerie.

Poor Jerome, who was considered a sad pickle by his Imperial brother, had experienced the greatest difficulty in returning to Europe with his American wife. Two frigates, the *Didon* and the *Cybele*, had been sent across the Atlantic to bring him home, and after much hesitation he embarked on board the former. However, he had hardly got out of New York bay when the *Cambrian* and *Boston* obliged him to put back. After waiting for some

time, M. Jerome chartered a private vessel, and once more put to sea with his bride, but alas! they were cast ashore in Delaware Bay. They next tried the *Présidente*, which had taken the French ambassador out to the States, but H.M.S. *Resolution* barred the way, and the French captain, who, much to the wrath and humiliation of Jerome, declined battle, put back into harbour. The fact is, that a very sharp look-out was kept in the hope of catching the young gentleman, as one may guess from the following letter written by Nelson to the Right Honourable Henry Addington :—

“‘AMPHION,’ GIBRALTAR, *June 4th*, 1803.

“MY DEAR SIR,—We arrived here last night. Bonaparte’s brother, Jerome, passed from Martinique a few days ago in a ship of the line. It would have been pleasant to have laid a little salt on his tail, but I hope to do it yet.”

However, Jerome and his bride eventually managed to reach Lisbon safely on board the Yankee brig *Erin*, but Jerome alone was allowed to land. We shall have to refer to this marriage, which was fraught with serious political consequences, further on.

TO VICE-ADMIRAL DECRÈS.

“STUPINIGI, *27th April*, 1805.

“I forward you a report concerning Creusot. It is essential to keep up this establishment. It will not be well to purchase it ; but I think it will be useful to give a fixed amount of orders, so that it may have a basis of operations, and be able to support itself.

“NAPOLEON.”

The world-famed works of Creusot therefore owed at their birth a debt of gratitude to a paternal government.

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

“STUPINIGI, 28th April, 1805.

“The newspaper reforms will soon take place, for it is too stupid to have journals which represent all the inconveniences of the liberty of the press without its advantages, and which by malevolence or incapacity spread reports calculated to alarm commerce, and always in a sense favourable to England. . . . The editors shall not be allowed to enjoy good revenues for rendering me no service, but on the contrary for injuring me. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

The *Débats* was supplied with a Government inspector, to whom it had to pay 40*l.* a month!

On the 6th May, Napoleon, who had removed to Alessandria, wrote to Cambacérès to know what steps it would be necessary to take in order to annul his brother Jerome's marriage. Jerome himself had arrived at Alessandria, but it was some days before he was received into the Imperial presence. Unable to resist his powerful brother, he consented to repudiate Miss Paterson, who shortly afterwards landed at Dover. To his sister Eliza Baciocchi, who had recently been made Grand Duchess of Tuscany, Napoleon wrote—

“ALESSANDRIA, 6th May, 1805.

“MY SISTER,—M. Jerome has arrived. I am satisfied with his sentiments. His secretary, who is at Milan, is about to repair to Miss Paterson to tell her how matters stand, and to make her feel that her marriage, null in the eyes of religion and of the law, should be so in her eyes also. Speak to M. Lecamus (the secretary) and write to M. Jerome in the same sense. Impress upon him the necessity of adhering to his promises, for it is on this condition alone that I shall restore him my friendship.

“NAPOLEON.”

On the 9th May Napoleon addressed a long letter to the King of Prussia, sending, at his request, passports for a Russian envoy. At the same time he expressed but little confidence in the success of negotiations with St. Petersburg, for "the Worouzoffs are sold to England, and the character of the Emperor Alexander is too fickle and too feeble to hope that any good will result."

Towards the close of this letter, which was exceedingly vague, the French Emperor said—

"SIR, MY BROTHER,—I desire peace, but I cannot submit to my people being cut off from the commerce of the world. I have no ambition. I have twice, without being constrained, evacuated the third of Europe. . . ."

Direct diplomatic relations had not been re-established with Russia since the death of the Duc d'Enghien, but as the Emperor Alexander was anxious that peace should not be broken he sent M. Novosiltzoff, who had already submitted a plan of mediation to Pitt, on a mission to Paris. This messenger of peace did not, however, get further than Berlin. Napoleon did not absolutely refuse him a passport, but said that he must wait two months for it; long before that delay had expired fresh aggressions on the part of the French Emperor led Alexander to recall his ambassador, and to join the third coalition.

On the 13th May the Emperor wrote from Milan to M. Schimmelpennick, praising the energy of his most faithful ally, the King of Spain, asking the Grand Pensioner of Holland to increase his Texel fleet, and saying—

"It is scandalous that five vessels and several frigates which you have on the Indian station have inflicted no damage on the English, while the cruisers we have in those seas, fewer in number, have played havoc with their commerce."

TO M. CAMBACÉRÈS.

"MILAN, 13th May, 1805.

"I am not of your opinion as concerns Jerome. If he had been married in France before the civil authorities a judicial decision would be necessary. But married abroad, his contract not having been inscribed upon any register, a minor, without publication of banns, there was no more of a marriage than between two lovers united in a garden, upon the altar of love, in presence of the moon and the stars. . . . The Pope believed there was a religious marriage, but he is now convinced of his error. I have sent the young lady back, and I am satisfied with the young man, who has talent, who knows that he has committed a folly, and wishes to repair it.

"NAPOLEON."

The Pope was convinced that the marriage was valid, and adhered to this opinion, in spite of threats and persecution, to the intense anger of Napoleon.

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

"MILAN, 19th May, 1805.

"Let me know the destination of the 500,000 francs which General Perron sent to France. . . . Let him be informed that he will be well received in France. . . . I am not in a position to judge whether he was right or wrong in abandoning Scindia. . . . I shall see him with pleasure transport his fortune and his information to this country.

"NAPOLEON."

Perron was an accomplished soldier, whose career, traced by Colonel Malleon in his *Final French Struggles in India*, was cut short by Lord Lake, to whom he surrendered at the close of the year 1803. He had brought Daolat Rao's army to a very high state of efficiency.

According to the *Annual Register* Lord Lake marched 414 miles in eighteen days, his force doing seventy miles without resting and surprising Rao's army. Perron, although taken prisoner, was not despoiled; he managed to return home with 400,000*l.*, and to marry one of his daughters to a De la Rochefoucauld, and the other to a Montesquiou.

On the 24th May the Emperor wrote to the Pope, congratulating him on his health and his safe arrival at Rome, saying that he had given orders for the execution of the Concordat, announcing that he was going to be crowned on Sunday, and talking of a balloon which, sent up in Paris on the day of his coronation, alighted at Rome. Napoleon added:—

“I have several times spoken to your Holiness of a young brother of nineteen years old whom I sent out on board a frigate to America, and who, after a month's stay at Baltimore, married a Protestant, the daughter of a merchant of that city. This young man has just returned home. He is aware of his fault. I have sent back Made-moiselle Paterson, his *soi-disant* wife, to America. The marriage is null. A Spanish priest was sufficiently oblivious of his duties as to give them his benediction. I desire a Bull from your Holiness which shall efface all trace of this marriage. I forward to you several opinions on the subject, one of which is by Cardinal Caselli, whose handwriting you will recognise. It would be easy for me to have the marriage broken by the Archbishop of Paris, the Gallican Church not recognising such unions; but it appears to me more suitable that the immediate intervention of your Holiness should give a greater importance to this affair, if only because it concerns the member of a reigning house. I beg your Holiness not to give publicity to this first communication, because before you have agreed to it I shall make no public demand. It is important for many reasons, and in the interest of religion

in France, that I should not have a Protestant woman about me, and it would be a dangerous example if a minor should be exposed to seductions which are at variance with the civil laws and all kinds of propriety.

“NAPOLEON.”

There were several mis-statements in this letter. For example, Jerome had not been married by some obscure Spanish priest, but by the Roman Catholic Primate of the United States. However, the Pope was intimately acquainted with all the details of the case, and would never lend himself to a divorce.

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

“MILAN, 26th May, 1805.

“Have several letters printed in the papers, as if from St. Petersburg, declaring that the French are much better treated ; that court and town feel the necessity of making friends with us ; that all are persuaded English avidity is the real cause of the war ; that the English are unpopular ; that their scheme of a coalition has broken down ; that at all events Russia will not stir ; that she is too far off to meddle on her own account in an effective and direct manner.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO PRINCE MURAT.

“MILAN, 26th May, 1805.

“SIR, MY BROTHER-IN-LAW AND COUSIN,—What you write to me concerning the conclusion of a treaty of alliance between England and Russia is nonsense ; it is entirely false. These reports, spread by the English so that they may for the moment escape from their difficulties, are unfounded.

“NAPOLEON.”

The Emperor was perfectly well aware of the truth of these reports, but the country was already sufficiently alarmed.

TO M. CAMBACÉRÈS.

"MILAN, 27th May, 1805.

"The coronation took place yesterday with pomp. The church was splendid. The ceremony passed off as well as that in Paris, with this difference, that the weather was superb. In taking the iron crown and placing it on my head, I added these words: 'God gives it to me; woe to whoever touches it!' I hope this will be a prophecy.

"NAPOLEON."

If the weather proved fine, there were two elements wanting at Milan which had greatly added to the lustre of the ceremony in Notre Dame. Napoleon was crowned without Josephine, and the Pope had refused to be present. Josephine was present in the cathedral, but took no part in the ceremony. As for his Holiness, he was still smarting under the ill-treatment he had experienced in France, and was slowly wending his way back to the eternal city a sadder and a wiser man. All his illusions had been dispelled, all his sacrifices had been made in vain, he had met with nothing but harshness and ingratitude at the hands of the new Charlemagne whom he had consented to crown. By the Concordat and the voyage to Paris he had hoped to derive serious benefits. In her attempts to gain the protection of Napoleon, the Church, as Lanfrey remarks, had adopted for motto: *Omnia serviliter pro dominatione*. The reward of all her condescension had been humiliation and shame. The court of Rome had been obliged to give up M. de Vénègues; the constitutional clergy had not been obliged to retract; it saw French bishops employed like functionaries, sometimes aiding the civil power in carrying out the laws of the conscription, sometimes denouncing or playing the spy on political conspirators, so that Fouché was able to write in a circular to the bishops: "Between your function and mine there is more than one point of resemblance." It saw liberty of worship established in France in spite of the remonstrances of Consalvi,

who urged that "a Catholic cannot protect false doctrines, the essence of the Catholic religion being intolerance." The Pope had hoped to obtain from his powerful friend not only spiritual concessions, but the restoration of the legations and of Avignon and Carpentras. No wonder that he left Paris with an ulcerated heart. What advantages had he obtained? He had forced Napoleon, on pain of not being present at the coronation, to consent to marrying Josephine at the altar, had persuaded him to adopt the Gregorian calendar, and had not been obliged to receive Madame de Talleyrand.

TO M. BARBÉ-MARBOIS.

"MILAN, 27th May, 1805.

"The Isle of Elba should have yielded 500,000 francs for the years X., XI., XII., and XIII. It appears that it only paid 80,000 francs in the year XII., and 65,000 francs for the year XIII. My intention is that you take immediate steps to enforce payment. The isle is not blockaded. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. CAMBACÉRÈS.

"MILAN, 29th May, 1805.

"The people of Genoa appear to desire their union to France. The advantages of this union, and circumstances, are such as to induce me to pay no attention to the blustering of a few Powers. In fact, this can excite the animadversion of England alone.

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

"MILAN, 29th May, 1805.

"I have already told you that the treaty between England and Russia was false (*sic*). It is a ruse of the English cabinet; these intrigues have completely failed.

Even were you to see this treaty published in the English gazettes, and Pitt announce it to Parliament, you may say it is untrue.

“NAPOLEON.”

On the 1st June, Napoleon, in a letter to Fouché, propounded his ideas concerning the press. He said :—

“I should like to have an organisation without censorship, but I do not wish to be held responsible for all they say. I should like the editors of the journals allowed to exist, to be devoted men, with sufficient sense not to publish news detrimental to the nation. These journals should direct their attacks against English manners, customs, literature, &c. Geoffroi is recommendable from this point of view only, and Voltaire, by preaching Anglo-mania, did us infinite harm. . . .”

When at St. Helena, Napoleon studied English with the view of making himself acquainted with our literature.

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

“MILAN, 6th June, 1805.

“As nothing would give me a better idea of the exact feeling of the court of Vienna than a negotiation with the view of exchanging a certain number of cordons of the Legion of Honour against Austrian cordons, write to M. de la Rochefoucauld to tell M. de Cobentzel that during my sojourn at Milan I have received the cordons of Prussian, Bavarian, and Portuguese orders, and that not seeing any reason to make an exception, which would be a symptom of coolness, I am disposed to propose an exchange with Austria. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

On the 7th May Napoleon issued a decree appointing Eugene Beauharnais Viceroy of Italy, to whom he gave voluminous instructions, from which we detach the following paragraphs :—“As you are not of an age to be

acquainted with the perversity of the human heart, we cannot recommend too much prudence and circumspection. Our subjects in Italy are naturally more false than the citizens of France. The only means you have of preserving their esteem, and of being useful to their happiness, will be by not according your entire confidence to any one. . . . Dissimulation, natural at a certain age, is for you a matter of principle. When you have spoken according to your heart and without necessity, say that you have committed a fault, and do not fall again into the same error. Show the nation over which you rule all the more esteem on discovering motives for esteeming it less. A time will come when you will perceive little difference between one nation and another. . . . Speak as little as possible, for your education has not been sufficiently cared for to allow you to indulge in discussions. Know how to listen, and be sure that silence has often the same effect as science. . . . Do not accord any confidence to spies; there is more inconvenience than advantage in having them," &c. &c.

In fact, his Majesty might have recommended to his viceroy the device *qui nescit dissimulare nescit regnare*.

Hardly a day passed without long despatches and orders being sent to the Minister of Marine on the subject of Villeneuve, Missiessy, Ganteaume, the Dutch and Spanish fleets, Nelson, Cornwallis, Cochrane, Calder, &c.

On the 9th June, Napoleon, after indulging in many speculations, said:—"If England is aware of the serious game she is playing, she will raise the blockade of Brest; but I know not, in truth, what kind of precaution will protect her from the terrible chance she runs. A nation is very foolish when it has no fortifications and no army to lay itself open to seeing an army of 100,000 veteran troops land on its shores. This is the masterpiece of the flotilla! It costs a great deal of money, but it is necessary for us to be masters of the sea for six hours only, and England will have ceased to exist. There is not a fisherman, not a

miserable journalist, not a woman at her toilette, who does not know that it is impossible to prevent a light squadron appearing before Boulogne. . . .”

We see by a letter of the 13th June that Napoleon thought Nelson had sailed not to the West but to the East Indies.

On the 14th June Napoleon wrote to M. Champagny, who, with M. Jerome Bonaparte, was blockaded by the English at Genoa, that the Baron de Giusti could stay or could leave that place just as he liked. The country being French, his mission was finished. The union of Genoa to France, added Napoleon, did no harm to Germany, but only to England ; but if Austria was in quest of a pretext for declaring war, she might make use of this.

This seizure of Genoa proved the feather which broke the camel's back, and it was as highly resented at St. Petersburg as at Vienna, and in fact by all the members of the coalition.

Before leaving Italy, Napoleon was intent upon arranging the affairs of his new kingdom, and instructing his youthful viceroy, who was only twenty-three years of age, in the art of governing. On the 19th of June he wrote no less than seven letters to “his cousin” upon various topics. The next day he sent him six more letters, all dated from Mantua, and the day following three from Bologna. In fact, during the month of June, Prince Eugene received no less than thirty-four despatches from his indefatigable suzerain, cousin, and stepfather.

TO PRINCE EUGENE.

“FONTAINEBLEAU, 13th July, 1805.

“I arrived here eighty-five hours after leaving Turin. However, I lost three hours at Mont Cenis, and I was constantly delayed by the Empress one or two hours for breakfast, and one or two hours for dinner. This made me lose eight or nine hours more. When the legislative

body has finished its sittings, retire for a month to Monza, and have the palace at Milan fitted up. I think I told you what I wanted. Arrange so that one will be able to walk straight through the grand apartments and reach those looking on the Place du Dôme. In this way the bedroom destined for the empress will be the king's bedroom, and the place where the boudoir stands will be the king's drawing-room; the room which precedes it will be the throne-room. The queen's room will be that which was occupied by Madame de la Rochefoucauld. The apartments which I occupied will be the 'little apartments'; there will be a library, a study, a place for the archives, a topographical office, a small bedroom, bath-room, drawing-room," &c. &c.

Nothing appeared to be too minute to attract the attention and engross the mind of this wonderful genius.

After leaving Fontainebleau, Napoleon repaired for a few days to St. Cloud, whence he dictated pressing despatches to his admirals and to the minister of marine.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER.

"ST. CLOUD, 20th July, 1805.

" . . . I think I ordered you to embark everything, for circumstances may present themselves at any moment. I wish you to embark the artillery, powder, and all the ammunitions, so that in twenty-four hours the whole expedition may start. A general of brigade, with some dashing officers, should embark with Marshal Ney's corps, which will be the first to land. . . . My intention is to land at four different points, at a short distance from each other. . . . Inform the four marshals; there is not an instant to be lost.

"NAPOLEON."

TO CARDINAL FESCH.

"ST. CLOUD, 24th July, 1805.

"The King of Spain has placed six cordons of the Golden Fleece at my disposal; I have deemed fit to grant you one. . . . You will find inclosed several numbers of the *Moniteur*, which may lead you to suppose that war is imminent. This is not the case. I have excellent news of my squadrons. Take steps to procure two cardinals' hats. . . . You will inform Cardinals Rayane and Caselli that I have accorded them the Grand Eagle of the Legion of Honour.

"Answer my last dispatch by return of courier, relative to the annulation of the marriage of M. Jerome.

"NAPOLEON."

The other Spanish cordons were given to his brothers Joseph and Louis, and his brothers-in-law, Prince Piombino (*id est* Bacciochi) and Prince Borghese. One Napoleon probably kept for himself.

TO PRINCE EUGENE.

"ST. CLOUD, 27th July, 1805.

"I have directed M. Marescalchi to forward you a decree, ordering the Legislative Body to terminate its sittings. My intention is that during my reign in Italy it shall not meet again. I had too good an opinion of the Italians. I see that there are still *beaucoup de brouillons et mauvais sujets*. It is incredible that a bill so simple as that of the finance should have enlisted a third of the chamber against it. . . . You will not send a message to the Legislative Body; you will pay it no honours; you will simply make known my displeasure. . . . You are wrong to look upon the Italians as children. There is a great deal of malevolence in all this. Do not allow them to forget that I am master to do what I like with them. This is necessary for all people, but especially for the

Italians, who only obey the voice of a master. They will esteem you only when they fear you, and they will fear you only when they see that you know their double and deceitful character. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. TALLEYRAND.

“ST. CLOUD, 31st *July*, 1805.

“All the news I receive from Italy is warlike, and Austria no longer conceals her intentions. Prepare a note for M. de Cobentzel, let it be long, wily, argumentative, and in similar terms to the inclosed.

“NAPOLEON.”

The note drawn up by Talleyrand was approved of, and forwarded to Vienna. At the same time, the French ambassador, M. de la Rochefoucauld, was instructed to say that if Napoleon received secret assurances that the Austrian troops should return to their garrisons in Hungary and Bohemia, he should consider himself at peace; but that if the movement of troops and formation of magazines continued, he should consider hostilities declared, and, in the impossibility of continuing a maritime war, he would at once march, in order to “pacify” Austria—that if the Cabinet of Vienna allowed itself to be influenced by such soldiers as Mack, Zach, &c., it would be drawn into difficulties. Napoleon added—“There is no commonsense in a war, and one can no longer fight, reasonably, but for the Empire of Constantinople—an apple of discord, concerning which France and Austria will in all probability march united.”

TO M. DARU.

“CAMP OF BOULOGNE, 6th *August*, 1805.

“. . . As regards the encouragement of art, the Imperial Library being under the department of the minister of the interior, and having placed 200,000*fr.* at his disposal, this

year, I am not aware why the Treasury refused to pay the money ; a large portion of the expenditure of the civil list is devoted to furniture and to painting and embellishing palaces, which is so much encouragement accorded to art. . . . David receives considerable sums for arts. My librarian has made me subscribe for a large number of engravings and other works, and I shall not refuse anything you may deem necessary to encourage artists ; but I do not wish this to be an obligation imposed upon me. The manufactories of La Savonnerie, the Gobelins and Sèvres, ought to work without costing the Treasury anything. . . . Every time that the embellishment of a palace is proposed it must be considered of what advantage this is for art and manufactures. The Museum is at my expense ; it costs me considerable sums ; it is intended to encourage art. . . .

“ NAPOLEON.”

On the 8th August Napoleon, in a letter to Cambacérès, mentioned the naval battle between Villeneuve and Sir Robert Calder. Although two Spanish vessels had been lost, he considered that the French fleet had gained a success. In a second letter to the minister of finance, he said :—

“ It would have been very fine but for the bungling of the Spaniards. However, we remained masters of the field of battle for two days ; the English retreated and we operated our junction. You know how little the Spaniards are to be reckoned upon ; unfortunately they had been placed in the rearguard, and they executed a manœuvre which brought them under fire first. The English appeared to be weak in ships and men. Reassure the moneyed men, and give them to understand that nothing will be left to chance. Without doubt I shall embark with my army, but I and my army will only embark with every possible chance of success. . . .

“ NAPOLEON.”

Napoleon wrote several letters on the subject of this naval combat—to Fouché, to Talleyrand, to Decrès, to M. Schimmelpennick, &c., he said : “ Villeneuve has fulfilled his object—the Junction. The English squadron refused action for three days. . . . The French squadron suffered very little. As all this will be very disagreeable for the Spaniards, praise Gravina, and make a thousand conjectures as to the fate of the Spanish vessels ; say that it is not known if they have been taken. My private opinion is that they have been captured. . . . The enemy has suffered to the extent of 20,000,000*f*. Three English vessels were dismasted and one sunk.”¹

Napoleon changed his tone afterwards. He naturally exaggerated the damage done to the English fleet, which suffered little except in spars. Two ships returned to England, but neither of them had to go into dock for repairs, and they were speedily able to rejoin Sir Robert. As for Villeneuve, he first put into Vigo, then to Corunna, and afterwards to Ferrol, where he remained refitting until the 11th August.

On the 13th August Napoleon wrote a long despatch to Talleyrand, in which he said : “ My mind is made up ; I desire to attack Austria, and to be at Vienna before the month of November, in order to meet the Prussians, should they present themselves, or else Austria must withdraw her troops from the Tyrol,” &c. The Austrian ambassador was to be told that Napoleon would not think of invading England while his southern frontier was threatened—that orders had been given for operations to be suspended—that unless Austria complied with the demands of the Emperor he would declare war in a month—that he was not mad enough to give the Russians time to arrive. M. de Cobentzel was to tell his master that if he desired war he would not spend his Christmas at Vienna, that he might have a numerous and formidable army ; “ but a rapid

¹ Villeneuve, in his report, said—“ But I still fail to comprehend how we lost the two ships that are missing.”

movement given to 300,000 men should be the work of one head ; a cabinet executes similar movements slowly ; and when the French nation learns that Austria attacks us at the instigation of England, the French Emperor will find 600,000 men who will be well worth the 80,000 Hungarians which the gazettes speak of as having offered their services to the Court of Vienna." And finally, Talleyrand was ordered to try and frighten "this skeleton Francis II., placed on the throne by the merit of his ancestors."

In a letter to the minister of marine, Napoleon expressed his displeasure with Villeneuve, who had executed none of his orders in the West Indies. "All this," he added, "was owing to his fright, and yet he knew that Nelson had only twelve ships. . . . This proves to me that Villeneuve is a poor creature, who sees double, and who has more perception than courage. . . . What can Villeneuve have to complain of with regard to the Spaniards? They fought like lions. . . .!!!"

On the same day his Majesty wrote a long and flattering despatch to Villeneuve himself. He was pleased with the combat of 22nd July, although he thought the admiral should not have allowed the *Windsor Castle* and the *Malta* to get away, nor Sir R. Calder to have carried off the two Spanish vessels. The letter of Napoleon terminated thus :—

"The English are not so numerous as you seem to think.

"If you can appear here for three days, or even for twenty-four hours, you will have fulfilled your mission. Send a special courier to Ganteaume to inform him that you have sailed. Never, for so great an object, will a squadron have run some risks, and never will my land and sea forces be able to shed their blood for a greater and more noble cause. In order to favour the invasion of that Power which, for the last ten centuries oppresses France, we could all die without regretting life. These are the sentiments which ought to animate you and all my soldiers. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO VICE-ADMIRAL DECRÈS.

"CAMP OF BOULOGNE, 14th August, 1805.

"With thirty vessels my admirals ought not to be afraid of twenty-four English ships, or else we must give up the idea of having a marine. . . . If Villeneuve remains at Ferrol beyond the 16th, I shall consider him the last of men. According to the news from London, Nelson is still far away. If Villeneuve sails with his thirty vessels he will be sure of forming a junction with Allemand. Nelson and Collingwood are 'out of the field of battle;' likewise the squadrons of Cochrane and of India; there are twelve vessels at Texel. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

"Nelson was home from the West Indies at this date, and landed at Portsmouth on the 18th August, meeting with an enthusiastic reception.

TO THE PRINCESS ELIZA.

"CAMP OF BOULOGNE, 19th August, 1805.

"MY SISTER,—I have ordered the grand marshal of my palace to send you my portrait, in accordance with your request, as you think it will be agreeable to the people of Lucca. Send me a detailed account of your coasts and a list of the batteries which are necessary. I will send you the guns.

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. TALLEYRAND.

"CAMP OF BOULOGNE, 22nd August, 1805.

"The situation of my armies and the position of my forces do not permit of any transaction approaching to weakness. In giving Hanover to Prussia I give her a territory which will augment her forces to the extent of 40,000 men, and will also improve the situation of her states. . . . I understand in giving Hanover to Prussia, to guarantee the integrity of her states, and also that Prussia shall guarantee the integrity of my present possessions

without asking me to enter into any engagement as regards Switzerland, Holland, and the Neapolitan States. If it be asked what are my present frontiers you can reply—the Rhine on the German side, and on the Italian side my limits are those which border my kingdom of Italy and Tuscany. The King of Prussia must guarantee my kingdom of Italy to me and my descendants. . . . I will listen to nothing in favour of the King of Sardinia, or of the Bourbons. . . . As for Holland, I will give no guarantee. . . . This is an offer which I make to Prussia, but it must be understood that it is an offer which I shall not make again in a fortnight ; if the gift of Hanover induces Prussia to declare in my favour, makes Russia and Austria tremble, and leaves me free to continue my maritime war, I shall consider myself indemnified for this great increase of power accorded to Prussia. But once I raise my camp on the ocean I shall not be able to stop myself ; my plans of maritime war will have failed, and I shall have nothing to gain by giving Hanover. Prussia must therefore decide immediately. . . .

“ NAPOLEON.”

Still anxiously awaiting the arrival of his fleets Napoleon wrote to Decrès on the 22nd August, saying that Villeneuve had only the qualities requisite to command a frigate ; that he was a man without resolution or moral courage. To Ganteaume : “ If Villeneuve arrives at Brest with the intention of anchoring do not permit him to do so, but sail at once for your destination. There is not a moment to be lost.” And in a second letter written the same day Napoleon said he desired to take advantage of the superiority which fifty sail of the line would give him, in order to avenge six centuries of insult and shame. “ I count upon your talents, your firmness, and your courage in this important juncture,” he added.

The next day Napoleon addressed a letter to the King of Prussia on the Hanover business, in which he said : “ I have made up my mind to march into Bavaria myself at

the head of 100,000 men. It will be necessary, therefore, to fight again. God, my conscience, your Majesty, and Europe, will bear witness that I am attacked, since my frontiers are threatened at a time when all my troops and ships are on the coast. The house of Austria is not in a position to hold its own against me. . . .”

TO M. TALLEYRAND.

“CAMP OF BOULOGNE, 23rd August, 1805.

“It is necessary to come to a decision. In reality I have nothing to expect from Austrian expeditions. Austria will employ fine phrases in order to gain time and to prevent me from accomplishing anything this year; her treaty of subsidies and act of coalition will be signed this winter, and in April I shall find 100,000 Russians in Poland, fed by England; 20,000 English at Malta, and 15,000 Russians at Corfu. I should then be in a critical position. My mind is made up.

“My squadron sailed from Ferrol on the 14th August—thirty-four vessels; there was no enemy in sight. If it follows my instructions it will effect its junction with the Brest squadron and enter the Channel; there will yet be time: I shall be master of England. If on the contrary my admirals hesitate, if they manœuvre badly and do not fulfil their mission, I shall be obliged to wait for the winter and to cross over with my flotilla. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

Writing two days later to Talleyrand Napoleon announced that he had commenced his movements, and that by the 17th September he would be in Germany with 200,000 men. He added: “Continue to insert letters from Salsburg, Trieste, and Inspruck in the *Moniteur*, so as to accustom public opinion to the idea of war. Declare, however, that I am making no preparations, but simply protecting my frontiers.”

On the 25th August Napoleon notified to the Elector

of Bavaria his intention of marching through his states. "Bavaria," he wrote, "will gain additional territory and splendour. . . . My heart bleeds at the thought of the ills which will result. But God knows I am innocent. I have twice saved Germany, twice re-established Austria on her tottering throne. . . . I beg your Royal Highness will not communicate this letter even to your ministers."

TO VICE-ADMIRAL DECRÈS.

"CAMP OF BOULOGNE, *26th August, 1805.*

"It results from news received from London that the greatest alarm is felt and peace anxiously desired; that Calder will not be tried nor disgraced for not displaying more obstinacy; that he had only a third of his crews. Calder's squadron suffered more than they say; most of his vessels returned to port disabled.

"NAPOLEON."

Despatch after despatch, dated from the camp of Boulogne, followed in quick succession, and with marvellous rapidity everything was prepared for the great blow about to be aimed at the new coalition. It is easy to understand at what a disadvantage the Aulic Council was placed in presence of so much activity, vigour, powerful conception, and practical knowledge combined in a single person, whose orders were supreme and whose will was unfettered. In the postscript of a letter addressed to Duroc on the 28th August, Napoleon wrote:—

"The whole army has marched, and I shall be ready on the 27th September. I have confided the army of Italy to Massena. Austria is too insolent; she is redoubling her preparations. My squadron has entered Cadiz. Keep this secret to yourself. Obtain all the maps you can of Bavaria and bring me the organisation of the Russian and Austrian armies."

In the midst of all these orders and despatches dealing

with a host of military and political affairs, it is curious to come across the following decree dated the 31st August :—

“ Art. 1. There shall be established successively horse races in those departments of the Empire the most remarkable for the horses they breed : prizes shall be awarded to the fleetest horses.

“ Art. 2. From year XIV. races shall be run in the departments of the Orne, Corrèze, Seine, Morbihan, Sarre, and Hautes Pyrénées.

“ NAPOLEON.”

TO M. CAMBACÈRES.

“ CAMP OF BOULOGNE, 1st *September*, 1805.

“ MY COUSIN,—I must tell you in the greatest confidence that there is no longer a single man at Boulogne beyond those necessary for the protection of the port. In the course of a few days we shall see whether the laughers will be on my side or on that of the court of Vienna. . . .

“ NAPOLEON.”

After giving a few more orders and forwarding instructions to General Gouvion St. Cyr to invade the kingdom of Naples, Napoleon set out for Paris. On the 4th September he was at the Malmaison, whence he wrote a violent letter to Decrès on the subject of Villeneuve :—

“ The admiral,” he said, “ has filled the measure to overflowing ; on leaving Vigo he ordered Captain Allemand to Brest, and informed you of his intention of going to Cadiz. This is certainly treason. . . . There is no name for this. Villeneuve is a wretch, who must be dismissed with ignominy. Devoid of combinations and of courage, he would sacrifice everything in order to save his skin. . . . After this I am obliged to regard Missiessy as a hero.”

And all Villeneuve's crimes were recapitulated, including his conduct in not renewing his battle with Sir Robert Calder's disabled fleet, &c. &c.

Villeneuve, we know, had hardly left Ferrol with the intention of carrying out his instructions to form a junction with Ganteaume, and then make his appearance in the Channel, when he learned that false intelligence at sea which decided him to seek refuge at Cadiz.

TO GENERAL DUROC (*on Mission to Berlin*).

“ST. CLOUD, 11th September, 1805.

“M. Talleyrand will inform you that I approve of the article proposed by M. de Hardenberg, and that if war does not take place I will guarantee the present state of Italy. I very much wish to know positively if the Russians have entered Austrian territory. M. Laforest (French ambassador) must not be sparing with spies; let him send Prussian, or other officers, to observe; and if necessary let him be prodigal of money. The King of Prussia can avoid a great war by signing the treaty. . . . Don't stop at anything; try and conclude the treaty. I will overlook everything else provided it does not prevent me from marching at once. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

NOTE FOR THE MINISTER OF MARINE.

“ST. CLOUD, 13th September, 1805.

“Art. 1. I wished to assemble forty or fifty ships of the line at Martinique by means of combined operations, cause them to return suddenly to Boulogne, remain for a fortnight master of the sea, have 150,000 men and 10,000 horses encamped on the coast, a flotilla of 3,000 or 4,000 craft, and on the arrival of my squadron disembark in England, and seize upon London and the Thames. This plan has failed. If Admiral Villeneuve instead of putting into Ferrol had been satisfied with forming a junction with the Spanish fleet, and had sailed for Brest, and united himself with Ganteaume, my army would have disembarked, and it would have been all over with England.”

Napoleon went on to explain that it was his intention to keep up a considerable force at Boulogne ; the camp there was healthy ; England would be kept in a continual state of alarm, and if necessary the troops might be rapidly thrown into Germany.

On the 15th September came the following address to the nation :—

“ FRENCHMEN,—I have passed the Rhine at the head of my army in order to re-establish one of our allies (the Elector of Bavaria) on his throne, from which he has been driven by the injustice and ambition of the house of Austria. . . . It is said that 100,000 Russians paid by English gold are marching to his aid. Well ! Let 100,000 more Frenchmen rally round my standards. Live without commerce, without colonies, and subject to the unjust will of our enemies is not to live like Frenchmen. . . .

“ NAPOLEON.”

Napoleon was loud in his complaints against Austria for having invaded Bavaria, and he addressed a violent note on this subject to the Diet of Ratisbon. The French Emperor in fact was more than angry, he was surprised at the rapidity with which the Austrians had crossed the Inn, and had obliged the Elector to fly from Munich.

On the 17th September Napoleon at last determined to remove Villeneuve from the command of the combined squadrons, and instructions were forwarded to Admiral Rosily to repair with due diligence to Cadiz, and to assume the command of the fleet.

On the 18th September Napoleon sent instructions to Massena saying that he hoped to pass the Rhine on the 27th September, and that he would not halt until he had reached the Inn. “ I put trust,” he said, “ in your talent and your bravery.” Gain me victories. In a letter to Prince Eugene of the same date he wrote—“ Make Marshal Massena a present of a carriage and six, of four riding horses,

and of 50,000 francs. At the same time write to him a friendly letter in my name, saying that I ordered this present to be made to him as a proof of my esteem, &c."

On the same 18th September, the minister of marine having proposed to give some of the crew of the *Topaze* who had been wounded, a gratification, Napoleon decided—"Rejected. Bravery is not paid for in money." The *Topaze* and consorts had captured the *Blanche* with the loss of one killed and eleven wounded, according to the French account.

Napoleon was still uncertain as to the side which Prussia would take, for if jealous of Austria, that Power was alarmed at the threatening attitude of Russia.

TO M. TALLEYRAND.

"ST. CLOUD, 19th September, 1805.

"Send a special courier to Berlin. New efforts must be made to induce Prussia to conclude the treaty of alliance. If that be not possible, Duroc, if they allow him to quit Berlin, can say on taking leave of the king that he has just received fresh instructions directing him to negotiate a treaty of neutrality. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

Prussia, bound by a secret treaty signed May 24th, 1804, to Russia, insisted on the independence of Holland and Switzerland being guaranteed, and only consented with bad grace to remain neutral in return for Hanover.

TO M. PORTALIS.

"ST. CLOUD, 19th September, 1805.

"Let M. Robert, priest at Bourges, know that I am displeased with the very bad sermon which he preached on the 15th August.

"NAPOLEON."

The 15th August was the Imperial *fête* day, on which occasion a good deal was naturally expected from the church.

Despatch after despatch now followed each other with marvellous rapidity directing the operations of the Grand Army. On the 22nd September, Napoleon with his own hand drew up the following direction for the march of his army corps which twenty-five days later brought about the capitulation of Ulm.

Bernadotte.	Wurzburg.	Anspach.	Nuremburg.	Ratisbon.
Marmont.	id.	id.	id.	id.
Davoust.	Manheim.	Mergentheim.	Anspach.	Dietfurt.
Ney.	Setz.	Crailsheim.	Weissemburg.	Ingolstadt.
Lannes.	Strasburg.	Gmünd.	Nierdlingen.	Neubourg.
Soult.	Landau.	Aalen.	Donauwerth.	

Napoleon had up to this moment been profuse in pacific assurances ; and although the Austrians had crossed the Inn on the 7th, it was only on the 22nd September that France was made aware of the new war into which she was about to be plunged.

On the Republican New Year's day (23rd September), Napoleon informed the Senate that he was about to place himself at the head of his troops. He added :—

“The desire of the eternal enemy of the continent is accomplished ; war has commenced in the centre of Germany ; Austria and Russia have joined England. . . . A few days ago I still hoped that peace would not be disturbed ; threats and insults found me impassable ; but the Austrian army has passed the Inn ; Munich is invaded. . . . It was at this moment that the wickedness of the enemies of the continent was unveiled. They still feared the manifestation of my profound love of peace ; they feared that Austria at the sight of the gulf dug under her feet would revert to sentiments of justice and moderation ; they hurried her into war. I groan over the blood which this will cost Europe ; but the French name will obtain fresh lustre. . . .”

The demands of Prussia, Austria, and Russia sufficiently explain the causes of this war.

The cabinet of Vienna said in a manifesto that peace between France and Austria reposed upon the treaty of Luneville, the stipulations of which had been violated by Napoleon, and demanded the independence of the Italian republics. The manifesto added—"Peace is disturbed when one Power arrogates to itself the right of occupation and protection, and exercising an influence provided for neither by international law nor treaties; when it speaks of the rights of victory after they have been abolished by peace; when it employs force to dictate laws to its neighbours to wring from them alliances, concessions, and acts of submission," &c., &c. Thus ran the unanswerable and unanswered Austrian manifesto. As regards Bavaria the cabinet of Vienna thought that by immediately invading that country the Elector would be induced to join the coalition. This was a fatal error which cost Austria the loss of an army.

TO PRINCE JOSEPH BONAPARTE.

"STRASBURG, 26th September, 1805.

"I have arrived at Strasburg. All the army has passed the Rhine. The enemy is at the issues of the Black Forest. Our manœuvres will soon commence. Do all you can to induce the nation to adopt the conscription. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO TALLEYRAND.

"STRASBURG, 27th September, 1805.

"... Things are proceeding rapidly. The Austrians hold the issues of the Black Forest. God grant that they may remain there. My only fear is lest we should frighten them too much. A great many things will happen in a fortnight.

"NAPOLEON."

TO PRINCE EUGENE.

"STRASBURG, 29th September, 1805.

"... Here are my allies in Germany: the Electors of Bavaria, Baden, and Wirtemberg, and the Landgrave of

Hesse Darmstadt, have each entered into an alliance with me, and have joined me with tolerably strong army corps. Have it printed in the Gazettes that I am with the army and that the Austrians are flying; that fear and disorder have succeeded arrogance and presumption. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

On the 30th September Napoleon addressed a proclamation to the Grand Army, in which he announced that the war of the third coalition had commenced; that Austria had violated treaties, and that the independence of the Germanic Body must be assured. He added:—

“SOLDIERS,—Your Emperor is in the midst of you; you are only the advanced guard of a great people. If it be necessary the whole nation will rise at my voice in order to confound and dissolve this new league woven by the hatred and the gold of England. But, soldiers, we shall have forced marches to make and fatigues and privations of all sorts to endure. No matter what obstacles are thrown in our way we shall overcome them, and we shall only repose ourselves after having planted our flags on the territory of the enemy.”

TO MARSHAL ANGEREAU.

“STRASBURG, 30th September, 1805.

“. . . My dear and good brother of Austria came to Memmingen, but he appears to have returned to Vienna after having held a grand council. God grant that his army may remain in its present position for a week, or better still, that it may advance to the Rhine. . . . Woe to the Austrians if they allow me to gain a few marches. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

Josephine, who had accompanied the Emperor to Strasburg, was left behind in that city.

TO THE EMPRESS JOSEPHINE.

"ETTlingen, 2nd October, 1805.

"I am still here in good health. I am about to leave for Stuttgart. The grand manœuvres are commencing. The armies of Wirtemberg and Baden have joined mine. I am in a good position, and I love you.

"NAPOLEON."

The Emperor sent Josephine another similar note from Ludwigsburg, and also wrote to Joseph announcing his junction with the Bavarians, and saying—"I heard the German opera of *Don Juan* at the Court Theatre last night. I fancy that this opera is the same as the one given in Paris. It appeared to me very good." His Majesty also sent a few lines to Cambacérès, declaring himself satisfied with the state of public opinion in Germany, and adding—"The people in general are very much irritated against the English, and pity the conduct of the house of Austria." To Champagny, his home minister, he wrote this brief epistle: "I am at the court of Wirtemberg, and, although waging war, heard some very good music here. The German singing, however, appears to me rather harsh. Is the reserve getting on? Where are you with the conscription for Year XIV.?" Fouché also was written to, directing him to animate public opinion in the newspapers.

TO THE ELECTOR OF BAVARIA.

"LUDWIGSBURG, 2nd October, 1805.

"MY BROTHER,—I have received your letter of the 1st October. The King of Prussia never attached any importance to troops passing through Baireuth and Anspach. Our constant custom during the last war was to pass through the territory in question as often as we liked. . . . In a letter which I wrote a month ago, I promised you that on the 7th October I should be in the centre of

Germany ; I hope to be able, with God's assistance, to re-establish you soon at Munich. . . . I shall employ all possible means to fix the power of your house on such bases that you will not have to dread being again driven from your capital. . . . I hope that you will be able to resist the first efforts of the Austrians, and to wait for the aid of the allied armies.

“NAPOLEON.”

And on the 20th Murat was ordered to respect Prussian territory, for “I have already had a serious quarrel about the first passage.”

On the 7th October the Emperor issued his first bulletin, in which the positions of the various army corps were enumerated, and the plan of operations partially disclosed. It terminated thus—“This great and vast movement has in the course of a few days carried us into Bavaria, allowed us to avoid the Black Mountains, the line of parallel rivers which fall into the valley of the Danube, and has placed us several marches in the rear of the enemy, who has no time to lose if he would save himself from utter destruction.”

In the second bulletin the following paragraphs occur :—“Colonel Maupetit, at the head of the 9th dragoons, was mortally wounded. His last words were—‘Let the Emperor be informed that the 9th showed itself worthy of its reputation, and that it charged and conquered to the cry of *Vive l'Empereur !*’

“It rains heavily, but this does not slacken the march of the army. The Emperor sets the example. On horse-back day and night, he is always in the midst of his troops and wherever his presence is necessary. He rode fourteen leagues yesterday ; he slept in a small village, without a servant or any kind of baggage. However, the Archbishop of Augsburg had his palace illuminated, and awaited his Majesty a portion of the night.”

The third bulletin mentioned that there had been some hard fighting, but that the enemy had been driven back,

and that the extent and complication of the combinations of the French army had entirely disconcerted the Austrians. This time we find—"The Emperor has taken up his quarters at Augsburg, in the palace of the Elector of Treves, who treated the suite of his Majesty with magnificence while they were awaiting the arrival of their carriages."

The fourth bulletin, dated the 12th October, announced the capture of Munich by Bernadotte, the repulse of the Austrians at several points, and that their communications were almost entirely cut off. And then—"The Emperor was on the bridge of Lech when Marmont's army corps defiled. He formed each regiment in a circle, spoke to it of the position of the enemy, the imminence of a great battle, and of his confidence in the troops. The weather was fearful during this harangue. The snow fell heavily, and the men were up to their knees in mud and suffering from cold. But the words of the Emperor acted like flame; while listening to them the soldiers forgot their fatigues and privations, and grew impatient for the hour of conflict."

The following day, in a proclamation to the army, Napoleon said—

"SOLDIERS,—A month ago we were encamped on the shores of the ocean, opposite England, when an impious league forced us to fly to the Rhine. Not a fortnight ago that river was passed, and the Alps, the Neckar, the Danube, and the Lech, the celebrated barriers of Germany, have not for a minute delayed our march. . . . The enemy, deceived by our manœuvres and the rapidity of our movements, is entirely turned. . . . But for the army before you we should be in London to-day, have avenged six centuries of insult, and have liberated the sea.

"Remember to-morrow that you are fighting against the allies of England. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

The sixth bulletin (15th October) announced a series of successes, the flight of the Archduke Ferdinand, that the Emperor had not taken off his boots for a week, and that since the beginning of the campaign the enemy had lost 20,000 men, thirty guns, and twenty standards. Also that—"So much devotion on the part of the soldier, so many touching proofs of affection given to the Emperor, and so many great deeds, deserve a more detailed account. . . ."

On the 18th October a message informed the Senate that Ulm had capitulated and reinforcements were demanded, "so that we may, without effusion of blood and without effort, repulse the armies formed by English gold and confound the auxiliaries of the tyrants of the seas." Napoleon also directed the bishops to thank God for his victories "against that unjust league fomented by the hatred and gold of England."

On the same day appeared another bulletin, in which the Emperor, after stating that he might have carried Ulm by storm but that he desired to spare bloodshed, added—"General Mack was in the place; it is the destiny of generals opposed to the Emperor to be captured in fortified towns. It may be remembered that after the skilful manœuvres of Brenta the old Field-Marshal Wurmser was made prisoner at Mantua; Melas was taken at Alessandria; Mack at Ulm."

Melas was not taken prisoner after Marengo, but merely signed an armistice, in virtue of which his army fell back on Mantua. It is a curious fact that Melas should have been selected to preside over the court-martial summoned to try Mack, and which condemned him to death. This sentence was commuted. The defence of Mack was that he had been tied down to act on the defensive, and was obliged to divide his corps in presence of an enemy which concentrated his forces. That he had been led to expect the co-operation of the Prussians, who never made their appearance; of the Bavarians, who joined the French; and of the Russians, who did not arrive in time. He also

complained that he had been deceived as to the date upon which hostilities would commence, the position of the French army, &c. Napoleon, after the capitulation, was generous enough to hand Mack a certificate attesting his military talents and judicious measures—a certificate which reminds us of the encomiums lavished upon Provera, in the hope, as he himself acknowledged, that the Austrians would employ him again. Mack's military career, in spite of his fine theories, closed at Ulm, and he narrowly escaped being shot as a traitor. It is perhaps only fair to the memory of Mack to quote the following appreciation from Lanfrey (vol. iii. p. 308):—

“Napoleon had an army more than double that of his adversary, he was quite unhampered, he could freely dispose of all the resources of a vast empire; nothing remained of that famous position of Ulm in which Kray had held out, thanks to the instructions which paralysed Moreau. The town was still fortified, but the entrenched camp had been destroyed, and could no longer offer any protection to the Austrian army.”

Ulm having capitulated, and Mack and his garrison having defiled before the Emperor:—

PROCLAMATION.

“IMPERIAL QUARTERS, ELCHINGEN,
21st October, 1805.

“SOLDIERS OF THE GRAND ARMY,—In a fortnight we have accomplished a campaign. We have driven the troops of Austria out of Bavaria. . . . But what does this matter to England? She has attained her end. We are no longer at Boulogne. . . . Of the 100,000 men composing the Austrian army 60,000 are prisoners; they will go and replace our conscripts in their agricultural labours. . . . Soldiers, I announced a great battle, but thanks to the faulty combinations of the enemy I was able to obtain success without running any risk; and, what is without

any example in the history of nations, so great a result has only weakened us by 1,500 men.

“Soldiers, this success is due to the unlimited confidence you have in your Emperor, to your patience, and to your intrepidity.

“But we shall not stop there : you are impatient to commence a second campaign. This Russian army which English gold has transported from the extremities of the universe must experience a similar fate. . . . They have no generals in fighting against whom I can acquire glory ; all my care shall be directed towards obtaining victory with the least possible effusion of blood ; my soldiers are my children.

“NAPOLEON.”

Before Napoleon started for Augsburg the ninth bulletin made its appearance. In this it is related how the Emperor, addressing the Austrian generals captured at Ulm, said :—

“ ‘Gentlemen, your master has waged an unjust war against me : I tell you frankly that I do not know why I am fighting or what is required of me. . . . I give this advice to the Emperor of Austria, my brother—let him hasten to make peace. . . . *I do not desire anything on the Continent.* Vessels, colonies, and commerce are what I want, and these would be as advantageous to you as to me.’

“General Mack replied that the Emperor of Germany did not desire war, but that he had been forced into it by Russia. ‘In that case,’ said the Emperor, ‘you are no longer an independent power.’

“An Austrian Colonel expressed his astonishment to see the Emperor wet through, covered with mud, and as worn out with fatigue as the lowest drummer in the army. The Emperor told his aide-de-camp to reply : ‘Your master wished to remind me that I was a soldier ; I hope he will admit that the throne and the Imperial purple have not caused me to forget my first trade.’

"The sight offered by the army on the 15th October was truly interesting. For two days the rain had been falling in bucketfuls, and every one was drenched; no rations had been served out; the men had mud up to their knees; but the sight of their Emperor restored them their gaiety, and directly they saw him whole columns in this condition shouted, *Vive l'Empereur!*

"It is reported that the Emperor replied to some officers who admired the manner in which the soldiers forgot their privations, and exhibited such pleasure on seeing him—'They are right, for it was to spare their blood that I made them undergo such great fatigue.' Won victories with legs instead of with arms, as he expressed it.

"The Emperor, when the army occupied the heights which commanded Ulm, sent for Prince Leichtenstein to say that he wished him to capitulate, telling him that if he took the place by assault he would be obliged to do as he had done at Jaffa, where the garrison was put to the sword—that this was the melancholy right of war. . . ."

Napoleon's intention of course was merely to frighten the Austrian general. The reference to Jaffa was, however, rather impolitic.

TO THE EMPRESS JOSEPHINE.

"ABBAYE D'ELCHINGEN, 29th October, 1805.

"MY GOOD JOSEPHINE,—I have fatigued myself more than was prudent. All day long for a whole week wet to the skin, and the feet cold, have made me rather unwell; but I have not been out to-day, and that has reposed me.

"I have carried out my designs; I have destroyed the Austrian army by simple marches; I have made 60,000 prisoners, and taken 120 guns, 90 colours, and more than 30 generals.

"I am going to march against the Russians; they are lost. I am satisfied with my army. We have lost

only 1,500 men, two-thirds of whom are but slightly wounded.

“Adieu, my Josephine ; a thousand kind things to every one. Prince Charles is covering Vienna.

“NAPOLEON.”

In the tenth bulletin occurs the following paragraph :—

“It is difficult to form an idea of the misery of the Austrian army ; it is paid with notes which lose 40 per cent. ; therefore our men jokingly call the Austrians paper soldiers. They have no credit, and the house of Austria would find it difficult to raise 10,000 francs. The generals themselves have not seen a piece of gold for years. The English, as soon as they heard of the invasion of Bavaria, sent the Emperor of Austria a little present, which has not made him richer. . . .”

On the 24th October—matters looking more and more gloomy in Prussia—fresh instructions were sent to Duroc. The Emperor required his services ; but before leaving Berlin he was to seek an interview with the King, and to use this language :—

“The Emperor has sent me to you. He wished to write to your majesty to inform you of his successes, but he has been informed that his enemies have triumphed at Berlin. Sire, you have in the Emperor more of a man of heart than a politician. Can it be possible that your majesty desires, by dubious conduct, to alienate a man of such noble character ? The affair of Anspach is but a vain pretext.”

The General was also to declare that the Emperor was the person in the world upon whom threats had the least effect, and who was the most irritated by them ; that Frederick resisted all Europe, and that the Emperor was greater than Frederick, &c.

If Prussia had timidly refrained from resenting the violation of Anspach before the capitulation of Ulm her indecision was naturally increased by that startling event.

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

“MUNICH, 26th October, 1805.

“Have the English prisoner Wright put in a cell; this miserable assassin endeavoured to escape from the Temple. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

The case of Captain Wright may be thus succinctly narrated. In 1804 he was in command of the *Vicengo* brig, which was captured off Morbihan by some French gun-boats which had surrounded her during a calm. He was at once sent to his old prison, the Temple, in Paris, where he had formerly shared the captivity of Sir Sidney Smith. He was accused of having been connected with the Georges' conspiracy, and of having landed most of the conspirators against Bonaparte in France. He replied that being a prisoner of war he could make no deposition, and that as an English subject he could answer no questions. It is probable that Napoleon hated him not only for having landed conspirators, but because, after having made his escape from the Temple with Sir Sidney Smith, he had aided that officer in the defence of St. Jean d'Acre and continued to be his bosom friend. He was several times referred to in the *Moniteur* as “the worst of assassins,” and the Emperor in his conversation and in his correspondence exhibited the most violent hatred towards him.

On the 26th October, 1805, the unfortunate Captain Wright was found dead in his cell. His throat was cut, and at his side was lying a razor and a copy of the *Moniteur*, containing the account of the capitulation of Ulm, which was said to have determined the suicide. Sir Sidney Smith afterwards brought to light a number of suspicious circumstances in connection with this tragedy. During the whole of the evening preceding the pretended suicide Captain Wright had been heard playing the flute and had exhibited no symptoms of dejection; the head

had nearly been severed from the body, and the razor had been shut after the wound had been inflicted. Then there were marks of people having trampled in the blood with which the floor was covered, and during the night cries had been heard and the noise of a struggle. Nor was this all: Captain Wright had several times told Lieutenant Wallis and other companions in the Temple that the fate of Pichegru was in store for him, but that they were in no case to believe in a suicide. Such was the evidence elicited ten years after the event.

In the *Annual Register* for 1805, November 1st, one finds:—"There can exist no doubt of the falsehood of the assertion that Captain Wright committed suicide. The moral temper of his mind, and the reliance he placed on the protection of the Government, were opposed to such an act of despair. He was aware of the measures adopted for his release. The second surgeon of the Temple recently blew out his brains after having forwarded to three ambassadors an account of the sufferings of Captain Wright, who was twice tortured."

Again, on the 11th July, we find:—"Mr. Windham moved for copies of the correspondence of the French Government on the subject of Captain Wright of H.M. sloop *Vicengo*, now a prisoner. Sir Sidney Smith seconded the motion, and dwelt upon the sufferings of his friend. He was so overcome by his feelings that he could hardly articulate."

In the *Naval Chronicle*, 1805 (vol. xi. p. 376), the motive assigned for self-destruction is treated as beneath contempt, and Captain Wright is set down as "the victim of an usurper." In vol. xv. p. 190, the belief is expressed that "Wright was put to torture in order to force him to reveal the plans of the Admiralty." In the volume for 1815 we find that "his lieutenant Wallis was threatened with torture if he did not incriminate him. In the next volume we find that the narrative of Captain Wright was given up to Sir Sidney Smith by the French Government. In this he

complained of harsh treatment, of threats, of having been questioned by Savary (whom he had met in Egypt during the Al-Arish negotiation), whom he found the most despicable of men. The narrative is filled with noble sentiments, and the hope is expressed that the Government will consent to no sacrifice to save him.

Lanfrey cannot believe Napoleon to have been guilty of this atrocious crime because it was useless, and yet he points out that he constantly spoke of Wright as an assassin of the worst description. In summing up the evidence in the case of Pichegru, Lanfrey admitted, too, that the murder of that purer, more innocent, and more interesting victim (the Duc d'Enghien) dispensed with the necessity of replying to the question — "Was Bonaparte capable of employing such means to get rid of Pichegru?" It seems to us that if Bonaparte were capable of having Pichegru strangled he was equally capable of having that "wretched assassin Wright" done to death. He had not shown himself very particular in the case of Mourad Bey, in that of Toussaint Louverture, or of the Marquis de Frotté; and how did he afterwards deal with the bookseller Palm and the patriot Hofer?

The letter, too, of the 26th October—the day upon which Captain Wright was assassinated—is very suspicious. It has all the appearance of having been written in favour of the defence, and to prove that Bonaparte was innocent before he was accused. At St. Helena Napoleon protested against the accusation levelled against him in connection with this affair, saying that during the Austerlitz campaign he had too much on his hands to be able to think of a wretched English captain. But the letter of the 26th October disproves this assertion.

TO PRINCE JOSEPH.

"BRAUNAU, 30th October, 1805.

"MY BROTHER,—I arrived here to-day. The snow is falling in large flakes. The Russians appear terrified at the

fate of the Austrian army. They left me Braunau, which is one of the keys of Austria, and is furnished with stores of all kinds. We shall see what the Russian army will do ; it has lost its head. The people are very discontented in Austria, as the Russians plunder and violate everywhere. They despise the Austrian. The Russian officers get on well enough, but the soldiers, who are brutes, cannot tell an Austrian from a Frenchman.

“NAPOLEON.”

On the 2nd November, Napoleon wrote—“Let my squadrons sail ; let nothing hinder them.” A fortnight before that date the squadrons in question had ceased to exist.

TO M. CAMBACÉRÈS.

“LINZ, 6th November, 1805.

“MY COUSIN,—I have received your letter, and beg you will thank the Council of State. We are within a few days’ march of Vienna. We have attacked the Russians but lightly, for no matter how quickly we march, they retire more quickly still. The country is extremely dissatisfied with them. In fact they are not amiable ; they are not satisfied with plundering, but kill and burn.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. TALLEYRAND.

“LINZ, 9th November, 1805.

“I think there will be no inconvenience in your coming to meet me at the Abbaye de Mœlk. You can pass by Braunau where you will see General Lauriston. The Emperor of Germany is still at Vienna. He has written me several letters, and would like to come to an arrangement.

“NAPOLEON.”

Several letters in fact passed between the two Emperors, but although they were filled with friendly assurances they were insincere on both sides and came to nothing.

In the twenty-first bulletin, the Grand Army was informed that the Abbey of Mœlk, where the Emperor had established his head-quarters, was one of the finest in Europe; that it occupied a strong position commanding the Danube; that it had been built by the Emperor Commodus, and that the cellars were well stocked with good Hungarian wine which would be grateful to the army. The troops were also told that war had been undertaken by the Austrian cabinet against the wishes of the imperial family; that Colloredo was governed by his wife, a Frenchwoman, who hated her country; that Cobentzel trembled at the very name of a Russian, and had probably been corrupted by English agents. To these two ministers, and to the "wretched" Mack, the war was attributed. As for the army and the people, the bulletin declared that they were perfectly aware they were fighting for the English, "those artisans of the misfortunes of the Continent who, by their monopoly, are the authors of the high price of goods."

The twenty-second bulletin, dated the 13th November, 1805, informed the army that Vienna had been evacuated, and that the Emperor and his Court had fled to Brünn where the Czar was expected coming from Berlin.

"In Hungary, as in Austria," continued this document, "people are persuaded that the Emperor Napoleon desires peace, and that he is the friend of all nations, and of all great ideas.

"The English are the object of the continual imprecations of all the subjects of the Emperor of Germany, and of the most universal hatred. Is it not time for princes to listen to the voice of their people, and to shake off the fatal influence of the English oligarchy?"

There had been some sharp skirmishing with the Russians, but no pitched battle. On the 14th November, Napoleon, who had taken up his quarters at Schœnbrunn, ordered Berthier to have all the Russians who were badly wounded sent into Vienna, so that the Viennese might see

that the Russians had sustained severe losses. No wounded French soldiers were to be sent in. In fact during this, as well as during other campaigns, the French losses were carefully concealed so that neither the army nor the country at large should be discouraged beyond measure.

TO M. CAMBACÉRÈS.

"SCHÖENBRUNN, 15th November, 1805.

"You will have seen by the bulletin that I have arrived at Vienna. This causes me, for the moment, all kinds of embarrassment. . . . I don't know what to think of Marbois (Minister of Finance). I believe he has gone mad. He wants me to summon the Legislative Body in order to procure money.

"It is really extraordinary that knowing me so busy he should preach me such ridiculous sermons. . . . I beg you will let me know if my palace of the Tuileries is finished. M. Fontaine (the architect) must not trust too much to my being in the palace of the Emperor of Germany. Find out also if my palace of Brussels is ready. I suppose you have some one in Paris to replace M. Daru, whom I have appointed my Minister of Finance in Austria.

"NAPOLEON."

It is interesting at this point to refer to some reflections made by Madame de Rémusat on this iniquitous war and the condition of France.¹

¹ "The English were far from having the same confidence in their soldiers which they have since deservedly inspired. The tightness of money was at once felt; shortly afterwards the bank suspended payment; money became dear, and was sold at a high rate. I was told that our exports were stopped by the war, and that they augmented the price of everything which came from abroad. The campaign of Austerlitz was the signal for numerous failures all through the country. Private uneasiness added to the general gloom. Already many distinguished families whose children had embraced the career of arms

In the twenty-fourth bulletin the Grand Army was informed that the palace of Schœnbrunn, "where the Emperor is staying, was built by Maria Theresa, whose portrait is to be found in nearly all the apartments. In the cabinet, where the Emperor works, is a marble statue of that sovereign. The Emperor on seeing it, said, 'If that great princess were still alive she would not allow herself to be influenced by the intrigues of a woman like Madame de Colloredo. She would never have given the command of her army to a man like Mack, appointed, not by the will of the sovereign nor the confidence of the nation, but by England and Russia. . . .'"

On the 16th November, Napoleon wrote a letter to the Elector of Wirtemberg asking him to use his influence with his sister, the mother of the Czar, in favour of the arrangements he contemplated. "She cannot be opposed to arrangements which will benefit her family," he said; "it is in the interest of Russia that Austria should be weakened. I think," he added, "that a mother imploring her son in favour of the splendour of her house would have a fine effect, and it would be possible to draw up the treaties in such a manner as to tickle the vanity of Russia. . . ."

Russia wanted something more than fine words.

On the same day the twenty-fifth bulletin to the Grand Army made its appearance. It related among other matters that—"General Klein made an incursion into trembled for their fate. With what anxiety did parents await those bulletins which at any moment might announce the loss of some one dear to them? What torture did Bonaparte impose upon mothers and upon wives during many a year! He was sometimes astonished at the hatred he ended by inspiring; but was it possible to pardon him such prolonged and painful anxiety, so many tears, so many sleepless nights, and so many days filled with terror?" And after Ulm—"The want of money was painfully felt; commerce suffered; the theatres were deserted; poverty increased and people were sustained alone by the hope that so brilliant a campaign would be followed by a speedy peace."

Bohemia with his dragoons. He found the Russians everywhere held in horror ; the devastations they commit make one shudder. The irruption of these barbarians, called in by the Government itself, has nearly extinguished in the hearts of Austrian subjects all affection for their prince.¹ We and the French, say the Germans, are the sons of the Romans ; the Russians are the children of the Tartars. We prefer a thousand times over to see the French armed against us to having such allies as the Russians. At Vienna the very name of Russian inspires terror. These hordes of savages are not satisfied with plundering for their subsistence ; they carry away and destroy everything. An unfortunate peasant who has nothing but his clothes in his cabin is despoiled of them. . . . No doubt this is the last time that an European government will call for such fatal aid. . . .”

The next day Napoleon wrote as follows to the Emperor of Austria :—

“ZNAJYM, 17th November, 1805.

“I hasten to reply to your Majesty’s letter, to thank you for the confidence you display, and to assure you of my desire to be agreeable. . . . I wished to push my advanced guards as far as Brünn to-day ; but I shall remain here all to-morrow, and in fact as long as your Majesty remains there, for I would not, when my sole desire is to pursue the Russian army and force it to evacuate your states, do anything you might consider personally disagreeable. I beg your Majesty to permit me merely to show you in what a terrible manner Moravia is being devastated. . . . Your subjects come to us with trans-

¹ Napoleon was afterwards convinced of his error. The Emperor of Austria lost none of his popularity by misfortunes for which he was not accountable. After his return to Paris Napoleon learned with astonishment what a touching reception the Viennese had given their conquered sovereign, and shrewdly surmised that had he returned to his capital under similar circumstances matters would have assumed a very different aspect.

ports of joy, show us where the Russians are, and help us. They are barbarians, they say, and if you give us arms we will aid you in driving them out. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

There can be no doubt, even according to their own historians, that the French, from marshals down, pillaged in the most shameless manner, and sent an immense booty to France.

TO VICE-ADMIRAL DECRÉS.

“ZNAYM, 18th November, 1805.

“I have received your letter relating to the combat of Cadiz. I await the ulterior details which you promise me before forming a decisive opinion on the nature of this affair. In the meantime I hasten to inform you that this will in no way change my plans as regards naval operations. . . . Let all the troops that were on board the squadron await orders in the first French town.

“NAPOLEON.”

It was on the 18th November while sitting at table, and while the French were singing *Te Deums* over the victory of Austerlitz, that Berthier silently handed Napoleon the despatch which announced the fatal disaster of Trafalgar. Villeneuve had obeyed the Emperor's positive orders, and the result was the almost total destruction of the combined fleet. Out of thirty-five vessels eight managed to get back to Cadiz, where they fell into the hands of the Spanish insurgents; four which formed the vanguard under the command of Rear-Admiral Dumanoir, contrived to make their escape for a time, after having taken little or no share in the battle; the remainder were either captured, destroyed, or wrecked upon the coast. At the battle of the Nile Villeneuve had been complimented for saving a portion of the fleet by sheering off in time, and Dumanoir thought it prudent to adopt the same course. Unfortunately, a few days later, he and his four ships were

captured by Sir Richard Strachan. The failure of the naval campaign was therefore complete, and England heard little more of the threatened invasion. Villeneuve would fain have fallen like Nelson on his quarter-deck, but a darker and more mysterious fate was in store for him. He was taken prisoner and sent to England. After frequent demands to be allowed home on parole to stand his trial he was permitted to return to France. He landed at Morlaix, from which place he wrote to Decrés, stating that he was on his way to Paris in order to appeal to the justice of the Emperor. In his letter to Decrés he said—“Overwhelmed with the extent of my misfortune, and the responsibility attending so great a disaster, I desire to lay at the feet of his majesty either the justification of my conduct, or the victim who is to be immolated not to the honour of the flag, but to the manes of those *who have perished by my imprudence.*” The imprudence of having obeyed orders contrary to his better judgment. The story goes that on reaching Rennes Villeneuve received so harsh a reply from his old friend the Minister of Marine, that he committed suicide by stabbing himself six times in the region of the heart. On his table was found a most noble and touching letter to his wife, in which he announced his intention in these words—“My tender friend, how will you receive this blow? Alas! I weep more for you than for myself. . . . Alone here; suffering under the anathema of the Emperor; repelled by his minister who was my friend; overwhelmed with an immense responsibility in a disaster which is attributed to me, and into which I was hurried by fatality. I ought to die. . . . Live tranquilly, derive consolation from religion; my hope is that you will find a repose which is denied me. Adieu! Dry the tears of those to whom I may be dear. I wish to finish, but I cannot. How fortunate that I have no child to receive this horrible inheritance, and to bear the weight of my name! I was not born for such a fate, I did not seek it, I was drawn into it in spite of myself. Adieu! Adieu! . . .”

Lanfrey tells this story, adding that people refused to believe in a suicide, the death of Pichegru, the tragedy of Vincennes, and the mysterious end of Captain Wright being fresh in their minds. But when Lanfrey wrote his history he was not aware of some important facts which will one day be published by the Marquis de Villeneuve, the grand-nephew of the admiral. In the first place no one ever saw the letter asserted to have been written previous to the suicide. Madame de Villeneuve applied for it in vain, and at last Fouché declared that he had sent her this important document by the post, and that it had been lost! Out of the six wounds which the admiral was supposed to have inflicted on himself, two were mortal, having pierced his heart. Villeneuve must therefore have stabbed himself at least once after death, and also have thrown the weapon away, for the dagger with which the blows were dealt was found at several paces from his body! Again, the story of Decrés having written harshly to the unfortunate admiral is pure invention. The Marquis de Villeneuve possesses the letter in question, which is couched in the most affectionate terms. Is it probable, too, that Villeneuve, who was so anxious to stand a court-martial in order to clear his character, should have put an end to his own existence, as if he feared an inquiry? A letter which Napoleon wrote on the day that the admiral died is, taking previous circumstances into account, calculated to heighten rather than allay suspicion. It ran thus :—

TO DECRÉS.

“ST. CLOUD, 22nd April, 1806.

“Order Admiral Villeneuve to go home, and to remain quietly in Provence until his exchange can be effected.

“If Captain Infernet behaved well, inform him of my satisfaction.

“Tell Captain Lucas to come to Paris. I shall see that brave man with pleasure.

“NAPOLEON.”

This letter, if sincere, would naturally prove that Napoleon had nothing to do with the admiral's death—that his resentment had vanished, and that he was well-disposed towards two of the captains who fought under Villeneuve's orders. The letter is altogether too moderate; it makes no mention of the court-martial which the admiral demanded. According to the Marquis de Villeneuve it was this court-martial which Napoleon wished to avoid. Villeneuve was to be tried, not for having lost the battle of Trafalgar, but for having sacrificed the combined fleet in a hopeless struggle. And he had Napoleon's positive orders to fight in his pocket. In fact, the instructions of the Emperor Napoleon caused the destruction of the combined fleets at Trafalgar, as those of General Bonaparte caused the disaster of the Nile.

Villeneuve had been placed in a position similar to that of Tourville under Louis XIV. In 1691 it was determined to attempt the invasion of England, and Tourville, who was to protect the flotilla, received orders to fight. In reply to his remonstrances Pontchartrain wrote—"It is not for you to discuss the orders of the king; if you will not execute them, his majesty will find some one more obedient and less circumspect than you are." Tourville put to sea, fell in with Admiral Russell off Cape Hogue, and lost a dozen vessels.

One version of the death of Villeneuve was that he had been murdered by Captain Magendie, of the *Bucentaure*, at the instigation of Napoleon, and so persistent was this rumour that the captain, after the fall of the empire, considered it necessary to clear his memory, and to protest against having dipped his hands in the blood of the "dear and good admiral."

In consequence of these rumours, Napoleon wrote on the 26th of April to Decrès, saying that he thought it would be well to have a medical report made on the death of Villeneuve, &c., adding: "It will be useless to say anything about his wife's letter!"

According to Lanfrey, Napoleon, after all the haughty demonstrations and threats he had made against England, at one time desired a disaster like that of the Hogue, so that he might be able to throw the blame of failure upon others, and escape from a false position without ridicule. It is certain that it was contrary to the entreaties of his Minister of Marine, and of his own, and of the Spanish naval officers, that the battle of Trafalgar was fought.

The French and the Spaniards have still to settle between them which of the two was the most to blame for this memorable disaster. Don José Guell, of Renté, recently published a history of the Spanish navy, in which he gives the following description of Trafalgar—an episode to be compared neither to the famous battle of Lepanto nor to the unfortunate destruction of the Spanish Armada. "The battle of Trafalgar," he writes, "was the last effort of the grandeur and the courage of the Spanish marine, and will remain the eternal glory of our country. Gravina, Alba, Escano, Cisneros, Galiano, Charruca, Yriarte, Valdès, Horé, Butron, Apodaca, Falcon, Alcedo, and Moyna of Castanos, are immortal names which a grateful nation should inscribe upon marble in memory of the noble actions of those heroes." After criticising the conduct of Villeneuve previous to Trafalgar, and alluding to the council of war held before the battle, the author continues: "The Spaniards were opposed to a sortie, their ships not being prepared. Charruca said to his comrades, 'I do not approve of a sortie of the combined fleets; the season is too far advanced; I believe the squadron would hamper the English more by remaining at Cadiz, than by fighting a decisive battle!' This decision was known to the French admiral, but he determined at all hazards to risk an engagement, and in fact he put to sea without any plans. All his instructions might be reduced to this phrase, 'Let every one do what he thinks best; I expect great things from each captain.' Nelson was more prudent. On the 19th October, 1805, the fleet put out

from Cadiz ; it was composed of fifteen Spanish and eighteen French ships, five frigates, and two brigs ; and on the 21st October a terrible action was fought.

“ A bitter engagement commenced between the *Royal Sovereign* and the *Santa Ana*. Both ships were equally ill-treated. In the middle of the engagement Collingwood was obliged to go aboard the frigate *Euryalus*, and the *Santa Ana*, destroyed, saw the gallant Alava and the captain, Gardoki, fall on her deck.

“ At the same moment the combat became general. Rear-Admiral Cisneros, commanding the *Santissima Trinidad*, exhibited unexampled courage ; the ravages caused by the enemy were enormous.

“ The spectacle offered by the centre of the Franco-Spanish squadron resembled a horrible volcano ; the firing was incessant ; a lugubrious gleam was shed over the ocean to a great distance ; the flames enveloped the combatants ; but the *Santissima Trinidad*, by prodigies of valour, kept her flag flying.

“ However, the victory remained with the English, who paid dearly for their triumph by the death of the great Nelson.

“ It was in this same battle that Yriarte distinguished himself by resisting until half-past five in the evening, and also the intrepid sailor, Valdès. The latter, who led the van on board the *Neptune*, remarking that the ships in the centre were about to be captured, and that Rear-Admiral Dumanoir, under whose orders he had been placed, had no intention of fighting, violated discipline, and went about alone in order to take part in the engagement. ‘ Where are you going ? ’ demanded Dumanoir. ‘ Under fire ! ’ he replied, without stopping, and he was followed by the captain of the *Rayo*. (Captain Macdonald.)

“ But these generous efforts were useless. The *Neptune*, attacked by four ships, sustained the formidable shock as long as her gallant chief had a voice to command and an arm to work his batteries.

“ Seriously wounded, as well as his second in command, surrounded by dead and wounded stretched on the deck, and interfering with the working of the ship, he could not prolong the struggle. But the tempest snatched the prey from the conqueror, and the vessel was dashed to pieces on the rocks of Santa Catalina.

“ The *Principe de les Asturias* was attacked by five ships, and resisted for four hours. Gravina, severely wounded, handed over the command to Escano, who was struck by a splinter in the leg. But, nevertheless, this valiant mariner continued to fight, and it was only when all hope had been lost that he gave the signal for retreat.

“ The same ardour and the same heroism appeared to animate all the combatants on that fatal day. Galiano, who commanded the *Bahama*, defended himself against three vessels. Wounded in the midst of his crew, he cried, ‘ Gentlemen, bear in mind that the flag is nailed to the mast, and cannot be hauled down ! ’ And the *Bahama*, torn to shreds after an heroic struggle, disappeared in the deep.

“ The fate of the *San Juan Nepomuceno* was equally glorious. She was commanded by Charruca, one of those gallant men who know, like the eagle, how to soar above the tempest. When the squadron received orders to sail, he sent for his brother-in-law, Cepodaca, and said to him, ‘ Write to your parents that you are about to take part in a battle which will be sanguinary. Bid them adieu, for your fate will be mine ; rather than surrender my ship, I shall blow her up. Such is the duty of those who serve king and country.’

“ And to a friend he wrote the same day, saying, ‘ If you happen to hear that my ship has been captured, say that I am dead.’

“ The *San Juan* fought alone against six vessels. During the engagement the masts were shot away, grape-shot and dead bodies strewed the deck, and yet Charruca never for a moment lost his serenity. . . . In the thickest of the fight a cannon-ball carried away his right leg. ‘ It is

nothing!’ cried the hero, brandishing his sword. ‘Continue firing!’ His noble heart deceived him. . . . When at last it became necessary to lower the flag, the English officers of the different ships which surrounded the *San Juan* leaped on board to ask to which of them she had surrendered, disputing such a victory. The worthy son-in-law of the gallant Charruca, the brave Falcon, answered, ‘Attacked by six vessels I succumb: never would the *San Juan* have struck to a single ship.’

“The remains of the *San Juan* were taken to Gibraltar, and preserved for many years. The cabin of the commander was closed, and the name of Charruca was inscribed on the door in letters of gold.

“Let us also cite the *Monarca*, which was one of the first vessels engaged. She fought for five hours, until she was dismasted and making water on all sides. The *San Ildefonso* was destroyed.

“Three ships were captured by the enemy, three were sunk, and four were driven ashore in the fearful tempest which succeeded the battle. Such were the results of Trafalgar.

“It may be said that Spain closed, with this catastrophe, the history of her great marine. . . . The disaster of Trafalgar was the winding-sheet of our maritime grandeur, and the signal of the ruin and decadence of Spain.”

The grand-nephew of Admiral de Villeneuve has taken exception to the latest Spanish edition of Trafalgar. He says that the French admiral received positive orders from the Emperor to fight, and that he issued the most minute instructions to his captains. Well knowing what Nelson would attempt, he said, “The enemy will not confine himself to forming a line of battle parallel to ours, and engaging us with his artillery; he will endeavour to envelop our rear division, to break our line, and to fall upon those vessels he succeeds in detaching.” “Never,” he adds, “did Villeneuve write the burlesque phrase attributed to him by the Spanish historian.” The text

of the last order issued by the French admiral, and which M. Lanfrey very wrongly says might be taken for a translation of that signalled by Nelson, was, "Captains who cannot perceive the signals of the admiral should manœuvre to come into action, they cannot do wrong in laying their vessels alongside those of the enemy. *The captain who is not engaged is not at his post and a signal to recall him will be a stain on his honour.*" Nelson would never have insulted his captains by supposing any of them capable of sheering off in the moment of danger.

The Marquis de Villeneuve further observes that it was the unanimous opinion of the French, as well as of the Spanish officers assembled on board the *Bucentaure*, that an engagement could end only in a disaster, but when Villeneuve declared that he had positive orders to attack, "all these gallant men bowed their heads in silence, and left the council-chamber in a state of consternation, but determined to make the English pay dearly for their victory." The count adds that no doubt several Spanish vessels showed themselves worthy of their old reputation, and defended their flags with great intrepidity, and that the names of Gravina, Cisneros, Valdès, and Charruca, deserve to be handed down to posterity with those of Lucas, Magon, Baudoin, and Infernet. But, on the other hand, there were numerous instances of weakness, and *several French and Spanish ships* re-entered Cadiz without having fired a shot. One vessel, placed in the centre of the line, left its post before the engagement commenced, and had not a single man placed *hors de combat*.

It is impossible not to be struck by several points of resemblance in the tragical end of Pichegru, of Wright, and of Villeneuve. There was no reason to suspect that either of the three intended suicide. Pichegru was anxious to speak out in court, Wright declared to his friends that he would not take his own life, and Villeneuve was anxious to stand a court-martial. In each case the manner of

death seemed contrary to the presumption that suicide had been committed — that Pichegru could have strangled himself as he was strangled ; that Wright could have cut his throat as his throat was cut, and have closed the razor after the deed ; that Villeneuve could have stabbed himself as he was stabbed. The volume of Seneca, the newspaper, and the letter which Villeneuve was supposed to have written to his wife, seem to be the work of the same mind, as also the order that Wright should be put in a cell, written on the day of his death, and the order that Villeneuve should repair to his seat in the country.

In the twenty-seventh bulletin it was announced that Murat had entered Brünn on the 18th November, and that “the Moravians are astonished to see, in the midst of their immense plains, the inhabitants of Ukrania, of Kam-schatka, of Tartary, and Normans, Gascons, Bretons, and Burgundians, cutting each other’s throats, without their countries having anything in common, and without the existence of any immediate political interest. They have sufficient good sense to say, in their bad Bohemian, that human blood has become merchandise in the hands of the English. A large Moravian farmer said lately to a French officer, while speaking of Joseph II., that he was the Emperor of the peasants, and that, had he continued to live, he would have freed them from the feudal rights which they pay to monasteries and convents. . . . The Emperor of Germany has retired to Olmütz. Our outposts are at one march from that place.”

Negotiations were attempted, and Count Stadion and General Gyulai had a long conference with Napoleon, who demanded that Venice should be ceded to the kingdom of Italy. These negotiations, however, were not destined to bear fruit, and now the Czar made his appearance on the scene. He had seen the King of Prussia while passing through Berlin, and the two monarchs had sworn inviolable friendship before the tomb of Frederick the Great at Potsdam.

TO THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

“IMPERIAL HEAD-QUARTERS, BRÜNN,
25th November, 1805.

“SIRE,—I send my aide-de-camp, General Savary, to your Majesty in order to compliment you on your arrival. I have charged him to assure you of all my esteem, and of my desire to find opportunities of proving how ambitious I am to win your friendship. Receive him with the kindness for which you are distinguished, and hold me to be one of the men the most anxious to be agreeable to you,” &c., &c.
“NAPOLEON.”

The Czar returned a reply addressed “To the Chief of the French Government,” a reply which led Napoleon to doubt the intentions of Prussia.

DECREE.

“BRÜNN, 28th November, 1805.

“ART 1. A contribution of 100,000,000*fr.* shall be raised in Moravia and the other provinces of the House of Austria occupied by the French army.

“ART. 2. This sum is to be given as a recompense to the army. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

In a letter of the 30th November, addressed to Talleyrand, Napoleon said he had just seen M. Haugwitz, who had conversed with a great deal of *finesse*, and even talent, and had left on His Majesty’s mind the impression that the Prussian Government was uncertain how to act. He added :—

“To-morrow I shall probably have a serious battle with the Russians ; I have done all I could to avoid it, for it will be blood shed without utility. I have had a correspondence with the Emperor of Russia ; the impression which

remains on my mind is that he is a good and worthy man under the influence of persons, who are sold to England, to such a point that they wish me to give Genoa to the King of Sardinia, and to renounce Belgium ! You will fall flat on your back when you learn that M. de Novosiltzof has proposed to unite Belgium and Holland. All reasonable persons pronounce this to be madness. . . . Write to Paris, but do not speak about a battle, for that would make my wife uneasy. . . .

“ NAPOLEON.”

On the 1st December Napoleon announced the coming battle to the army, and took his troops into his confidence. He said :

“ The positions which we occupy are formidable, and while the Russians march to turn my right they will expose their flank.

“ Soldiers, I shall myself direct all your battalions ; I shall keep out of range if, with your accustomed bravery, you carry disorder and confusion into the ranks of the enemy ; but if the victory is for a moment uncertain, you shall see your Emperor expose himself. . . .

“ NAPOLEON.”

The knowledge displayed by Napoleon of the intentions of the Russians was afterwards attributed to the fact of Weyrother's plan having been betrayed. According to De Maistre, no doubt existed at St. Petersburg that such was the case.

TO PRINCE JOSEPH.

“ AUSTERLITZ, *3rd December*, 1805.

“ . . . After manœuvring for a few days I fought a decisive battle yesterday. I defeated the combined armies commanded by the Emperors of Russia and of Germany. Their force consisted of 80,000 Russians and 30,000 Austrians. I have made about 40,000 prisoners, taken 40

flags, 100 guns, and all the standards of the Russian Imperial Guard. . . . Although I have bivouacked in the open air for a week, my health is good. This evening I am in bed in the beautiful castle of M. de Kaunitz, and have changed my shirt for the first time in eight days. . . . The Emperor of Germany sent Prince Lichtenstein to me this morning to ask for an interview. My army on the field of battle was less numerous than the enemy, who was caught *in flagrante delicto* while manœuvring.

“NAPOLEON.”

According to the allies they had only 72,000 men, while the French had 75,000. Napoleon himself speaks of having had 80,000. It is certain, however, that the victory was crushing, that Austria and Russia suffered terrible losses, that Francis II. was obliged to sue for peace and to accede to the most humiliating terms; that Alexander effected his retreat with difficulty, and that De Haugwitz, frightened out of his wits, consented to sign an offensive and defensive treaty, and, on the part of his master, to accept Hanover at the very moment that Prussia was about to receive a subsidy from England, and consequently to join the coalition.

In the thirtieth bulletin the Grand Army was assured that the negotiations opened by Austria were simply intended to lull the vigilance of Napoleon—that Savary had been very well received by the Emperor of Russia, and in conversation with the thirty coxcombs by whom the Czar was surrounded, had convinced himself of the confusion that reigned in the enemy's councils.

The bulletin added :—

“An army thus led could not be long before committing blunders. From that moment the plan of the Emperor was to wait and watch for a moment to take advantage of them. He immediately gave orders for his army to retreat, and retired during the night, as if he had been defeated, took up a strong position three leagues to his rear, and set

to work in the most ostentatious manner to fortify it and establish batteries.

“He asked for an interview with the Czar, who sent him his aide-de-camp, Prince Dolgorouki. This aide-de-camp was able to remark that everything betokened reserve and timidity in the French army. . . . Contrary to his custom, the Emperor, who generally receives negotiators with distrust, went himself to the outposts. After the first compliments the Russian officer wished to enter upon political questions. He decided everything with an impertinence difficult to imagine. He betrayed the most complete ignorance of the interests of Europe and the situation of the Continent. He was, in a word, a youthful trumpeter of England. . . . The Emperor could hardly restrain his indignation, and this young man, who has acquired a great influence over the Emperor Alexander, returned under the idea that the French army was on the eve of destruction. It is easy to conceive what the Emperor suffered when it is known that he was asked to cede Belgium and to place the Iron Crown on the head of one of the most implacable enemies of France” (the King of Sardinia).

Then followed a long description of the field of Austerlitz, which terminated thus :—

“Never was field of battle more horrible. In the midst of immense lakes one can still hear the cries of men whom it is impossible to succour. It will require three days to transport all the enemy’s wounded to Brünn: the heart bleeds. May all the blood shed, may all these misfortunes, fall upon the perfidious islanders who have caused them! May the cowardly oligarchs of London support the consequences of so many woes!”

TO M. TALLEYRAND.

“AUSTERLITZ, 4th December, 1805.

“The Emperor of Germany asked for an interview, which I granted; it lasted from 2 till 4 P.M. I will tell

you what I think of him when I see you. He wished to conclude peace on the spot. He appealed to my feelings; I defended myself, a kind of warfare which I assure you was not difficult. He asked for an armistice, which I conceded. . . . You will tell M. de Haugwitz to wait for me at Vienna. . . . Inform the Austrians that the battle has changed the face of affairs, and that they must expect harder conditions; that I complain, above all, of their conduct in sending me negotiators on the day they intended to attack me, in order to throw me off my guard. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

Talleyrand did what he could to induce his master to accord such terms to Austria as would permit of friendly relations being established between the two countries. Napoleon, however, was inexorable, caring little for that revenge which his enemy would be driven to seek on the first opportunity. The Archduke Charles, on dismissing his troops, is said to have exclaimed, “Repose yourselves, my children, until we recommence.” Austria was allowed to exist, but was made a deadly enemy.

TO THE ELECTOR OF WIRTEMBERG.

“AUSTERLITZ, *5th December, 1805.*

“MY BROTHER,—The Emperor of Russia is surrounded by twenty scamps, who will work his ruin, and yet he has so many great qualities that I think some advice offered by you, through your sister, might be useful. . . . Having demanded an interview at his outposts, he sent me Prince Dolgorouki, and I had a conversation with that coxcomb, who spoke to me as he would speak to a Boyard whom he was about to send to Siberia. . . . This young man, who was exceedingly arrogant, mistook my moderation for fear—an error which I encouraged for military reasons, and which brought about the battle of Austerlitz, where in truth the enemy behaved with an amount of ignorance and presumption difficult to conceive. This has

made the Emperor of Russia open his eyes, and I have learned, through the Emperor of Germany, that he desires to make peace, and never more to meddle with matters which do not concern him.

“NAPOLEON.”

The thirty-first bulletin, after entering into some further details of the battle of Austerlitz, related in this manner the conversation which took place between the Czar and General Savary after the battle. According to the bulletin the Russian army was surrounded, and not a man could escape. “Prince Czartoryski introduced General Savary to the Emperor, ‘Tell your master,’ cried the Czar, ‘that I am going away; that he performed miracles yesterday; that that day has increased my admiration for him; that he is a man predestined by Heaven; that it will require a hundred years for my army to equal his. But can I withdraw in safety?’ ‘Yes, sire,’ replied Savary, ‘if you will ratify what the two Emperors of France and of Germany have agreed upon.’ ‘And what is that?’ ‘That your Majesty’s army shall evacuate Germany and Austrian Poland.’ . . . ‘What guarantee do you require?’ ‘Sire, your word.’ ‘I give it.’”

The bulletin then hoped that this act of generosity would not be forgotten in Russia.

As a fact, Napoleon mistook the Russian line of retreat, and was unable to intercept Alexander and his army.

In the thirty-third bulletin we find that in counting over the dead it was discovered that 18,000 Russians, 6,000 Austrians, and 900 Frenchmen were slain at Austerlitz, and that General Roger Valhubert, who died of his wounds, wrote the following letter to the Emperor, shortly before breathing his last:—“I wished to have done more for you. I shall be dead in an hour. I do not regret life, since I have participated in a victory which assures you a happy reign. . . .”

In reality the French appear to have lost 8,500 men.

DECREE.

“IMPERIAL CAMP, AUSTERLITZ,
7th December, 1805.

“The widows of the generals who fell at Austerlitz will enjoy a life pension of 6,000 francs ; the widows of colonels and majors, 2,400 francs ; the widows of captains, 1,200 francs ; the widows of lieutenants, 800 francs ; the widows of soldiers, 200 francs.

“NAPOLEON.”

And by another decree Napoleon adopted all the children of the officers and men who fell at Austerlitz, undertook to find places for their sons and husbands for their daughters. Independently of their baptismal names they were to be allowed to add that of Napoleon.

The thirty-fourth bulletin contains a terrible portrait of the Russian soldiers, who were slaughtered by the peasants whenever they caught them alone ; nor did this astonish the Emperor, seeing the atrocities they committed. “They illtreat the poor as well as the rich. For them three hundred blows of a stick is a trifle. They plunder, burn villages, massacre ; these are their amusements. They have even slaughtered priests at the altar. . . . The battle of Austerlitz was a European victory, because it destroyed the *prestige* attached to the name of these *barbarians*. This word, however, does not apply to the court, nor to a great many officers, nor to the inhabitants of towns, who are, on the contrary, civilised even to corruption.”

The atrocities perpetrated by the Russians were greatly exaggerated, but what Napoleon desired was to create ill blood between the Austrians and their allies.

TO THE CARDINAL ARCHBISHOP OF PARIS.

“BRÜNN, 11th December, 1805.

“MY COUSIN,—We have taken forty-five flags from the enemy : on the anniversary of my coronation, that day upon which the Holy Father, the cardinals, and all the

clergy of France, offered up prayers in the sanctuary of Notre Dame for the prosperity of our reign. We have resolved to place the said flags in the church of Notre Dame, metropolis of our good city of Paris. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

In the days of Louis XIV., the Duc de Luxembourg sent home so many captured standards that he was nicknamed the upholsterer of Notre Dame, but his votive offerings could not be compared to those of Napoleon.

TO MARSHAL DAVOUST.

“SCHÖENBRUNN, 13th December, 1805.

‘I beg you will send me a detailed account of what you did at Austerlitz. Tell me the truth concerning what happened. Let me know if Klein’s division did anything.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE KING OF PRUSSIA.

“SCHÖENBRUNN, 15th December, 1805.

“SIR, MY BROTHER,—I have seen M. de Haugwitz. I spoke with him for a long time concerning my sentiments and my plans. He read my heart; he saw it laid bare. . . . I sincerely hope that he will conceal nothing from your Majesty, and if you have anything to complain of, I flatter myself that you will perceive that, had I been dealing with a simple political personage, my heart would not have been so deeply affected. M. de Haugwitz is the bearer of a treaty from which your Majesty will judge that I have not forgotten six years of friendship, and above all the proof of interest which you gave me in being the first to recognise my dynasty. . . . One of the greatest blessings which I desire to owe to the success I have obtained, is to remember that it has placed me above ordinary prejudices, and in a position to consult only my heart and the tender friendship which I have long vowed to you. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

Napoleon had used the most violent language towards the Prussian ambassador, and had threatened war unless all his conditions were at once accepted. Before driving Austria to extremities and attacking Naples, it was necessary to have some assurance that the Cabinet of Berlin would not suddenly change its tone, and that no danger was to be expected from that quarter. The situation might at any moment become overcast. The Russians had been beaten, but they had managed to effect an orderly retreat, Napoleon knew not in what direction. The Archduke Ferdinand, before hearing of the armistice, had attacked the Bavarians, under Wrede, with 20,000 men, and had inflicted a sharp defeat upon them in Bohemia. Then the Archduke Charles, deeply mortified, was at the head of an army 80,000 strong. Hence the wheedling letter to the King of Prussia.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER.

"SCHÖENBRUNN, *19th December*, 1805.

"A million francs in paper will be placed at your disposal.

"You will propose a plan for distributing two millions among the marshals, generals, and colonels.

"NAPOLEON."

TO PRINCE JOSEPH.

"SCHÖENBRUNN, *20th December*, 1805.

"MY BROTHER,—I have received your letter of the 20th Frimaire. . . . Negotiations continue; my army is reposing. The army of Prince Charles is close here. It is probable that if peace be not concluded promptly, there will be, in a month's time, an affair after which the Austrian empire will remain without the shadow of a resource.

"NAPOLEON."

TO PRINCE JOSEPH.

"SCHÖENBRUNN, *24th December*, 1805.

"MY BROTHER,—I have received your letter of the 16th Nivose. I am very angry at the importance which you

have given to the news of the arrival of the Austrian plenipotentiaries, and that you have the weakness to pay attention to the speeches of people who talk of nothing but peace. It is not peace which is important but the conditions of peace, and the question is too complicated for the comprehension of a Paris citizen. I am not accustomed to shape my policy after the discourses of Paris loungers. My people will always be satisfied when I am. I shall always execute what I say, or perish in the attempt. Those who clamour for peace to-day, will blame the conditions to-morrow. You must not allow public opinion to be led astray by the newspapers; I am especially dissatisfied with the *Journal de Paris*. None but fools and intriguers can think and write like that. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

“SCHÖENBRUNN, 25th December, 1805.

“. . . I see difficulties in the way of reading bulletins; in the churches I do not consider this practice becoming. Its only effect would be to give priests a greater importance than they have; for it would give them the right of making observations, and in the event of bad news arriving they would not fail to make comments. You never observe strict principles; sometimes you wish to have nothing to do with priests, at other times too much; you must let all this alone. M. Portalis did wrong to write this letter without knowing my intentions.

“NAPOLEON.”

It was rather hard to doubt the zeal of the clergy at this period especially if we are to believe what Madame de Rémusat says (vol. ii. 204):—“From the opening of the campaign, pastorals had been published in every See justifying this new war, and calling upon the conscripts to join their corps. The bishops recommenced once more (after Ulm), making plentiful quotations from the Gospel to prove that the Emperor was protected by the Lord of Hosts.”

The finances were in a very bad condition in France, and a good deal of fraudulent speculation going on in the absence of the Emperor.

TO PRINCE JOSEPH.

“SCHÖENBRUNN, 25th December, 1805.

“MY BROTHER,—I send you a letter for the Minister of the Treasury (M. Barbé-Marbois). You will read it, then seal it and hand it to him. I do not yet know whether it is incapacity or treason, but the coalition has had no more useful ally than this minister. I shall suspend my judgment until my approaching arrival in Paris. . . . I think positively that this man has betrayed me. Tell him that there is one way of escaping the storm, to replace the bonds which have been taken out of the treasury. . . . Talk this over with the Minister of Finance, but say nothing to Cambacérès; I do not know to what extent the brothers Michel with whom he is connected, are mixed up in this affair.

“NAPOLEON.”

On his return to Paris, Napoleon dismissed Barbé Marbois who was replaced by Mollien. We shall hear more of this matter.

TO THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA.

“SCHÖENBRUNN, 25th December, 1805.

“SIR, MY BROTHER,—I thank your Majesty for the amiable letter you have written to me. I experienced great pleasure on learning this morning from M. Talleyrand that all difficulties have been removed, and that peace has been re-established between us. Will your Majesty allow me to rejoice with you on the occasion of this fortunate circumstance? I feel, by the deep sentiments with which you inspired me when I had the honour of seeing you, that it will depend only upon you to make me a sincere friend, and for the remainder of my life to be spent in being agreeable to you. Let your Majesty never doubt

the esteem and friendship which all the qualities you possess have inspired, and which one cannot resist from the moment one has the advantage of knowing you. I shall be charmed, before leaving the states of your Majesty, to have an opportunity of paying you my respects, and renewing the assurance of the feelings which animate me.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. TALLEYRAND.

“SCHÖENBRUNN, 25th December, 1805.

“I have received your letter of the 3rd Nivose. . . . The Emperor and Prince Charles have written to me. . . . I shall have an interview with the archduke at three leagues from Vienna. . . . I send you a copy of my letter to the Emperor, who has written to me in the most amiable manner. I have congratulated the Emperor on the conclusion of peace. I will make no concessions. I did not like giving Prince Charles *rendez-vous* here, because I do not wish to talk over political affairs with him. At the *rendez-vous* I have selected, we shall pass two hours together; one hour will be employed in dining, the other in talking over military matters and in reciprocal protestations. Besides, everything here has been sent away or sold, with the exception of 500 or 600 guns. . . . If you cannot sign peace at once, wait and sign it on the advent of the new year; for I have a few prejudices, and I should like peace to date from the renewal of the Gregorian calendar, which presages, I hope, as much happiness for my reign as the old one. . . . You can assure those gentlemen (the Austrian Commissioners) that I have no other interest beyond causing my commerce to flourish, re-organising my marine, and, after having been general on land, of becoming an admiral; that this depends upon them. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

The Republican calendar was to cease on the 1st January, 1806.

In the thirty-seventh bulletin, the position of the army was thus set forth :—

“ Marshal Bernadotte occupies Bohemia ; Mortier, Moravia ; Davoust, Presburg ; Soult, Vienna ; Ney, Carinthia ; Marmont, Styria ; Massena, Carniola ; Augereau commands the reserve in Suabia ; Prince Eugene commands the troops in Italy ; General St. Cyr is marching upon Naples, in order to punish the treason of the queen, and to hurl from the throne that criminal woman, who in such a shameless manner has violated all that is sacred among men.

“ When people interceded on her behalf, the Emperor replied—Should hostilities recommence, and the nation have to support a war of thirty years, such atrocious perfidy cannot be pardoned. The Queen of Naples has ceased to reign ; this last crime has filled the measure of her destiny ; let her go to London to augment the number of intriguers. . . . M. *de* Talleyrand is at Presburg, where negotiations are being carried on.”

On the 6th Nivose, year XIV. (27th December, 1805) Napoleon announced in letters written to Prince Joseph, Prince Eugene, the *kings* of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, the Elector of Baden, and in a proclamation to the army that peace had been signed that morning at Pressburg, the ancient capital of Hungary. On this same date, Napoleon wrote no less than sixteen despatches, one of which alone occupies six printed pages.

On the 31st December Napoleon addressed two letters to his brother Joseph. The first appointed him lieutenant commanding-in-chief the army of Naples. Joseph was to assume the uniform of a general of division.

The second letter ran thus :—

“ MY BROTHER,—I have demanded the hand of the Princess Augusta, daughter of the *Elector* of Bavaria, who is a

very pretty person, for Prince Eugene. The marriage is settled. I have demanded another princess for Jerome. As you have seen him lately, let me know if I can count upon this young man to do what I wish. I have also arranged the plan for a marriage between your eldest daughter and a little prince, who will one day become a great prince. . . . I beg you will inform my mother of the marriage of Prince Eugene with the Princess Augusta.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO PRINCE EUGENE.

“MUNICH, 31st December, 1805.

“MY COUSIN,—I have arrived at Munich. I have arranged your marriage with the Princess Augusta. The banns have been published. This morning the princess paid me a visit, and I had a long conversation with her. You will find her portrait on the accompanying cup; but she is much better.

“NAPOLEON.”

The Bavarian alliance was a surprise for all parties; for the Princess Augusta, who was engaged to the Prince of Baden; for Prince Eugene, who was in love with somebody else; for the new King of Bavaria, who did not dare to refuse his daughter's hand; and for the Empress Josephine, from whom the intention had been kept secret. However, the match turned out well. As for *Monsieur* Jerome, he was to marry the Princess of Wirtemberg, contrary to canon law. The third matrimonial scheme announced by the Emperor was the strangest of all. The eldest daughter of his brother Joseph, Zenaide, was born in 1801, and was consequently only four years of age; and the little prince whom she was to wed, and who was to become a great prince, was the eldest son of Louis Bonaparte, who was born in 1802, to whom Napoleon intended to leave his crown. The popular belief was, as we know, that the Emperor himself was the father of “the little Napoleon,” who was carried off by croup at six years of age.

CHAPTER III.

THE YEAR 1806.

THE year 1806 found Napoleon at the zenith of his power, and elated beyond measure by the success of his arms. He was Emperor of France and King of Italy, and he proposed to have himself crowned by the Pope at Rome, Emperor of the West. Pius VII. was to be reduced to the condition of a stipendiary, and was to be as subservient to Napoleon as were the French bishops. The House of Hapsburg had been humbled to the dust, the Russians had been obliged to recross their frontier, and England was left without any available ally. Spain, Portugal, the larger part of Germany, Italy and Holland, were all in the grasp of the Corsican adventurer who was intent upon making his brothers kings, or viceroys, and his marshals—

“Those pagod things of sabre sway,
With front of brass and feet of clay,”

princes or dukes, with enormous revenues torn from captive nations.

However, there were some matters which caused uneasiness to the conqueror. War was becoming more and more unpopular in France, for the people were getting sick of that military glory which is so splendid in the pages of history, but which entails so much misery and so many sacrifices at the time. Then the Austrians might again take the field, the Russians might return, and Prussia

looked formidable. According to Madame de Rémusat, Napoleon admitted to Josephine that the reputation of the Prussian troops, and especially the excellence of the Prussian cavalry, as compared to his own, caused him great anxiety. In spite of this, Napoleon was determined to punish both Prussia and Naples for their manifold crimes.

Matters stood thus with Prussia. She had signed a secret treaty with France. However, on the 3rd October, the French under Bernadotte, while surrounding General Mack at Ulm, had marched through Anspach, thus violating Prussian territory. This led to an angry correspondence, as we have seen. A fortnight after the capitulation of Ulm, Prussia signed a convention at Potsdam, engaging herself to mediate between France and the allies, and in the event of Napoleon rejecting her offers, she was to join the coalition on receiving a subsidy from England. Prussia at once began to prepare for war, and permitted the Russian troops to march through her territory. Three days before the battle of Austerlitz, Haugwitz presented an ultimatum to Napoleon on the part of his master, but before Napoleon had time to reply, Austerlitz was fought and won, and the position between France and Prussia was entirely changed. When Haugwitz next saw the French Emperor, it was in fear and trembling, for Prussia had lost her two allies. Austria had been obliged to make peace, and Russia had been disabled for the moment. Prussia had only England to rely upon. After a good deal of hectoring, to the great astonishment of Haugwitz, as the price of his alliance, Napoleon offered Hanover to Prussia in exchange for Anspach and Neuchâtel. Haugwitz, who had expected a declaration of war, was enchanted with this solution, and immediately signed the convention on his own behalf.

By this skilful manœuvre Napoleon placed Prussia in the most cruel position. To refuse to ratify the treaty would be equivalent to a declaration of war, to accept

Hanover at a moment when she was expecting subsidies from England would be, as Fox afterwards described the conduct of Prussia, "the union of everything contemptible in servility with everything that was odious in rapacity."

The King of Prussia however made up his mind to sign the treaty with some modifications. He insisted that it should not be offensive and defensive, that he should accept Hanover only provisionally and after having received the consent of England, and that he should be allowed to annex the Hanse towns in order to give satisfaction to his subjects, &c., &c. M. Laforest accepted these modifications, which were forwarded to Paris, where they would probably have been accepted by Napoleon, but for the death of Pitt, and the advent of Fox, upon whose friendship he relied. Instead of modifying the treaty of Schönbrunn, Napoleon rendered it more onerous. Prussia was called upon, in addition to the conditions already imposed, to renounce Baireuth, to recognise all the changes made in Italy, and to close the mouth of the Elbe and the Weser to British commerce. Haugwitz signed this new treaty with a groan, and forwarded it to Berlin, where it was ratified. Napoleon thus forced the sovereignty of Hanover upon Prussia, but would not allow her to exercise sovereign rights, for it was in spite of Prussia that she was forced to close her ports to the British flag, an act which was equivalent to a declaration of war against England. In addition to the above hard terms, the King of Prussia was called upon to dismiss his prime minister Hardenberg, who was accused by the French Emperor of having "prostituted himself to the eternal enemies of the Continent."

The Elbe and Weser were no sooner closed to England than she seized upon four hundred Prussian and German merchant ships, in order to indemnify herself, just as she had seized the galleons from Spain. Prussia is said to have been much astonished at this act of hostility, which

was part of the price which she had to pay for her own weakness or perfidy. Her feelings of shame and anger may be easily imagined, when she learned that while Laforest had been urging the Prussian Government to retain Hanover, Lucchesini discovered in Paris that Napoleon was offering the Electorate to England as a pledge of peace!¹

Prussia, too, had been led to believe that she would be permitted to form a confederation of the north, but when she applied for the Hanse towns she was informed that France had too much deference for England to permit this, nor would Napoleon's regard for justice and respect for the law of nations allow him to see any compulsion used towards independent princes in this matter! It was much the same with Hesse Cassel and Saxony.

The cup of Prussia's humiliation was being gradually filled to overflowing. When the Duchies of Berg and Cleves were handed over to Murat, there was a cry of rage all through Germany at this investiture of a foreigner, a soldier of fortune, the brother-in-law of Bonaparte, who entered into the Germanic system, and this irritation was increased when Napoleon ordered the trial and execution of the unfortunate bookseller, Palm. The crime attributed to Palm was that he sold patriotic pamphlets, and especially one written by Gentz, entitled, *The Profound Degradation of Germany*. The fact that Palm was residing at Nuremberg, that is to say upon neutral territory, no more saved him than it saved the Duc d'Enghien; he was shot.

One is permitted to doubt the sincerity of the negotiations which Napoleon opened up at this time with England, through the medium of Lord Yarmouth, who had been detained as a prisoner on the rupture of the treaty of

¹ Napoleon had not only the audacity to deny this fact when he knew that it was discovered, but he instructed M. Laforest to swear to the King of Prussia that negotiations with England had been broken off simply because he refused to cede Hanover to her!

Amiens. The basis of these negotiations was the *uti possedetis*. Talleyrand, too, offered to restore Hanover to England, and to leave Sicily, which the French had not been able to take, to the Bourbons. But M. d'Oubril having arrived in Paris to treat for peace in the name of the Emperor Alexander, the policy of Napoleon underwent a change. England was told that she must be satisfied with Hanover, Malta, and the colonies which she had conquered, but that the French Emperor could not give up Sicily, the possession of which his brother Joseph considered as indispensable. Joseph was at this time King of Naples. At the same moment Napoleon offered, in his usual manner, to indemnify the Bourbons; in place of Sicily he offered to give them the Hanse towns which were to be taken from Germany! When Fox refused this bargain, Napoleon offered next Albania, which belonged to the Porte, and this in spite of some splendid presents just forwarded to him by the Sultan, and assurances of good will on his part; then Ragusa, which was dependent upon Austria, and finally the Balearic Isles, which belonged to his faithful ally the King of Spain. These proposals were of course rejected, one after the other.

At this moment the Czar refused to ratify the treaty concluded by d'Oubril, and Fox died. War now became certain, Sicily being the bone of contention,¹ and in this war Prussia was broken to pieces like a potter's vessel. She lost the battles of Jena and Auerstadt, her chief fortresses, and her capital, where Napoleon penned his celebrated "Decree of Berlin," which was an answer to the right of search and other tyrannical proceedings on the high seas, and which was to ruin British commerce.

No sooner had Napoleon concluded the treaties of Pressburg and of Schœnbrunn than he declared that the time had come to chastise *cette coquine*, as he called the Queen

¹ Napoleon feared that with both Sicily and Malta in her hands England would be able to close the lower end of the Mediterranean, and that England intended to keep Sicily he had no doubt.

of Naples. And in his thirty-seventh bulletin to the Grand Army he announced that General St. Cyr was marching upon Naples "to punish the treason and to hurl from the throne this criminal woman, who has so shamelessly violated all that is sacred to man." And Napoleon declared that should he be obliged to wage war for thirty years such atrocious perfidy could not be pardoned. As Lanfrey points out, the perfidy began on the side of Napoleon, who, long before Naples violated her neutrality, had determined upon seizing that kingdom. Nelson, in his will, said that he would never have been able to go to Egypt and to destroy the French fleet but for the aid which Lady Hamilton obtained from the Queen of Naples, who got his fleet supplied. It was probably from this date that Napoleon's antipathy for the Queen of Naples commenced. Then he had long decided that the Napoleons should everywhere supplant the Bourbons.

The French armies overran Naples, the Bourbons were driven from the throne, and Joseph Bonaparte reigned in their stead. On the 6th July Sir J. Stuart defeated a superior French force under General Regnier at Maida, and thus broke the spell of invincibility which the French soldiers had hitherto enjoyed. At Maida they were completely routed, and one of Napoleon's pet regiments broke and ran. However, the French soon afterwards made themselves masters of the whole kingdom of Naples, which England found it impossible to defend.

A repetition of the comedy played at Milan, when Napoleon assumed the iron crown, was performed in the month of June in Paris, when the representatives of the Batavian Republic came to offer the crown of Holland to Louis Bonaparte, who shortly afterwards installed himself at the Hague and commenced his ill-starred reign.

As Naples for a time had escaped the wrath of Napoleon in 1805, thanks to the third coalition, so did the war with Prussia for a time save Portugal. England had sent Lord

St. Vincent to the Tagus with a fleet, and a land force under Lord Rosslyn to protect our ally, but when Napoleon marched upon Berlin she was able to withdraw her army and navy.

The close of 1806 found Napoleon in Poland, where he discovered a fifth element—mud—and where he met with an amount of resistance which should have sobered him. He was about to enter on a period of sanguinary and undecided battles and to experience appalling losses.

The Emperor, as we see by his letters at the beginning of 1806, was not sorry for an excuse for remaining at Munich, in order to see his adopted son, Prince Eugene, settled, and if Austria intended to execute the treaty of Pressburg.

TO M. CAMBACÉRÈS.

“MUNICH, *3rd January*, 1806.

“I thank you for what you say on the occasion of the new year. I hope that you will write twenty similar letters, but above all without making use of *ipecacuanha*.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER.

“MUNICH, *5th January*, 1806.

“MY COUSIN,—Despatch your brother, General Berthier, with the decree which nominates Prince Joseph commander-in-chief of the army of Naples. He must remain with the head-quarters of that army and keep the object of his mission the most profound secret, because I am not sure that Prince Joseph will accept, and upon that account nothing must be known.

“NAPOLEON.”

Joseph, as we have seen, had already declined the throne of Italy, and evidently could not be implicitly counted upon.

On the 7th January Napoleon sent a message to the Senate on the subject of the marriage of Prince Eugene with the daughter of the King of Bavaria.

TO THE POPE.

“MUNICH, 7th January, 1806.

“MOST HOLY FATHER,—I have received the letter of your Holiness dated the 18th November. I was deeply grieved that when all the Powers in the pay of England were coalesced against me in an unjust war, your Holiness should have given ear to bad advice and have written so inconsiderate a letter. You are at perfect liberty to keep my minister at Rome or to send him away. The occupation of Ancona is the necessary consequence of the bad military organisation of the Holy See. It was in the interest of your Holiness that this fortress should fall into my hands rather than into those of the English or the Turks. Your Holiness complains that since your departure from Paris you have done nothing but suffer ; the reason is that since that period those who feared my power, and assured me of their friendship, have changed their opinions, considering themselves justified in so doing by the strength of the coalition, and that since the return of your Holiness to Rome I have experienced nothing but refusals on your part even in matters of the greatest importance for religion, as, for example, when it was a question of preventing Protestantism from raising its head in France.¹ I consider myself the protector of the Holy See, and it was on the strength of this title that I occupied Ancona. I consider myself, like my predecessors of the second and third race, as the eldest son of the Church, and as alone having a sword to protect her from being defiled by Greeks and Mussulmans. I shall ever protect the Holy See, in spite of the intrigues, the

¹ When Napoleon thus referred to Jerome's marriage with Miss Paterson he was bent upon marrying him to a Protestant princess, and Stephanie de Beauharnais to a Protestant prince !

ingratitude, and the evil designs of those men who have unmasked themselves during the last three months. They thought I was ruined: God showed by the success with which He favoured my arms the interest which He took in my cause. I shall be the friend of your Holiness whenever you consult your heart and the true principles of religion, &c.

“NAPOLEON.”

And his Majesty threatened to withdraw Cardinal Fesch from Rome and to replace him by a layman.

TO CARDINAL FESCH.

“MUNICH, 7th *January*, 1806.

“The Pope wrote me a letter on the 18th November both ridiculous and insane: those fellows believed me to be dead. I occupied Ancona because, in spite of your representations, nothing was done for its defence. . . . Let it be known that I will not tolerate any bantering; that I will not have Russian and Sardinian ministers at Rome. My intention is to replace you by a secular ambassador. Since the dotards seem to care nothing about a Protestant occupying the throne of France I shall send them a Protestant ambassador. Tell Consalvi that if he loves his country he should leave the ministry or do what I ask; that I am religious, but not a bigot; that Constantine separated civil from military affairs, and that I also may appoint a senator to command in Rome in my name. It is all very well for them to talk about religion after admitting the Russians, renouncing Malta, and now wishing to dismiss my ambassador. It is they who prostitute religion. Is there another example of an apostolic nuncio in Russia? Tell Consalvi—tell even the Pope—that since they wish to drive my minister from Rome, I may go there to reinstate him. Can nothing be done with these men except by force? They allow religion to perish in

Germany through not concluding the concordat; they allow it to perish in Bavaria, in Italy; they become the laughing-stock of courts and of people. I gave them advice to which they would never listen. They believed that the Russians, the English, and the Neapolitans would respect the neutrality of the Pope! For the Pope I am Charlemagne, because, like Charlemagne, I have united the crown of France with that of Lombardy, and because my empire borders the East. I therefore expect to be treated from this point of view. I shall change nothing in appearance if they behave well; otherwise I shall reduce the Pope to be Bishop of Rome, &c. &c.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO PRINCE JOSEPH.

“MUNICH, 12th January, 1806.

“. . . You will be in the vicinity of Rome on the 15th. I have sent you the General Dumas. Marshal Massena ought to be with the army. I count that after a few days' repose you will have 40,000 men, with whom you can form three corps: Marshal Massena will command the strongest; General St. Cyr another; and General Regnier the smallest, composed of 6,000 good troops in reserve. Make friends with General Regnier; he is cold, but of the three the most capable of drawing out a good plan of campaign and of giving you good advice. In your position art consists in making each of the three believe that he enjoys your confidence. . . . Speak seriously to Massena and St. Cyr, and tell them that you will tolerate no embezzlement. Massena plundered a great deal in the Venetian country.

“NAPOLEON.”

And this in spite of the *douceur* he received at the opening of the campaign.

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

"MUNICH, 15th January, 1806.

"I read in the *Journal de l'Empire* that there appears at the foot of a comedy written by Collin d'Harleville—'Seen and authorised the publication and sale in accordance with a decision of H. E. the Minister of Police. By order of H. E. the Chief of the Department for the Liberty of the Press.' I am astonished at these new forms, which the law alone could authorise. If it were necessary to establish a censure, that could be done only by my permission. It being my determination that the censorship shall not exist, I was much surprised to see, in my empire, forms which may be all very well at Berlin and Vienna. I have long sought to re-establish the social edifice; to-day I am obliged to keep a look-out in order to maintain public liberty. I have no idea of Frenchmen becoming serfs. In France all that is not prohibited is allowed, and nothing can be prohibited except by laws, by the tribunals, or by the police, when it is a question of morality or public order.¹ I say once more that I will have no censorship, because every publisher is answerable for the works he issues; because I will not be responsible for the follies that are printed; because I will not suffer a clerk to tyrannise talent and to mutilate genius.

"NAPOLEON."

TO PRINCE EUGENE.

"STUTTGARD, 19th January, 1806.

"MY SON,—I arrived here yesterday evening, and I shall leave to-morrow. I send you the *Moniteur*, in which you will find matters concerning yourself.

"NAPOLEON.

"P.S. Two kisses for the Princess Augusta—one from me and the other from the Empress."

¹ This maxim appears to have been borrowed from Catherine of Russia.

TO PRINCE JOSEPH.

"STUTT GARD, 19th *January*, 1806.

"It is my intention that you shall enter the kingdom of Naples at the beginning of February, and that I shall be informed in the course of the month that my eagles float over that capital.¹ You will conclude no armistice or capitulation. My intention is that the Bourbons shall cease to reign at Naples; and I wish to place a prince of my house on that throne—you first, should it suit you, another should it not suit you." [Fourteen regiments of infantry and twelve of cavalry were to remain in Naples for the present.] "The country will furnish provisions, clothing, &c., so this force will not cost me a farthing. . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. CAMBACÉRÈS.

"STRASBURG, 24th *January*, 1806.

"MY COUSIN,—I send you a bulletin written by M. Lebrun. Tell me confidentially if he has lost his head: I begin to believe that he has. Good God, how stupid literary men are! He who is capable of translating a poem is not fit to command fifteen men. Since I was born nothing has astonished me more than the conduct of Lebrun at Genoa.

"NAPOLEON."

Lebrun, formerly Third Consul, had translated Homer and Tasso.

TO MARSHAL AUGEREAU.

"STRASBURG, 24th *January*, 1806.

"You will occupy Frankfort with a division of your army. . . . At first you will levy no contribution on the city. It is only when you have united your whole army corps that you will demand 4,000,000 francs, and pay the same into the military chest of the Grand Army. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

¹ This was decreeing victory after the manner of the Convention.

Very few cities suffered more than Frankfort at the hands of Napoleon and his marshals.

TO M. LEBRUN.

"PARIS, 27th January, 1806.

"MY COUSIN,—I manifested, in my former letter, my dissatisfaction with the bulletin which you published concerning the insurrection of Placentia. I desire in this to assure you that I am highly satisfied with the measures taken by you to put down the insurrection. I blamed your words, but I greatly praise your zeal.

"I have deprived Marbois of his portfolio. He did things impossible to conceive. I still believe him to be honest, but under the influence of scamps.¹

"NAPOLEON."

We shall refer to the Barbé-Marbois affair at some length presently.

In a letter to Prince Eugene dated the 27th January Napoleon said: "A thousand amiable things to the princess. I long to hear that she supported her journey well, *et qu'elle se trouve bien des premiers combats de l'hyménée*. Tell her how much I love her." Writing the same day to his brother Joseph he said: "Do not tolerate any robbers. I hope you are satisfied with Massena; if not, send him away. . . . Do not allow Salicetti to rob. The Princess Julie (Joseph's wife) and the children are coming to dine with me. I think that I told you it was my intention to bestow the kingdom of Naples in my family. It will form like Italy, Switzerland, Holland, and the three kingdoms of Germany, part of my Federative States, or to speak plainly, the French Empire."

What greater justification of the third coalition could be found than the concluding portion of this letter?

Three days afterwards Napoleon held the following language to Count Miot de Melito:—

¹ *Vide* letter of the 25th December, 1805.

"You are going to rejoin my brother. You will tell him that I have made him King of Naples, that he will continue to be Grand Elector, and that nothing will be changed as regards his relations with France. But impress upon him that the least hesitation, the slightest wavering, will ruin him entirely. I have another person in my mind who will replace him should he refuse. I shall call him Napoleon, and he shall be my son. It was the conduct of my brother at the coronation and his refusal to accept the crown of Italy which made me call Eugene my son. I am determined to give the same title to another should he oblige me. At present all feelings of affection yield to state reasons. I recognise only those who serve me as relations. My fortune is not attached to the name of Bonaparte, but to that of Napoleon. It is with my fingers and with my pen that I make children. To-day I can love only those whom I esteem. Joseph must forget all our ties of childhood. Let him make himself esteemed! Let him acquire glory! Let him have a leg broken in battle! then I shall esteem him. Let him give up his old ideas. Let him not dread fatigue. Look at me; the campaign I have just terminated, the movement, the excitement, have made me stout. I believe that if all the kings of Europe were to coalesce against me I should have a ridiculous paunch.

"I offer my brother a fine opportunity. Let him govern his new states wisely and firmly. . . . But above all let him prevent Massena from robbing. What he wrings from the people of Naples must go to the troops and to the State, and not go to fatten swindlers. What Massena did in Venice was fearful. That affair is not over yet. . . . As for Salicetti, I have written to my brother not to allow him to rob so much. . . . I can have no relations in obscurity. Those who do not rise with me shall no longer form part of my family. I am creating a family of kings, or rather of viceroys, for the King of Italy, the King of Naples, and others will all be included in a federative system. How-

ever, I am willing to forget what two of my brothers have done against me ; let Lucien abandon his wife, and I will give him a kingdom. As for Jerome, he has partially repaired his faults. After cruising for a year I shall marry him to a princess. But I shall never permit the wife of Lucien to seat herself by my side."

On the 30th of January, Napoleon dictated a "note" in which he said :—

"I do not desire Prussia to acquire any considerable increase of territory. Such increase would render her more formidable to Russia, but also more formidable to France. . . . Such as she is to-day Prussia is a great Power, and from a general point of view it would be a great mistake to allow her to augment her force. But if special considerations conspired to tolerate this augmentation, the remedy would lie in creating a new state in Germany which would by family, or geographical relations, be drawn into the French system. . . ."

Although the Prussian territory was so straggling that Voltaire compared it to a lady's garter thrown on the floor, yet Prussia was formidable as a nation ; she was not a mere conglomeration of divers nationalities.

TO CARDINAL FESCH.

"PARIS, 30th January, 1806.

"MY COUSIN,—I have found your reflections upon Cardinal Ruffo very mean and puerile. You behave like a woman at Rome. You did wrong to advise the cardinal to come to Paris. You meddle with things which you do not understand.

"Take possession of the Venetian palace at Rome. I have written to Prince Joseph to aid you *vi et armis*, if necessary. Listen to nothing that people may say. This palace belongs to the states of Venice. Take possession of it in the name of the King of Italy."

"NAPOLEON."

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER.

"PARIS, 30th January, 1806.

"I have received your letters, and presume that you have arrived at Munich. As M. Haugwitz has not yet made his appearance see that my army remains ready for war, and to act with the rapidity of thought. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

And the army did remain ready until it was wanted to punish Prussian tergiversations and weakness, and to march on Berlin.

TO THE PRINCE OF THE PEACE.

"PARIS, 2nd February, 1806.

"Nothing astonishes me on the part of the Queen of Naples; however, I shuddered on reading your letter.

"It is a great consolation to learn that their majesties are in good health. Never doubt the interest I bear you, and my desire to give you proofs of my protection; nor my esteem and friendship for the king.

"NAPOLEON."

TO GENERAL JUNOT.

"PARIS, 4th February, 1806.

" I can understand nothing of all this. Let Prince Eugene send you troops. Burn five or six villages, and shoot some sixty persons; make very severe examples, for the consequences of what is passing in Parma are incalculable for the security of Italy. I am astonished that General Menou has given no signs of life in all this.

"NAPOLEON."

TO PRINCE EUGENE.

"PARIS, 4th February, 1806.

"MY SON,—I am surprised that you have told me nothing of your voyage, nor what happened in the Tyrol. Your wife was more amiable. However, I wish you to

write to me sufficiently often so that I may always know where you are, where you are going, and what you are doing, how you get on together, and what amount of esteem you have for your wife.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE PRINCESS AUGUSTA.

“PARIS, 5th February, 1806.

“MY DAUGHTER,—I have learned with pleasure that you have arrived in Italy, and that you are well enough to undertake the journey to Venice; but what most pleased me was to read in your letter assurances of the happiness you enjoy. Be persuaded that I take a great interest in your life, and I was not mistaken in supposing that you would be happy with Eugene. Believe me that if such had not been my opinion, I should have sacrificed my political interests to your tastes. Your letter, my good and amiable Augusta, is filled with those delicate sentiments which are peculiar to you. I have ordered a little library to be arranged for you. I hope that the Empress sends you the fashions, and that you will tell me what I can send you. . . .

“I conclude by recommending to you my people and my soldiers; let your purse be always open to the wives and children of the latter; nothing will touch my heart more than this.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

“PARIS, 6th February, 1806.

“The Emperor sends to M. de Talleyrand an extract from the *Gazette of Baireuth*. We are threatened with the arrival of 200,000 Prussians. In truth the Prussians are mad. Let M. de Talleyrand tell M. de Haugwitz that this must finish.

“NAPOLEON.”

NOTE FOR M. DE LACEPEDE.

"PARIS, 6th February, 1806.

"His Majesty sees with pleasure that the Prince of the Peace has paid the subsidy of 11,000,000 francs. . . . The Emperor will support with all his influence, and by force of arms, if necessary, all that the Prince of the Peace wishes to do with regard to Portugal.

"As for operations in Ireland, all that interests that important portion of Catholicity touches the heart of his Majesty, but you must not allow yourself to be deceived by adventurers. However, the Emperor is about to direct his attention once more to the navy and the flotilla, and to adopt measures for subduing England if she does not conclude peace.

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. FOUCHE.

"PARIS, 7th February, 1806.

"M. Portalis has informed me of the existence of several ecclesiastical journals, and of the inconveniences which may result from the spirit in which they are written, and above all from the diversity of opinions in religious matters. My intention is consequently that the religious journals shall cease to appear, and that they shall be united into one paper which shall supply all the subscribers. This journal being specially intended for the instruction of the clergy shall be called the *Journal des Curés*. The editors shall be nominated by the Cardinal Archbishop of Paris.

"NAPOLEON."

In a long letter to brother Joseph, who was marching on Naples, Napoleon said—"Fox is Minister of Foreign Affairs, Grenville at the Home Office, Spencer at the Admiralty, Addington at the Exchequer, Lord Hawkesbury at the Treasury, Windham at the War Office, Sheridan, Paymaster-General.

"I am well satisfied with the turn affairs have taken here. I had a great deal of trouble in making a dozen swindlers,

at the head of whom was Ouvrard, disgorge. Barbé Marbois was duped just like the Cardinal de Rohan in the necklace affair, only for 90,000,000 francs. I was determined to have them shot without trial. Thank God I have been repaid. This has put me out of temper. I tell you this to show you what scamps men are. As you are at the head of a great army, you require to know this. The misfortunes of France have been always due to such wretches.

"M. de Haugwitz is here. We have not yet settled matters. The Prussian court is very false and very stupid. . . . Remember that the house of Spain is the same as the house of Naples, and say nothing to offend it.

"I take the greatest interest in your prosperity, and especially in your glory, which, in your position, is of the first necessity ; without it life can have no charm. I hope that Mathieu Dumas¹ has joined you. . . ."

Napoleon acted in his usual arbitrary manner in the Ouvrard affair. Ouvrard was thrown into prison, and forced to disgorge, but, as one of the Emperor's advisers told him, no court would have convicted the banker. Ouvrard and Co. were engaged in a complicated business. They advanced money to the State upon exchequer bills, and they were army contractors ; at the same time they had an enormous contract with Spain for the working of her South American colonies. Spain being at war with England, and having lost her fleet, could draw no more piastres from Mexico. Ouvrard undertook to obtain them through some houses in Amsterdam, and in return he was to perform certain engagements, such as sending corn to Spain and paying the Spanish subsidies which were owing to Napoleon. However, before the piastres, upon which Ouvrard counted, could arrive, he ran short of money, and applied to Barbé Marbois for aid from the Bank of France. The Minister of Finance consented to save Ouvrard ; there was an issue of paper, the notes of

¹ General Dumas, the military historian.

the bank were depreciated, and a demi suspension of payment followed.

The situation was terrible. Fortunately for Napoleon he won the battle of Austerlitz, and everything was saved. Had the coalition held out a few weeks longer, France would have been bankrupt (Thiers, viii., p. 97). No wonder that Napoleon was alarmed and irritated at having found himself upon the verge of ruin. Ouvrard, however, was not to blame, but the system against which he had loudly and vainly protested.

Ouvrard may have been too grasping, but one can see from his memoirs that he was imbued with sound principles. He says, for example, that—"Napoleon, when he ascended the throne, knew no other means of filling his treasury than those he employed to fill the chest of his army when he was general-in-chief—war taxes, the spoils of kings and people, subsidies imposed upon his allies (often as ill treated as his enemies), blockading, ports closed to free commerce and opened to licences. . . . While Mr. Pitt looked upon all wealth acquired by private individuals as better in their hands than in those of the State, the Emperor, on the contrary, considered that he ought to be the centre of all riches and the dispenser of all fortune; these were the reasons which made Napoleon act as a bitter enemy to his own interests. . . . Napoleon knew no other sources of revenue but fiscality and conquest. Credit was for him an abstract term, in which he saw merely the dreams of ideologists and the empty notions of economists."

After Ouvrard had been in prison for some time, Napoleon once more required his services, sent for him, and asked him to undertake the general supply of his armies. In reply, Ouvrard said—"To do that, sire, it will be necessary for you to renounce the principle that war must support war. Regular armies, in our days, cannot live like conquering hordes; in order to reap abundance you must not sow famine. Establish administrative credit instead of the requisitions and devastations in force to-day. Let

the local authorities of the conquered countries levy contributions to pay for everything consumed by your armies," &c., &c.

Just before Napoleon left Paris to open the Waterloo campaign, he said to Ouvrard—"I approve of your plan of levying contributions on conquered countries; come to my head-quarters, and I will confide this operation to you." But there were no more countries to be conquered, and the conversion of Napoleon came too late.

DECISION.

"PARIS, 8th February, 1806.

"The Emperor is asked if the statue of Peace, executed in plaster by Chaudet, shall be cast in bronze furnished by the guns taken from the enemy, and what dimensions it is to have?

"If this be the statue decreed by the Senate, it ought to be of a size to be placed in the Emperor's *salon*. I think the intention of the Senate was that it should be cast in silver."

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER.

"PARIS, 9th February, 1806.

"My cousin, the Emperor of Austria, has asked permission to remove the arms from one of his castles in the Tyrol. I hope that all that is curious, and especially the armour of François I., has not been given to him. I attach great importance to keeping this armour.

"NAPOLEON."

Berthier was afterwards ordered to bring this armour to Paris, where the Emperor was to receive it in state.

TO CARDINAL FESCH.

"PARIS, 9th February, 1806.

"MY COUSIN,—I have received your letter of the 31st January. I am waiting to know if you have taken possession of the Farnese and Venice palaces in my name. Let me know what I can do with them. "NAPOLEON."

TO PRINCE JOSEPH.

“PARIS, 9th February, 1806.

“MY BROTHER,—If there be a Russian minister at the Court of Sardinia, or a Sardinian minister at Rome, drive them away.

“On arriving at Naples the first thing to be done will be to let every one remain in office ; then disarm the country, establish a good minister of police, drive all the foreigners out of Naples, seize all the English merchandise in the kingdom, have three or four Tuscans, who have always been agents of Acton, arrested. . . . The returns showing the situation of the armies are for me the most agreeable books in my library, and those that I read with the greatest pleasure in my hours of recreation.

“I see already by those that you have sent traces of that disorder which Massena everywhere creates.

“NAROLEON.”

TO HIS HOLINESS THE POPE.

“PARIS, 13th February, 1806.

“MOST HOLY FATHER,—I have received the letter of your Holiness of the 29th January. I share all your pain, and can understand your embarrassment. You can avoid all this by walking in the straight path and not entering into the maze of politics and ‘considerations’ for Powers which, in a religious point of view, are heretics and beyond the pale of the Church, and in a political point of view are distant from your States and are incapable of protecting you or of doing you any harm. All Italy will be subjected to my law. I shall in no way interfere with the independence of the Holy See ; I shall even have it paid all the expenses occasioned by my army, but our conditions must be that your Holiness shall have the same respect for me in temporal matters that I have for you in spiritual matters, and that you shall cease to show any useless toleration towards heretics and enemies of the

Church. Your Holiness is sovereign of Rome, but I am Emperor. All my enemies ought to be your enemies. It is, therefore, not proper that any agent of the King of Sardinia, any Englishman, Russian, or Swede, should reside in Rome or in your States, nor that any vessels belonging to those powers should enter your ports.

“As the head of our religion I shall always have a filial deference for your Holiness, but I am accountable to God, who made use of my arms to re-establish religion. And how can I see it compromised by the dilatoriness of Rome without groaning? Nothing is done, and for mundane interests, for the vain prerogatives of the tiara, souls are allowed to perish. Those who allow Germany to remain in a state of anarchy will have to answer for this before God; those who delay sending bulls to my bishops and who leave my dioceses in anarchy will have to answer for this before God. As for the affairs of Italy, I have done everything for the bishops; I have consolidated the interests of the Church; I have not meddled with any spiritual affair. What I did at Milan I shall do at Naples, and wherever my power extends. I do not refuse to accept the co-operation of men endowed with the true zeal for religion and to come to an understanding with them, but if, at Rome, days are wasted in culpable inertness, I, commissioned by God to watch over the maintenance of religion, shall be unable to remain indifferent to what may injure the welfare and the salvation of my people.

“Most Holy Father, I know that your Holiness desires to do right, but you are surrounded by men who will not permit you, who have bad principles, and who, instead of searching to remedy evils, search to aggravate them. If your Holiness had remembered what I said to you in Paris the religion of Germany would have been organised, and not left in its present lamentable condition. In this country, as in Italy, everything would have been done in concert with your Holiness. But I cannot allow matters to languish for a year which should be terminated in a

fortnight. It was not by going to sleep that I raised the state of the clergy so high and reorganised religion in France, so that now there is no country in which it does, so much good and where it is more respected. Those who hold any other language to your Holiness deceive you and are your enemies ; they will draw down misfortunes which will be fatal to them.

“Upon which I pray God, &c., &c.

“NAPOLEON.”

Napoleon from an early age had a peculiar taste for theological controversies. When at St. Helena he said that as a sub-lieutenant he had so thoroughly studied the disputes between the Gallicans and the Ultramontanes that he might have taken out his degree in divinity.

On the same day his majesty wrote to Uncle Fesch, saying :—

“I shall protect the Papal States against the whole world. Have bulls sent for my bishops. They take a month to do the work of twenty-four hours. That is not religion. In Germany there is but one cry against the court of Rome. Its conduct is revolting. I have ordered Joseph to aid you. I hold you responsible for the execution of these two points—1st, expulsion of the English, Russians, Swedes, and Sardinians from the Roman states ; 2nd, prohibition of the ships of those Powers from entering the Roman ports. Say that I have my eyes open, that I am Charlemagne, the sword of the Church, their Emperor ; that they ought not to know if an empire of Russia exists. . . .”

TO THE KING OF BAVARIA.

“PARIS, 14th February, 1806.

“SIR, MY BROTHER AND COUSIN,—Marshal Berthier will acquaint you with the orders which I have given for the occupation of Anspach. The King of Prussia was wrong not to ratify the treaty of Vienna unconditionally.

I have not accepted the alterations, and the treaty is null. However, the Prussian army has occupied Hanover, and consequently I have ordered the occupation of Anspach. Prussia wished to take Hanover, and to give us neither Cleves nor Anspach. . . . I greatly desire to see Prussia driven north.

“NAPOLEON.”

In a letter of the 16th February his Majesty approves of the conduct of Prince Eugene in closing the ports of Venice and Italy to English goods. In the same letter we see that the inhabitants of Verona, Padua, Trieste, &c., were to contribute 7,400,000 francs towards the Grand Army, as Napoleon was greatly in need of money.

NOTE TO THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR.

“PARIS, 17th February, 1806.

“In the month of May a portion of the army will be assembled in Paris.

“The city of Paris has decided on offering crowns of gold to the eagles of the grand army, &c., &c.

“The city of Paris will be compensated for these expenses, the increase of town dues, all the more so as the officers and soldiers, who will receive extra pay on that day, will spend a great deal of money.

“Some bull fights like those in Spain, or fights between wild beasts, are amusements which would be pleasing to warriors.”

The theatres were to remain open for a week free ; there were to be concerts at which warlike songs were to be sung, and everything was to be done to arouse enthusiasm and an *esprit militaire*.

As a matter of fact the army did not return to Paris, but marched to Berlin, and then to Warsaw.

TO THE PRINCESS ELIZA.

"PARIS, 22nd February, 1806.

"MY SISTER,—I beg that you will allow your Court to wear nothing but silks and cambric, and that you will exclude all cottons and muslins in order to favour French industry.

"NAPOLEON."

TO PRINCE JOSEPH.

"PARIS, 25th February, 1806.

"MY BROTHER,—I have received your letter of the 14th. I compliment you on the fall of Naples and other places. I have ordered that all the Neapolitan officers in Paris and in my kingdom of Italy shall be sent to you.

"NAPOLEON."

TO PRINCE JOSEPH.

"PARIS, 28th February, 1806.

". . . You cannot be in want of money at present. Disarm Naples, and levy a contribution of 10,000,000 francs on the city. It will be paid easily. You have certain resources by confiscating English merchandise. I compliment you on your reconciliation with St. Januarius, but in the midst of all that I suppose you have occupied the forts. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

The first thing Joseph did after entering the city was to throw a diamond necklace round the neck of the favourite saint. Championnet had acted very differently before, and Murat acted very differently afterwards.

On the 2nd March Napoleon opened the session with a pompous speech, in which he thus referred to the battle of Trafalgar:—"The tempest caused us to lose some vessels *after a battle imprudently waged*. I cannot praise too highly the high-mindedness and the attachment which the King of Spain showed under these circumstances in the

common cause. I desire peace with England, and I shall always be ready to conclude it on the bases of the treaty of Amiens. . . .”

It required a good deal of audacity to speak of Trafalgar as a battle imprudently waged after the positive instructions sent to poor Villeneuve. Napoleon attempted a similar excuse when at St. Helena. In his *Military Correspondence* (vol. x., p. 139), he wrote:—“Tourville attacked eighty English vessels with forty; the French fleet was destroyed. The order of Louis XIV. did not justify this; that order was not a military order which exacted implicit obedience, it was an instruction. The clause understood was—if the chances of success are equal. In that case the responsibility of the admiral was covered by the order of the prince. But when defeat was certain, it was misunderstanding the spirit of the order to execute it to the letter. If on approaching Louis XIV. the admiral had said, ‘Sire, if I had attacked the English your whole fleet would have been lost; I returned to port,’ the king would have thanked him;—*de facto*, the royal order would have been executed.”

Louis XIV. threatened to supersede Tourville unless he fought Russell, and Napoleon threatened to supersede Villeneuve unless he fought Nelson.

TO PRINCE JOSEPH.

“PARIS, 8th March, 1806.

“MY BROTHER,—I see that in one of your proclamations you promise not to levy any war contributions, and that the soldiers are not to exact meals from their hosts. It is not by cajoling people that you win them, and it is not by such measures that you will be able to recompense your army. Lay a contribution of thirty million francs on the kingdom of Naples, remount your cavalry and artillery, &c. It would be too ridiculous if the conquest of Naples were not to procure the well-being and comfort of my army. . . . The new English

Government appears to be animated by better principles than the last one, if I am to judge by a letter from Mr. Fox, warning the police of an attempt to assassinate me. He names the individual, gives details, and says that he writes by the express order of the king. . . . Massena should be settled at Naples, with the title of prince and a large revenue.”¹

As M. Lanfrey says, it was Napoleon himself who imagined this false plot for his own assassination, which, while testing the friendship of Fox, furnished an excuse for reopening negotiations, and attempting to obtain from the new ministry what he had failed to obtain from Pitt.

In a letter of the 13th March we see that Hamburg, Amsterdam, Frankfort, and Augsburg were to contribute 9,618,000 francs towards the Grand Army.

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

“PARIS, 14th March, 1806.

“There are three countries which I should like to have in order to ‘round off’ Prince Murat. First, the abbeys of Essen and Werden, the county of Lamark, and the county of Witgenstein. The two first belong to Prussia; I don’t know to whom the third belongs. See what you can offer Prussia in exchange. . . .

“Make me a report upon giving Frankfort to Darmstadt, which will indemnify Hesse Cassel and Nassau; these will

¹ On the 2nd March Napoleon had written to Joseph that Massena was hated by the army, that he was not a man of sufficient elevation to command Frenchmen, and that he had plundered 3,000,000 francs; and on the 12th the Emperor wrote—“Advise Massena to give back the 6,000,000 francs he has taken. The only way he has of saving himself is to restore them quickly; if he does not restore them I shall appoint a military commission, to sit at Padua, to make an inquiry, for this is too much brigandage. . . . Have St. Cyr watched. The detail of their embezzlements is unheard of; I learned it from the Austrians, who blushed at it.”

cede the country contiguous to the Duchy of Berg; Hesse Cassel will cede the *enclave* near the Rhine, which will be given to Baden. This affair must be promptly terminated, and ratified in less than twenty days. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

The territorial arrangements of his Majesty were numerous, complicated, and perplexing.

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

“PARIS, 14th March, 1806.

“I saw M. Ver Huell this evening. I reduced the question to two words. Holland has no executive, and requires one; I will give her Prince Louis. A compact will be made by which the religion of the country will be respected; the prince will keep his and the people theirs. The present constitution will be maintained; there will be a king instead of a grand pensioner. . . . The castle of Loo and its dependencies must be given to the prince, with means to keep up the splendour of his rank. . . . Before twenty days Louis must make his entrance into Amsterdam.

“NAPOLEON.”

And this was the way in which the liberties of Holland were disposed of. It may at once be stated that Louis was afraid to refuse the proffered throne; he preferred reigning at the Hague to being driven into exile like Lucien. In 1805 Louis had been given the command of an army corps, and after Austerlitz had gone to Strasburg to pay his respects to his brother. Napoleon received him very coolly, and asked him why he had left Holland. Louis gave for a reason that rumours had been spread of a monarchical transformation. “These rumours,” he added, “are disagreeable to a free and estimable nation, nor do they please me.” And yet he accepted the throne.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER.

"LA MALMAISON, 1806.

"I send you the *Moniteur*; you will see what I have done for you. I exact one condition only, which is that you get married. Your passion has lasted long enough; it has become ridiculous, and I have the right to hope that the man whom I have called my companion in arms, who will be placed alongside of me by posterity, will no longer abandon himself to a weakness without example. I therefore wish you to get married, or I will see you no more. You are fifty years of age, but you belong to a race which lives for eighty, and these thirty years are those during which the *douceurs* of marriage are most necessary.

"When circumstances permit you will go to Strasburg. From thence you will go to your principality, to settle affairs. It brought 50,000 crowns to Prussia, it should bring you double that sum. You know that no one likes you better than I do, but you also know that the first condition of my friendship is that it must be made subordinate to my esteem. You have deserved it up to the present. Continue to render yourself worthy of it by aiding me in my plans, and in founding a good and large family.

"NAPOLEON."

Berthier, who was born at Versailles in 1755, joined the royal army as a lad, fought under Rochambeau in America, and returned to France a colonel. During the Revolution he did duty in the National Guard of his native town, and helped the daughters of Louis XV. to make their escape. He next served against the Royalists in La Vendée, then joined the army of Custine, afterwards acted as aide-de-camp to Kellermann, and in 1796 became chief of the staff to Bonaparte. When at Milan Berthier fell desperately in love with a Madame Visconti, who left her second husband

to follow the fortunes of the French soldier. Berthier was still passionately attached to this woman when he received the above letter. He rushed off to the Empress, who had known Madame Visconti in Italy, appealed to her, and wept like a child. All that Josephine could do was to express her pity for his grief and her admiration for his constancy. However, there were to be no more public mistresses among the dignitaries of the empire. Talleyrand had been obliged to condone with M. Grand and to marry Madame Grand ; and as Berthier was too good a Catholic to marry a divorced woman, the fiat went out that he must marry some one else, and raise up heirs to his principedom of Neufchâtel. For two years he managed to elude the orders of his chief ; but one day the Duke William of Birkenfeld arrived in Paris to solicit compensation for territory which had been wrested from him, and was sent for by Napoleon. His Majesty said, "I intend to give your daughter's hand to Berthier." Whereupon the duke, unaccustomed to such abrupt measures, fainted away. The marriage duly took place in 1808, and three months after the ceremony Berthier learned the death of M. de Visconti. Upon this he took up his pen and wrote to Prince Borghese—"You know how often the Emperor pressed me to obtain a divorce for Madame de Visconti. But a divorce was always repugnant to the feelings in which I was educated, and therefore I waited. To-day Madame de Visconti is free, and I might have been the happiest of men. But the Emperor forced me into a marriage which hinders me from uniting myself to the only woman I ever loved. Ah ! my dear prince, all that the Emperor has done and may yet do for me, will be no compensation for the eternal misfortune to which he has condemned me." Berthier's share of the Imperial plunder was 60,000*l.* a year and the castle of Chambord, where he, his wife, and Madame di Visconti lived together on the best terms. It will be seen that Berthier's ideas of morality were very curious and confused.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER.

“LA MALMAISON, 10th April, 1806.

“I am sorry that you sent your brother to Paris. I would not receive him. Tell him to rejoin immediately. He has made 2,000,000 francs in Hanover, and must not give himself airs. If he intends to neglect his duty because he is rich, he will find out his mistake. I shall degrade a general who leaves his troops. As for the confinement of his wife, I cannot enter into such details as that; my wife might have died at Munich or at Strasburg, and that would not have disturbed the execution of my plans for a quarter of an hour. All the soldiers in Germany wish to return to Paris. . . . Send me details concerning the embezzlements. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

Made £80,000 in Hanover!

TO VICE-ADMIRAL DÉCRÈS.

“LA MALMAISON, 10th April, 1806.

“I have read with attention the report of the Prefect of Martinique. I beg that you will show this document to M. Dubuc; it is entirely favourable to the English. . . . Let me know how the court of justice can be composed so that the great majority may consist of men arrived from France and enemies of the English. . . . Write to General Villaret that I have read this song with indignation, and that it is not proper for French officers to hear the praises of Anglomania.

“NAPOLEON.”

On the 11th April Napoleon addressed Joseph for the first time as King of Naples.

TO PRINCE EUGENE.

"ST. CLOUD, 14th April, 1806.

"MY SON,—You work too hard, and your life is too monotonous. This is good for you, because work should be a recreation for you, but you have a young wife who is *enceinte*. I think you should manage to pass the evening with her and see a little company. Why don't you go to the theatre once a week? I think that you should keep hounds and hunt once a week at least. I would willingly make an allowance for this out of the budget. You must make your house more gay; that is absolutely necessary for the happiness of your wife and for your health. I lead the same sort of life as you do, but then my wife is old and does not require me to amuse her; I work harder than you do, and yet, to tell the truth, I divert myself a great deal more. A young wife requires to be amused, especially when she is in an interesting position. You used to like pleasure, you must return to your old tastes. It is right that you should do for the princess what you would not do for yourself. I am going to settle at St. Cloud. Stephanie and the Prince of Baden love each other pretty well. I spent two days with Marshal Bessières; we played like lads of fifteen. You used to get up early, you should resume that practice. It would not disturb the princess if you went to bed with her at eleven o'clock. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

DECREE.

"ST. CLOUD, 17th April, 1806.

"NAPOLEON, EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH, KING OF ITALY,—In consequence of the services rendered to the country by the Constable Duguesclin of glorious memory, we have ordered and order as follows:—

"Art. 1st.—Madame de Gesvres shall be recalled from exile and released from all supervision.

"Art. 2nd.—She is granted a pension of 6,000 francs a year for life out of our imperial treasury. "NAPOLEON."

It is hardly probable that any Englishman of the nineteenth century would feel offended at a descendant of the constable receiving a pension, considering that the Princess of Wales gave the warrior himself 30,000 florins to help him to pay his ransom after he had been captured by the Black Prince ; and that the Black Prince released Duguesclin " because he esteemed but did not fear him."

On the 20th April Napoleon wrote to Prince Eugene saying :—"I do not approve of the sortie of the Italian fleet. What would you have two frigates, a corvette, and two brigs do against two frigates and a brig ? The forces were equal. If they had been only Russians you might have attempted the sortie. You must avoid fighting with the English ; defeat was certain"

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER.

"ST. CLOUD, 22nd April, 1806.

MY COUSIN,—The affairs of Cattaro are not getting settled ; however, I have decided to remain in Germany until I know how matters are likely to turn out. Keep an eye on the movements of the Austrians. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

By the treaty of Presburg Cattaro was to have been handed over to France by Austria, but the Russians seized on the place, and Napoleon made this a pretext for keeping his armies in Germany eating up the country.

TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

"ST. CLOUD, 22nd April, 1806.

"MY BROTHER,—I see with pleasure that you have burned an insurgent village. I suppose that you allowed the soldiers to pillage it. That is the way in which villages which revolt should be treated. It is the right of war, and it is also a duty prescribed by policy. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

“ST. CLOUD, 25th April, 1806.

“I forward you a claim made by the Princess of Lucca. It is absolutely necessary for the Queen of Etruria to cede those territories to the princess, either giving her an equivalent out of the territories of the Pope, who on the other side might be indemnified out of the King of Naples, or by paying a rent.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. DE LACÉPÈDE.

“ST. CLOUD, 25th April, 1806.

“I have not deemed it right to sign the decree that you sent me about Chambord. . . . In the meantime send me a proposition for placing at your disposal a sum of money to repair the castle so that it may be ready on the 1st January, 1807, to receive 100 pupils.

“NAPOLEON.”

Chambord was shortly afterwards given to Marshal Berthier.

TO PRINCE EUGENE.

“ST. CLOUD, 30th April, 1806.

“MY SON,—I wrote to you to start a pack of hounds. It is important that gentlemen in Italy should be accustomed to ride; the exercise and the fatigue of hunting will be most advantageous to them. It would be much better for them to take to this pastime than to remain always with their wives. For you the recreation is necessary.

“NAPOLEON.”

Some Irish officers having deposed their swords because they were not told off to march against the English who had disembarked in Italy, General Hartz implored the

indulgence of the Emperor, and his Majesty decided—
 “I never find it ill when officers wish to serve.”

Mdlle. Contat having asked permission to retire from the stage.

DECISION.

“ST. CLOUD, 9th May, 1806.

“I am not obliged to accord a benefit to an actress. As Mdlle. Contat is still fit for service she must continue to play.

“NAPOLEON.”

Mdlle. Contat had made her *début* in 1776! she retired in 1808.

TO M. CHAMPIGNY.

“ST. CLOUD, 9th May, 1806.

“After all the difficulties in the way of constructing the Arc de Triomphe on the site of the Bastille, I consent to its being constructed at the gate of Chaillot, at l’Etoile [where it now stands]. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO GENERAL JUNOT.

“ST. CLOUD, 13th May, 1806.

“I see with pleasure the energy which you display in governing. The forty-four individuals condemned to death and to the galleys is a salutary measure, which will serve as an example, and will check those who desire to indulge in their natural inconstancy.

“NAPOLEON.”

NOTE.

“ST. CLOUD, 14th May, 1806.

‘The triumphal arches would be labour lost, and I should never have consented to them had I not considered them a means for encouraging architecture. I

desire that these arches shall nourish French sculpture for ten years. . . . You must lose no opportunity of humiliating the Russians and the English. William the Conqueror and Duguesclin may be honoured with monuments.

“NAPOLEON.”

A statue was set up to William the Conqueror at his birthplace, Falaise, in 1851. In history one finds that this warrior died at Rouen in 1087, deserted by all his friends, and that his servants plundered even the bed upon which he expired, and left his body on the floor. “This, William,” says Bonnechose in his *History of France*, “conqueror of a great kingdom and ravisher of immense domains in a foreign country, obtained only by pity a grave in his own native land; the persons present at his burial were obliged to pay down the funeral expenses on the lid of his coffin.”

Such was the fate of the soldier whose great achievement Napoleon wished to imitate.

On the 16th May violent remonstrances were addressed to the court of Rome, and also this letter :—

TO CARDINAL FESCH.

“ST. CLOUD, 16th May, 1806.

“MY COUSIN,—I have re-called you from Rome because it is not in accordance with my dignity that you should remain at so ill-conducted a court which does all it can to annoy me, and which I shall be constrained to punish sooner or later. But you may remain at Rome as long as it suits you, leaving political affairs in the hands of Alquier. See the Pope and tell him that the note of Cardinal Consalvi has greatly displeased me, that this man, by folly or by treason, wishes to ruin the temporal power of the Holy See, and that he will succeed. I have signed a treaty with the archchancellor elector,¹ by which

¹ Archchancellor Dalberg, who, after having vainly endeavoured to persuade the Germans to proclaim a dictatorship in order to oppose

you have been appointed his coadjutor. This is still a secret, but it is probable that before a month the affair will be arranged. If you remain at Rome, leave all the odious work to Alguier and remain neutral. I do not wish to take the temporal states of the Pope, but I must have satisfaction for the threat made to me at Austerlitz to drive my minister from Rome.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE ARCHBISHOP OF RATISBONNE, *Elector Arch-chancellor of the Empire of Germany.*

“ST. CLOUD, 16th May, 1806.

“I have received your letter of the 17th with the work which accompanied it. I thank you for the amiable things you say. Going some evening to shoot at Rambouillet, I will take it in my carriage to read it. I shall find in it the good taste and the talent which render your society so interesting, and which have inspired so much esteem.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO PRINCE EUGENE.

“ST. CLOUD, 16th May, 1806.

“MY SON,—General Lemarois should have reached Ancona by this time. I have given him the command of the troops in the Papal States.

“NAPOLEON.”

Lemarois was an old and trusted aide-de-camp; he was one of the witnesses of that strange civil marriage performed between Napoleon and Josephine, in the town hall of the second ward, at ten o'clock at night, by a sleepy mayor.

Napoleon, went over to the Emperor after Austerlitz, considering all further resistance useless. He became Primate of the Confederation of the Rhine, and as he did not die until 1817 Uncle Fesch never had the chance of succeeding him.

TO THE PRINCESS ELIZA.

"ST. CLOUD, 27th May, 1806.

"MY SISTER,—I have received your letters. Do not exact any oath from the priests ; it leads to nothing but difficulty. Go your own way ; suppress the convents.

"NAPOLEON."

Napoleon having caused the Concordat to be published at Lucca, and the Pope having interfered, a most violent note was the consequence. His Holiness was informed that "the principles of religion are immutable, and what can procure the salvation of souls at Bologna can procure them salvation at Lucca." And Talleyrand was directed to ask Pius VII.—"Do you take the Emperor for a weak and ignorant Prince? It is not the morality preached by the Gospel, nor the example left by Jesus Christ, to sow disorder, to provoke insurrection, and to trouble the tranquillity of states. The Emperor declares that what has been done at Lucca was by his order, and that he shall regard all correspondence with his Italian states and with Lucca, not communicated to him, as an example of rebellion." In the meantime sister Eliza was to seize on the property of the monks, and to see that the Papal brief was kept a secret.

Letter after letter was written to Joseph, urging him to push on the siege of Gaeta, and to capture Sicily. "It will be easy for you," wrote Napoleon, "to deceive Sidney Smith. I often laid snares for him, into which he invariably fell. When he has tumbled into three or four more he will get disgusted."

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

"ST. CLOUD, 26th May, 1806.

"The court of Rome is trying to deceive people in an underhand way. Write to Alquier to let Cardinal Consalvi know that none of these matters escape me, that I follow

them with a watchful eye ; that at the first thing he does he shall answer for it with his head ; that I shall have him arrested in the centre of Rome.

“NAPOLEON.”

General Tilly (a French officer) asked the permission of the Emperor to wear the order of the Red Eagle given to him by the King of Prussia.

DECISION.

“ST. CLOUD, 26th May, 1806.

“It appears to me extraordinary that the King of Prussia should give orders without my permission. You must make known my dissatisfaction at Berlin.

“NAPOLEON.”

DECREE.

“ST. CLOUD, 30th May, 1806.

“A report having been made to me that certain Jews, exercising the profession of usurers alone, have, by the accumulation of immoderate interest, reduced many farmers to great distress, we feel it our duty to come to the aid of those of our subjects who have been brought to deplorable extremities by unjust avidity.”

The consequence was that a convocation of Jews from the chief cities of France was assembled in July at Paris to consider the following questions:—

1st. Is the Jew permitted to marry more than one wife ? 2nd. Is divorce permitted ? 3rd. Can a Jew marry a Christian woman or a Jewess a Christian ? 4th. Are the French brothers or aliens in the eyes of the Jews ? 5th. What connection does their law permit with Frenchmen ? 6th. Do Jews born in France and treated as citizens consider France their native country ? are they bound to defend her ? are they obliged to obey the civil code ? 7th. Who are the rabbins ? 8th. What civil jurisdiction

do the rabbins exercise among the Jews? what power of punishment do they possess? 9th. Are the mode of choosing rabbins, and the system of punishment, regulated by the Jewish laws? 10th. Are the Jews forbidden by their laws to take usury from their brethren? are they permitted or are they forbidden to take usury from strangers? 11th. Are those things proclaimed which are forbidden to the Jews by their laws?

These questions were prompted by a desire on the part of Napoleon to conclude a sort of concordat with the Jews, and ended, after satisfactory explanations had been given, by the French Government undertaking to pay the rabbins.

TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

“ST. CLOUD, 30th May, 1806.

“I am not at all surprised that you are satisfied with Marshal Jourdan. I was equally satisfied with him in the administration of Italy; he is an upright, active, and methodical man.

“I do not see why you leave Massena at Capua. Send him to Gaeta, and order him to carry on the siege of that place with activity.

“NAPOLEON.”

Strange to say, Jourdan was the only Marshal who received no title at the hands of the Emperor.

TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

“ST. CLOUD, 31st May, 1806.

“. . . I have already told you, and I repeat it, that you trust the Neapolitans too much; I tell you this especially as regards your kitchen and the protection of your person, for you run the risk of being poisoned or assassinated. I firmly desire therefore that you should keep your French cooks, and always have a French guard. You have not sufficiently followed my private life to know to

what an extent, even in France, I have relied on the protection of my most faithful and oldest soldiers. . . . No one ought to enter your room of a night but your aide-de-camp, who should sleep in the room preceding your bedroom; your door should be always fastened inside, and you should never open to your aide-de-camp until you have recognised his voice, and he himself should not knock at the door until he has shut the door of his own room to make sure of no one following him. . . . The character of the Neapolitans has been known for centuries, and you have to deal with a woman who is the personification of crime. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

King Joseph was then told to try and attach Jourdan and Regnier to his person; but “Massena is good for nothing in the matter of civil government, besides he is not capable of affection. He is a good soldier, but entirely addicted to the love of money; this is the main-spring of his conduct, and that alone will make him act, even under my eye. He began by small sums; to-day, milliards would not suffice.” . . . “I read in your speech phrases which you must permit me to object to. You compare the attachment of the French for my person to that of the Neapolitans for you. What love can you expect a people to have for you when you have done nothing for them, whose country you occupy by right of conquest, with some 50,000 foreigners? . . . I have erected Beneventum and Ponte Corvo into two duchies, the first for Talleyrand, the second for Bernadotte. I know that they are not rich, but I will supply a dotation. Talleyrand is wealthy enough, and does not require any. I will take care of Bernadotte. . . . You understand that in giving the title of duke and prince to Bernadotte it is through consideration for your wife (the sister of Madame Bernadotte, whom Napoleon, before he became famous, wished to marry), for there are several generals in

my army who have served me better, and who are more devoted to me, than he is. But I thought it suitable that the brother-in-law of the Queen of Naples (daughter of the soap boiler Clary), should hold a distinguished rank. . . . In an hour I shall receive the Turkish Ambassador. I shall proclaim Prince Louis King of Holland, and Cardinal Fesch coadjutor of the Elector Archchancellor. Send two squadrons of cavalry and some infantry to Beneventum and Ponte Corvo, that will hinder meetings, petitions, &c., &c."

On the 5th June, Napoleon replied to the Dutch, who, under considerable pressure, had offered the crown to Prince Louis. In this reply, the Batavian people were told that "the offer of the Crown of Holland to Prince Louis is in conformity with the true interests of your country and with mine, and is calculated to assure the general repose of Europe. . . . I proclaim Prince Louis, King of Holland." Then turning to the new king, Napoleon said—"You, prince, reign over these people. Their fathers won their independence through the constant aid of France. Since then, Holland became the ally of England. She was conquered. She again owes her existence to France. Let her owe you a king, who shall protect her liberties, her laws, and her religion, but never cease to be a Frenchman.

"The dignity of constable to the empire shall be possessed by you and your descendants. It will remind you of the duties which you owe towards me, and the importance which I attach to the preservation of the fortresses which protect the north of my States, and which I confide to you. Prince, encourage among your troops that *esprit* which I have seen them exhibit on the field of battle. Encourage among your new subjects feelings of union and love towards France. Be the terror of the wicked and the father of the good; that is the character of great kings."

This address plainly foreshadowed all the difficulties with which poor Louis was shortly to be called upon to struggle.

In announcing this matter to the Senate Napoleon said : —“Prince Louis not being animated by any personal ambition has given us a great proof of the love he bears us and his esteem for the people of Holland in accepting a throne which imposes on him such weighty obligations.”

It was much against his will that poor Louis accepted the throne thus thrust upon him. He seemed perfectly aware of the state of bondage in store for him. On the morning after his acceptance there was a family party at the Tuileries, and after breakfast, relates Madame de Rémusat, the Emperor sent for “the little Napoleon,” and made him recite the fable of “the frogs asking for a king,” and greatly enjoyed the embarrassment caused by the allusions it contained. The reluctance of the Queen Hortense to go to Holland was not less than that of King Louis. She dreaded the climate, the gloomy temper of her husband, and leaving the Tuileries. Nor had she been long at the Hague before she wished now to bury herself in a convent, now that one of the English cruisers which she saw from her windows would land a detachment and carry her off.

In another message to the Senate of the 5th June, Napoleon said in reference to Beneventum and Porte Corvo :—“We do not intend, however, to infringe the rights of the King of Naples or of the Court of Rome (which both laid claim to the two duchies) our intention being to indemnify both. By this measure those two governments, without experiencing any loss, will see a cause of contention, which has several times threatened the tranquillity of these states, disappear.”

It was the boast of Napoleon that he knew the exact *tirant d'eau* of each of his officers; writing to brother Joseph on the 6th June, he said :

“Marshal Jourdan is much more capable of commanding the troops in the interior than Marshal Massena, who, in his turn is more capable of aiding you in an expedition to Sicily. General Verdier would be better than General

Regnier; if you do not employ Massena, employ both those generals. In the trade of war as in that of letters each one has his style. Where sharp and prolonged attacks requiring a great deal of audacity are required Massena would be preferable to Regnier. To protect your kingdom against an invasion Jourdan is preferable to Massena." Then towards the close of a very long letter, Napoleon added—"You are a soldier only to the extent that a king should be. If you take upon yourself the details of the expedition you will expose yourself to very disagreeable things without any necessity. If Sicily were nearer, and if I were with the advanced guard, I would cross over with it; with my experience of war with 9,000 men I could beat 30,000 Englishmen."

That day month 4,800 Englishmen beat 7,000 Frenchmen at Maida.

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

"ST. CLOUD, 7th June, 1806.

"I asked you for a note on the forces of Prussia. The information contained in the letters of Laforest is not what I want. I require to know the general situation of the army of the King of Prussia.

"NAPOLEON."

On the 9th June, Napoleon drew up instructions for General Sebastiani:—

"1st. My ambassador at Constantinople must do all in his power to inspire the Porte with confidence; to make it understand that I want nothing from Constantinople, that I wish to pacify parties and to reorganise that formidable Empire, which even in a prostrate condition imposes upon Russia and the Continent.

"2nd. The constant object of my policy is to make a triple alliance, myself, the Porte, and Persia, aimed indirectly at Russia.

"3rd. I wish to be treated as the most favoured nation.

But I wish to regain the influence which I have lost by skill, insinuation, and confidence, and not by arrogance, force, and threats. My ambassador should please and inspire confidence, and I shall deem that he had carried out his instructions each time that the Porte informs him of the demands made by Russia or England.

"4th. I shall support no rebel to the Porte, nor any of my old friends of Egypt and Syria, nor any Greek. My sole and simple policy is to be closely united to the Porte."

And Sebastiani was further directed to do all in his power to bring the Russians into disfavour, to depreciate their military forces and the courage of their troops, the objects of these negotiations being to close the Bosphorus to the Russians.

The position of Turkey at this moment was critical indeed. "The divan," as Dr. Lardner says, "was distracted by the opposite factions of France and England, the ministers of which countries were alternately threatening to take their leave if their advice were not adopted; Egypt was in a state of anarchy, Mecca, Medina, and Bagdad had revolted; the Janissaries, discontented with the introduction of European tactics were ripe for an excuse to conspire against the government; while a Russian army on the Danube, a French army in Dalmatia, and an English fleet within sight of the Dardanelles, perplexed the Sultan, who, whichever way he decided could hardly fail to risk the safety of his dominions." In the end Selim accepted the French alliance, and the British ambassador had to fly for his life. How Napoleon kept his treaty with the Sultan we shall see hereafter. It was certainly fortunate for the French Emperor that the Russians should have thrown a force of 60,000 men into Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bessarabia instead of concentrating all their forces on the Vistula.

General Menou commanding the departments beyond the Alps having reported that the curé of Spinetta had

been arrested as a receiver of stolen goods to the brigand Maino ; that a canon, brother of the curé, was accused of complicity ; that a third ecclesiastic had assaulted and robbed three gendarmes ! asked for instructions.

DECISION.

“ ST. CLOUD, 12th June, 1806.

“ Send to the Minister of Police to conduct the proceedings with rapidity and severity. . . .”

“ NAPOLEON.”

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

“ ST. CLOUD, 19th June, 1806.

“ Inform M. Alquier that I regard the Pope from a temporal and from a spiritual point of view. As a temporal prince he forms part of my confederation, whether he likes it or no. If he makes arrangements with me I shall leave him his present states ; if not I shall seize on all his coasts. As for the spiritual portion he must be informed that if the difficulties which exist in my kingdom of Italy are not settled, that I shall establish in that kingdom the French Concordat ; that our religion being true and not conventional, all that saves in France will save in Italy. . . .”

“ NAPOLEON.”

In another letter to Talleyrand that minister was instructed to assure Ali Pashâ that Napoleon was the true friend of the Sublime Porte, and that the Sultan should tame the Servians and the Greeks, who were the real allies of Russia. M. de Talleyrand was then to express his regret that Napoleon could not send a fleet to Corfu, as he had sent some of his naval forces to India, and as he required the rest for the invasion of England !

Doctor Jenner having asked that two of his friends detained as prisoners of war might return to England.

DECISION.

"ST. CLOUD, 19th June, 1806.

"Granted, and returned to the minister of war.

"NAPOLEON."

On the demand of the historical section of the Institute, Alexander Hamilton (the Oriental scholar) was also allowed to return home, while Lord Shaftesbury, a friend of Mr. Fox, was allowed to change his residence from Lyons to Paris. Mr. Fox, in fact, procured the release of several of his countrymen, and among them Lord Yarmouth, who opened negotiations for peace.

TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

"ST. CLOUD, 21st June, 1806.

"Lord Yarmouth has arrived, with full powers from the King of England to sign peace. We should be tolerably well agreed but for Sicily. The English will recognise you as King of Naples, but, as you have not taken Sicily, they cannot recognise you there. It does not suit me to conclude anything until you are in possession of both portions of your kingdom.

"NAPOLEON."

TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

"ST. CLOUD, 22nd June, 1806.

"The Court of Rome has gone mad. It refuses to recognise you, and I know not what kind of treaty it wishes to conclude with me. It believes that I cannot at the same time respect the spiritual authority of the Pope and repress his temporal pretensions. It forgets that St. Louis, whose piety was well known, was almost always at war with the Pope, and that Charles V., who was a very Christian prince, besieged and took Rome.

"NAPOLEON."

TO PRINCE EUGENE.

"ST. CLOUD, 24th June, 1806.

"My SON—Continue to send me the letters of the Archbishop of Seleucia, forwarded from Rome to Dresden. They have discovered the cipher here, so that they are easily read.

"NAPOLEON."

TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

"ST. CLOUD, 29th June, 1806.

"M. Celerier *débauche*¹ the actors and actresses of Paris for Naples. Already one or two artists of the opera have said that they wish to go to Naples. You must feel how ridiculous this is. If you wish for actors of the opera (*sic*) *pardieu* I will send you as many as you want, but it is not right to *débaucher* them. It is thus that they acted in Russia, and I was so shocked at the time at this conduct that I wrote to the Emperor of Russia that I would send him all the ballet girls of the opera if he liked, with the exception, however, of Madame Gardel.

"I should have had Celerier arrested had I not known that he was attached to you as architect.

"NAPOLEON."

A few days later Napoleon decided upon sending two French companies to play for three years through the chief towns of Italy.

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND.

"ST. CLOUD, 30th June, 1806.

"I see with pleasure that you are satisfied with the Dutch. The pretensions of your finance minister are out of the question. My expenses are heavy, and I cannot aid you as I should like. As long as the war lasts I shall

¹ The word used twice in this letter is *débaucher* instead of *embaucher* which means to bribe.

be obliged to keep up my army. . . . I think it will be well to levy an income tax; there would be no inconvenience in imitating England.

“NAPOLEON.”

In what condition did Louis find the finances of Holland when he arrived? The expenditure 78,000,000 florins and the revenue 35,000,000! And, in addition to this, commerce was at a standstill.

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND.

“ST. CLOUD, 11th July, 1806.

“. . . . Flushing does not belong to Holland; it is a separate possession, as results from the treaty of the Hague. If General Monnet takes 10 per cent. you must bring him before a court-martial. You must not act in this matter as King of Holland, but as commander-in-chief; however, you must act with caution. General Monnet has rendered services and he is well acquainted with the isle of Walcheren. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

“ST. CLOUD, 12th July, 1806.

“I learn that the Emperor of Austria has sent agents into Italy and the interior of France under pretext of discovering the manufacturers of false notes on the Bank of Vienna. I can only express my surprise that you should have allowed my territory to be violated, and that you did not arrest these agents. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

Prince Metternich, in his *Memoirs* (vol. ii. p. 355), gives a curious account of an interview which he had with Napoleon after his marriage with Marie Louise. The Emperor then told him that he had intended by means of false notes to have rendered Austria bankrupt, and he

chuckled over the idea with great glee. Napoleon promised to have these notes and the plates destroyed, but, as a matter of fact, the Austrian ambassador could obtain neither. Some of these false notes, to the amount of 200,000 florins, afterwards got into circulation, and led to several arrests in Paris.

TO THE PRINCESS STEPHANIE OF BADEN.

“ST. CLOUD, 13th *July*, 1806.

“I see with pleasure that you are well. Love your husband, who deserves it for his attachment to you. . . . Treat your people well, for sovereigns are made only for their welfare. Accustom yourself to the country, and find everything good, for nothing is more impertinent than to talk always of Paris. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

The Princess Stephanie had been forced to wed much against her inclination, and it was all that Napoleon could do to force her to live with her husband. However, after several years of estrangement, a mutual affection sprang up between the Grand Duke and his wife.

TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

“ST. CLOUD, 16th *July*, 1806.

“Have those people who assassinated the blind men coming from Egypt been tried and punished as they deserve? Let the proceedings be striking, for I shall give them great publicity. All the world—Russians, Austrians, English—know the atrocity of the Queen of Naples, and that she could not return to Naples, as she would have to navigate in a sea of blood. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

“ST. CLOUD, 21st *July*, 1806.

“We have no news from General Regnier. . . . The art of war about which every one speaks is a difficult art; you have not a man in your council who understands the

first notions of it. I have concluded peace with Russia (treaty not ratified). . . . Negotiations are going on with England. Sicily is always the difficulty. But, by God! with 36,000 men do not allow one of your divisions to be crushed. Since you have no news of Regnier, his communications must be intercepted, and the country have risen. I regret that I am detained in Paris. If I were in Naples not an Englishman would have disembarked, or if they had disembarked, they would have been surrounded before four days by double their number, and pursued by columns of cavalry; not one would have escaped. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

After Regnier and his division had been crushed at Maida on the 6th, the whole country round had risen against the French, and had massacred all the stragglers. M. Thiers (vol. vii., p. 15, *History of the Empire*) highly praises the humanity of General Stuart, who, shocked at the cruelty of the Calabrians, offered ten ducats for each French soldier, and fifteen for each French officer brought to him alive.

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND.

“ST. CLOUD, 21st July, 1806.

“You write to me every day about your distress. I am not charged to pay the debts of Holland, and if I were charged, I have not the means. If Holland gives up her colonies she might disarm all her vessels; but that is out of the question. Holland is no doubt pressed, but she has resources. A few years of peace will re-establish you. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

When this letter was written Holland was of course at war with England, and instead of enjoying a few years of peace, she found herself in the following October lugged into the war with Russia and Prussia. The consequences were that Louis had to assemble the States at the Hague,

and to ask for a year's taxes in advance. As Madame de Rémusat says: "As a recompense for the sacrifice of her liberties Holland was menaced with war, and had to submit to double taxation, the continental blockade, and to see her commerce ruined." "On giving Holland to Louis," writes Lanfrey, "Napoleon had sworn that her colonies should be restored, and at the moment he made this promise he was offering them to England."¹

TO M. PORTALIS.

"ST. CLOUD, 26th July, 1806.

"It is my intention to organise nine metropolitan seminaries without delay. Present me a report on the number of priests necessary. . . . Draw attention to the necessity of having priests well educated and attached, and to the evil produced by bad theology and the disputes arising therefrom. Insist upon the necessity of a sound and uniform education. You will found your arguments on the principles of the Gallican Church. It is also my intention that the catechism should appear without delay.

"NAPOLEON."

This is a specimen of the catechism which had been introduced into France by Napoleon, who looked upon eluding the conscription as the eighth deadly sin:—

Q. What are your duties towards Napoleon I., our Emperor?

A. We owe him specially love, respect, obedience, military service, tribute ordered for the defence of the Emperor and of his throne, fervent prayers for his safety, and for the prosperity of the state.

Q. Why are we bound to fulfil these duties towards our Emperor?

A. Because God in overwhelming our Emperor with gifts for peace as for war, has established him as our

¹ *History of Napoleon*, vol. iii. p. 440.

sovereign, and has given him His image upon earth. To honour and to serve our Emperor is therefore to honour and to serve God Himself.

Q. Are there not particular motives which should attach you to our Emperor?

A. Yes; for it is he whom God resuscitated to re-establish the holy religion of our fathers, and to be its protector. He has restored and preserved public tranquillity by his profound wisdom; he defends the State with his powerful arm; he has become the anointed of the Lord by the consecration which he received from the sovereign pontiff, head of the Universal Church.

Q. What will be thought of those who fail in these duties towards our Emperor?

A. According to the Apostle St. Paul they will resist the order of God Himself, and deserve eternal damnation.

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND.

“ST. CLOUD, 29th July, 1806.

“I read in the papers that you have suspended the penalty of death in your kingdom. If this be the case, you have committed a great fault. It is a misplaced mania of humanity. The first duty of a king is justice.

“NAPOLEON.”

A letter to the King of Naples, dated 30th July, shows that Napoleon had received the news of Maida by that date. He wrote: “You have quite as good generals as any in France. St. Cyr is very prudent. It is true that Regnier has committed blunders of all kinds, which I did not expect.” His Majesty also wrote: “The kingdom of Italy brings me in 140,000,000 francs, and the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily must bring me in as much. . . . Do not employ too many Neapolitan troops, who would abandon me if I were to be beaten in Italy. . . . Show

no mercy. Have at least 600 insurgents executed. They have massacred a great number of soldiers [after Maida]. Burn down the houses of thirty chiefs of villages, and distribute their property to the army. Disarm all the inhabitants, and have six of the worst behaved villages plundered. . . . Since you compare the Neapolitans to the Corsicans, remember that when Niolo was entered forty rebels were hung, and that the terror was so great that no one moved afterwards. . . . You see the terror inspired by the Queen, I do not ask you to follow her example ; but it is not the less true that it is a power. . . . If you play the *roi fainéant*, if you do not hold the reins with a firm and decided hand, if you listen to the opinion of the people who do not know what they want, &c., &c., instead of being of use you will be of harm to me."

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

"ST. CLOUD, 2nd August, 1806.

"I send you the letters of the Duke of Cleves [Murat]. I wish you to despatch a special courier to M. Laforest at Berlin, to inform him confidentially of what is passing. I have sent positive orders to the Duke of Cleves not to commit any act of hostility towards Prussia. The object of your despatch to M. Laforest will be to tell him, that, if the Prussian Cabinet learns anything serious has happened, he is to declare that having refused to make peace with England so as not to deprive Prussia of Hanover, I can have no designs upon Prussia. . . . Reiterate that I desire, at no matter what price, to remain upon good terms with Prussia, and, if necessary, allow Laforest to remain under the conviction that I really will not make peace with England on account of Hanover.

"NAPOLEON."

It was not unusual for Napoleon to deceive his own ambassadors as Laforest was to be deceived.

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

“ST. CLOUD, 5th August, 1806.

“All the libels spread through Germany come from Nuremberg. Tell the Senate of that town that if the booksellers are not arrested and the libels burned, I shall punish the town before leaving Germany.

“NAPOLEON.”

On the same day his Majesty wrote to Berthier, saying :—

“I suppose that you have arrested the booksellers of Augsburg and Nuremberg. Let them be brought before a court-martial and shot within twenty-four hours. It is no ordinary crime to spread libels in places occupied by the French armies in order to excite the inhabitants against them. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

Palm, the Nuremberg bookseller, alone was executed, the others managing to make good their escape. Palm died with a fortitude which excited general admiration.

On the same day Napoleon announced to Joseph the arrival of Lords Yarmouth and Lauderdale to negotiate on the part of the King of England. He added—

“You must not forget that force and severe justice (*sic*) are the kindness of kings. I am waiting to know how much property you have confiscated in Calabria, and the number of insurgents to whom you have meted out good justice. Have three persons shot per village. Have no more compassion for priests than for other people.”

In the draft of the treaty then drawn up, one sees by Art. 7 that Hanover was to be ceded to England, and when the English negotiators remarked that there was no engagement taken by the Emperor to compel Prussia to evacuate Hanover, nor any time fixed for such evacuation,

MM. Talleyrand and Clarke replied that the good faith of the Emperor was a sufficient guarantee, but that such an article might be introduced.

TO PRINCE EUGENE.

“ST. CLOUD, 7th August, 1806.

“MY SON,—I send you a copy of the catechism, which has been adopted for France ; it would be a good thing if it could be adopted for Italy without inconvenience. But it is a delicate matter, and you must be very circumspect. Consult the minister of worship. It might be well for some bishop to publish it in his diocese as a diocesan catechism. You must act with great prudence and secrecy.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

“ST. CLOUD, 8th August, 1806.

“I send you a letter, which will make you thoroughly acquainted with that scamp Lucchesini. My opinion was formed long ago with respect to that wretch. He has continually deceived you, because I have long perceived that nothing is more easy. It will be necessary to send a courier to Laforest, confiding the despatch to him, so that he may be able to enlighten the Prussian cabinet. He must also inform M. d’Haugwitz that Lucchesini sees very bad company, and that the information he acquires is ridiculous. I think it would be difficult to give a greater proof of the imbecility of this pantaloon ; because he is false and base, there is no falsehood or baseness of which he does not believe me capable. . . . It is enough to have a minister confined in a madhouse. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

All this because Lucchesini had informed his court of what was passing on the subject of Hanover. It must be remembered that both d’Haugwitz and Lucchesini belonged to the French party, and Prince Metternich, in his *Memoirs*,

speaks in the severest terms of the marquis as one of the creatures of Napoleon.

In a letter several pages long, addressed to brother Joseph, is to be found this curious paragraph—"When you talk about the 50,000 enemies of the Queen you make me laugh. . . . You exaggerate the degree of hatred which the Queen has left behind at Naples: you do not know mankind. There are not twenty persons who hate her as you suppose, and there are not twenty persons who would not surrender to one of her smiles. The strongest feeling of hatred on the part of a nation is that inspired by another nation. Your 50,000 men are the enemies of the French."

There was certainly no clap-trap about Napoleon.

TO PRINCE JOACHIM (MURAT).

"ST. CLOUD, 11th August, 1806.

"I cannot believe that your territory has been invaded by Prussian hussars. Send a complaint to M. Laforest, with the names of the officers and the King of Prussia will no doubt cashier them. As for the propos attributed to General Blucher, I do not attach any faith to them. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND.

"ST. CLOUD, 13th August, 1806.

"I have seen what you say about Prussia in your letter of the 8th. I have carefully followed the movements of that court, and am well acquainted with what passes. I nevertheless thank you for the details you have sent me. You must keep your German frontier in a good state, and have an army corps to defend it. You are loved in Holland, but that is not sufficient; the nation must play as important a part in the affairs of Europe as Bavaria. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO PRINCE EUGENE.

"ST. CLOUD, 14th August, 1806.

"MY SON,—I thank you for what you say about my *fête* day. Affairs are getting settled. I will soon send you instructions for your voyage to Paris. I know that you wish to come here. You will see the Queen of Holland. We will keep the princess until after her confinement.

"NAPOLEON."

Prince Eugene had been sent to Italy by his step-father in a fit of jealousy, and when his Majesty was paying his addresses to Madame Duchatel. There was no danger in now allowing the viceroy to return, as he was sincerely attached to his wife.

In a letter of the 17th August, Napoleon wrote thus to his brother Joseph—"I should much like to see a revolt on the part of the *canaille* of Naples. Until you have made an example you will not be master of the country. A revolt is necessary for all conquered people, and I should look upon a revolt at Naples as the father of a family sees his children catch small-pox, provided the invalid is not weakened too much. It is a necessary crisis. . . . Lord Yarmouth has been recalled, and Lord Lauderdale remains charged with the negotiation. . . . I would not listen to any *mezzo termine*. Peace or war, you shall have Naples and Sicily."

TO THE PRINCESS AUGUSTA.

"ST. CLOUD, 30th August, 1806.

"MY DAUGHTER,—I have read with pleasure your letter of the 10th. You are right to rely upon my affection. Take care of yourself in your present condition, and try and not give us a daughter. I would give you a recipe for that, but you would not believe in it. It is to drink some wine pure every day. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER.

“ST. CLOUD, *3rd September*, 1806.

“I was just going to send you orders for the return of the army, when I learned that the Emperor of Russia had refused to ratify the treaty. I must wait therefore for some days to see what will happen. Send some Polish officers to the Russian frontier to see what is going on. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

The following letter contrasts strangely with one addressed to Berthier on the subject of his brother Cæsar :—

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER.

“ST. CLOUD, *4th September*, 1806.

“I see no inconvenience in granting Marshal Ney leave for twenty days to be present at the confinement of his wife. . . . You can also give a similar leave on the same conditions, and under the same pretext, to Marshal Davoust, should he wish to take advantage of it. . . . In a few days I will grant you leave also, as I know you wish to return to Paris [probably to see Madame Visconti]. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

On the 5th September, Napoleon gave Marshal Berthier a series of instructions for the concentration of the army corps of Soult, Ney and Angereau, at a point ten days' march from Berlin. He also requested information with regard to several rivers, and fortified towns in Prussia, not, as he said, that he had any designs upon Berlin, but it was well to be furnished with these details beforehand in case of necessity.

TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

“ST. CLOUD, 8th *September*, 1806.

“I see with surprise that the chief of the staff dares to correspond with the enemy without your permission. General Cæsar Berthier is then ignorant of his duty! The reply of Sidney Smith is impertinent, as is everything which emanates from that officer. You should have placed General Berthier under arrest for a week. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

On the 10th September, Napoleon wrote to Berthier, saying—“The movements of Prussia continue to be very extraordinary. They wish to receive a lesson. I am sending my horses on to-morrow, and my guard will march in a few days. . . . Tell the King of Bavaria secretly that if I quarrel with the King of Prussia, which is improbable, he will get Baireuth. . . . I have ordered the King of Holland to form a camp at Utrecht.” And on the same day to Grand Equerry Caulaincourt—“You must send on sixty horses from my stables to-morrow, and among them eight saddle-horses. Do this with as much mystery as possible. Try and make people believe that I am going to hunt at Compiègne.” His mules, his cantines, a solid tent, an iron bedstead, and some thick carpets, were also to be despatched towards the eastern frontier.

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND.

“ST. CLOUD, 10th *September*, 1806.

“You have heard of the armaments made by Prussia, and the non-ratification of Russia. My negotiations with England are not broken off, but they put forward the most extraordinary pretensions. They wish to have Surinam, Berbice, and all your colonies. . . . Form a camp at Utrecht without delay on the pretext of preparing for war with England. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

In a long note addressed by General Clarke to Lords Yarmouth and Lauderdale on the 8th August, he said—"Let Hanover become a French province, &c., &c., and let Great Britain keep as compensation, the Cape, Surinam, Malta and Pondicherry. France will consent to it."

On the 12th September, Napoleon wrote a long letter to the King of Prussia, assuring him of his pacific intentions, and declaring that certain information he had received was false, that he looked upon war as a sacrilege, and that if he had made preparations for war it was owing to the formidable preparations made by Prussia. On the same day, M. Laforest was instructed to leave Berlin should the Prussians insist upon occupying Saxony; and a note was sent to the French minister at Dresden saying that Napoleon would not allow the territory of Saxony to be violated, and hinting that Saxony might declare herself independent, or join the Confederation of the Rhine.

Originally, Saxony was to have belonged to the Confederation of the North, but Napoleon, while encouraging this idea at Berlin, had at the same time encouraged Saxony to resist.

In a letter to the King of Naples, Napoleon wrote on the 13th: "Negotiations with England continue, but peace or war will be decided upon in a few days. Fox is past work, struck down by an illness which will probably carry him to his grave. Jerome has disembarked; I have settled his marriage with Catherine, daughter of the King of Wirtemberg; I have recognised him as a prince, and have given him the grand cordon of the Legion of Honour. As I shall be obliged to consult the people with regard to his right of succession to the throne, I hope that Lucien will not allow this opportunity to escape. Do not be uneasy with regard to politics. If I must strike again, all my measures are taken, and Europe will learn my departure from Paris by the entire ruin of my enemies."

We shall have more to say on the subject of Jerome's

marriage which had very important political consequences. He repudiated his wife, but Lucien was of a sterner stuff, and preferred exile to a throne coupled with the condition that he should put away a woman who had been true to him, and had borne him several children.

TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

"ST. CLOUD, 13th *September*, 1806.

"Mr. Fox is dying. Lord Yarmouth has been received in London in triumph because he was known to belong to the peace party. The illness of Mr. Fox has filled the nation with consternation. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

And a few days later, Napoleon wrote—"I have just received the news of the death of Mr. Fox. Under present circumstances he is a man who dies regretted by two nations."

A series of despatches here follow on the subject of the coming war—despatches to the various military commanders respecting the march and concentration of their army corps, and to the members of the Confederation of the Rhine respecting the contingents they were to furnish.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER.

"MAYENCE, 28th *September*, 1806.

"I reached Mayence this morning. All my foot guards have arrived; they travelled by post; the cavalry and artillery of the guard will not be here for five or six days. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

On the 30th, his Majesty, being still at Mayence, wrote to the Prince Primate of the Confederation of the Rhine—"The movements of the Prussians oblige me to accelerate mine. . . . I can give you no news of negotiations with Prussia, as a Prussian courier crossed mine on the road. . .

Do not doubt my firm determination to protect the Confederation. . . .”

On the 5th October, Napoleon informed Talleyrand that all his columns were in motion, and that he was just starting for Bamberg. On the same day he gave orders to General Dejean to make arrangements for the transport of 6,000 men by post from Paris to Montreuil in the event of the English attacking Boulogne.

At this moment, apprehensive of the consequences of a check, Napoleon conceived the bold idea of making overtures to Austria, for he was without a single ally in Europe. He therefore wrote from Wurtzburg on the 3rd October to M. de Larochefoucauld, his ambassador at Vienna, in these terms—“I am determined no longer to remain the ally of a Power so versatile and despicable as that of Prussia. I shall preserve peace with her, no doubt, because *I have not the right to shed the blood of my people for vain pretexts*. However, the necessity of turning my attention to my navy, renders it necessary for me to have an ally on the continent—Russia, Prussia, or Austria. In no case can Prussia be trusted. There remain Russia and Austria. . . . I have conceived a great esteem for the Emperor of Austria. I believe him to be true to his word; you should enter into explanations in that sense, without, however, exhibiting any undue anxiety in the matter.” Although Austria would have dearly liked to have recovered Silesia, torn from her by the rapacity of Frederick the Great, and to have punished Prussia for not joining the third coalition, the overtures of Napoleon were not listened to.

PROCLAMATION.

“BAMBERG, 6th October, 1806.

“Soldiers!—Orders for your return to France had been issued. Triumphal *fêtes* awaited you in the capital. But new plots were hatched under the mask of friendship and alliance. War cries were heard at Berlin. For the last two months we have been provoked every day. . . .”

In a message to the Senate the Emperor announced on the 7th October that he was in the midst of his army of the Rhine, and then proceeded to indulge in the usual amount of bombast customary on similar occasions. On the same day Napoleon wrote to M. de Talleyrand that he had received a letter from the King of Prussia, which he had skimmed over. He said it was an ill-natured libel; and he added that he had entered Baireuth on the 7th, and had received the Prussian ultimatum on the 8th, which was a good joke.

What Prussia complained, was, that "French politics had been the scourge of humanity for the last fifteen years"; that "an insatiable ambition, was still the ruling passion of France"; that "the treaty of Amiens had hardly been signed when the Dutch and Swiss territories were violated." The Enghien affair was raked up, also the fact that while the treaty of Luneville guaranteed the independence of Italy, Napoleon had assumed the Iron Crown and had incorporated Genoa. Then Sir G. Rumbold had been arrested on German territory, the Hans towns laid under contribution, Anspach, Cleves, &c., annexed to France, the rights of the Prince of Orange, who a week before had received a letter from Napoleon congratulating him upon taking undisturbed possession of his states, and condoling with him on the death of his father, had been trampled upon. Then there was that perfidious Hanover business, and altogether such a list of crimes that the wonder is how Prussia could so long have remained the ally of France and have held aloof from the third coalition. She was about to reap her reward.

On the 7th October Napoleon wrote to Prince Eugene: "Having marched into Baireuth, hostilities opened to-day. It will be useless to mention this and to alarm the public. . . . My information is that Austria will not move; on the contrary, she is sending troops in the direction of Galicia and Silesia."

And on the same date to King Joseph: "I see with

pleasure that you have got rid of that wretch Fra Diavolo." It was General Hugo, the father of Victor Hugo, who captured the celebrated brigand and hung him.

On the 8th October Napoleon issued his first bulletin to the Grand Army, and explained the causes of the new war. The peace concluded with Russia and the negotiations opened with England had alarmed Prussia, he said. The Cabinet of Berlin suspected that a treaty had been concluded by which Russia was to have Poland, Austria Silesia, and England Hanover. She was persuaded that those three powers were in league with France.

His Majesty then declared that the wrongs of Prussia towards France dated from "very distant epochs." "The first, she armed to profit by our internal dissension. She afterwards rushed to arms when the Duke of York invaded Holland, and during the late war, although she had no motive for discontent with France, she armed again and signed that famous treaty of Potsdam, which a month later was replaced by the treaty of Vienna." After mentioning the letter written by the King of Prussia and the Prussian ultimatum, the bulletin said that the Queen of Prussia was with the army wearing the uniform of her regiment of dragoons, writing twenty letters a day in order to kindle the flames of war in all directions, and that she appeared like Armida in her distraction setting fire to her own palace.

In the second bulletin, dated from Auna, 12th October, an account was given of the first engagement with the enemy, in which Prince Louis of Prussia fell: "Neither Dresden nor Berlin are covered," went on the bulletin. "Turned on its left, caught *in flagrante delicto* while indulging in hazardous combinations, the Prussian army at the onset finds itself in a critical position."

On the same date Napoleon addressed a long letter to the King of Prussia, in which he protested his desire to come to terms. He said: "Sire, I have been your friend

for six years. . . . If you had asked me, in your note, for anything possible I would have granted it, but you asked me for my dishonour, and you must have been certain what the reply would be. There is therefore war between us, and the alliance has been broken for ever. But why allow our subjects to be slaughtered? I shall not enjoy a victory purchased by the lives of a large number of my children. If I were at the *début* of my military career, and if I feared the chances of war, this language would be out of place. Sire, your Majesty will be conquered, you will compromise your own repose and the existence of your subjects without the shadow of a pretext. Prussia is to-day intact, and can treat with me in a manner suitable to her dignity; in a month's time she will be in a different position. . . ."

The Prussian ultimatum which so irritated Napoleon consisted of three points. The Emperor was asked to evacuate Germany, to restore Wesel, and to place no obstacle in the way of the formation of the Confederation of the North.

What were the forces with which Prussia was attacked? Napoleon boasted that he could march upon Dresden with a square of 200,000 men. He left 50,000 men behind him to keep up his communication with the Confederation of the Rhine; at Wesel he had 30,000 men under King Louis; a corps of 20,000 men under the orders of Mortier protected Mayence; and on the northern and eastern frontiers were 12,000 national guards and 30,000 conscripts. In order to prevent interference Marshal Brune was charged to protect the coasts; Marmont had 20,000 in Illyria; Prince Eugene had a force of 40,000 men in the neighbourhood of Venice, and in case of necessity could borrow 30,000 men from King Joseph. This was the formidable machine set in motion to annihilate Prussia, whose generals were old and worn out, and in whose councils were nothing but division and dire confusion.

TO THE EMPRESS.

“GERA, 13th October, 1806.

“MY GOOD FRIEND,—My affairs are going on as well as I hoped. With the aid of God they will, I think, have assumed a terrible character for the poor King of Prussia, whom I pity personally, for he is a good man. The queen is at Erfurt with the king. If she wishes to see a battle she will have that cruel pleasure. I am quite well, and have grown stouter since I left Paris. However, I get over from twenty to twenty-five leagues a day on horseback, in a carriage, and all sorts of ways. I go to bed at eight and get up at midnight; I sometimes think that you have not gone to bed.

“Ever yours,

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE EMPRESS.

“JENA, 15th October, 1806.

“MY FRIEND,—I have manœuvred finely against the Prussians. Yesterday I gained a great victory. They had 150,000 men. I took 30,000 prisoners, 100 guns and standards. I was in presence and close to the King of Prussia; I nearly captured him and the queen. I have been bivouacking for two days. Adieu, my dear friend; enjoy good health and love me.

“If Hortense is at Mayence give her a kiss for me, also to Napoleon and the little one.

“NAPOLEON.”

The little one was Napoleon Louis, the second son of Louis and Hortense, who died at Forli in 1832, leaving his next brother, Louis Napoleon, to inherit the purple.

In the fifth bulletin, dated Jena, 15th October, the Grand Army was informed that the battle of Jena had wiped out the disgrace of Rosbach, and had calmed the warlike frenzy of the Prussians. “The Emperor,” it said,

“passed along the lines at daybreak, and recommended his troops to beware of the Prussian cavalry, said to be very formidable.” He reminded them that just a year ago they had captured Ulm ; that the Prussian army, like the Austrian army, was to-day surrounded, having lost its line of operations and its magazines—that it would fight, not for glory, but in order to secure its retreat. . . . “The hussars and the chasseurs exhibited an audacity beyond all praise. The Prussian cavalry could not resist them. . . . We shall not speak of the infantry, which has long been acknowledged the first in the world.” The Emperor declared that the French cavalry, after two campaigns and the last battle had no equal.

It has been remarked that Napoleon in his bulletins did very scanty justice to Davoust, who was perhaps the soundest of all his lieutenants, and certainly the most ungainly. But what was the state of the case? Davoust had to struggle against the great bulk of the Prussian army at Auerstadt, while Napoleon at Jena had to deal with a force only half as strong as his own. All this he set right in his fifth bulletin, by representing that whereas he had 80,000 Prussians opposed to him, Davoust had only 50,000. In this way the fault of having left the corps of Davoust *en l'air* was rectified.

A decree, also dated the 15th October, showed the money value of the victory of Jena. The states of the King of Prussia this side the Vistula were to pay 100,000,000 francs ; the states of the Elector of Saxony, 25,375,000 ; those of the Elector of Hesse Cassel, 6,000,000 ; those of the Duke of Brunswick, 5,625,000 ; and from Hanover, 9,100,000, &c. &c. ; in all, 159,425,000 francs. Ost Frise was to be given to Holland, and all the English merchandise found in the towns of the north was to belong to the army, &c. &c.

The sixth bulletin announced that 6,000 Saxons and over 300 officers had been taken prisoners ; that the Emperor had assembled the officers and told them that he was

sorry to see their army fighting against him; that he had taken up arms only to insure the independence of the Saxon nation, and to oppose its being incorporated with Prussia; that their sovereign, whose qualities he recognised, had shown extreme weakness in yielding to the threats of Prussia; that the Saxons ought to enter the Confederation of the Rhine and place themselves under the protection of France; that the Continent needed repose, &c. All the Saxon prisoners were released.

TO GENERAL CLARKE.

“WEIMAR, 17th October, 1806.

“The enemy has spread the report that I have granted an armistice of six weeks. Contradict this, and write to the Prince de Berg (Murat) and to Marshal Ney that it is false.

“NAPOLEON.”

The King of Prussia asked for this armistice, but it was refused.

In the eleventh bulletin (Merseberg, 19th October) it is stated that—“The Prussian general, Blucher, with 5,000 men, passed through General Klein’s division of dragoons, which had cut him off. Having declared to General Klein that an armistice of six weeks had been signed, that general had the simplicity to believe him. . . . The Prussian generals aped, as well as they could, the manners of the Great Frederick. Although we were in their country, they appeared quite ignorant of our movements. . . . The Emperor visited the field of Rosbach, and ordered the column which had been erected there to be sent to Paris.”

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

“DESSAU, 22nd October, 1806.

“. . . Immediately after the battle of Jena the King of Prussia sent me an aide-de-camp with a letter. To-day he sends me the Marquis de Lucchesini. I have ordered

him to remain at the outposts, and I have sent Duroc to know what he wants. The king seems inclined to come to terms, but that will not prevent me from going to Berlin.

“NAPOLEON.”

On the 23rd October a proclamation was issued, informing the inhabitants of Hesse Cassel that France had taken possession of their country in order to spare it from the horrors of war. “Besides, your sovereign and his son, holding rank in the Prussian army, are bound to obey the order of the Prussian commander-in-chief.”

The Hessians so little appreciated this proceeding that they soon revolted against the French.

The fifteenth bulletin (Wittenberg, 23rd October) pointed out that nearly all the authors of the war had been killed or wounded—Prince Louis and Generals Schmittau and Ruchel killed, and the Duke of Brunswick seriously wounded. And—“All the blame of the war rests with the Duke of Brunswick, who ill-conceived and ill-directed the movements of the army; he thought that the Emperor was in Paris when he was already on his flank; he thought that he had the initiative when he was already turned. . . . Lord Morpeth, sent by the court of London to deal in Prussian blood, mission unworthy of a man like him, reached Weimar on the 11th with seductive offers and offers of large subsidies. The horizon was already dark. The cabinet would not see him, told him there was little safety for his person, and advised him to return to Hamburg and to await events. What would the Duchess of Devonshire have said could she have seen her son-in-law breathing flame and war, coming to offer poisoned gold, and obliged to retrace his steps sadly and hurriedly? One is indignant at seeing England compromise herself by playing so odious a part.”

It was also stated that 60,000,000 francs' worth of English goods had been seized at Leipsic.

The seventeenth bulletin announced the arrival of Napoleon at Potsdam. He found Sans Souci to his taste, and remained for some time in the room of Frederick the Great.

"It was remarked," continued the bulletin, "that the Emperor alighted at Potsdam the same day as the Emperor of Russia had the year before. It was from that moment that the queen gave up the care of her domestic concerns and the serious occupation of the toilette to meddle with state affairs. . . . The result of the celebrated oath taken on the tomb of the Great Frederick, on the 4th November, 1805, was the battle of Austerlitz, and the evacuation of Germany by the Russian army. Forty-eight hours afterwards an engraving was to be seen in all the shop windows which excited the laughter even of the peasants. The handsome Emperor of Russia was seen in it with the queen close to him, and on the other side was the king with his hand raised over the tomb; the queen herself was draped in a shawl like those in which Lady Hamilton is represented in London, pressing her hand on her heart, and looking at the Emperor of Russia. One cannot conceive how the police of Berlin could permit such a pitiful satire. However, the shade of the Great Frederick must have been indignant at this scandalous scene."

This manner of treating an unfortunate queen who has been compared by some French writers to Maria Theresa was as unjust as it was ungenerous, and filled every one with scorn and contempt. But Napoleon was no respecter of the weaker sex, as was proved by his conduct to the queens of Naples and of Etruria, and to numbers of Frenchwomen of rank or talent.

TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

"POTSDAM, 25th October, 1806.

". . . I have crushed the Prussian monarchy; I shall crush the Russians if they arrive. I no longer fear the

Austrians. I shall not ask you for any troops; I have no need of them. If, however, you could send me some cavalry, do so. . . ."

"NAPOLEON."

We have two letters written from Potsdam on the subject of the theatre. The first, to Fouché, ran thus: "I send you my approval relative to the expense of the scenery for the ballet of the *Return of Ulysses*. Have a detailed report made of this ballet, and see the first representation, so as to make sure that there is nothing bad in it; you understand in what sense. The subject appears to me fine; it was I who gave it to Gardel."

The second was to Cambacérès, as follows: "I send you a piece which is 'of the other world.' If the authors be not madmen they must be wretches who should be severely punished. I beg you will follow up this affair."

One can imagine a malicious author making allusions to Penelope's admirers of such a nature as to be highly disagreeable to the modern Ulysses and his spouse.

PROCLAMATION TO THE ARMY.

"POTSDAM, 26th October, 1806.

". . . . You are the worthy defenders of my crown and of the glory of this grand nation. . . . Here are the results of our labours. One of the first military Powers of Europe, which dared lately to propose to us a shameful capitulation, has been annihilated. The posts and the defiles of Franconia, the Saal, the Elbe, which our fathers would have crossed in seven years, we have crossed in seven days, and in the interval we have delivered four combats and one great battle. . . . We have made 60,000 prisoners, taken sixty-five standards, 600 guns, three fortresses, and over twenty generals. . . . Soldiers, the Russians boast that they are coming; we shall march to meet them and spare them half the road. We shall not lay down our arms until we

have obliged the English, those eternal enemies of our nation, to renounce their plan of troubling the Continent, and their tyranny of the seas . . .”

On the same day appeared the eighteenth bulletin, which gives an account of the visit of Napoleon to the tomb of the Great Frederick, and how, “the Emperor made a present to the Hotel des Invalides at Paris (where his own ashes now repose) of the sword of Frederick, of his ribbon of the Black Eagle, of his general’s sash, and of the flags carried by his guard during the seven years’ war.” And—“Lord Morpeth, the English envoy to the Prussian court, during Jena, was at six leagues from the field of battle; he heard the cannon. A courier told him that the battle was lost, and in a moment he was surrounded by fugitives. He fled, crying—‘I must not be taken.’ He offered sixty guineas for a horse, obtained one, and escaped.”

On the 27th October came the nineteenth bulletin, in which the French army was told that the whole Prussian nation was indignant with the authors of the war, and with that wretched scribe Gentz, a man without honour, who sold his pen for gold; and that—“The portrait of the Emperor of Russia was found in the apartment of the queen at Potsdam. At Charlottenberg was found her correspondence with the Emperor during three years, and memoranda drawn up by English writers to prove that no account should be taken of treaties concluded with Napoleon. . . . The notes, reports, and State papers were redolent of musk, and were mixed up with *chiffons* and other objects of the queen’s toilette. . . .”

On the 28th October appeared the twenty-first bulletin, giving an account of the entry of Napoleon into Berlin, and how he received the ministers of Bavaria, of Spain, of Portugal, and of Turkey. Then the Protestant and Calvinist clergy. “There are,” added the bulletin, “12,000 French refugees at Berlin, owing to the revoca-

tion of the Edict of Nantes. The Emperor spoke with the chief among them; he said that they had good right to protection, and that their privileges and worship should be respected. He recommended them to attend to their business, to remain quiet, and to accord their respect and obedience to Cæsar."

M. Weiss, in his *Histoire des Réfugiés protestants de France depuis la Revocation de l'Edit de Nantes jusqu'à nos Jours*, has given an interesting account of those persons expelled from France for their religious opinions. To take merely the military men who fled to Prussia, one finds the Comte de Beauvau, Henri de Briquemault, de Beaucourt, d'Hallard, Pierre de la Cave, du Plessis, the Counts of Montgomery, de Comminges, de Cadal, de Gressy, with a Fouquet, a Beaufort, a la Salle, a Montfort (!) &c., &c. Numbers of the French officers distinguished themselves in the Prussian service; and their descendants fought gallantly through the Seven Years' War—La Mothe Fouquet, du Moulin, Forcade, Bonin, &c. And after the Franco-German war, a French editor, turning over the Prussian army list, related sorrowfully how he had found such names as the following among the invaders: Abercorn, d'Albaing, de Narbonne-Pelet, de Janson, d'Alton, Baron de Collas, de Colomb, de la Corbière, de Cordier, du Bois, de Gransilliers, de Lattre, de Longchamps-Bérrier, de Longueville, Comte Clairon d'Haussonville, de Lucadon, de Marées, de Mars, de la Chevalerie, de Chapuis, de Grain, de Grais, Baron de la Motte-Fouqué, de François, de Dufay, de Durant, Durrieu, de la Croix, de Coudray, d'Asse de la Barre, de Bauld de Nans, Bronsart, La Baume, Beaumont, de Donat, du Faur, du Fais, Le Goullon, de Gabain, de Clerc, Chevalier, Chasles de Beaulieu, de Bougé, de Borries, Baron de Le Fort, de Cuvry, du Cornu, d'Arrest, Artois, de Balle, des Barres, Le Batteur, de Beaulieu-Marconnay, Beauvais, Boie, de Bra, Châlon, Coumont, Destrée, de Lorne, Malbranc, du Verdy, du Vermois, &c.

No wonder that the French were beaten at Blenheim, Ramilies, Turin, Oudenarde, and Malplaquet, as the historian Michelet says—"It was no longer France which fought, but eternal justice."

As for Napoleon's interview with the refugees or their descendants, little good came of it, for, according to M. Weiss (vol. i. p. 222), "The humiliating defeat of Jena and the cruel treaty of Tilsit broke the last sympathies of Prussia for the tongue still spoken by families of French origin." And their pastors from that time began to preach in German instead of in French. However, as far as religion was concerned, Protestants certainly owed something to Napoleon.

TO THE PRINCESS FERDINAND OF PRUSSIA.

"BERLIN, 28th October, 1806.

"I have received the letter of your Royal Highness. I was much touched by the position of Madame de Hatzfeld. I convinced her that her husband was guilty, and that, according to the laws of war, he ought to be executed. However, I spared him even the disagreeableness of a trial. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO THE EMPRESS.

"BERLIN, 6th November, 1806.

"I have received your letter. You seem annoyed at the ill I said about women. It is true that I dislike intriguing women above everything. I am accustomed to good-hearted, gentle, and conciliating women; those are the women I love. If they have spoiled me, it is not my fault, but yours. Besides, you will see that I have been kind to one who showed herself sensitive and good, Madame de Hatzfeld. When I showed her the letter of her husband, she said to me while sobbing, with the deepest sensitiveness and simplicity, 'Ah, it is indeed his writing.'

When she read the letter, her accent went to my heart. I said to her, 'Well, Madame, throw this letter into the fire, and I shall no longer have the power to punish your husband.' She burned the letter, and appeared very happy. You see that I love good-natured, simple, and gentle women; that it is because they alone resemble you.

"Adieu, my friend. I am in good health.

"NAPOLEON."

This was an extraordinary piece of clemency on the part of Napoleon, who was so fond of striking terror into the hearts of conquered nations. According to Lanfrey, who appears to have seen a copy of the incriminated letter, it was quite insignificant; that was why the Prince de Hatzfeld confided it to the post-office, and probably that was the reason why the Emperor told the Princess to throw it into the fire. The court, composed of seven colonels, which was to try the Prince de Hatzfeld as a traitor and a spy, reminded one, continues Lanfrey, of the lugubrious affairs of the Duc d'Enghien and of Palm; and the most familiar friends of Napoleon—Berthier, Rapp, and Duroc—were indignant at the idea of seeing the blood of a man, who was both honoured and esteemed, shed for fidelity to his sovereign. They implored Napoleon not to sully his own glory, and to make his comrades executioners. The Emperor remained inflexible, and if the Prince had not been concealed for a time by Savage and Caulaincourt, he would certainly have been shot. It seems, however, that the impression of horror was so general when the fate which awaited the Prince became known, that Napoleon recoiled before the effect of the atrocity he had contemplated, and arranged the little clemency scene which he related so prettily to Josephine. According to Madame de Rémusat this act of generosity on the part of the Emperor created more impression in Paris than his victories.

TO THE PRINCE OF ORANGE.

"BERLIN, 8th November, 1806.

"MY COUSIN,—I am not a judge of the conduct of your Highness. It does not suit me to weigh the nature of your obligations. Your Highness says in your letter that you were obliged to wage war against me; you will not find it ill therefore that I should wish to have at Fulde a prince who is master to remain at peace with me.

"NAPOLEON."

The twenty-ninth bulletin (dated Berlin, 9th November) gives an account of the capitulation of the last *débris* of the Prussian army under Blucher, adding—"Thus the Prussian generals, who in their delirium and their vanity indulged in so many sarcasms against the Austrian generals, renewed four times the catastrophe of Ulm; the first by the capitulation of Erfurt, the second by that of Prince Hohenlohe, the third by that of Stettin, the fourth by that of Schwartau," where Blucher was at last brought to bay.

In a letter of the 14th November, addressed to Mollien, we see that Napoleon was rather anxious about the pay of the army. The letter concluded thus: "However, here, master of Prussia and of all Westphalia, money will begin to come in so that there is no reason to be uneasy."

TO THE EMPRESS.

"BERLIN, 16th November, 1806.

"I have received your letter of the 11th, and see with satisfaction that my sentiments afford you pleasure. You are wrong to think that I flatter you. . . . I am sorry to think that you do not amuse yourself at Mayence. If the voyage were not so long you might come here, for there are no more enemies this side of the Vistula. I shall wait to know what you think of it. I should also be very glad to see Monsieur Napoleon.

"NAPOLEON."

The thirty-third bulletin, dated Berlin, 17th November, announced the signature of a suspension of arms between France and Prussia.

On the 21st November was signed the famous Decree of Berlin, which declared the blockade of the British Isles, and copies of this decree were sent to Hamburg, Holland, Madrid, Tuscany, and Naples.

"The Continental blockade," says Duruy, in his *History of France*, "was a gigantic war machine, which would certainly kill one of the adversaries. It was Napoleon that it killed." Madame de Rémusat says that this was a struggle between despotism and constitutional rights, and that, "despotism succumbed, and, no matter how much it costs us to say so, Providence must be thanked for the salvation of nations and the lesson given to posterity." She also shows us Talleyrand, saying with more warmth than he was accustomed to exhibit, "Tremble, madmen that you are, at the successes gained by the Emperor over the English! For, if the English constitution be destroyed, the civilisation of the world will be shaken to its very foundations." And such was the opinion of many enlightened Frenchmen, both civil and military.

TO THE EMPRESS.

"KUSTRIN, 25th November, 1806.

"I am at Kustrin in order to make some reconnaissances. I shall see, in two days, if you can come. Hold yourself in readiness. I hope that the Queen of Holland will be of the party. It is two o'clock in the morning. I have just risen; this is the custom of war. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO THE EMPRESS.

"MESERITZ, 27th November, 1806.

"I am going to take a town in Poland. This is the first town. This evening I shall be at Posen. After that I will call you to Berlin, so that we may arrive there on

the same day. My health is good. The weather is rather bad; it has been raining for three days. My affairs are going on well. The Russians are retreating.

"Adieu, my friend. A thousand amiable things to Hortense, Stephanie, and the little Napoleon.

"NAPOLEON."

We see by letters to Talleyrand and to Soult of the 27th, that the King of Prussia, having thrown himself into the arms of the Russians, could not ratify the suspension of arms.

TO M. CAMBACÉRÈS.

"POSEN, 1st December, 1806.

"You will see by to-day's bulletin that my troops have entered Warsaw. The whole of Poland is up in arms. It is difficult to form an idea of the national movement of this country. Regiments are raised by force (!) The most enthusiastic are the most rich. Priests, nobles, peasants are unanimous. Poland will soon have 60,000 men under arms. The great nobles of the country all have from 4,000*l.* to 20,000*l.* a year. They pay the expenses of their army. In the midst of the movements of so large an army, and the excesses which naturally result, we have festivities, and to-morrow I am going to a ball given by the nobility of the city. The ladies have been presented to me; they have all left their country seats; this is the first time since the destruction of Poland that they have shown themselves. All the people in easy circumstances speak French, and the peasants love France.

"NAPOLEON."

This enthusiasm was, as Napoleon admitted the next day in a letter to Murat, somewhat circumspect. Murat thought that he was going to reign at Warsaw, and so did Prince Jerome, but it was not the intention of Napoleon for the moment to break with Austria.

TO M. GAUDIN.

“POSEN, 1st December, 1806.

“Have a circular written, and take measures so that, throughout the extent of the empire, all letters coming from England, or written in English and by Englishmen, be seized. This is most important, as it is absolutely necessary to isolate England.

“NAPOLEON.”

A similar letter was written to Prince Eugene with regard to “my kingdom of Italy.”

TO SULTAN SELIM.

“POSEN, 1st December, 1806.

“Prussia, which had formed a league with Russia, has disappeared. I have destroyed her armies, and am master of her strong places.

“My armies are upon the Vistula, and Warsaw is in my power.

“Prussian and Russian Poland are rising, and are forming armies to reconquer their independence. This is the moment for you to reconquer yours.

“Drive out the rebel Hospodars whom you were forced to re-establish by the most unjust violence, and in spite of your firman declaring them to be traitors.

“Do not grant to the Servians the concessions which they demand sword in hand.

“March upon Choczim ; you have nothing to fear from Russia.

“I have directed my ambassador (Sebastiani) to contract the necessary engagements with you. If you have been too prudent up to the present, a longer condescendence towards Russia would be a weakness which would ruin your empire.

“NAPOLEON.”

In a letter to Talleyrand of the same date the Emperor declared that he desired to remain at peace with Austria, and that he would have nothing to say to an insurrection in Austrian Poland. He however expressed his readiness to indemnify Austria for her share of Poland by a portion of Silesia, should that arrangement suit the Court of Vienna.

The thirty-sixth bulletin drew a flattering description of the enthusiasm awakened in Poland by the French. Even the stragglers, it was said, who committed excesses in other countries, had been touched by the reception of this good people, and had been obliged to make an effort to behave well.

The next day, however, the Emperor wrote to Murat, who was acting as Governor of Warsaw,—

“The Poles, who show so much circumspection, and ask for so many guarantees before declaring themselves, are egoists who are not inflamed by love of country. I am old in my knowledge of men. My greatness does not repose on the aid of a few thousand Poles. It is for them to take advantage with enthusiasm of present circumstances ; it is not for me to take the first step. Let them show a firm resolution to be independent ; let them pledge themselves to support the king which will be given to them, and then I shall see what is to be done. . . . I know Poniatowski better than you do, for I have followed the affairs of Poland for the last ten years. He is more frivolous and scatter-brained than most of the Poles, and that is saying a good deal. He enjoys very little confidence in Warsaw. . . . Let it be well understood that I have not come to beg for a throne for one of my relations ; there are not wanting thrones which I can give to my family. . . .”

On the 2nd December¹ the construction of the Madeleine was ordered “in our good city of Paris.” On the frontis-

¹ On the 2nd December, and also on the 3rd, Napoleon wrote seventeen letters or despatches, some of them of great length.

piece was to be written, "The Emperor Napoleon to the soldiers of the grand army." The names of the men present at Ulm, Austerlitz, and Jena were to be engraved upon marble tables, and the names of those who fell on tables of massive gold. Every year on the anniversaries of Austerlitz and Jena the "monument" was to be illuminated, and a concert given preceded by a speech on the virtues necessary for a soldier, and in praise of those who perish on the field of battle on memorable days.

The original building called the Madeleine was built in the days of Charles VIII., and consequently dates back from the fifteenth century. In the days of Louis XV. it was little but a ruin, and its reconstruction was therefore decided upon. The first stone of the new edifice was laid in 1764, and it was still unfinished when Napoleon determined to turn it into a "temple of glory." The temple was far from complete when the Empire passed away, and in 1816 appeared a Royal ordinance directing that the building should be terminated, and that in it should be placed expiatory monuments to Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette, Louis XVII, and the Princesse Elizabeth. However, when Louis Philippe came to the throne the Madeleine without roof, and its columns without capitals, resembled the ruin of some temple of antiquity, and it was not until 1842 that it was finished and handed over to the ecclesiastical authorities.

TO THE EMPRESS.

"POSEN, 2nd December, 1806.

"To-day is the anniversary of Austerlitz. I went to a ball given by the town. It rains. My health is good. I love you and long for you. My troops are at Warsaw. It has not been cold yet. All the Polish women are French women. For me there is only one woman. Do you know her? I would give you her portrait, but it would be necessary to flatter it so much that you would

not recognise it. However, to tell the truth, my heart has only loving things to say to you. The nights are long, all alone.

“Ever yours,
“NAPOLEON.”

On the 3rd December Napoleon wrote three letters to the King of Holland, in which poor Louis was ordered to “be down on the Dutch, be down on the Dutch,” who were the richest people in Europe. “You attach too great a price to popularity,” said Napoleon. “Before being good, you must be master.”

TO THE EMPRESS.

“POSEN, 15th December, 1806.

“MY FRIEND,—I am starting for Warsaw. I shall be back in a fortnight, when I hope I shall be able to send for you. However, I should see you return to Paris, where you are desired, with pleasure. You know that I depend upon events. All my affairs are going on well. . . . Adieu, my friend. I have made peace with Saxony. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE EMPRESS.

“GOLYMIN, 29th December, 1806.

“I write a line only, my friend. I am in a wretched barn. I have beaten the Russians. I have captured thirty guns, their baggage, and 6,000 men. The weather is fearful ; it rains, and we have mud up to the knee. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE EMPRESS.

“PULTUSK, 31st December, 1806.

“I laughed heartily on receiving your last letter. You have formed an idea of the belles of Poland which they do not deserve. . . . I received your letter in a wretched

barn, having mud, wind, and straw for my bed (*sic*). To-morrow I shall be at Warsaw. I think that everything is finished for this year. The army is going into winter quarters.

"I shrug my shoulders at the nonsense of Madame de L——. However, you ought to be angry, and advise her not to be so foolish. . . . As for me, I despise ingratitude as one of the worst defects of the heart. I know that instead of consoling you they grieved you. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

We shall see that poor Josephine had some reason for her jealousy, and that her faithless lord did protest too much.

CHAPTER IV.

THE YEAR 1807.

THE principal events of the year 1807 were the battles of Eylau and Friedland, which were followed by the treaty of Tilsit, the invasion of Portugal, and preparations for the invasion of Spain; the war with Sweden, which lost Finland; and the bombardment of Copenhagen, and seizure of the Danish fleet which was about to be handed over to Napoleon. Two new kingdoms were created, those of Saxony and Westphalia, the latter being given to Jerome Bonaparte.

The fighting in Poland was of the most desperate and sanguinary character. The campaign opened with the affairs of Pultusk and Golymin, in which both French and Russians sustained heavy losses. Napoleon in his bulletins claimed both days, but when we consult Jomini we find that the Russians held Golymin till nightfall, which was more unfortunate than the non-success of Pultusk. Ney had a very narrow escape of being cut off, and Bernadotte was driven back from his lines to the small town of Strasburg. Both French and Russians claimed the victory at Eylau, where the slaughter on both sides was appalling. The Russians however were beaten at Ostralenka, and then at the celebrated battle of Friedland, which, although Tolstoy afterwards beat Massena and Massena beat Tolstoy, may be said to have finished the campaign.

The fate of Napoleon, especially after Eylau, hung on a thread, and nothing saved him but his wonderful activity and the confidence with which he inspired his soldiers. Had Austria joined the coalition at that moment, instead of offering to mediate, had Russia not made war with Turkey, and sent 60,000 men into the principalities, and had England furnished in time the subsidies which she had promised to Prussia, to Sweden, and to Russia, the career of Napoleon would have been cut short, and Europe would have been spared years of bloodshed, ruin and misery.

Prussia alone, as if to make amends for the past, acted through this campaign with courage and good faith. She refused to listen to the overtures of Napoleon, and the *débris* of the army, under the command of General Lestocq, greatly distinguished itself at Eylau and elsewhere. Although no Prussian town or fortress defended itself with the courage and desperation of Saragossa, the Prussian troops in the open field fought as they fought under the great Frederick.

The harsh manner in which Prussia was treated at Tilsit was universally blamed as cruel and impolitic. We find Napoleon declaring to the Legislative Body on the 16th August that none of his determinations were influenced by resentment, and justifying his policy; and at the same time Prince Metternich writing thus from Paris to Count Stadion—"The Emperor sacrifices to his resentment a power which he should protect to serve as a counterpoise to Russia." As far as resentment went, Napoleon, all through his career, showed that he was not a Corsican for nothing, and the events of 1807, as more than one historian has remarked, were stamped with hatred to England, and the fixed determination to ruin her by means of the continental blockade.

After Austerlitz Napoleon returned to Paris, determined to punish Prussia for having resented the violation of Anspach, and Naples for having joined the coalition.

After Friedland he returned home, determined to seize upon Portugal, to punish Spain and Austria, and according to Prince Metternich to partition Turkey and to march upon India. Some of these matters he had talked over with the Czar at Tilsit.

Not long after his return to Paris Napoleon paid a visit to Italy, and from Milan issued a decree against British commerce, which was at once an aggravation of the decree of Berlin, and an answer to the Orders in Council which put an end to the immunity which had been enjoyed by the vessels of neutral powers which though not at war with England had embraced the continental system. As the British Government very rightly insisted, the powers in question, in submitting quietly to the orders of Napoleon, became his accomplices—the accomplices of an act which Napoleon's own brother declared was as unjust as it was impolitic. "Article six," he said, "is barbarous, Article eight is worse, and the decree is more likely to ruin France than England." And it was to enforce his decrees of Berlin and of Milan that fire and sword were carried through Europe.

Some idea may be formed of the restless activity of Napoleon by the fact that during the first three months of 1807, while in Poland, he wrote 1,715 letters or despatches (at least that number has been collected and published). At the same period, if we are to believe a bulletin, his Majesty was in the habit of riding forty leagues a day! He was constantly calling upon his marshals for fuller details, and he wrote to his librarian in Paris to forward him two or three volumes a day.

Napoleon opened the new year with a very friendly letter to his "very great and faithful friend," the Sultan Selim, whose noble resolutions had filled his heart with joy. After giving a glowing account of his victories of the Russians, his Majesty added—

"The moment has arrived for the Ottoman Empire to resume its ancient splendour. There is not an instant to

be lost. Your frontiers are invaded. Call upon your faithful subjects to defend what is most dear to them. The Russians wish to destroy your cities, your mosques, and the very name of Mussulman. . . . I pray God to bless your arms. . . .

“Your very dear and perfect friend,
“NAPOLEON.

“Written at our Imperial Castle of Warsaw, 1st January, 1807.”

As early as June, 1806, and while negotiating a treaty of peace with Russia, Napoleon had pressed the Sultan to replace the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia on his own authority. This would be equivalent to a declaration of war, as according to treaty the Hospodars were appointed in concert with the Czar. Sebastiani was sent to Constantinople to bring about this matter, and what between promises and threats the feeble-minded Selim was induced to dismiss the two Hospodars, and to close the Bosphorus to Russian vessels. England remonstrated, and a Russian army, under General Michelson, at once entered the Principalities. Napoleon was delighted with the success of his scheme. On the 11th November he wrote to Selim, saying—“Recover confidence. The fates have promised the duration of your empire. I have a mission to save it. . . .” And in December, Sebastiani was ordered to sign a treaty with Turkey, guaranteeing the integrity of Moldavia, Wallachia and Servia, and binding France not to make peace except in concert with the Porte. This was the state of affairs at the beginning of 1807.

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND.

“WARSAW, 2nd January, 1807.

“. . . I think that you have done wrong to create marshals, which has the inconvenience of costing money, and of giving men who have done little great pretensions.

Do you think that a French General of Division would be commanded by a Dutch marshal? You ape the organisation of France, whereas circumstances are very different. Begin by establishing the conscription. "NAPOLEON."

TO THE EMPRESS, AT MAYENCE.

"WARSAW, *2nd January*, 1807.

"I have received your letter, my friend. Your grief affects me, but you must submit to events. The distance between Warsaw and Mayence is too great. Events must allow me to go to Berlin before I can write to you to join me there. However, the beaten enemy is retreating; but I have a great many affairs to settle here. I wish you would return to Paris, where your presence is necessary. . . . My health is good; the weather is bad. I love you with my heart.

"NAPOLEON."

These short and tender epistles to Josephine were written to allay her jealousy. She was well aware of what was going on at Warsaw, and that her faithless lord had formed a liaison with the young and lovely Countess of Walewska, who had been selected by Murat for his imperial brother-in-law. The fruit of this liaison was the Count Alexander Florian Joseph Colonna Walewska, who filled several high posts under the second empire, and who succeeded the Duc de Morny, the illegitimate son of the mother of Napoleon III., as President of the Corps Législatif.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER.

"WARSAW, *4th January*, 1807.

"MY COUSIN,—I beg that you will spare the states of Mecklenberg Strelitz. There is a grandmother of the Princesse Eugene there. She is an old woman; see if she wants anything, and inform her that you have been ordered to treat her with particular attention.

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. RISSAULT, *Librarian.*

“WARSAW, 5th January, 1807.

“The Emperor complains that he receives nothing new from Paris. It would be easy for you to forward two or three volumes every day by the courier which leaves at 8 A.M. . . .

“MENEVAL, BY ORDER OF THE EMPEROR.”

TO THE EMPRESS, AT MAYENCE.

“WARSAW, 8th January, 1807.

“MY GOOD FRIEND,—I have received your letter of the 27th, as well as those of M. Napoleon and of Hortense. I begged you to go back to Paris. The weather is too bad, and the roads dangerous and detestable, and the distance too great to permit of your coming here. . . . Mayence is too dull. Paris claims you; go there, this is my wish. I am more annoyed than you are. I should like to share the long nights of this season with you. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

On the 8th January was issued the forty-ninth bulletin which announced the capitulation of Breslau, and that M. de Zastrow “the wise and moderate man who signed the armistice which the King of Prussia had refused to sign,” had been named Foreign Minister. The Grand Army was then told that the Russian soldiers were highly irritated with the Czar and with their generals, and that Baron de Vincent had arrived with letters from the Emperor of Austria.

TO M. DE CHAMPAGNY.

“WARSAW, 11th January, 1807.

“You must allow the Place de la Concorde to retain its present name. Concorde, this is what renders France invincible.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. CAMBACÉRÈS.

"WARSAW, 13th January, 1807.

"I have received your letter of the 31st December. The affair of Hesse Cassel is terminated. It appears that it was the soldiery which wished to move. "NAPOLEON."

In fact some 10,000 Hessians refused for a time to lay down their arms.

On the same day his Majesty wrote to the King of Holland complaining that according to reports from London trade with Holland was just as brisk as before the decree of Berlin. Brother Louis was to see to this.

The fiftieth bulletin, after referring to the flight of the King of Prussia to Memel and to other matters, went on to say on the subject of Turkish affairs—"Austria and France are equally interested in not seeing Moldavia, Wallachia, Servia, Greece, Roumelia, and Anatolia become the playthings of Muscovite ambition. The interest of England in this matter is not less evident than that of Austria and France; but will she recognise this? Will she impose silence on the hatred which governs her cabinet? Will she listen to the lessons of policy and experience? If she closes her eyes to the future, if she listens only to her jealousy of France she will perhaps declare war against the Porte; she will become the auxiliary of the insatiable ambition of the Russians. . . ."

TO THE EMPRESS.

"WARSAW, 16th January, 1807.

"MY GOOD FRIEND,—I have received your letter of the 5th; what you say of your grief gives me pain. Why these tears, this chagrin? I shall soon see you; do not doubt my sentiments; and if you wish to be still dearer to me exhibit greater strength of mind. I feel humiliated at the idea that my wife can doubt my destinies. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

On the 17th Napoleon wrote a flattering letter to the Shah announcing his successes in Poland, and calling upon him to attack the common enemy with vigour in Georgia.

“Fortune,” he said, “has placed a bandage over the eyes of our enemy. Already sorely pressed in the east and the west he has declared war against the Ottoman Porte. No doubt an invisible power, the same which caused me to conquer, and which watches over your glory, wished to drag our enemies to their destruction in blindly arming them against the forces of three powerful empires. Let us all three join together and form an eternal alliance. . . .

“NAPOLEON.

“Given at our Imperial Palace of Warsaw, 17th January, 1807, and third year of my reign.”

TO THE EMPRESS.

“WARSAW, 18th *January*, 1807.

“I fear that you are greatly grieved at our separation, which must last some weeks longer, and by your return to Paris. I exact greater strength of mind on your part. I am told that you are always crying. Fie! how naughty that is. Be worthy of me and show more courage. Cut a suitable figure in Paris, and above all be contented. My health is good, and I greatly love you; but if you weep constantly I shall believe you devoid of courage; I do not love cowards; an Empress should have a brave heart.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

“WARSAW, 18th *January*, 1807.

“You mention a certain Mademoiselle Grouthe, who says that she is the daughter of Louis XVI. I suppose that you have taken steps to put an end to this farce. When half France believed that Cagliostro had been brought

up in the great Pyramid at Cairo, what may not be expected from a matter capable of furnishing a pretext to malevolent persons? . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

It was not until the 20th January that Napoleon replied to the letter of the Emperor of Austria of the 21st December.

Austria, as Russia and as Prussia had done on previous occasions, had wished to mediate, but she was informed that the peace and harmony which she desired to see reigning in Europe had been rendered impossible by what had just taken place at Constantinople.

In the fifty-third bulletin the Grand Army was informed that the English, seeing that Kalmucs and Tartars could not stand French bayonets, had called to their aid dysentery, the plague, and other epidemics, and had spread reports as to the ravages made by sickness in the ranks of the army, and in the manufacturing districts. These wicked reports were indignantly contradicted.

According to the French returns it was afterwards shown that during this short campaign no less than 420,000 men were received into hospital, 210,000 fever patients, and 100,000 wounded men, and that 32,000 men died. These are official figures quoted by General Dumas, vol. xi. 486.

TO THE EMPRESS.

“WARSAW, 23rd *January*, 1807.

“I have received your letter of the 15th. It is impossible for me to allow women such a journey—bad roads, dangerous, and muddy. Return to Paris and be gay; perhaps I shall soon be there. I laughed at what you said about taking a husband in order to be with him. I thought in my ignorance that the wife was made for the husband, the husband for the country, his family, and glory; forgive my error, one has always something to learn from you pretty women. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE KING OF SAXONY.

“WARSAW, 24th *January*, 1807.

“SIR, MY BROTHER,—I congratulate myself on the peace which unites us, and which time will only strengthen. Our allies are the same, the interests of your majesty have become mine, and our union has been still more consolidated by those sentiments of confidence, attachment, and esteem with which I have the honour to be, &c., &c.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

“WARSAW, 28th *January*, 1807.

“SIR, MY BROTHER,—I could not receive the wishes of your Majesty for my happiness without a lively emotion. Your destiny, my successes have placed vast countries between us. To the south you touch the Mediterranean, I touch the Baltic ; but by the harmony of our plans we tend towards the same goal. Look after your coasts ; drive off the English and their commerce. Their exclusion will restore peace to your States. Your kingdom is rich, populous ; with the aid of God it will be happy and powerful. Receive my most sincere wishes for the prosperity of your reign, and reckon always on my fraternal affection. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER.

“WARSAW, 28th *January*, 1807.

“MY COUSIN,—Write to my minister at Dresden so that the Saxon contingent may arrive as soon as possible at Glogau.

“NAPOLEON.”

In a message to the Senate dated Imperial camp of Warsaw, 29th *January*, 1807, the Emperor said among

other things—"We have ordered our Minister of Foreign Affairs to lay before you a report on the danger of the Ottoman Porte. A witness from the first days of our youth of all the ills produced by war, our happiness, our glory, our ambition has been centred in the conquests and labours of peace. But the force of circumstances in which we find ourself deserves our chief care." And then followed an apology for the war with Russia which was creating the greatest uneasiness through the country.

TO M. LEBRUN.

"WARSAW, 29th *January*, 1807.

"I have received your letter of the 17th, and thank you for all you say. I am aware of your attachment, which I greatly prize. What are you doing in Paris? I have not heard that you gave a little ball during the Carnival.

"NAPOLEON."

All the great officers of the state were supposed to spend money in entertaining so as to keep Paris gay.

On the same day Napoleon in a letter to Talleyrand said that he felt inclined to place 25,000 men on the Danube, and that if the Porte wished it he would send half-a-dozen line of battle ships to cruise with the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea. All this was to be kept very secret, and the proposals communicated to the Sultan alone.

Selim declined the offer, for his suspicions had been aroused by the high handed conduct of Cæsar Berthier, the Governor of the Ionian Isles, who had summoned some Turkish places on the Adriatic coast to open their gates under a threat of bombardment. This reminded the Turks of what the French had done in Egypt, and induced them to decline the proposed assistance. Better to fight the Russians alone than to call in such dangerous friends.

TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

"WARSAW, 29th January, 1807.

"Turkey has declared war against Russia. A Tartar who left Constantinople on the 2nd brings me excellent news from that country.

"A million has been forwarded to you from Turin. My health never was better, and the consequence is that I have become more *galant* than formerly.

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. CAMBACÉRÈS.

"SCHLITT, 5th February, 1807.

"MY COUSIN,—I am in pursuit of the Russian army. I have driven it from all its positions, and am going to force it back behind the Niemen. It is splendid weather, and everything is going on well.

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

"ARENSDORF, 6th February, 1807.

Our affairs here could not be going on better. A corps of 20,000 men has been cut off. The Russian army is flying it knows not where, in the greatest disorder; artillery baggage, magazines are falling into our hands. My only fear is lest the corps cut off should be Prussian corps.

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

"EYLAU, 9th February, 1807

"It is 2 A.M. I am tired. I can write only a few words. Marshal Duroc will inform you that I gained a victory yesterday over the Russian army.

"As for the communication made by the King of Prussia, I think that you may reply to this effect: that I accept the overtures made with a view of bringing the war to a close, and that I will send plenipotentiaries as soon as Russia or Prussia have made theirs, to Memel or elsewhere.

"NAPOLEON."

TO THE EMPRESS.

"EYLAU, 9th February, 1807. 3 A.M.

"MY FRIEND,—There was a great battle yesterday ; I gained the victory, but we have lost a great many men. The loss of the enemy, which is still more considerable, does not console me. I write these few lines to you myself, although I am very tired, to tell you that I am well and that I love you.

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. CAMBACÉRÈS.

"EYLAU, 9th February, 1807.

"MY COUSIN,—The weather has become severe. I fought a battle yesterday and gained the victory, but I lost a great many men. However, you will find the details in the bulletin, which is exact.

"NAPOLEON."

TO THE EMPRESS.

"EYLAU, 9th February, 1807. 5 P.M.

"I send you a line, my friend, lest you should be uneasy. The enemy lost the battle, 40 guns, 12 standards, 12,000 prisoners; he suffered horribly. I have lost 1,600 killed and between 3,000 and 4,000 wounded. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

Similar letters were written in various directions, and the Russian loss was set down at 30,000 men. In the bulletin Napoleon stated his loss to have been 1,900 killed, 5,700 wounded ; that of the Russians from 12,000 to 15,000 prisoners, as many men placed *hors de combat*, 18 colours, and 45 guns; 7,000 dead Russians were counted lying on the field of battle. The enemy, it was said, had been driven back a hundred leagues from the Vistula.

TO THE EMPRESS.

"EYLAU, 11th February, 1807. 3 A.M.

"I write you a line, my dear friend ; you must have been very anxious. I beat the enemy on a memorable day, but it cost me the lives of many gallant fellows. In consequence of the bad weather I shall go into cantonments.

"I beg of you not to be disconsolate ; all this will soon be finished, and the happiness of seeing you will make me promptly forget my fatigues. Besides, I have never felt better. . . . Adieu, my friend ; a thousand kisses.

"NAPOLEON."

NOTE IN THE EMPEROR'S HANDWRITING.

"EYLAU, 12th February, 1807.

"It has been found in the army that the bulletin of the battle of Eylau exaggerated our losses, and that it was not sufficiently advantageous for our army." The Emperor said upon this occasion—"A father who loses his children finds no charm in victory. When the heart speaks even glory has no illusions."

TO THE KING OF PRUSSIA.

"EYLAU, 13th February, 1807.

"SIR, MY BROTHER,—I send you my aide-de-camp, General Bertrand, who possesses my entire confidence. He has things to say to you which I hope will prove agreeable. Believe me that this will be the happiest moment of my life ; I flatter myself that it will be the commencement of a durable friendship between us."

"NAPOLEON."

The instructions given to General Bertrand were to this effect :—That the Emperor was prepared to sign peace and to restore the states of the king up to the Elbe ; that his Majesty was not well pleased with Russia and the

little hurry she appeared to be in to deliver Prussia from the situation in which she had been placed.

Bertrand was then to try and persuade M. de Zastrow that it would be much more advantageous for the King of Prussia to owe his re-establishment to France than to Russia, as in the latter case he would become the vassal of the Czar. As for Poland, the General was to say that since Napoleon had become acquainted with that country he attached no importance to it. He was also to declare that the Prussian nation was necessary to Europe.

TO THE EMPRESS.

“EYLAU, 14th February, 1807.

“My FRIEND,—I am still at Eylau. The country is covered with dead and wounded. This is not the finest part of war; one suffers and the mind is oppressed at the sight of so many victims. I am well. I have accomplished what I wished, to have repulsed the enemy and defeated his plans.

You must feel anxious, and this idea afflicts me. However, make your mind easy, my friend and be gay. Tell Caroline and Pauline that the grand duke (Murat) and the prince (Borghese) are well.

“NAPOLEON.”

In the fifty-ninth bulletin it is stated that—“The enemy has published the subjoined note:—‘On the 8th there was a sanguinary battle at Eylau. Twice the French became masters of the town, but in the end the Prince Bagration arrived with a strong column and carried it at the point of the bayonet. General Lestocq took the enemy in flank and decided the victory in favour of the Russians. The Russians lost 20,000 men killed and wounded. The French lost 30,000; seven eagles have been captured and taken to Kœnigsberg.’ All this is false. The enemy attacked the town and was constantly repulsed. He acknowledges having lost 20,000 men; he suffered far

more severely. The capture of nine (*sic*) eagles is as false as the capture of the town. . . .”

The battle of Eylau was remarkable as the beginning of the demi-successes of Napoleon. It was a long and sanguinary struggle, which lasted from early dawn far into the night, and was waged into varied success. Eylau was several times taken and retaken, and if some of the Russian corps suffered heavily that of Augereau was so terribly cut up that after the battle its remains were incorporated with other corps, while the marshal himself, carried wounded from the field, repaired to Paris.

“The night,” as Lanfrey says, “had not shadows sufficiently thick to veil the horrors of that field of carnage, where nearly 40,000 men were lying dead, dying, or wounded. ‘What a massacre, and without any result!’ exclaimed Ney the next morning.”

Fortunately for Napoleon the Russians fell back for a few miles and left him in possession of the battle-field. He was thus able to claim a victory. The French, however, were unable to move. Though close to Königsberg, and within sight of its steeples, they remained at Eylau for nine days burying the dead and trying to open up negotiations for peace. Overtures addressed to General Beningsen met with the reply that his master had sent him to fight and not to negotiate; and a letter to the King of Prussia also met with an unfavourable reply. Upon this Napoleon retired sixty miles and went into winter quarters. Lanfrey thinks that if Napoleon had had to do with Wellington he would never have been allowed to remain master of the field. Beningsen, however, was not in the least aware of the loss he had inflicted on the army, and he was afraid of the French being strongly reinforced. Napoleon was in a most critical position. During the time he remained at Eylau his cavalry had suffered severely, especially at the hands of the Cossacks, and matters were looking gloomy indeed. It was at this juncture that

he turned towards Austria, tried first persuasion and then threats. Austria offered to mediate, and Napoleon was greatly alarmed lest this intervention should end in war, and lest 150,000 Austrian mediators should appear on the Elbe.

Hence his anxiety to negotiate, but while negotiating he displayed his usual activity, reorganising and re-inspiring his army, and pushing on the sieges of Dantzic and the other places which still held feebly out.

At home the greatest consternation reigned, especially when another levy of 80,000 men (the third since the war began) was demanded, and when the terrible losses sustained by the army became known. For months Napoleon never ceased repeating in private letters and in official documents that his losses had been trifling, but it appears tolerably certain, according to Jomini and to Sir R. Wilson, that 30,000 Frenchmen were put *hors de combat* at Eylau alone.

The Duc de Fezeusac, too, in his *Memoirs*, says that the Russians captured 200 waggons laden with wounded men, and that the neighbouring villages were crowded with sick.

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

"LIEBSTADT, 20th February, 1807.

"I see with pleasure that the conscription is going on well. You have seen that we had a very sanguinary affair at Eylau on the 8th; my right had another at Ostralenka on the 16th; in both the Russians were beaten.

"I do not attach any importance to Kosciusco; he is not esteemed in the country as he believes; besides, his conduct proves that he is only a fool. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND.

"OSTERODE, 25th February, 1807.

I am informed that the commerce between England and Holland was never more brisk than since the Berlin

decree, and the communications with England more rapid and more numerous.

"You must reinforce your corps at Hamburg because I have been forced to withdraw 3,000, and to send them to join Marshal Mortier.

"NAPOLEON."

On the 26th Napoleon wrote to the King of Prussia expressing his willingness to make peace with him and with the Russians if they would only renounce their designs upon Turkey; he was ready to make peace even with England. This letter terminated thus: "I should look upon myself with horror were I to be the cause of the effusion of so much blood; but if England deems this effusion of blood necessary for her plans and her monopoly what can I do?"

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

"OSTERODE, 28th February, 1807.

"Spread the following reports in an official manner. They are, however, true. Spread them first in the salons and then put them in the papers—that the Russian army is greatly weakened, that some regiments are reduced to 150 men . . . that the Russian army demands peace, and accuses some great lords of having been purchased by England and of selling Russian blood for British gold; that after Eylau the Russian generals sent Prince Bagration to St. Petersburg to say that the army had been almost entirely destroyed, and that it would be impossible to support another campaign.

"NAPOLEON."

On the 3rd March Napoleon wrote a long letter to Talleyrand, in which he expressed his inability to understand what Austria required. He had read and re-read the last despatch of M. de Stadion without being able to come to any conclusion.

"Does she wish," he wrote, "to guarantee the integrity of Turkey? I consent. Does she wish to conclude a treaty by which, should Russia acquire an increase of territory in Turkey, the two powers should make common cause to obtain an equivalent? That might be arranged." [Poor Sultan Selim!]

Napoleon then added—"If affairs with Prussia do not get settled, and if the House of Austria will join with us, we might give it a portion of Silesia. By this means it would regain what the Prussian monarchy took from it formerly. . . ."

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

"OSTERODE, *March 11th*, 1807.

"Since the Porte refuses to have troops at Constantinople or in Bosnia, you can assure the ambassador that it shall no longer be a question of this. As for the officers asked for, it will be necessary to know the number required, their rank, and branch. . . . I sent you a letter yesterday for Marshal Massena, who I suppose has joined his army corps.

"NAPOLEON."

TO THE EMPRESS.

"OSTERODE, *March 11th*, 1807.

"MY FRIEND,—I am sorry to see that you are ill; take courage. My health is good, and my affairs are doing well. . . . A great many foolish things will be said about the battle of Eylau. The bulletin tells everything; the losses were rather exaggerated than lessened.

"Ever yours,

"NAPOLEON."

His Majesty now declared that he had lost at Eylau only 1,500 killed and 3,000 wounded.

TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

"OSTERODE, 11th March, 1807.

"I have received your letter of the 20th. The English squadron is before Constantinople. I have received news up to the 10th February, which shows that the English ambassador has left Constantinople. We shall now see how all this will end.

"NAPOLEON."

In a letter to General Duroc of the same date the Emperor said—"I am pleased with the Spanish ambassador at Constantinople, who is highly praised by Sebastiani. . . ."

And in a letter to War Minister Clarke, at Berlin, the Emperor bitterly complained of a report made by Colonel Aubert on the battle of Eylau. He declared that the battle was won at 4 P.M., and that as for 15,000 Frenchmen having taken to their heels, that was a horrid calumny. Some stragglers and a military train alone had fled on a cry being raised that the Cossacks were coming. "I exaggerated my losses in my bulletin," added his Majesty. "I am now told that there were only from 4,000 to 4,500 men wounded." And—"All this is a tissue of lies. I was not for a moment on foot."

There is abundant proof to show that Augereau's corps, 16,000 strong, outnumbered and blinded by snow, was utterly routed, pursued by the Russian cavalry, and, virtually speaking, annihilated. As for the statement made that the Emperor was on foot during a portion of the battle, it is borne out by General Bertrand, who, in his account of Eylau, says—"I was never so much struck with anything in my life as by the Emperor at Eylau; when alone with some officers of his staff he was almost trodden under foot by a Russian column from 4,000 to 5,000 strong. *The Emperor was on foot.* Berthier called for his horses, but the Emperor refused to mount, and ordered his guard to advance."

On the 12th the Emperor wrote a letter to Cambacérès, in which he said—"I never intended to enter Kœnigsberg," and expressing his displeasure that the *Moniteur* should have announced this to be his intention.

Sir Robert Wilson, in his account of the campaign, says that when Napoleon began the battle of Eylau he never doubted that he would be in Kœnigsberg the next day, and that Berthier wrote to Josephine on the same day, saying—"The Russians have fled to Gumbinnen; to-morrow Kœnigsberg will receive the Emperor." The fact is that the Russians struck for Dantzic and the French for Kœnigsberg, and that both were foiled, at least for the moment.

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

"OSTERODE, 19th March, 1807.

"Give orders everywhere for M. de St. Priest to be arrested.

"NAPOLEON."

M. de St. Priest escaped to Russia, and lived far into the reign of Napoleon III. He is chiefly celebrated as the author of a rather neat inscription at Coblenz (vide *Vapereau*, p. 1550; and *Guide-book to the Banks of the Rhine*).

"M. de Saint-Priest was at the battle of Austerlitz; received a gunshot wound at Lutzen; and had just been named Colonel (in the Russian army) when, in 1814, he fell into the hands of the French, and was near being shot at Sedan."

"The *Guide*, under the head of Coblenz, says:—

"Opposite the church of St. Castor, a fountain—ugly enough—attracts the attention of visitors by the two following inscriptions:—

"Année 1812

"Mémorable par la Campagne

"contre les Russes,

"sous le Préfectorat de Jules Doazan.

"Vu et approuvé par nous,

"Commandant Russe de la ville de Coblenz,

"Le 15 Janvier, 1814.

“‘This Russian commander was no other than the French General de Saint-Priest, who—from modesty, no doubt—dared not engrave his name on the fountain.—(Adolphe Joanne—*Les bords du Rhin Illustres.*)’”

On the same day Napoleon wrote a long letter to Talleyrand on the subject of Austria, whose conduct was causing some uneasiness at Osterode. The French ambassador, Andréossy, was to say that independently of the 140,000 men which the Emperor had in his depots in France, he had just raised 80,000 conscripts of the class of 1808 ; that in addition he had created ten legions of reserve, each composed of five battalions ; and that he was prepared to march into Bavaria with the army of Brittany and Normandy, 40,000 strong. Andréossy was further to declare that France had given no cause for complaint, but quite the contrary, for she had demolished the Prussian fortresses in Silesia. If Austria doubted what he said she might send an officer to inspect the army of Brittany and Normandy. She was to be warned, too, that if she entered the lists Russia would desert her and allow her to be destroyed, as she had allowed Prussia to be destroyed. He was to add that no one but women and children would believe the Emperor capable of burying himself in the plains of Russia.

The calling out of the 80,000 conscripts a year before their time had created such a painful impression in the country that in order to assuage the general grief, says the *Annual Register*, it was found necessary to qualify the new call by a clause setting forth that these conscripts were not to serve out of France. Renault St. Jean d'Angely is said to have shed tears when announcing to the Senate the necessity of this levy.

TO MARSHAL LEFEBVRE.

“OSTERODE, 19th March, 1807.

“The partisan Schill has been cut off from Kolberg. That wretch, who is a sort of brigand, has fallen back on

Kœslin. Send some Saxon or Polish cavalry in pursuit of this wretch. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

Schill had made some daring raids to the rear of the French army, and in one of these had snapped up Marshal Victor, who was afterwards exchanged for Blucher. A very dark fate awaited poor Schill.

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

“OSTERODE, 20th March, 1807.

“I see that the affair of Mlle. Aubry is thought more of by the Parisians than all the losses sustained by the army. M. de Luçay did wrong not to show her all the interest which her state inspired.

“NAPOLEON.”

The lady in question, who had played the part of the Goddess of Reason during the orgies of the Revolution, in 1807 was representing “Glory” at the Opera, when she fell and broke her arm. The Empress was present when the accident occurred, and was much shocked.

TO VICE-ADMIRAL DECRÉS.

“OSTERODE, 22nd March, 1807.

“There can be no doubt that Rear-Admiral Allemand should not attack an equal force of the enemy, much more a superior force. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO GENERAL DEJEAN.

“OSTERODE, 25th March, 1807.

“Did I ever give you an order to send 10,000 Prussians to Spain? I told my Minister for Foreign Affairs to make such a proposal to Spain, but was that equivalent to an order from me? This sort of thing has happened

several times. . . . I told the Porte that I wished to send 30,000 men to Constantinople; if, in consequence of that declaration, you had ordered them to march, it would have been rather extraordinary. Since the Prussians refuse to go to Spain, take this pretext for spreading them through Languedoc, where they may be employed on the canal of Arles and the swamps of Rochefort.

“NAPOLEON.”

It was a common trick on the part of Napoleon to send the soldiers of one country into another so as to breed bad blood between them. As for prisoners, a great many were required, not only for public works, but to carry on the ordinary labours in city and field in consequence of the dearth of hands caused by the conscription.

TO M. CAMBACÉRÈS.

“OSTERODE, 26th March, 1807.

“I suppose that your ball will be a grand one. There is nothing new here. I have written to the Minister of Police to send Madame de Staël to Geneva. This woman continues her trade of intriguer. She went near Paris in spite of my orders. She is a veritable plague. Speak seriously to the Minister, for I shall be obliged to have her seized by the gendarmerie. Keep an eye upon Benjamin Constant; if he meddles with anything I shall send him to his wife at Brunswick. I will not tolerate this clique. . . . I desire to lend money on pledge; that is to say, when a manufactory or a commercial house is threatened with failure, to lend money to the extent of half the value of the merchandise. If there be no law according me this power make out a decree giving it to me. Under extraordinary circumstances one must have recourse to extraordinary measures. . . . I have appointed M. de Broglie Bishop of Ghent.

“NAPOLEON.”

The above letter forms much food for reflection on the vicissitudes of human life. Benjamin Constant, after writing his celebrated pamphlet intitled *De l'Esprit de Conquête et de l'Usurpation*, adhered to the Empire after the return from Elba, and helped to draw out the constitution in which was embodied the "Additional Act." As for the Bishop of Ghent, he was thrown into a dungeon at Vincennes for siding with the Pope. His nephew, the Duc Achille de Broglie, married the daughter of Madame de Staël, the fruit of that union being the present Duc de Broglie, who has twice held the office of Prime Minister who has been ambassador to London, who is now a senator and an Academician, and who enjoys a high literary reputation, worthy of his persecuted grandmother.

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

"OSTERODE, 27th March, 1807.

"I have seen in the newspapers a pretended letter written in Russia. It is lamentable. We do not require to be defended by fables. No man in his senses will be deceived, and it will only create a bad effect. The Russians belonging to the army never say among themselves that they gained the battle. . . .

"In general all that is published with the view of enlightening public opinion appears to me ill-conceived, and as if the author did not believe what he was writing. . . .

"NAPOLÉON."

TO THE EMPRESS.

"OSTERODE, 27th March, 1807.

"MY FRIEND,—Your letter grieves me. You are not going to die, you are in good health, and have no reason for sorrow. . . . You must not think of travelling this summer; it is impossible to allow you to run about inns and camps. I desire to see you and to live in tranquillity.

I know how to do other things than make war ; but duty before everything. All my life I have sacrificed tranquillity, interest, happiness to my destiny. . . .

“ NAPOLEON.”

In spite of the famous receipe the Princess Eugene did not give birth to a son, as the following letter shows :—

TO PRINCE EUGENE.

“ OSTERODE, *27th March*, 1807.

“ MY SON,—I congratulate you on the confinement of the princess ; I am very anxious to learn that she is doing well and out of all danger. I hope that your daughter will be as good and as amiable as her mother. It remains for you now to have a boy next year. . . . Have your daughter called Josephine.

“ NAPOLEON.”

In 1823 Josephine married Prince Oscar, the heir to the throne of Sweden, and son of the quondam Marshal Bernadotte and Désirée Clary, whom Napoleon had demanded in marriage. A son was born afterwards, and in due time married the daughter of the Czar Nicolas—that is to say married into the Russian Imperial family which had refused with horror the matrimonial overtures made by Napoleon.

In a letter of the 1st of April the Emperor informed M. Mollien that he had paid the army for four months out of the money levied on the conquered countries, and that he had wherewithall to pay them for five months longer. He complained that several officers had drawn upon the Paymaster-General, and consequently had been paid out of the public treasury !

TO THE EMPRESS.

“ FINCHENSTEIN, *2nd April*, 1807.

“ MY FRIEND,—I write one line. I have transferred my head-quarters to a fine castle like that of Bessières (Grignon),

where I have a number of fire-places, which is very pleasant, as I often get up in the night and like to see the fire. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

The next day the Emperor wrote to the Sultan and to the Shah encouraging them to attack the common enemy. To the former he said—“Confide your wants to me. I am sufficiently powerful and interested in your success, both by friendship and policy, not to refuse you anything.” He then related how he had refused to make peace unless the independence of the Porte were ratified.

The Shah was called upon to live on good terms with the Sultan, and to intercept all communications between the English and India.

In several letters at this period Napoleon expressed his surprise at the energy and courage suddenly exhibited by the Turks, who had forced Sir John Duckworth to repass the Dardanelles.

TO PRINCE EUGENE.

“FINKENSTEIN, *4th April*, 1807.

“MY SON,—Send General Lauriston twenty-five gold and silver watches to be given to the Turks. Also send twenty-five to Marmont.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND.

“FINKENSTEIN, *4th April*, 1807.

“You say that you have 20,000 men with the grand army. You do not believe this yourself. You have only 10,000; and what men! You should make soldiers instead of marshals, knights, and counts. If you continue you will make me look ridiculous in Holland.

“You govern that country too much like a Capucin. The goodness of a king should be full of majesty. . . . A king orders, and asks nothing from any one. . . . When people say of a king that he is good, his reign is a failure.

. . . Your quarrels with the queen are known to the public. You should exhibit at home that paternal and effeminate character you show in your manner of governing. . . . You treat a young wife as you would command a regiment. Distrust the people by whom you are surrounded; they are nobles. . . . You have the best and most virtuous of wives, and you render her miserable. Allow her to dance as much as she likes, it is in keeping with her age. I have a wife who is forty years of age; from the field of battle I write to her to go to balls, and you wish a young woman of twenty to live in a cloister, or like a nurse always washing her children. . . . Render the mother of your children happy. You have only one way of doing so, by showing her esteem and confidence. Unfortunately you have a wife who is too virtuous: if you had a coquette she would lead you by the nose. But you have a proud wife, who is offended and grieved at the mere idea that you can have a bad opinion of her. You should have had a wife like some of those whom I know in Paris. She would have played you false, and you would have been at her feet. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

At the moment that Napoleon wrote this delectable epistle he was living in adultery himself, and, as we have seen, rendering his own wife (poor Hortense's mother) miserable.

TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

"FINKENSTEIN, 14th April, 1807.

"I must say that I was not pleased with the preamble of your order for suppressing the monasteries. With regard to all that concerns religion you must use the language of religion, and not that of philosophy. That is the great art of the person who governs. Why speak of the services rendered to art and science by monks. . . . One supports ill-treatment much more readily from a person who is of your way of thinking than from a person

who differs in opinion from you. Your preamble is philosophical, and an insult to the men you evict. You should have said that the great number of monks rendered their existence difficult, that it was necessary for their dignity that they should have enough to live upon, and hence reform was indispensable. . . . Men will support misfortune when it is not accompanied by insult, and when it is not apparent that the blow comes from an enemy to the cloth. Now the enemies of the monks are men of letters and philosophers. You know that I myself do not like them, for I have destroyed them everywhere

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. CAMBACÉRÈS.

"FINKENSTEIN, 18th April, 1807.

"No matter what pleasure it gives me to interest myself in all that concerns the welfare of my people, it would be going too far to mix myself up in theatrical squabbles. I therefore give you the exclusive supervision of the opera until my return. Maintain a severe discipline, and cause authority to be respected. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

"FINKENSTEIN, 18th April, 1807.

"I am delighted to hear nothing more of Madame de Stael. When I trouble myself about her it is when I have facts before me. That woman is a regular crow ; she thought that she saw the tempest coming. . . . Let her go to her Lake Lemman.

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. CAMBACÉRÈS.

"FINKENSTEIN, 29th April, 1807.

"There is nothing new here. The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia are with their army in the little town of Bartenstein. The siege of Dantzic is being pushed on vigorously.

"NAPOLEON."

All that Napoleon could obtain from Austria was an offer to mediate, and in April she interposed her good offices. But at Bartenstein the Czar and the King of Prussia decided upon the terms they alone would accept—the dissolution of the Confederacy of the Rhine; Prussian territory to be restored; a new Confederation to be formed under the auspices of Austria and Prussia. England and Sweden adhered to this convention, and the former promised to send 20,000 men to the Baltic to operate against the French flank and rear. A separate agreement was concluded between Prussia and England; the former was to restore Hanover, the latter to furnish a subsidy of 4,000,000*l.* Unfortunately the change in the policy of the English Government, due to the accession of Canning to office, came too late, and the consequences were terrible, as was soon afterwards seen.

On the 29th Napoleon wrote a letter to the King of Prussia rather vague in its character, and while breathing peace making no tangible proposals. In fact he was playing his old game of trying to sow discord in the camp of the enemy, and to gain time.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER.

“FINKENSTEIN, *1st May, 1807.*

“The aides-de-camp of Marshal Angereau, instead of remaining with the army, have followed him to Paris. Let me know to what corps they belong, for it is not my intention to allow them to remain in Paris.

“NAPOLEON.”

They might say more than was agreeable about Eylau.

TO THE EMPRESS.

“FINKENSTEIN, *2nd May, 1807.*

“MY FRIEND,—I see with pleasure that you are in good health, and that you are always fond of the

Malmaison. It is said that the arch-chancellor has fallen in love ; is this a joke, or is it true ? It greatly amuses me. . . .

“ NAPOLEON.”

TO M. CAMBACÉRÈS.

“ FINKENSTEIN, *3rd May*, 1807.

“ It seems to me that I wrote to the Princess Pauline that she might go to the waters. I only opposed this by way of advice, because I see that the doctors order waters when they want to get rid of their patients. . . .

“ NAPOLEON.”

A decree had given the Emperor the most extended authority over his family, and of this authority he made a most exorbitant use.

In a letter to Fouché, of the same day, the Emperor wrote :—

“ Marshal Angereau is surrounded by a lot of scamps, who spread bad news. Keep an eye upon them, and speak to the Marshal on the subject.” Also — “ The English are trifling with the Russians. While they are fighting on all sides to please them, the English undertake important expeditions on their own account. They have just taken Montevideo. England is therefore engaged in a war which will require a number of men. . . . ”

In a letter to brother Joseph, dated the 4th, the Emperor gave some family news. He said that he was satisfied with Prince Jerome, who had left the navy, had become a general of division, and had been actively employed during the campaign.

“ If I am not mistaken,” he added, “ there is the stuff in him for making a first-rate man. . . . He is adored in Silesia. I have given him an isolated command, for I do not believe in the proverb that, in order to know how to command, one must know how to obey.

"I am also pretty well satisfied with Louis, although his mind is too charitable, and this does not suit the dignity of the diadem. . . ."

TO M. CAMBACÉRÈS.

"FINKENSTEIN, 7th May, 1807.

"I do not approve of the resolutions which you have taken on the subject of the opera, because in the general orders drawn up by me during my absence I did not give you the right of adopting resolutions. . . .¹

"NAPOLEON."

TO THE EMPRESS.

"FINKENSTEIN, 10th May, 1807.

"I know nothing of the ladies who you say correspond with me. I love only my good, pouting, capricious Josephine, who knows how to pick a quarrel with such good grace, like all she does ; for she is always amiable, except when she is jealous, and then she is the very devil. But to return to those ladies. If I were to notice any of them I should like them to be rosebuds, and none of them fulfil that condition. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

On the same day the Emperor drew up several pages of instructions for General Gardane, who was ordered on a mission to Persia. He was to encourage the Shah to resist the Russians on one side, and the English on the other ; he was accompanied by artillery and engineer officers, who were to place the Persian army on a proper footing ; and he was to report on the best route which a French army, wishing to invade India, could follow.

"In the event of 20,000 Frenchmen marching upon India," he wrote, "it would be well to know how many Persian auxiliaries would join the army, the places for landing, the roads to follow, and the provisions and water

¹ *Vide* letter of the 18th.

necessary for the expedition. . . . General Gardane should also enter into communication with the Mahrattas in order to find out what support an expedition would receive in India."

General Gardane had hardly reached Teheran, when Napoleon had flung himself into the arms of Alexander, and consequently his mission was at an end as far as Russia was concerned.

TO THE EMPRESS, AT ST. CLOUD.

"FINKENSTEIN, 14th May, 1807.

"I can conceive all the grief which the death of the little Napoleon must cause you ; you can understand the pain it occasions me. I should like to be near you, so that you might be more moderate in your sorrow. You have had the good fortune never to lose a child ; but this is one of the conditions and penalties attached to human misery. Let me hear that you are reasonable and in good health. Would you augment my pain ?

"NAPOLEON."

The death of the "little Napoleon," or "M. Napoleon," as the Emperor liked to call him, was a terrible blow to a portion of the imperial family. Whatever may have been the truth concerning his birth, there can be no doubt that the Emperor treated him with an amount of affection which was not transferred to his brothers after his death. Then there was something suspicious in the grief of Josephine, who, when the sad intelligence reached her from the Hague, was at once convinced that nothing now stood between her and a divorce. Why should the Emperor not have been content to leave the Imperial crown to the second son of his brother Louis—Napoleon Louis ? It is a remarkable fact that the Emperor, after the death of the "little Napoleon," seemed to care little about him. He was no longer of any use. M. de Fontanes could

represent "the hero surrounded by the pomp of victory condescending to weep over a child ;" but, according to M. de Talleyrand, the hero was so far from weeping, that when the authorities of Warsaw came to condole with him on his loss, he (M. de Talleyrand) had to tell him to assume an air of sadness. Upon this, Napoleon replied that he had not time "to amuse" himself with feeling or regretting like other people.

He wrote several short notes to the Empress and to the Queen Hortense, telling them to bear up, to be gay, and to search distraction in Paris, and then he appeared rather tired of their tears.

Josephine guessed rightly that her doom was fixed, and that she would be divorced. Strange irony of fate that the next wearer of the imperial purple should have been Louis Napoleon, who was born about a year after the death of the little Napoleon, and who was undoubtedly the grandson of Josephine.

In a letter to Prince Eugene, dated the 18th, the Emperor said :—

"You can do what you think suitable with regard to the baptism of the Princess Josephine. I have read your letter to the Pope ; it appears to me to be very good ; but I doubt if it will produce an impression, as these fellows are incompetent beyond everything one can imagine."

There was more bickering with the Court of Rome, which would not confirm the bishops nominated by the Viceroy.

In a letter to Fouché, dated the 20th, Napoleon wrote :—

"There were things which did not please me at the sitting of the Academy, which was too political. It did not belong to the president of a learned body to speak about Mirabeau. If he spoke about him, he should have confined his remarks to his style, which alone concerned him. When shall we learn wisdom ? When shall we be

animated with true Christian charity? and when shall our actions have for object to give pain to and to humiliate no one? What is there in common between the Academy and politics? Nothing more than between the rules of grammar and the art of war."

At the reception of Cardinal Maury the Abbé Sicard had ventured to abuse Mirabeau *inde iræ*. Fouché was charged to set matters right, and to have some articles written in praise of the great orator.

On the 24th of May, Napoleon wrote to Fouché, saying:—

"The last news from the Mediterranean is that the English have not captured Alexandria, and that they have experienced a considerable check. If they take that city it will cost them a good deal of blood."

The English did take Alexandria, but afterwards evacuated it.

TO GENERAL CLARKE (*War Minister at Berlin*).

"FINKENSTEIN, 26th May, 1807.

"Dantzic has capitulated, and my troops have entered the place. Publish this news in the Berlin journals. Have a salute fired at Spandau and at other places. If you like you can have a *Te Deum* sung. Give this capture the greatest possible publicity.

"NAPOLEON."

Dantzic had made a gallant resistance, and was not to be erected into a free town, which was much the same as being taken into the bosom of the Confederation of the Rhine and becoming a French town.

TO M. DE LACÉPÈDE.

"FINKENSTEIN, 27th May, 1807.

"Write a letter to Corporal Bernandat of the 13th of the line not to drink more than is good for him. It appears that he received the cross for his gallantry. It must not

be taken away from him because he likes drinking. Give him to understand however that he is wrong to put himself in a state which degrades the decoration he wears.

“NAPOLEON.”

Had brother Louis written the above he would certainly have received a sharp reprimand for his leniency. The famous naturalist to whom this letter was addressed was Chancellor of the Legion of Honour.

On the 28th May the Emperor wrote a circular to the bishops, who were to return thanks to the Almighty for the capture of Dantzic. This circular concluded thus—“Let our people also pray that the cabinet which persecutes our holy religion, and also the eternal enemy of our nation, may cease to have any influence on the Continent, so that a solid and glorious peace, worthy of us and of our great people, may console humanity and allow us to give full career to all the plans we propose to undertake for the good of religion and for the welfare of our peoples.”

This circular was sent to the Kings of Naples and Holland, and to the Viceroy of Italy, for their bishops.

At 2 P.M. on the 5th June, Napoleon wrote to Bernadotte, saying—“Marshal Ney sends me word that he was attacked this morning at six o'clock. Is it an affair like yours, or is it a serious attack?” and “Although it is not probable that the enemy, after having allowed the capture of Dantzic, will undertake a serious affair; yet should he attempt anything it will be at Guttstadt.”

In fact, upon the 5th June the whole Russian army got into motion. Bernadotte was wounded with a spent bullet in the head and driven back. Ney too was surprised, and had Beningsen pressed the retiring columns with vigour, they must have been destroyed. The serious attack, as Napoleon predicted, was made at Guttstadt.

This advantage and some successful Cossack raids which highly irritated the Emperor, did not hinder Beningsen from falling back on the intrenched camp of Heilsberg.

Paris in the meantime was uneasy, and Cambacérès was ordered : "Should public impatience grow too strong you can insert some details in the *Journal de l'Empire* in the shape of a private letter written from Thorn or from Dantzic by an officer of the army."¹ To Fouché his Majesty wrote—"See the Empress often so as to hinder bad news from reaching her. A week after the reception of this letter all will be over."

TO THE EMPRESS.

"FRIEDLAND, 15th June, 1807.

"MY FRIEND,—I write you only a few words, for I am very tired : I have been bivouacking for several days. My children have worthily celebrated the anniversary of Marengo. The battle of Friedland will be just as celebrated and as glorious for my people. The whole Russian army routed, 80 guns captured, 30,000 men taken prisoners or killed, with twenty-five generals ; the Russian guard annihilated ; it is the worthy sister of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena. The bulletin will tell you the rest. My loss is not large. I successfully out-manceuvred the enemy. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

This battle, which was less sanguinary but more decisive than that of Eylau, exercised an enormous influence on the state of the Continent. The Russians, ill-commanded at the battle of Friedland, fought with a desperate courage against superior numbers in a way which excited general admiration. They lost 17,000 men killed or wounded, 5,000 of the latter remaining in the hands of the enemy. The French however captured only 500 unwounded men, 17 guns, and no colours. On their side the French lost 10,000 men and two eagles. The Russians too were allowed to retire to the left bank of the Alle without being molested. These facts show how dearly victory was

¹ *Vide* letter of 27th March to Fouché.

purchased. In fact, after Friedland as after Eylau, Napoleon appeared stunned by the resistance he had encountered.

TO M. CAMBACÉRÈS.

"TILSIT, 19th June, 1807.

"I hope that the campaign which has been finished in a week will give pleasure to my people. The Russian army was more crushed and beaten than ever the Austrians were.(?) Beningsen, who commanded them, displayed very little talent. Their soldiers in general are good. They are greatly weakened and discouraged. My army is superb, and has not suffered. I learn with pleasure that the conscription goes on well.

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. CAMBACÉRÈS.

"TILSIT, 22nd June, 1807.

"While waiting for St. Denis to be ready, have the body of the little Napoleon placed in a chapel at Notre Dame.¹

"NAPOLEON."

On the same day, in a Proclamation to the army, the Emperor said—"Frenchmen, you are worthy of yourselves and of me. You will return to France covered with laurels after having obtained a glorious and durable peace. It is in fact time that the country should live in repose protected from the malignant influence of England. My recompenses will prove to you my gratitude, and the extent of the love I bear you."

On the 22nd too an armistice was signed with Russia, and another was being discussed with Prussia.

¹ The remains of the "little Napoleon" were in due time transferred to St. Denis, but Louis XVIII. had them afterwards removed from that burial place of the French kings.

Several times in letters, bulletins and proclamations, Napoleon had announced the capture of 160,000 stand of arms at Kœnigsberg—arms sent by England to the allies.

TO GENERAL SAVARY.

“TILSIT, 25th June, 1807.

“Let me know if there are any muskets at Kœnigsberg. I was told that there were 160,000, and since then I hear nothing more about them. As I have announced this fact everywhere, I shall be very angry if I have been deceived.

“NAPOLEON.”

His Majesty was deceived, and has been accused of mendacity on this subject by several writers. For instance, Sir R. Wilson says—“This assertion is a falsehood of the most extravagant character.” The weapons in question had not arrived when Kœnigsberg fell.

TO THE EMPRESS.

“TILSIT, 25th June, 1807.

“MY FRIEND,—I have just seen the Emperor Alexander; I was well satisfied with him; he is a handsome, good, and youthful Emperor; he has more intelligence than is generally supposed. He is coming to stay at Tilsit to-morrow. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

“TILSIT, 25th June, 1807.

“I have just seen the Emperor of Russia in the middle of the Niemen on a raft where a handsome flag was hoisted. To-morrow the Emperor is going to present the King of Prussia to me, and is coming to reside here. To that effect I have neutralised the town of Tilsit. I wish you to arrive as speedily as possible. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

It was now that the celebrated Treaty of Tilsit was discussed and concluded by two monarchs who thought they could share the world between them.

The ostensible treaty of Tilsit produced these results. Prussia, which had acted towards Russia with a good faith which atoned for previous backslidings, abandoned by the Czar, lost half her territory. She was treated in a way to make her an irreconcilable enemy and a dangerous one. Dantzic was declared a free town. France retained possession of Magdeburg. Hesse Cassel and the Prussian possessions west of the Elbe went to form the kingdom of Westphalia which was given to Jerome Bonaparte. The King of Saxony was rewarded with the grand duchy of Warsaw or the Polish provinces, belonging to Prussia, with the exception of the province of Bialystock which went to the Czar. That Alexander should have accepted even so small a share of the territory torn from his ally was not to his credit. Finland was abandoned to the tender mercies of the Czar, and so were the Danubian principalities in return for the mouths of the Cattaro and those Ionian isles which Napoleon had once declared to be of more importance than the whole of Italy. In a letter to Marmont of the 8th of July, the Emperor mentioned his intention of letting Russia have Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bulgaria, of letting Austria take Servia, and of seizing upon Bosnia, Epirus, Albania and Thessaly, for himself. Six months previously he had written to Marmont to spare no assistance to his faithful allies the Turks; and at Posen he had openly declared that the full and complete independence of the Ottoman Empire was the object nearest to his heart, and that it was indispensable for the security of France and of Italy.

Napoleon flattered himself that he had fascinated the Czar, and had made him a firm friend if not a willing instrument. Prince Metternich, however, after a long conversation with Count Tolstoy, wrote home (12th November, 1807), that in his opinion the close friendship

existing between the cabinets of St. Petersburg and the Tuileries had been greatly exaggerated, and Lanfrey says that Napoleon went to Tilsit to deceive Alexander, and left it the dupe of his own avidity.

In addition to the ostensible there was the secret treaty of Tilsit. Count Miot de Melito, who was with King Joseph in Spain, gives the text of this treaty as published by order of the Cortes in 1812, being inclined to believe, from what afterwards happened, that it is in conformity with what was really agreed upon between Napoleon and Alexander. The articles ran thus :—

Art. 1. Russia to take possession of European Turkey, and to extend her conquests in Asia as far as she deems fit.

Art 2. The Bourbon dynasty in Spain, and the House of Braganza in Portugal, to cease to reign. A prince of the Bonaparte family to succeed to each throne.

Art. 3. The temporal power of the Pope to cease. Rome and its dependencies to be united to Italy.

Art. 4. Russia to aid France with her navy to take Gibraltar.

Art. 5. The French to take possession of Tunis, Algiers, &c.

Art. 6. France to possess Malta; no peace to be concluded with England until she yields up that island.

Art. 7. The French to occupy Egypt, &c. &c.

Art. 8. The navigation of the Mediterranean shall be permitted to French, Russian, Spanish, and Italian vessels only.

Art. 9. Denmark shall be indemnified by the Hanse towns, if *she consents to hand over her fleet to France*, &c.

In numerous letters we shall find Napoleon referring to points mentioned in this secret treaty which evidently reveals the objects of his policy,

TO M. DE CHAMPAGNY (*Foreign Minister*).

"TILSIT, 26th June, 1807.

"I have received your letter in which you give me an account of the way in which the Spaniards have been received at Bordeaux. Inform the Prefect of the Gironde of my satisfaction, for to bestow marks of consideration and interest on my allies is to be very agreeable to me.

"NAPOLEON."

No one then in France supposed that his Majesty nurtured any evil designs on Spain.

To Fouché, Napoleon wrote on the 30th—

"The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia are lodging here and dine every day with me. This makes me hope for a prompt termination of the war, a consummation devoutly to be wished for in the interest of my people.

"NAPOLEON."

That Napoleon did not dine at the table of the allied sovereigns is accounted for by the fact that he was afraid of being poisoned.

On the same day the Emperor drew up a table of the various estates at his disposal in Poland! The total value of these estates was set down at 26,582,652 francs, or over a million sterling. The share accorded to Davoust amounted to nearly 20,000*l.*, Lannes received over 10,000*l.*, while Bertrand, Bessières, Berthier, Soult and Victor, received over 4,000*l.* each. Bernadotte, Massena, Grouchy, Ney, and other officers, had their reward.

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

"TILSIT, 3rd July, 1807.

"M. de Turenne will hand you this letter, and acquaint you with details. See that nothing more be said against

Russia, either directly or indirectly. Everything leads to the belief that our system is about to be connected with that power in a stable manner.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE EMPRESS.

“TILSIT, 6th July, 1807.

“I see with pain that you are an egotist, and that the success of my arms has no attraction for you.

“The handsome Queen of Prussia is to come to dine with me to-day.

“I am in good health, and greatly wish to see you when destiny permits it. The probability is that this will not be long. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE EMPRESS.

“TILSIT, 7th July, 1807.

“MY FRIEND,—The Queen of Prussia dined with me yesterday. I had to defend myself against being obliged to make some further concessions to her husband ; I was *galant*, but adhered to my policy. The Queen is very amiable. . . . When you read this letter peace will have been concluded with Russia and Prussia, and Jerome recognised as King of Westphalia. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE EMPRESS.

“TILSIT, 8th July, 1807.

“The Queen of Prussia is really charming ; she is full of *coquetterie* towards me. But do not be jealous ; I am an oilcloth off which all that runs. It would cost me too dear to play the *galant*.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

"TILSIT, 9th July, 1807.

"Commandant Guilleminot must repair to the headquarters of General Michelson [commanding the Russian forces in the principalities]. Thence he must go to the Grand Vizir, inform him that peace has been concluded, and acquaint him with the articles of the treaty concerning the Porte. . . .

"Commandant Guilleminot must afterwards go to Constantinople and take a letter in cipher to Sebastiani. You will let my ambassador know that my system with regard to the Porte is shaky and on the point of changing; that I am not decided, however; that the greatest friendship exists between me and Russia; that the Emperor Alexander has passed twenty days here, and that I hope our union will be lasting; that, on the other hand, the fate of the Sultan Selim touched my heart,¹ and that the little respect shown to my ambassador and to my troops was much felt by me. . . . Sebastiani must make known, if possible, the interest which I take in Selim, *but he must do this in a manner so as not to accelerate his death*. He must declare that it is ridiculous that the Emperor Mustapha should not have written to me, to me who alone have protected his empire. . . . I still remain the friend of the Porte; but I have become once more the friend of Russia. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

"KÖNIGSBERG, 10th July, 1807.

"I arrived here this morning at three o'clock. I am staying in an old castle which was the cradle of the Prussian monarchy. Peace has been signed and ratified,

¹ Poor Selim had been dethroned, and his nephew, Mustapha, now ruled in his stead.

and everything is going on well. That arch madman, the King of Sweden, has seized this opportunity to denounce the armistice. It is a pity they cannot put the fellow in a lunatic asylum.

“NAPOLEON.”

Sweden declared war when it was too late, and the consequence of his rash if gallant act was the loss of Finland.

TO THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

“KÖNIGSBERG, 13th July, 1807.

“SIR, MY BROTHER,—Desirous of placing near your Majesty some one who will be able to express to you *viva voce* the sentiments with which you have inspired me, I send you my aide-de-camp, the General of Division, Savary, whom I have appointed ambassador to your court. I beg your Majesty to receive him with that kindness which is peculiar to you. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

Savary, who must have reminded the Czar painfully of Austerlitz and of the violent death of the Duc d'Enghien.

TO THE EMPRESS.

“DRESDEN, 18th July, 1807.

“MY FRIEND,—I arrived here yesterday quite well, although I remained a hundred hours in my carriage without leaving it. I am staying with the King of Saxony, with whom I am highly satisfied. I am then half way home, and I warn you that I shall tumble down on St. Cloud one of these fine nights like a jealous fellow. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

"DRESDEN, 19th July, 1807.

". . . The day after your arrival in Paris you must inform the Minister of Portugal that by the 1st September the ports of that country must be closed to England; in default of which I shall declare war against Portugal, and confiscate the English merchandise. . . . The same day send a despatch to my ambassador at Madrid, so that he may see the Prince of the Peace, and conclude a convention for the closing of the Portuguese ports. In default of this the Ministers of France and of Spain will leave Lisbon, and the two Powers will declare war against Portugal: an army of 20,000 Frenchmen will march to Bayonne on the 1st September to join a Spanish army and to conquer Portugal. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

In a despatch of the 16th October, Prince Metternich gives a description of the violent language addressed to various ambassadors. To M. de Lina Napoleon said: "It Portugal does not do what I wish, the House of Braganza will not reign for two months. I shall not tolerate a single English envoy in Europe; I shall declare war against any Power that has one in two months from this. I have 300,000 Russians at my disposal.¹ . . ."

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

"DRESDEN, 22nd July, 1807.

"Write to M. Alquier to present a note in which he will insist on the number of French cardinals being

¹ *Vide* thirty-fourth bulletin. "The Russians ill-treat the poor as well as the rich. They plunder, burn villages, and massacre—these are their amusements. The battle of Austerlitz was a European victory, because it destroyed the *prestige* attached to the name of these barbarians." In the twenty-fifth bulletin Napoleon, after giving an account of the atrocities committed by the Russians in Austria (a friendly country), added—"No doubt this is the last time that any European Government will call in such fatal aid."

proportionate to the number of Roman cardinals, and the number of German and Spanish cardinals, in proportion to the population of each country; for it is not proper that the Church of France, that an empire so large and powerful, should be without organs in the consistory. He must add that it is high time to finish all these little quarrels, and that I am highly indignant and irritated at the threat of excommunicating me, and of declaring that I have forfeited the throne; it only remains for them to shut me up in a monastery, and to have me whipped like Louis le Débonnaire. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

The Emperor also wrote a letter of several pages to the Viceroy of Italy, which was to be forwarded to the Pope, and in which such passages as these are to be found: “Does the Pope think that the rights of the throne are less sacred in the eyes of God than those of the tiara? . . . They wish to denounce me to Christendom! The madmen! This ridiculous idea can only arise from a profound ignorance of the age in which we live. The Pope who takes such a step will cease to be a Pope in my eyes. I shall consider him as an Antichrist. . . . If this were done I would separate my people from all communion with Rome, and I would establish my police there. . . . What does Pius VII. wish to gain by denouncing me? Lay my thrones under interdict and excommunicate me? Does he think that the arms will fall from the hands of my soldiers? Does he wish to put a poniard in the hands of my people to assassinate me? Infuriated Popes have preached this infamous doctrine. . . . The present Pope is too powerful; priests are not made to govern; let them imitate St. Peter, St. Paul, and the Apostles, who are well worth a Julius, a Gregory, a Leo. Jesus Christ said that His kingdom was not of this world. Why does the Pope object to render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s? . . . I begin to blush and to feel humiliated at all the follies which the Court of

Rome makes me endure, and perhaps the time is not far distant when I shall recognise the Pope only as Bishop of Rome, and equal in rank to the bishops of my states. I shall not fear to assemble the Gallican, Italian, German, and Polish Churches in council to do my work without a Pope, and to protect my people against the pretensions of the priests of Rome."

TO MARSHAL BERNADOTTE.

"ST. CLOUD, *2nd August*, 1807.

". . . If England refuses to accept the Russian mediation, Denmark must declare war against her, or I must declare war against Denmark. In the latter case your duty will be to seize on the whole Danish continent. . . . You must make a great fuss about Denmark having opened the passage of the Sund, and having allowed the sea to be violated, which, for the Danes (!), ought to be as inviolable as their own territory. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

Marshal Bernadotte had been appointed Governor of the Hanse towns.

The above letter proves that England was quite right to anticipate his Majesty in this matter.

TO PRINCE EUGENE.

"ST. CLOUD, *4th August*, 1807]

"I do not know what rash act you suppose the Pope to be capable of committing. You should have sent some troops in the direction of Bologna, and if he commits an imprudence it will be a fine opportunity for depriving him of the Roman States.

"NAPOLEON."

On the 5th the Emperor wrote to his brother the King of Wirtemberg demanding the hand of the Princess Catherine for his "very dear brother Jerome Napoleon."

It will be remembered that one of the grounds upon which Napoleon had asked the Pope to annul the marriage of Jerome with Miss Patterson was that she was a Protestant, and now his Majesty was going to marry his brother to a Protestant princess. The Princess Catherine was at first very much opposed to the match, both because Jerome was a Catholic, and because she had heard sad tales of French profligacy ; then she was engaged to be married to the Hereditary Grand Duke of Baden, who was both a German and a Protestant.

Ever since the Miss Patterson affair the Emperor and the Pope had been on the worst possible terms. The Pontiff had revenged himself for a series of acts of usurpation and violence by refusing to break the matrimonial chain of Jerome, and it was not with impunity that any one thwarted the plans of the Emperor. Both Napoleon and Pius VII. behaved with bad faith in this matter. The former had assured the Pope that the marriage ceremony had been performed by an obscure Spanish Priest, whereas it had been solemnised by the Catholic Primate of the United States ; and he otherwise misrepresented the matter, adding that it was in the interest of religion that he should not have a Protestant woman about him whose children might one day inherit the French throne. On his side the Pope, after himself carefully examining the affair, declared that he could discover no cause of nullity. He pointed out that the plea of seduction which had been urged was inconsistent with the plea that the marriage had been performed without the consent of Jerome's mother, for it showed that there had been mutual consent. As for the difference of religion, the Pope remarked that this furnished a case of nullity only in marriages contracted between Catholics and infidels. At one moment, he wrote, he had hoped to be able, with a clear conscience, to conform to the wishes of his Majesty, for a canonical cause of nullity might be deduced from the clandestine manner in which the marriage had been performed. This was contrary to the Council of

Trent, but unfortunately this blemish could be invoked only in those countries where the decrees of the said Council had been published, and in spite of the most minuté search he could not discover that they had been published at Baltimore. In spite of his ardent desire to be agreeable to his Majesty he could not render himself guilty of an abominable abuse before the throne of the Almighty. That Napoleon had some reason to complain that the objections raised by the Pope were frivolous is proved by the fact that Pius VII. afterwards dissolved the marriage of the Duc de Berri with Miss Amy Brown, performed in 1806 in England, where the decrees of the Council of Trent have never been published, and this on the demand of Louis XVIII., whose first act on his restoration was to abolish the law of divorce! There was so little ground for annulling the latter marriage that the daughters of the duke and of *Madame Brown* were made countesses by the king, and were declared to be legitimate by Pius VII.! Again, the French Cardinal de Belloy had no hesitation in declaring Jerome's first marriage invalid, and the marriage ceremony with Catherine of Wirtemberg was performed by the Prince Primate of the Confederation of the Rhine.

TO M. GAUDIN.

"ST. CLOUD, 8th August, 1807.

"I am proprietor, in the duchy of Warsaw, of all the debts due to the King of Prussia by private individuals. These debts are due for money advanced to proprietors on the security of their land. They appear to amount to a sum of 60,000,000 francs. . . .¹

"NAPOLEON."

¹ The requisitions during the war were enormous. According to official documents, signed by Daru, Germany had to pay 24,200,000*l.*; Italy a tribute of 1,200,000*l.*; Spain, 2,880,000*l.*; Portugal, 640,000*l.*; Austria (arrears), 2,000,000*l.* Total, 30,920,000*l.* Hanover, too, had to pay over 90,000*l.* The Prussians say that Germany had to pay not 24,200,000*l.* but 29,590,000*l.*, and also to hand over a number of

TO VICE-ADMIRAL DECRÈS.

"ST. CLOUD, 10th August, 1807.

"You should give orders in all my ports, without laying an *embargo* upon Portuguese vessels, that none should be allowed to sail, so that in the event of war with that Power I may be able to seize on all its ships in my ports. Let me know the number of Danish vessels in my ports.

"NAPOLEON."

And yet the French Emperor was never weary of protesting against the intolerable tyranny of England on the ocean!

TO VICE-ADMIRAL DECRÈS.

"ST. CLOUD, 12th August, 1807.

"It appears that a great number of English speculators have sent merchandise to Montevideo. There is no market for these goods, but if there be it is probable that the ships will return laden with the produce of the country. I am of opinion that eight or ten frigates sent out to the 'rear' of Montevideo would do a good business. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

On the opening of the Legislative Body on the 16th of August Napoleon gave an account of his stewardship. He

works of art. Then we find Hamburg and the Hanse towns called upon to furnish 200,000 pairs of shoes, 50,000 great coats, 37,000 vests, and 16,000 coats. The Hanse towns could not possibly supply these effects, and consequently Bourienne, who had been appointed governor, had to contract for them with English houses, and when the Grand Army took the field in June it fought under the eyes of Napoleon, and in spite of the Continental blockade, in uniforms imported from Leeds and Halifax!

Lanfrey sets down the value of the domains upon which Napoleon seized in Italy, Poland, Hanover, and Westphalia, at 10,000,000*l*.

As for the town of Hamburg, it had not finished paying off its liabilities when the Franco-German war broke out in 1870.

said—"Since your last session new wars, new triumphs, and new treaties of peace have changed the political aspect of Europe" . . . "In all I have done I have had in view solely the welfare of my people, which is dearer to me than my glory. I desire a maritime peace. No feeling of resentment shall influence my determinations; I can have none against a nation, the plaything and the victim of the parties by which it is torn. . . . But no matter what issue the decrees of Providence may have assigned to the maritime war, my people will find me always the same, and I shall find my people always worthy of me." And then, carried away by their attitude while he was more than 500 leagues from Paris, he said—"You are a good and a great people."

TO VICE-ADMIRAL DECRÈS.

"PARIS, 21st August, 1807.

"Denmark has declared war against England. Send a courier to Toulon and to Genoa, so that the Danish ships may be detained in those ports lest they should fall into the hands of the English.

"NAPOLEON."

TO GENERAL SAVARY.

"ST. CLOUD, 26th August, 1807.

"The English have disembarked at Copenhagen. They are bombarding that town. My opinion is that Russia should march an army against Sweden to force her to take part with Denmark. The Emperor Alexander has only to say what he desires and I will do all that is necessary. I have a considerable army at Hamburg. I also think that if the English go on in this way it will be necessary to close all the ports of Europe to them, even those of Austria, to drive all the English ambassadors from the Continent, and to have all private individuals arrested. If the Emperor be of this opinion we will make a joint declaration to Austria, which will be obliged to submit.

"NAPOLEON."

TO CHARLES IV., KING OF SPAIN.

“RAMBOUILLET, 8th *September*, 1807.

“SIR, MY BROTHER,—The choice of the Duke of Frias as extraordinary ambassador can be only agreeable to me since he possesses your confidence. I receive with pleasure the congratulations which your Majesty has charged him to offer for the success with which it has pleased Providence to bless my arms in the common cause. Your Majesty who has behaved upon this occasion as a faithful ally will second me, with still more zeal, in the present matter which is of peculiar interest to you. . . . Above all Portugal must be wrested from the influence of England, so as to oblige this latter Power to sue for peace. “NAPOLEON.”

The Minister of War having submitted to the Emperor an application on the part of the Prince of Hohenzollern, who commanded a Westphalian regiment, for an extension of leave—

DECISION.

“RAMBOUILLET, 11th *September*, 1807.

“General Clarke will tell this officer to study his manœuvres, as it is my intention to make him take the command at an early date, and he will draw down upon himself an affront if he does not know his duty.

“NAPOLEON.”

On the 16th of September Napoleon announced to Savary that the Porte had accepted his mediation, and that “the English ‘breathe the devil’ on the Continent. They say that the Emperor of Russia is going to be assassinated. They kill me with all kinds of maladies. They are going to declare war with Austria.” On the same day his Majesty wrote to the Czar thanking him for some furs, sending him some Sèvres china, and saying that the moment was not far distant when England would be driven from the whole Continent.

TO M. DE CHAMPAGNY.

“FONTAINEBLEAU, 22nd September, 1807.

“M. de Lima (Portuguese ambassador) went yesterday to see the Grand Duke of Berg (Murat) without having been presented to that prince, which was his duty, for three reasons—because he is my brother-in-law, because he is grand admiral, and because he is a reigning prince. Inform him of my displeasure. M. de Metternich had the good sense to have himself presented the evening before.

“In concert with M. de Ségur, you must write me a report as to the way in which ministers and ambassadors should be received. . . . I desire that everything may be arranged before Friday, so that on the arrival of the Russian ambassador he may find everything settled. It will be well for you to enlighten me as to what was the practice at Versailles and what is done at Vienna and St. Petersburg. Once my regulations adopted, every one must conform to them. I am master to establish what rules I like in France . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

The etiquette of the new Imperial court soon became more severe than that of Versailles or Vienna, for the vigilant eye of Napoleon allowed not the slightest transgression to pass with impunity.

On the 23rd September, Napoleon sent Marshal Berthier, Prince of Neufchâtel, a list of the various sums destined to reward the commanding officers of the Grand Army. Berthier himself was to have 40,000*l.*; Marshals Ney, Davoust, Soult, and Bessières, 24,000*l.* each; Marshals Massena, Angereau, Bernadotte, Mortier, and Victor, 16,000*l.* each. Then come twenty-five generals, who were to receive 8,000*l.* each. M. de Ségur, too, was to have 8,000*l.* for teaching etiquette; and Senator Beauharnais, brother to Josephine's first husband and now ambassador

at Madrid, also 8,000*l.* The marshals who had no houses in Paris were each to purchase one.

A note in the handwriting of the Emperor showed it to be his intention that thirty dukes should be established in Paris, each with at least 4,000*l.* a year, to shed lustre on the throne ; also sixty counts with 2,000*l.* a year, and 400 barons with at least 200*l.* a year. The dukes and the counts were to receive money to purchase residences.

As has been remarked, Napoleon did not bestow his gifts, he sold them.

TO THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHÂTEL.

“ FONTAINEBLEAU, 24th September, 1807.

“ Write to Marshal Victor to inform General Blucher that if he makes any preparations for war, and if he does not cease his bragging, he will send troops to besiege him in Kolberg ; that this is the formal order of the Emperor, who is tired of the Prussian *fanfaronnades*.

“ NAPOLEON.”

TO GENERAL DUROC.

“ FONTAINEBLEAU, 25th September, 1807.

“ Send for M. Izquierdo to-morrow, and confer with him about the money which the King of Spain owes me, the affairs of Portugal, and those of Etruria. . . . As for Portugal, I shall make no difficulty in giving the King of Spain a suzerainty over that country, and even in detaching a portion of it for the Queen of Etruria and for the Prince of the Peace.

“ As for the affairs of Etruria, you will inform him that it is very difficult that a branch of the house of Spain should continue to remain established in the middle of Italy ; that this offers me great difficulties now that all Italy belongs to me. . . .

“ NAPOLEON.”

It was Napoleon who himself had established the house of Spain in Etruria, in exchange for Louisiana. But we shall refer again to this matter when we come to the treaty of Bayonne.

TO GENERAL SAVARY (*on a Mission at St. Petersburg*).

“FONTAINEBLEAU, 28th September, 1807.

“I did not know that you were so *galant* as you have become. All the fashions for your pretty Russian ladies shall be forwarded. I will pay the expenses myself. You must present them, saying that having, by chance, opened the despatch in which you asked for them, I wished to make the selection myself. You know that I understand toilette very well. Talleyrand will send actors and actresses.

“I am very displeased with the Prussians; there is no doing anything with them; they are as stupid as ever.

“Do not alarm the Emperor Alexander uselessly. Surrounded as he is by the love of his subjects, he has nothing to fear, if he will only show a little vigour.¹

“I am waiting for M. de Tolstói, and I shall receive him, not as an ambassador, but as a man honoured by the peculiar friendship of the Czar. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

On the same day, in a letter to the Emperor Alexander, Napoleon said: “Your Majesty will be much afflicted by what is passing at Copenhagen. It appears to me that it would be easy to drive the English from the entire Continent: a joint declaration would do that.”

¹ It was feared that Alexander would share the fate of Paul, and for similar reasons. “When he was crowned,” says Lardner, in his *History of Russia* (vol. iii. p. 261), “a woman of rank remarked on the occasion of the ceremony that—‘the young Emperor walked, preceded by the assassins of his grandfather, followed by those of his father, and surrounded by his own.’”

In numerous letters Napoleon referred to English merchandise, which, in spite of the stringency of his orders, appeared to penetrate everywhere, even into his own palace. To Prince Eugene he wrote: "A great quantity of English merchandise passes through Italy under false seals." The viceroy was to see to this. To King Louis the Emperor wrote: "Your intentions with regard to hindering communications between Holland and England are not carried out. . . . At the last fair at Rotterdam all the shops were filled with English goods. . . . The Dutch have no right to trade with England." "Let the merchants cry out; do you think those of Bordeaux don't bellow?" And to M. Gaudin his Majesty wrote: "I learn that the director of the customs allows prohibited goods to enter on the pretext that they belong to the Empress. . . . Make me a report upon this. . . . When laws weigh upon society every one must set an example."

TO EUGENE NAPOLEON, *Viceroy of Italy*.

"FONTAINEBLEAU, 1st October, 1807.

"The Empress has made a present of a garland of hortensias to the Vicereine of Italy. I wish, without letting the princess know anything of the matter, that you would have it valued by some good jeweller and let me know the result, so that I may see to what extent these gentlemen rob me.

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. DE CHAMPAGNY.

"FONTAINEBLEAU, 7th October, 1807.

"Inform M. de Beauharnais that I saw with regret his despatch relative to his communications with the agents of the Prince Royal (Prince of Asturias); that it seemed to me wretched; that these intrigues are unworthy of my ambassadors. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

It will be afterwards seen that the Emperor himself was at the bottom of this intrigue, which led to the war with Spain, and which was one of the most infamous transactions of his reign.

TO GENERAL CLARKE.

"FONTAINEBLEAU, 12th October, 1807.

"Send an extraordinary courier to General Junot, ordering him twenty-four hours after its reception to enter Spain with his army, and to march upon Portugal. Tell him that my ambassador has left Lisbon, and that therefore not a moment is to be lost in order to be beforehand with the English.

"NAPOLEON."

TO CHARLES IV., KING OF SPAIN.

"FONTAINEBLEAU, 12th October, 1807.

"SIR, MY BROTHER,—When Holland, the Princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, your Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, and myself, have united to drive the English from the Continent and to reap vengeance for the new crime committed against Denmark, Portugal offers for the last sixteen years the scandalous example of a power sold to England.¹ . . . The port of Lisbon has been a mine of inexhaustible treasure. . . . It is time to close Oporto and Lisbon to them. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

And the king was called upon to co-operate with Junot, who would reach Burgos by the 1st November.

On the 13th October, writing to Davoust, who had been left in command of the Grand Army at Warsaw, Napoleon said: "The rumours of war with Austria are absurd. You should always hold the most pacific language. The word

¹ Portugal had paid France 640,000*l.* for the privilege of keeping her ports open and remaining neutral! The treaty to this effect was concluded between the two countries on the 19th March, 1804. The sole offence of Portugal was wishing to adhere to this bargain.

war should never pass your lips. You should receive the Austrian officers well."

And the next day, writing to Savary, his Majesty said, "England has made no propositions, either directly or indirectly. Everything leads to the belief that her intention is to continue the war. Our first operation, after Lord Gower has been driven from St. Petersburg, should be to drive the English minister from Vienna. . . . I am pleased to see that the Emperor has marched his army into Finland. Sweden must be forced to close her ports, and to declare war against England."

The fact is, that as Napoleon never forgot the Portuguese frigates which helped to blockade him in Egypt, as he never forgot nor forgave the conduct of Spain just before Jena, nor the conduct of Prussia before Austerlitz; so with Austria; he had already made up his mind to punish her for refusing his alliance before the battle of Friedland.

On the 16th of October the celebrated military historian Jomini, having complained that after having served on the Emperor's staff during the late campaign, his name had been struck off the staff by Berthier, Napoleon decided that Jomini should be attached to Marshal Ney's staff.

His Majesty afterwards created Jomini a baron, but refused him military promotion, in spite of his eminent services in the field and his military writings. The consequence was that Jomini offered his services to the Czar, but he had hardly taken up his quarters at St. Petersburg, when he was summoned to Paris by Napoleon, and offered to choose between a dungeon at Vincennes and the rank of general. Jomini accepted the latter alternative, and served once more for a time in the French army.

TO GENERAL JUNOT.

"FONTAINEBLEAU, 17th October, 1807.

". . . . Send me a description of the provinces through which you pass, the roads and the nature of the ground.

Send me sketches. Let the officers of engineers perform this work, which is important. Let me see the distance of the villages, the nature of the country, and its resources. Do not leave your army—first, because a general should never leave his army; afterwards, because he is great only with his army, and he is small at court.

“I have just learned that Portugal has declared war against England; that is not sufficient; continue your march. I have reason to believe that there is an understanding with England, so as to give the British troops time to arrive from Copenhagen. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

The above letter sufficiently shows the intentions of Napoleon towards Spain, and that he was determined to seize upon Portugal, no matter what happened. Portugal had been called upon to close her ports to England, to declare war against England, to detain all Englishmen in Portugal, and to confiscate all British property. The Prince Regent reluctantly consented to the three first demands, but having opposed the last as contrary to his honour, Napoleon at once withdrew his ambassador.

On the 23rd October, the treaty of Fontainebleau was drawn up between France and Spain for the partition of Poland, and this was followed on the 27th by a secret convention, and a convention relative to the occupation of Portugal, or rather of a portion of that country. For a second time Charles IV. became a consenting party to the spoliation of his unoffending neighbour. He had his reward.

On the 31st the Emperor wrote a series of instructions to Junot, among which one finds the following paragraph:—“I have already informed you that in authorising you to enter the country as an auxiliary, it was to enable you to render yourself master of the fleet, but that my mind was decidedly made up to seize upon Portugal.”

None of the fortresses were to be confided to the Spanish allies.

TO M. DE LACÉPÈDE.

"FONTAINEBLEAU, 31st October, 1807.

"You will receive a decree nominating the sire Durandeu, commandant of the National Guard of Viteaux, member of the Legion of Honour, in consequence of his courageous conduct in arresting the brigands who robbed Madame Grassini. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

The fact is that Madame Grassini, upon whom the brigands had fallen, was a lady whose beauty and whose vocal talent had some years before conquered the heart of the First Consul. A liaison ensued, which lasted for a year. Bourrienne, in his *Memoirs*, says that in 1815 this lady's good graces were sought by the Duke of Wellington in order that he might resemble General Bonaparte in something!

On the 1st November Napoleon wrote to M. Cretet, Minister of the Interior, on the subject of public works at Ajaccio. In this letter he said—"The Neapolitan galley slaves and the blacks who are in Corsica commit highway robberies because they are not employed. The King of Naples has 4,000 more galley slaves whom I cannot admit into France, much less into Italy, where they cause trouble. The real place for them is Corsica," which island had long been considered a *refugium peccatorum*. Seneca described its inhabitants as robbers, liars, and atheists; and Napoleon, who knew his countrymen, probably thought a few more galley slaves would not hurt. The French themselves felt very sore on the subject of the colony which the Romans would not keep having furnished them with a master.

TO GENERAL SAVARY.

"FONTAINEBLEAU, 1st November, 1807.

"As for our affairs they are of three kinds—1st, to make war against England; 2nd, to oblige Austria and

Sweden to declare against England; 3rd, to settle the affairs of the Porte. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

In the same letter Napoleon consented to receive Russian naval cadets in his ports, and to let the Czar have 50,000 stand of arms, for he had a million in his own arsenals, and there was no sacrifice which he would not make to be agreeable to the Emperor Alexander. He also said that he had purchased the hotel of the Princess Caroline, his sister, and that he offered it as a gift to the Czar for his ambassadors, and further that he had decided upon sending Caulaincourt to St. Petersburg as his Extraordinary Ambassador, with a salary of 24,000*l.* a year, “which, joined to what he has, will allow him to cut a suitable figure.”

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

“FONTAINEBLEAU, 5th November, 1807.

“For the last fortnight you commit nothing but follies; it is time to put an end to them, and to cease meddling directly or indirectly in matters which do not concern you. Such is my will.

“NAPOLEON.”

An interesting despatch is to be found on this subject in Prince Metternich's *Memoirs* :—

METTERNICH TO STADION.

“PARIS, 30th November, 1807.

After referring to the rumours of a repudiation of Josephine, the Austrian ambassador went on to say—“The Minister of Police went to see the Empress the other day at Fontainebleau, and told her that the public welfare, and above all the consolidation of the present dynasty, required that the Emperor should have children, and that she ought to ask the Senate to join with her in

supporting a demand which would be most painful to the Emperor. The Empress, prepared for this question, asked Fouché if he had received the orders of the Emperor on the subject of the step he had taken. 'No,' he replied, 'I speak to your Majesty as a minister, as a private individual, and as a subject attached to the glory of the country.' 'I have no account to render you,' interrupted the Empress; 'I look upon my union with the Emperor as traced in the book of destiny. . . .'

"Several days elapsed without anything occurring between the imperial couple, when suddenly the Emperor once more shared the apartment of his wife, and asked her the reason of her sadness. The Empress then related the conversation she had had with Fouché. The Emperor declared that he had never charged his minister with such a mission. He added that she ought to know him well enough to be sure that he required no intermediary to arrange matters with her.

"A short time afterwards Fouché reiterated his demand in a long letter which is said to have been a masterpiece of eloquence, power, and reason. Josephine went at once to the Emperor, who received her very coldly, and who, after many complaints and reproaches concerning her susceptibility and her jealousy, repeated what he had told her before. He promised her that he 'would wash Fouché's head.'

"His Majesty set out for Italy. The public continued to busy itself with rumours which no one contradicted, when on the 23rd the Government Commissioner of the bank assembled the merchants at the Bourse to tell them that he had been directed by the Minister of Police to contradict the rumours of a divorce."

Prince Metternich went on to say that no minister would have dared to act as Fouché had done without the orders of the Emperor, and that a petition was about to be addressed to the chief of the State, asking him to insure

the succession in a direct line. . . . "It is urgent," he added, "to know upon what princess the choice of the Emperor will fall." Referring to the rumour of a matrimonial alliance with the Czar, Prince Metternich said that clearly the question of such an alliance had been discussed between the two sovereigns at Tilsit, that General Caulincourt had been directed to make a formal demand, and that if Alexander refused his sister, complications would at once arise, the extent of which it would be impossible to determine.

As we shall see, very serious complications did grow out of this matter, such as the march to Moscow and back.

In a long letter to Savary, dated the 7th, the Emperor gave an account of the brilliant way in which the new Russian ambassador had been received and which had caused great jealousy. "It was agreed," wrote Napoleon, "that he should write to Prince Kourakine, and that I should hand him the draught of a note in order to decide the court of Vienna to declare war against England. I spoke to him frankly on the subject of the affairs of Turkey, giving him to understand that anything which could draw closer our bonds would suit me; that the world was large enough for two powers. . . . M. de Tolstor spoke to me a good deal about evacuating Prussia; I said that would soon be done. I added that Russia no doubt intended to keep Wallachia and Moldavia, in which case it was only fair that, by way of compensation, I should keep some provinces of Prussia; that if Russia had more extended ideas on the subject of Turkey M. de Romanzoff should send him more precise instructions; that, as for me, I wished to do all that could tighten our bonds."

In a postscript the Emperor added:—"The courier from Vienna has just arrived. The Emperor of Austria has decided upon declaring war against England unless she puts things back in the state she found them at Copenhagen. It would be shameful for Russia, after an event

which so intimately concerns her, to remain behindhand. But I hope that Lord Gower has already been dismissed."

On the 8th of November a letter was written to Junot to say Portugal had consented to close her ports to England, but for all this he was not to delay his march upon Lisbon for a single day. If the Prince Regent wished to live in peace with France he was to send a plenipotentiary to Paris, but in the meantime Junot was to seize on the fleet and the arsenals.

TO EUGENE NAPOLEON.

"FONTAINEBLEAU, 11th November, 1807.

"Marescalchi will communicate to you the treaty which I have concluded with Spain; *you will see that Tuscany belongs to me.* My intention is to unite it to Italy. I think that I have troops enough at Leghorn to accomplish this. But you must prepare, in secret, the necessary measures.

"NAPOLEON."

The Princess of Lucca (sister Eliza) having submitted some new coins for her principality to the Emperor with his superscription *Napoleone protège l'Italia* :

DECISION.

"FONTAINEBLEAU, 11th November, 1807.

"This type is not suitable; what it is wished to put in place of *Dieu protège la France* is indecent.

"NAPOLEON."

Napoleon meant to say that this little bit of flattery on the part of his sister was blasphemous, but there was surely more blasphemy in connecting the name of the Almighty in any way with his usurpations. The idea of the Princess of Lucca was to render to Cæsar the things that were Cæsar's.

In a letter to Junot dated the 12th occur such paragraphs as these :—

“It is for you to set an example of disinterestedness. See above all that the army is paid. What is derived from captures, from jewels, and from English merchandise shall be half for the privy purse and half for the army ; and, in this half, the generals and the chiefs will have no reason to complain of their treatment.

“The English goods must be seized and Englishmen arrested and sent to France ; all English property, even funded, such as houses, vineyards, &c., must be sequestered in my name.

“I enjoin you once more to behave well, and as I would do myself, and to give an example of the greatest purity ; it is much better to have a fortune nobly acquired, that you are not ashamed of, and which you have received from my hands, than an illegitimate fortune. It being probable that the military glory which you will reap in Portugal will not be great, you must therefore acquire that of an upright and irreproachable administrator.

“The chief of your staff is an individual who is not over delicate ; he took a great deal of money at Fulda. . . .

“Have all the precious articles you take packed in boxes and sent to the Sinking Fund Office. . . .”

There is something at once lugubrious and grotesque in this way of crying halves with Junot who was about to let loose his soldiery on an unfortunate country which had committed no crime beyond remaining on friendly relations with England. It is pretty well known what attention Junot paid to the advice of the arch plunderer, with whose purity no one was better acquainted than the commander-in-chief of the army of Portugal.

Lord Londonderry, in his story of the Peninsular War, says that the Portuguese had to pay £4,000,000 for the protection of their private property. “Such were the orders of Napoleon.” The consequences, or some of them, were, that “the peasantry, heart-broken and desperate, refused

to sow their fields, and the higher classes, whose usual place of residence was Lisbon, fled from their homes, till the city presented the appearance of a place depopulated by war or pestilence."

As an instance of how the French army afterwards behaved, Southey says that "General Loison promised the Archbishop of Oporto that his property should not be touched. After this promise Loison himself and some of his officers entered the archbishop's library, which was one of the finest in Portugal; they took down all the books in the hope of finding valuables behind them; they broke off the gold and silver clasps from the magnificent bindings of the rarest part of the collection, and in their disappointment at finding so little plunder tore in pieces a whole pile of manuscripts. They took every gold and silver coin from his cabinet of medals, and the jewels with which his relics were adorned. Loison was even seen in noon-day to take the archbishop's episcopal ring from his table and to put it in his pocket."

The same author says that "The French had entered Portugal with so little baggage that even the generals borrowed, or rather demanded, linen from those upon whom they were quartered. Soon, however, without having received any supplies from home, they were not only splendidly furnished with ornamental apparel, but sent to France large remittances in bills, money and effects, especially in cotton. . . . The emigration (of the royal family) had been determined upon so late that many rich prizes fell into their hands. Fourteen cart-loads of plate from the patriarchal church reached the quay at Belem too late to be received on board. This treasure was conveyed back to the church. . . . When the French seized it they added to their booty a splendid altar service which had been wrought by the most celebrated artist in France. Junot fitted himself out with the spoils of Queluz, and Loison had shirts made of the cambric sheets belonging to the royal family, which were found at Mafra."

We shall have something more to say on this subject when we come to the Convention of Cintra.

On the 15th November the Emperor, in sending brother Jerome, King of Westphalia, a Constitution, gave him such sound advice as this: "What people would wish to return under the arbitrary Prussian system after having tasted the blessings of a wise and liberal administration? The people of Germany, of France, of Italy, and of Spain desire equality and liberal ideas. For many years I have conducted the affairs of Europe and I have reason to be convinced that the buzzing of the privileged classes is at variance with public opinion. Be a constitutional king. Even should the common sense and the intelligence of the age not require this, in your position good policy would command it. You will find yourself possessed of a force of opinion which will give you a natural ascendancy over your neighbours who are absolute monarchs."

Article 2 runs thus:—"We reserve for ourself the allodial domains of the princes to be employed in recompenses which we have promised to the officers of our armies who rendered us the greatest service during the present war."

Art. 7 set down the contingent which the new kingdom was to furnish to the Confederation of the Rhine at 25,000 men.

It may be said that these two articles were destined to prove thorns in the side of King Jerome, whose impoverished country was thus heavily taxed at starting.

On the 6th December Napoleon wrote from Venice to M. Maret, Secretary of State, complaining of the continuance of rumours calculated to afflict the Empress [rumours of a coming divorce], and directing him to insert this paragraph in the *Moniteur*:—

"Two marriages are about to take place at Munich—that of the Princess Charlotte of Bavaria with the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg, and that of the sister of the Emperor of Russia with the Prince Royal of Bavaria."

M. Maret was also to insert that the Prince Augustus of Prussia, who had been made prisoner and had been sent to Coppet, had learned very bad principles from Madame de Staël. . . .

The marriages mentioned here connected the Bonaparte family with that of the Romanoffs.

TO JEROME NAPOLEON, KING OF WESTPHALIA.

“VENICE, 7th December, 1807.

“I send you the replies of the Empress of Russia. I opened that addressed to you. I did not take the same liberty with that for the princess, because I suppose that it contained nothing important. However, I beg you will send me a copy of it. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

A letter of the same date, addressed to the Emperor of Russia, concluded thus:—

“I have just received the declaration which your Majesty has sent to London. Of all the powers on the Continent Sweden alone remains at peace with England. Your Majesty will probably set this matter to rights.

“I am truly glad to see the work of Tilsit consolidated. I shall be more so when your Majesty keeps your promise of coming to Paris;¹ it will be a very pleasant moment for me and for my people. We shall get the better of England, we shall pacify the world, and the peace of Tilsit will be a new epoch in the annals of the world.”

On the 17th December Napoleon issued his celebrated Decree of Milan, by which any neutral vessel who had submitted to be searched, or had consented to touch at an English port, was to be regarded as losing her nationality.

¹ When Alexander did visit Paris it was hardly a pleasant moment for his quondam friend and hero.

Article 3. The British Isles are declared in a state of blockade by sea and by land.

On the same day his Majesty wrote to M. Cretet ;—

“Flushing having been united to France, I beg you will have it attached to the nearest department.”

And to Vice-Admiral Decrès, saying that a Russian vessel had put into Morlaix, where she was to be detained, because, if really Russian, she would inevitably fall into the clutches of England, and if her Russian flag were a mere mast, of course she should not be allowed to sail,

TO KING JOSEPH.

“MILAN, *December 17th*, 1807.

“I saw Lucien at Mantua. I think he promised to send me his eldest daughter. This young person must be in Paris by January. Lucien, who appeared to be swayed by conflicting feelings, had not the strength of mind to come to a decision. I did all I could to persuade him to employ his talents for me and for his country. If he wishes to send me his daughter she must start without delay, and he must send me a declaration placing her entirely at my disposition. There is not a moment to be lost. Events are marching rapidly, and my destinies must be accomplished. I await with impatience a clear and concise answer with regard to Charlotte.

“The interests of Lucien’s family will be provided for. A divorce with Madame Joubberthon once pronounced, and Lucien established in a foreign country [as king of Italy or of Tuscany], he will be at liberty to live on terms of intimacy with Madame Joubberthon, but not in France; nor must he reside with her as if she were a princess and his wife. Madame Joubberthon shall have a high title conferred upon her at Naples or elsewhere. Politics alone influenced me in this matter. I have no desire to meddle with the tastes and passions of Lucien. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

Napoleon, in the first place, had done all in his power to prevent the marriage of Lucien with the divorced wife of the stockbroker Jouberton, and he had driven him into exile. Now he offered him a crown if he would repudiate her, but Lucien was made of sterner stuff than Jerome, and refused. He, however, consented to send his daughter Charlotte to Paris, and to allow Napoleon to dispose of her hand.

This matter intimately concerns us, for had Charlotte Bonaparte proved more tractable she might have become Queen of Spain, and in that case there would have been no Peninsular War. The idea of Napoleon was to wed her to the Prince of Asturias, and to govern Spain through his niece. The Emperor, however, having opened her letters to her father, and found them filled with criticisms of the Imperial court, from whose immoral atmosphere she longed to escape, sent her back to her father, who was only too delighted to receive her back.

On the 28th December came a second Milan decree, levying a contribution of 100,000,000 francs on Portugal for the purpose of redeeming all the properties belonging to private individuals ! and confiscating all the property of the Queen, the Prince Regent, and the nobles who had abandoned their country. Junot's force was to become "the army of Portugal," was to be paid and equipped by Portugal, and each man, in addition to his rations, was to receive a bottle of wine *per diem* !

When the above decree was issued the House of Braganza had ceased to reign. A month previously the royal family had embarked for Rio Janeiro on board the Portuguese fleet, escorted by four English ships of the line.

CHAPTER V.

THE YEAR 1808.

A GREAT deal of the correspondence of 1808 is devoted to Spanish affairs, and it will be well to bear in mind the following facts: In 1795, Spain concluded a treaty with France at Bale, by which the Republican troops were to evacuate the provinces of the Ebro, and France was to receive in return the Spanish portion of the island of St. Domingo. This treaty gave so much satisfaction that Manuel Godoy, who was instrumental in concluding it, was created Prince of the Peace. Godoy was at the same time the favourite of the king, the lover of the queen, the husband of a princess of the blood, and prime minister. Several other treaties were afterwards concluded between the two countries, all of which entailed losses and dishonour on Spain, the loss of Louisiana, Trinidad, and other colonies, the loss of her galleons and her commerce, and the total destruction of her fleet at Trafalgar. In addition she had to furnish troops to France, and subsidies. Just before Jena, the Prince of the Peace conceived that the moment had arrived to shake off this costly alliance, and he went as far as issuing a bombastic proclamation, and ordering a levy of conscripts. Before he could commit any overt act, however, the news of the defeat of the Prussians arrived, and the Prince of the Peace, at once changing his tactics, despatched the Duke of Frias to congratulate

Napoleon on his victory. The Emperor allowed his wrath to remain dormant, but there is little doubt that at Berlin he made up his mind to punish this treason, and to dethrone the Bourbons. He received the Spanish ambassador with great amiability, and wrote to Charles IV. calling him the faithful ally of France. Strange to say, Godoy, the author of the proclamation, was universally detested in Spain as the docile instrument of the policy of Napoleon, while the Prince of Asturias became a popular hero as the antagonist of France.

Shortly after this, Napoleon persuaded the feeble Charles to sign the iniquitous treaty of Fontainebleau, by which the high contracting powers were to partition Portugal ; the Prince of the Peace was to have one slice of that country, the Queen of Etruria was to have another, and Charles was to have half the Portuguese colonies. Of course the Portuguese ports were to be closed to England, and a corps of 40,000 French troops was to assemble at Bayonne in order to be able to march on Portugal, should Junot, with his 25,000 men, and the Spanish contingent also 25,000 strong, ordered to march upon Lisbon, not prove sufficient. The great object of Napoleon was to get hold of the Portuguese fleet, and to have an excuse for pouring troops into Spain. What afterwards happened showed that Napoleon had no idea of keeping faith with Charles. Junot entered Lisbon, but the Portuguese fleet had just time to make its escape with the royal family on board.

At this period, Beauharnais, the brother of Josephine's first husband, was ambassador in Spain, a simple-minded, upright gentleman. There were two parties at Madrid, that of the court and Manuel Godoy, and that of the Prince of Asturias and Juan Escoiquiz his tutor. Knowing the Prince of the Peace to be distasteful to Napoleon, the French ambassador attached himself to the latter party. Escoiquiz, who was a crafty and ambitious monk, was determined to turn the goodwill of Beauharnais to

account, in order, if possible, to gain the powerful protection of Napoleon. He knew that the Emperor had a weakness for royal alliances, and so he entered into negotiations with Beauharnais to obtain the hand of an imperial princess for the Prince of Asturias. Napoleon encouraged these overtures, but said they were too vague. This was in July, 1807. In the month of October, he received a regular demand signed by the Prince of Asturias, and addressed to "that hero who effaces all those who preceded him," begging Napoleon to grant him the honour of allying himself to the imperial family. While Beauharnais was intriguing with Escoiquiz, Napoleon was intriguing with the opposite party.

In December, 1808, Prince Metternich wrote a remarkable despatch on the restless activity of the Emperor, in which he said: "Napoleon, before the end of the war with Prussia, prepared the destruction of Spain, the oldest, the most ill-used and most disinterested of the allies, not only of Napoleon, but of all the preceding governments in France. This should prove that friendship is no safeguard for a Power which finds itself in the path of the French Emperor. . . . Engrossed with the idea of invading Spain, Napoleon would listen to no remonstrances against a plan as impolitic in its conception as it was criminal and ridiculous in its means of execution. Guided by his own insatiable ambition, and the perfidious counsels of Murat, who hoped to seat himself on the throne," &c.

As the Prince of Asturias in his letter to Napoleon had brought the gravest charges against his father, this gave the Emperor an excuse for interfering between Charles IV. and his son. Beauharnais was directed to continue his negotiations, and Ferdinand was encouraged to rebel against his parents.

On the 29th October, the king suspected Ferdinand of conspiring against him, caused him to be arrested, and had his papers seized. Among other compromising papers was found the memorandum of Escoiquiz demanding the hand

of a French princess. Charles at once wrote to Napoleon asking him to recall Beauharnais. He had so little idea of Napoleon being mixed up in the intrigue that he implored his advice. On the receipt of the king's letter, Napoleon, who thought that his perfidy had been unmasked, flew in a violent passion, and overwhelmed Masserano, one of the Spanish ambassadors, with invectives. He declared that Beauharnais had been calumniated, that he would at once march upon Spain, and troops were hurried up by post from Metz, Nancy and Sedan, to the frontier. Napoleon was just about to fall on his prey when the news arrived that Ferdinand had implored his father's pardon in the most abject terms, and had been forgiven. The Emperor had no longer an excuse for interfering.

The fact was that Ferdinand had made a clean breast of it, and that the Court of Madrid had been terrified out of its life on finding Napoleon himself mixed up in the intrigue. Ferdinand was therefore pardoned, so that the Emperor should have no excuse for carrying out his threat.

Napoleon not only refused to recall Beauharnais, or to disavow him, but he declared that he would not tolerate the publication of anything concerning either himself or his ambassador in connection with this affair, and he wrote to King Charles assuring him that he had never received any letter from his son, that he had never heard him spoken of, and was not aware of his existence. The fact is that the Emperor was at that moment intent upon giving his niece Charlotte, Lucien's eldest daughter, to the Prince of Asturias.

When Charles IV. realised the situation, he considered that the best thing he could do would be to repeat the demand urged by his son, and he consequently wrote an affectionate letter to the Emperor asking for the hand of a French princess, and begging his Majesty to carry out the stipulations of the treaty of Fontainebleau.

After allowing some time to pass, Napoleon replied that he would willingly consent to a matrimonial alliance,

on condition of the Prince of Asturias having received his Majesty's pardon. The Emperor, who was aware that this pardon had been accorded, said nothing about the treaty, and continued to march troops into Spain. As for the match between Charlotte Bonaparte and the Prince of Asturias, it had to be given up. The young lady having expressed her desire to escape from the immoral atmosphere of the imperial court, was sent home.

Napoleon repaired to Bayonne to watch matters from the frontier, sending Murat on to Madrid. The Emperor was hardly settled at Bayonne before a revolution occurred at Aranjuez, in consequence of the people suspecting the king of wishing to leave the country. Charles was dethroned and Ferdinand was proclaimed king. The Spaniards were somewhat bewildered, but were inclined to think that the object of Napoleon was to deliver them from an odious government and to support Ferdinand. Napoleon, however, refused to recognise Ferdinand, on the ground that his father had been forced to abdicate and had retracted his abdication, and by coaxing both parties to Bayonne, he ended by frightening Ferdinand into abdicating in his turn, and by persuading Charles to cede him his rights and to become his pensioner. By a series of tricks the Bourbons were deposed, and the Spanish throne, after having been offered to King Louis of Holland, was finally accepted by King Joseph of Naples.

While Napoleon was at Bayonne he had a long conversation with Escoiquiz, of which the monk has left a graphic description. The chief points upon which the Emperor insisted, while every now and again pulling the monk's ears, were that the abdication of Charles was not voluntary; that it was necessary for the interests of France that the Bourbons should cease to reign; that Charles IV., when he thought he was occupied in Spain, before Jena, wished to declare war against him.

Escoiquiz maintained that Napoleon by giving Ferdinand the hand of a French princess would make him a

faithful ally, and he warned the Emperor of the insuperable difficulties which would attend any attempt to force a foreign king upon a high-spirited nation. While speaking very firmly, the monk at the same time indulged in what he considered wholesome flattery. He apologised for this in the following curious note: "I must warn my readers that such language was indispensable in speaking to this vain and ferocious man. The truth could reach his hardened heart only under the guise of flattery. I was at Bayonne, and I was dealing with Attila. I need say no more." Escoiquiz having pointed out numerous difficulties, the conversation took this turn:—

Napoleon. You exaggerate, canon; I have nothing to fear from the only Power which might cause me some uneasiness. The Emperor of Russia, to whom I communicated my plans when at Tilsit, approved of them, and pledged his word of honour not to thwart them. As for the other Powers, they will take good care not to stir.¹ At all events, the Spaniards will not offer a serious resistance. The wealthy will remain quiet for fear of losing their property; and the clergy, whom I shall hold responsible for any disorders, will soon exert their influence in the same direction.² Believe me, canon, that a country in which there are many monks is easy to subdue.

¹ This was a grievous error on the part of Napoleon, as he soon found out.

² When summoned to wait upon Napoleon at Bayonne the Bishop of St. Andero replied in the following terms: "I cannot make it convenient to attend, and if I could I would not. I judge of your sincerity towards Spain by your conduct towards Portugal and other kingdoms with which you have interfered. If you are in earnest in your offer to befriend the Spanish nation liberate our sovereign and his family, and withdraw your troops from among us. . . ." And in one of his bulletins, not published in the *Correspondence*, the Emperor afterwards spoke of the Bishop of Santander, who had published a pastoral full of dignity and eloquence against the invasion of his country, as "a furibond and fanatical priest, animated with the spirit of the demon and always marching with a cutlass at his side."

Escoiquiz. I respect the opinions of your Majesty, and I recognise the inferiority of my political talents; but acquainted with the character of my countrymen, I have the honour to warn your Majesty that the wealthy classes and the clergy will be the first to set the people the example of sacrificing all they have, and that the nation in a body will oppose the elevation of any other sovereign but Ferdinand.

Napoleon. Supposing what you say to be true, I shall still attain my object by sacrificing 200,000 men, and I am far from supposing that Spain will cost me so many.

Escoiquiz insisted that it would require 300,000 men to hold Spain, and asked of what use an alliance would be on such terms. Nothing, however, would shake the iron will of Napoleon. At St. Helena, however, he admitted that if he had listened to some of the reasons advanced by Escoiquiz he would have acted wisely.¹

In the whole of this Spanish business Napoleon was badly inspired. He thought to accomplish his design by craft, and he found himself immersed in a sea of troubles, for the whole nation sprang to arms to resist him.

In some "Observations" written by Prince Metternich in April, 1809, he said (vol. ii. p. 297): "Napoleon, after Tilsit, had the choice between overthrowing Austria or Spain. He preferred beginning with the second, because he thought that he could accomplish his purpose without striking a blow. Nothing would have been more unpopular in France than a war immediately after the disastrous campaign of Poland. The Grand Army itself

¹ He also said, "That unfortunate affair proved my ruin, it divided my forces, opened a 'wing' for the English soldiers, and attacked morality in Europe. I embarked badly in the affair. The immorality was too patent, the injustice too cynical, and the attempt presented itself merely in its hideous nudity, deprived of all that was grandiose and of the numerous benefits with which my intention was filled. . .

fatigued, cut up, wished for repose." Prince Metternich then said that no doubt existed about Napoleon looking upon the destruction of the throne of the Bourbons as an *intermède pacifique* between the war of 1807 and war with Austria. "This is what was signed at Tilsit." He also wrote that: "Napoleon, absorbed in his plans against Spain, would listen to no remonstrance against a project which was as impolitic in its conception as it was criminal in its means of execution. He allowed himself to be guided by his insatiable ambition and by the perfidious counsels of Murat." Of Murat, who thought that he would be called to reign at Madrid.

Austria, aware of the intentions of Napoleon, and seeing him levying fresh troops not only in France but in Italy and throughout the Confederation, began to arm also. Hence an angry correspondence between the two cabinets, which was destined to end in war.

Napoleon was at Bayonne, intent upon repairing such reverses of his lieutenants in Portugal and Spain as the defeat of Junot at Vimeiro, which led to the convention of Cintra and the capitulation of Baylen, where 20,000 men under General Dupont laid down their arms. Suddenly, alarmed at the threatening attitude of Austria, he repaired to Erfurth to meet the Czar. Before venturing into Spain it was necessary to make sure of Russia, and to make sure of Russia it was necessary to give effect to the promises of Tilsit with regard to Moldavia and Wallachia. At Erfurth Russia recognised King Joseph, and agreed to attack Austria should Austria attack France.

On several occasions during the year 1808 Napoleon declared his ardent desire to make peace, and he persuaded Alexander to write a joint letter with him to the King of England, proposing terms which he must have known to be unacceptable, and which were probably offered in order to gain time and to delay the despatch of British troops to Portugal. Canning replied to the letter of the two Emperors, insisting on the allies of England,

the Kings of Portugal, of Naples, and of Sweden, and the Spanish "insurgents," being admitted to any negotiation. Napoleon positively refused to hear of the admittance of the Spanish "insurgents," and asked what England would say if he had proposed the admission of the Roman Catholic insurgents in Ireland! England, on her side, would no more recognise King Joseph than would Austria, who contended that even if Charles and Ferdinand had abdicated in a regular way, there were other heirs to the Spanish throne.

TO JEROME NAPOLEON, KING OF WESTPHALIA.

"PARIS, *4th January*, 1808

". . . I think that if you begin by making your treasury support these expenses you will ruin it. What will you do when the Grand Army passes through your states? It remained for a year in Bavaria without costing the king a farthing; it was fed by the inhabitants. It is true that they were a little burdened; but if the king had been obliged to pay the army, he would not have been able to support it for a fortnight. . . . These circumstances are not new for me. I was two years in France without finances. In Italy it has been the same for six years. . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO MARSHAL MONCEY.

"PARIS, *7th January*, 1808.

"Your head-quarters should be Vittoria on the 10th. However, you need not push forward too rapidly, as there is no hurry. . . . Directly you enter Spain send officers right and left to gather information with regard to the situation and the feeling of the country.

"NAPOLEON."

Similar instructions were addressed to General Mouton, afterwards better known as Comte Lobau—instructions

which clearly foreshadowed the intention of the Emperor to invade a country with which he had recently concluded a close alliance.

TO EUGENE NAPOLEON, VICEROY OF ITALY.

"PARIS, 9th January, 1808.

"MY SON,—As soon as you receive this letter send orders to General Miollis to march upon Perugia with all his artillery, cavalry, and infantry. Order General Lemarrois to march on Fogliano, leaving a battalion to guard Ancona. I have given orders for the King of Naples to send a column of 3,000 men to Terracina. . . . From Perugia General Miollis will continue his march to Rome, on the pretence of passing through that city on his way to Naples. Orders have been given for the Terracina column to march upon Rome as soon as General Miollis has entered that city. General Miollis on his arrival must take possession of the castle of Angelo; he must render all possible honours to the Pope, and declare that his mission is to occupy Rome in order to arrest the Neapolitan brigands who seek refuge there. He must have the consul and the agents of King Ferdinand arrested, the English Consul, and all the Englishmen who are in Rome. He must keep his men in order, remain quiet, not meddle with the Government, and merely cause his troops to be fed and paid.

"NAPOLEON."

A letter similar to the above was addressed to King Joseph. It commenced, however, thus—"The impertinences of the court of Rome have no limits, and I am impatient to have done with them. I have sent away the negotiators."

TO CHARLES IV., KING OF SPAIN.

"PARIS, 10th January, 1808.

"I was in Italy when I received your Majesty's letter of the 18th November, by which you informed me of your

desire to draw closer the bonds between the two states by uniting the Prince of Asturias with a French princess. I share the feelings of your Majesty; I willingly consent to this alliance. But your Majesty can understand that no man of honour would like to ally himself to a son dishonoured by his *Declaration*, without being certain that he has recovered your good graces. Your Majesty cannot doubt my desire to dissipate all the clouds and difficulties which have arisen between us, so that, in concert, we may once more take the necessary measures for subduing our most implacable enemies.

“NAPOLEON.”

In a second letter written on the same day, the Emperor said—“I have received your Majesty’s letter. I do not think that affairs are sufficiently advanced for the publication of our convention settling the fate of Portugal. . . .

To M. DE CHAMPAGNY (*Minister of Foreign Affairs*).

“PARIS, 12th January, 1808.

“ . . . I have read your despatches from Spain and Portugal with attention. You must have a historical notice of the conspiracy written, so that I may make use of it according to circumstances. Write to General Junot to remain master of the entire kingdom of Portugal until commissioners have been appointed to fix the limits according to convention.

“I have read the despatches from Russia. . . . You will write to Sebastiani that negotiations have been commenced, and you will direct him to ask these two questions—1st, Should the Russians try to keep Moldavia and Wallachia, will the Porte declare war in conjunction with France? What are its means for waging war? 2nd, If the English land at Corfu will the Porte force Ali Pasha to provision that fortress and protect the passage of couriers and troops on land? . . . You will inform Count

Tolstoy that I have accorded an entire amnesty for all that happened in Dalmatia and Albania through deference for the Emperor Alexander. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

With respect to Moldavia and Wallachia, Napoleon acted with his usual perfidy. By the treaty of Tilsit the Czar was to have those provinces, but at the same time the Emperor had promised the Porte that if it would accept his mediation, he would engage that Moldavia and Wallachia should be evacuated by the Russians. When he made this promise he thought it very improbable that his offer would be accepted by Turkey. It was accepted, however, and its acceptance placed Napoleon in an awkward predicament. As Sebastiani had just exposed the bad policy of allowing Turkey to fall under the domination of Russia, Napoleon determined to try and elude his promise to Alexander, and Savary was charged to try and amuse him with fine promises and to turn his attention in the direction of Sweden.

By the treaty of Tilsit the French were to occupy Prussia until the war contribution was paid. That contribution was fixed at a fabulous sum so that Napoleon might keep a large force in Prussia as a sort of permanent menace to Russia. More than once this question was on the point of bringing about hostilities between the two countries, but when Napoleon and Alexander met at Erfurth, the Emperor was no longer in a position to refuse the demands of the Czar. Spanish affairs had accomplished this change, which made Count Tolstoy say to his brother—“The Emperor Alexander builds a great many churches; advise him to build one to Our Lady of Help in Spain.”

And England was asked to sanction all these iniquities; the seizure of Spain and Portugal by France, and of Finland and the Principalities by Russia.

TO JEROME NAPOLEON.

“PARIS, 18th *January*, 1808.

“MY BROTHER,—With your letter of the 12th I have received the petition of the Duke of Brunswick. You should not reply to that prince, since he has not employed the word *subject* in his letter, and as you can recognise only subjects in Brunswick. The presence of a prince of the House of Brunswick would be damaging to the country, and should not be permitted. In two or three years’ time there will be no harm in allowing him to retire to some spot. In the meantime you should not reply to him.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO FETH-ALI, SHAH OF PERSIA.

“PARIS, 18th *January*, 1808.

“Salutations to the sovereign who extends the glory of Persia and who reigns with wisdom and firmness. . . . There remains only one enemy for us to fight against, England. I have determined the Powers of Europe to second me in my efforts to oblige her to renounce her tyrannical pretension. Let your Majesty unite your efforts to mine, and you will participate in the glory of having restored peace to the world.

“I pray God, very great, very powerful, and very glorious Prince, that He may watch over the prosperity of your Empire and augment the number of your years.

“NAPOLEON.”

On the 22nd January Napoleon forwarded to his Minister of Foreign Affairs a copy of the instructions to be sent to M. Alquier at Rome. As soon as the French troops were at the gates of the city, M. Alquier was to present a note to the Cardinal Secretary of State calling upon him to “arrest all the Neapolitan brigands dripping with French blood,” the agents of Queen Caroline and of England, and

to purge the Eternal City of all the enemies of France. M. Alquier was also to be informed that—

“The Emperor has no ambition to obtain an extension of territory for his Italian states, and does not wish to deprive the Pope of anything; but he wishes the Pope to be included in his system, and to exercise in his states the same influence which he exercises in Naples, in Spain, in Bavaria, and in the states of the Federation. If, however, the court of Rome, through the blindness which urges it on, should commit any fresh imprudence it will lose for ever its temporal states.”

Everything was to be done as quietly as possible—“Let M. Alquier give a ball to the French officers,” added the Emperor, “to which he must invite the principal Roman ladies; let him present the officers to the Pope. . . . While wishing to avoid any scandal, I am determined to act severely on the first bull which the Pope permits himself to publish; a decree shall be at once issued annulling the donation of Charlemagne and uniting the States of the Church to those of Italy, furnishing a proof of the harm which the sovereignty of Rome has done to religion, and showing the contrast between Jesus Christ dying on the cross and his successor making himself a king.”

TO VICE-ADMIRAL DECREÈS.

“PARIS, 27th January, 1808.

“I have asked the King of Spain in such a way as not to meet with a refusal, that the 120 gun ships, the *Prince of Asturias* and the *Montanez*, may be ceded to me; I will cede in return to the King of Spain the *Atlas*, 74, which is at Vigo. You will order Vice Admiral Rosily to hoist his flag on board the *Prince of Asturias*. . . . I have also asked the King of Spain to take efficacious measures for arming four other vessels at Cadiz, so that they may be ready to join my squadron. . . . If all this succeeds I

shall have seventeen vessels at Toulon, ten French and seven Spanish ; and at Cadiz twelve vessels, seven French and five Spanish.

“ NAPOLEON.”

The British navy in January, 1808, consisted of 144 ships of the line, 20 ships from 44 to 50 guns, 178 frigates, 226 sloops of war, 227 armed brigs in commission. Counting vessels building and in ordinary England possessed over 1,000 ships of war. No less than 232 of these ships, including 68 sail of the line, were captured from the enemy.

TO THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

“ PARIS, *2nd February*, 1808.

“ SIR, MY BROTHER,—General Savary has just arrived, I have spent hours with him speaking about your Majesty. . . . You have seen the debates in the English parliament, and the decision to carry on the war. I have written to Caulaincourt on this subject, and if your Majesty will condescend to speak with him he will acquaint you with my opinion. It is only by large and vast measures that we shall be able to arrive at peace and consolidate our system. Let your Majesty augment and fortify your army. I will give you all the help I can : no feeling of jealousy animates me against Russia : I desire her glory, prosperity, and extension. Will your Majesty allow a person tenderly and truly devoted to you to give you a bit of advice ? Your Majesty should drive the Swedes to a greater distance from his capital. Extend your frontiers on this side as much as you like [*id est*, give up all idea of Constantinople].

“ An army of 50,000 men—Russians, French, and perhaps Austrians—marching upon Asia by way of Constantinople would have no sooner reached the Euphrates than England would tremble and go down upon her knees. I am ready in Dalmatia : your Majesty is ready on the Danube. A month after coming to terms an army could

be on the Bosphorus. The blow would re-echo through India, and England would be subdued. I shall refuse none of the preliminary stipulations necessary to attain so great an end. But the reciprocal interest of our two countries should be combined and balanced. This can only be settled in an interview with your Majesty, or after sincere conferences between Romanzoff and Caulaincourt, and the despatch here of a man favourable to the system. Count Tolstoy is an excellent man, but he is prejudiced against and distrusts France, and is far from being on a par with the events of Tilsit and the new position in which the close friendship between your Majesty and myself have placed the universe. Everything can be signed and decided before the 15th March. On the 1st May our troops can be in Asia, and at the same epoch the troops of your Majesty at Stockholm. Then the English, threatened in India, driven from the Levant, will be crushed under the weight of events with which the atmosphere is laden. Your Majesty and myself would have preferred the pleasures of peace and to pass our lives in the midst of our vast empires, engaged in vivifying them and rendering them happy by means of arts and a beneficent administration. The enemies of the world object to this. We must become greater in spite of ourselves. It is both wise and politic to do what destiny orders, and to go where the irresistible march of events leads us. Then this cloud of pigmies will yield and will follow the movement which your Majesty and I shall order, and the Russian people will be content with the glory, the wealth, and the fortune which will be the result of these great events. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO MADAME MÈRE.

“PARIS, 4th February, 1808.

“MADAME,—I have read with attention the report concerning the Sisters of Charity. I am very anxious to see

the number of the different institutions for the relief of the sick augment in my empire. I have informed my minister of worship of my desire to have the regulations of these establishments revised . . . All the annual aid which you have thought fit to ask for shall be granted. I am even disposed to grant new and larger favours. . . . I can, Madame, only express my satisfaction for the zeal which you have shown and the new cases which you have undertaken. They can add nothing to the feelings of veneration and of filial love which I bear you.

“NAPOLEON.”

The Emperor had placed his mother at the head of all the charitable institutions of France, but this arrangement did not last long, “Madame Mère” being decidedly of opinion that charity should begin at home, having little confidence in the stability of the present, and much uneasiness with regard to the future.

TO M. DE CHAMPAGNY.

“PARIS, 4th February, 1808.

“You must despatch a courier to Constantinople upon Algerian affairs. You must send for the Turkish ambassador and inform him that through condescendence for the Porte I have not yet undertaken an expedition against Algiers ; but that if by return of courier my slaves are not liberated, I shall seize on that country. The Minister of Marine has been ordered to send an aviso to Algiers with despatches to M. Dubois-Thainville directing him to inform the Dey that unless he releases the Genoese, Corsican, and Italian slaves I shall declare war against him . . . that a French army will land unless my flag is respected, and the English treated as all the enemies of the Mussulmans should be treated.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO EUGENE NAPOLEON.

"PARIS, 12th February, 1808.

"MY SON,—I have news that my troops entered Rome on the 2nd, and that the consul and the agents of Queen Caroline were at once arrested. Write to General Miollis to take over the police, to treat the Papal troops well and see that they want for nothing, to drive out the Neapolitan rebels, even the cardinals. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. DE CHAMPAGNY.

"PARIS, 16th February, 1808.

"Write to M. Beauharnais that some time ago I sent eight horses to the King of Spain and six to the Prince of the Peace. I do not know how my Grand Equerry sent the horses, but if they have not reached Madrid I desire that on their arrival M. Beauharnais may place them in his stables, for it would not be suitable, in the present state of affairs, that I should make a present to the King of Spain. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

"PARIS, 17th February, 1808.

"Whence come the details in the journals to-day concerning the reception of M. de Caulaincourt?"

"The *Publiciste* might have dispensed itself with praising M. de Lambert. Have articles written describing that officer as a traitor who fought against his country, and who had the pain of being present at the triumph of the French.

"NAPOLEON."

Savary had been very coldly received in Russia and had found all the houses of the nobility closed to him. It was the same with Caulaincourt, whose hands were also stained with the blood of the Duc d'Enghien. The Empress mother refused to see him.

The *Annual Register* announced the arrival of the new French ambassador at his post in these terms :

"Caulaincourt, the ruffian who seized the Duke d'Enghien, has arrived at St. Petersburg as the representative of Bonaparte, where he has been received with marked distinction."

TO EUGENE NAPOLEON.

"PARIS, 17th February, 1808.

"MY SON,—I wrote to you to say that I had recalled Alquier. I learn that General Miollis has experienced some difficulty at Rome for the pay and keep of his troops. He must take measures so that they may want for nothing ; and, should it happen that the Roman Government finds it impossible to furnish what is necessary, General Miollis must take over the government and the administration of the city and the ecclesiastical provinces, with the exception of Ancona, Camerino, Urbino, and Macerata, which are under the orders of General Lemarrois. . . . Tell Miollis in secret that it is possible that I may soon go to Rome.

"NAPOLEON."

Rome was almost the only capital on the Continent which Napoleon never visited.

TO M. BERTHOLLET.

"PARIS, 18th March, 1808.

"Is it true that a man called Achard has made good sugar from maple at Berlin, and that good sugar can also be made from turnips ? I beg that you will inquire into this.

"NAPOLEON."

The Emperor did get the French to use beetroot sugar, but he could never persuade them that Swiss tea was equal to that which came from China, or that chicory was as good as coffee. There are now 500 manufactories in France engaged in making sugar from beetroot.

On the 20th February Napoleon wrote a long letter to Murat or to the Grand Duc de Berg, Lieutenant of the Emperor in Spain, in which instructions were given for the occupation of Pampeluna and the march on Madrid. The Emperor said that he was at peace with Spain, but if the general in command at Navarre refused to hand over the fortress of Pampeluna force was to be employed.

On the following day his Majesty wrote a letter to King Jerome, in which he said :

“The horizon is not clear, and if war breaks out in the autumn you must be ready organised, so that you may take the field with two strong divisions of infantry and cavalry, and place at my disposal a contingent triple that which was furnished by Hesse Cassel. . . .”

TO CHARLES IV., KING OF SPAIN.

“PARIS, 25th February, 1808.

“SIR,—MY BROTHER,—Your Majesty, in your letter of the 18th November last, demanded the hand of a French princess for the Prince of Asturias. I replied to your Majesty on the 18th January that I consented. Your Majesty, in your letter of the 5th February, makes no mention of this marriage. All this leaves several matters, which are of great interest to my people, in obscurity. Your friendship leads me to expect that you will clear up all doubts.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. GAUDIN (*Minister of Finance*).

“PARIS, 26th February, 1808.

“I have read with interest your report on the finances of Portugal. . . . I do not see any inconvenience in confiscating the merchandise taken from the English, and in restoring the merchandise in the custom-houses which really belongs to the Portuguese, on verifying that it does

not come from England. . . . You might lay a double duty on this merchandise by way of a war contribution. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO GENERAL JUNOT.

“PARIS, *4th March*, 1808.

“. . . . You should not have published my decree imposing a contribution of 4,000,000*l.* until you were master of the country. . . . On reading over my letters again, you will see that since you entered Portugal you have done nothing that I desired. . . . You entered Portugal on the 1st December; on the 15th the Portuguese troops, formed or not, should have been sent by forced marches to France, so as to have arrived at Bayonne between the 15th January and the 1st February, where I should have had them organised. Thus you have allowed the forts to remain for whole months in the hands of the Portuguese. I do not know in what school you have been brought up. In Italy, where I have no fault to find with the inhabitants, where I am their legitimate sovereign, where the troops are in my pay, I never leave fortresses in the hands of Italians. . . . The first thing to do, without losing a moment, is to send the Portuguese troops to France. . . . I do not know what you understand by the ‘Portuguese army.’ As soon as the English land it will join them; the men would be wretches if they did not. I did not believe you so wanting in political foresight; you are so to an unexampled extent.

“NAPOLEON.”

In letters to Junot and Murat, the Emperor announced his intention of reaching Burgos on the 20th March. Marshal Moncey, with his corps, was to be the first to enter Madrid, whither he was to be quickly followed by Murat. Murat was to issue an order, saying:—“The Emperor has learned with pleasure the good discipline

observed by the army ; he invites it to continue the same, and to show the greatest respect for the Spanish people, who have so many titles to be considered estimable. The soldiers should treat the Spaniards as they would treat Frenchmen. The friendship between the two nations dates a long way back ; it should, under present circumstances, be consolidated, his Majesty having in view matters useful and advantageous to the Spanish nation,¹ for which he has always had the highest esteem."

On the 9th March the Foreign Minister was directed to write to M. Beauharnais, telling him to inform the Spanish authorities that two French divisions on their way to Cadiz would stay for some time at Madrid. M. Beauharnais, too, was to ask what General Solano, with his division, was about, and if he meant to oppose the march of the French. "Add in cipher," continued Napoleon, "that an army of 50,000 men will enter Madrid on the 22nd or the 23rd. Tell M. Beauharnais to reassure the friends of the Prince of the Peace and of the Prince of Asturias, and to spread the report that I am going to Cadiz, in order to besiege Gibraltar, and to march into Africa and to settle the affairs of Spain *en passant*, in order to secure the succession. Should the Prince of the Peace or the Prince of Asturias express the desire to come to Burgos, that will be most agreeable to me. . . ."

TO EUGENE NAPOLEON.

"PARIS, 10th March, 1808.

"I approve of the conduct of General Miollis ; let him treat the Roman soldiers well and dismiss the bad officers.

¹ There can be little doubt that Joseph would have made a much better King of Spain than either Charles or Ferdinand had he been allowed to reign. All the Bonapartes who tried their hands showed a remarkable aptitude for good government — Joseph, Louis, even Jerome, Elisa, and Caroline, while Lucien, had he accepted one of the thrones offered to him, would certainly have made a wise and liberal ruler.

The Cardinal Caraffa must be held responsible for the stone thrown from his window unless he finds the offender. Send away from Rome the Neapolitan cardinals and the cardinals who are my subjects. Let Litta return to Milan; let the Genoese return to Genoa; the Italians to Italy, the Piedmontese to Piedmont, the Neapolitans to Naples. Let this message be executed by force, if necessary. Since the cardinals have caused the pope to lose his temporal states by their bad advice, let them return home. . . . My troops are at thirty leagues from Madrid. Important events are being prepared. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

In a long letter to Murat, written on the 14th March, the Emperor pointed out that his great object should be to reach Madrid without fighting, and to rest and supply his troops—“During that time,” wrote Napoleon, “my differences with the court of Spain will be settled. I hope that war will not take place. If I take so many precautions, it is that I never leave anything to chance. Should war break out you will be in a capital position, since you will have in your rear a force more than sufficient to protect you, and on your flank Duhesme’s division, 14,000 strong. You will also have news of the division of General Junot. . . . I desire to remain on good terms with Spain, and to accomplish my political ends without hostilities. . . . I have sent you an order for the payment of the troops, so that on reaching Madrid they may spend money and not resort to violence. . . .”

TO KING JOSEPH.

“PARIS, 16th March, 1808.

“I ordered that the Neapolitan cardinals and prelates at Rome should be sent to you to swear allegiance. I learn that you have directed General Miollis to send them to Alessandria. I cannot understand this conduct. What

the devil can you fear from two or three old priests, while the taking of the oath would have had an excellent effect? One of my principal differences with the Pope is because he will call you *Prince Joseph*, and that he makes the cardinals, your subjects, refuse to take the oath. If at Naples you fear two or three unfortunate old men, you must be very insecurely seated on your throne.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO EUGENE NAPOLEON.

“PARIS, 20th March, 1808.

“MY SON,—I order that Cardinal Ruffo, who formerly commanded in the Calabrias, be sent to Paris, and that Cardinal Ruffo, of Scylla, Archbishop of Naples, be sent to Bologna, as well as two other cardinals whose presence at Naples is considered dangerous by the king. . . . Inform General Miollis that there is no arrangement possible with the court of Rome; since the orders of the general are treated with contempt, he must seize upon the temporal government. Henceforward the battalions must pass through the Vatican, no matter if the Pope be there. . . . However, I wish to allow Lent to pass before settling the affairs of Rome definitely. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG.

“ST. CLOUD, March 23rd, 1808.

“I suppose that you will arrive at Madrid to-morrow. You must maintain strict discipline there. If the court be at Aranjuez, you must not disturb it, but show a friendly feeling towards it; if it has retired to Seville you will also leave it alone. You must send an aide-de-camp to the Prince of Peace, to tell him that he was wrong to avoid the French troops; that he has no reason to fear a hostile movement; that the King of Spain has nothing to fear from our troops. . . . General circumstances have caused me to delay my departure. Russia has declared

war against Sweden. The Russian troops have entered Finland, and my army, commanded by the Prince of Ponte Corvo (Bernadotte) is at Copenhagen, and is going to form its junction with the Russian army under the walls of Stockholm.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

“ST. CLOUD, 24th March, 1808.

“The negligence which you have displayed in the supervision of the press, that portion so important of your functions, forces me to suppress the *Publiciste*. . . . You will send a copy of my decree to the other newspapers, and let them know that I have suppressed this paper because it displayed English sympathies, described the French soldiers as monsters, and paid its court to Switzerland by representing the mildest and most humane of nations as a nation of tigers. You will give fresh instructions to the *Journal de l'Empire* and to the *Gazette de France*, and inform them that if they desire not to be suppressed, they must say nothing contrary to the glory of the French arms or tending to calumniate France.

“NAPOLEON.”

P.S.—However, I prefer to dismiss the editor; present another to me.

TO MARSHAL BESSIÈRES (*commanding the Imperial Guard*).

“ST. CLOUD, 26th March, 1808.

“MY COUSIN,—You will have heard of the insurrection at Madrid, the result of which appears to be that the king will not leave, and that my troops will be well received. . . . Send my pages, my saddle horses, my cooks, and all that I have at Burgos to Madrid. Let my guard, infantry, cavalry and artillery march so as to reach Madrid as soon as possible for I shall be there myself before long. . . . The best marchers should do from ten to twelve leagues a day. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

On the 27th, the Emperor wrote a long letter to Murat in which he said, "You must prevent any harm being done to the king, to the queen, or the Prince of the Peace. Until the new king has been recognised by me, you must act as if the old king were still on the throne. Maintain order at Madrid, and hinder any arming on a large scale. Employ M. Beauharnais in all this until I arrive. . . . I am sending M. Laforest to Madrid. He is a man of ability, and good for any business. . . . The affair of the 20th has singularly complicated matters. You must not imagine that you are attacking an unarmed nation, and that you have only to display your troops in order to subdue Spain. . . . You have to deal with a new nation which has all the courage and all the enthusiasm of men not worn out by political passions. The aristocracy and the clergy are the masters of Spain. If they tremble for their privileges and their existence, they will organise *levées en masse* against us, and the war will continue for ever. . . . The Prince of the Peace is detested because he is accused of having handed over Spain to us. . . . The Prince of Asturias has none of the qualities necessary for the chief of a nation, but that will not hinder him from being opposed to us and made a hero of. . . . England will not allow this opportunity to do us mischief to escape. . . . Ferdinand is the enemy of France, and that is why he has been made king. To place him on the throne would be to play the game of factions which for the last five and twenty years have desired the destruction of France. A family alliance would be a feeble bond. . . . You will act so that the Spaniards may not suspect what I intend to do, and this will not be difficult as I do not know myself. . . . You will give the nobility and the clergy to understand that if France interferes in the affairs of Spain, their privileges and immunities shall be respected. . . . I will take care of your personal interests ; do not think of them yourself. Portugal will remain at my disposal. . . ."

It was this same doubt with regard to the intentions of Napoleon which at first paralysed the resistance of the Spaniards. That it really existed in the mind of Napoleon is another matter. Murat thought that he was to be King of Spain, and was working in his own interest ; but he was once more disappointed as at Warsaw. The Spanish crown was first offered to brother Louis, and that on the same day that Napoleon wrote the above letter.

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND.

“ ST. CLOUD, *27th March*, 1808.

“MY BROTHER,—The King of Spain has just abdicated ; the Prince of the Peace has been thrown into prison ; an insurrection has broken out at Madrid. The Grand Duke of Berg was obliged to enter the city with 40,000 men. Up to the present the people call lustily for me. Sure that the only way to conclude a solid peace with England is to create a great movement on the Continent, I have determined to place a French prince on the throne of Spain. The climate of Holland does not suit you. Besides, Holland will not be able to rise from its ruins. In the present whirlwind, whether peace be concluded or not, it has not the means of existing. In this state of affairs I have thought of you for the throne of Spain. You will be the sovereign of a generous nation, of 11,000,000 men, and of important colonies. With economy and activity, Spain will be able to place 60,000 men under arms, and to have fifty vessels in her ports. Answer me categorically and say what your opinion is on this subject. . . . If I name you King of Spain will you accept ? Can I count upon you ? . . . Reply in two words. I have received your letter of such a date, and I answer *yes* or *no*. You can afterwards write at length and develop your ideas, addressing your letter under envelope to your wife, who will hand it to me if I am still in Paris, and

send it back if I am not. Take no one into your confidence, for a thing must be done before one admits having thought about it."

The next day his Majesty wrote again to Murat saying, "I highly approve of your conduct. I presume that you have not allowed the Prince of the Peace to perish, and that you have not permitted King Charles to go to Badajos. If he be still in your hands you must dissimulate with Beauharnais, and say that you cannot recognise the Prince of Asturias until I have recognised him. . . ."

On the 31st, writing to Marshal Davoust at Warsaw, the Emperor said—

"I am on very good terms with Russia, and also with Austria. I see no probability of war, but when one has an army it should always be ready to act. . . . The Grand Duke of Berg entered Madrid on the 24th with the army corps of Marshal Moncey and General Dupont, that is to say with more than 50,000 men. Marshal Bessières commands a corps at Burgos, and General Duhesme is at Barcelona. I occupy all the strong places in Spain. You will have seen in the *Moniteur* an account of the events which took place at Madrid on the 18th and 20th. King Charles was overpowered; he has implored my protection. I am going to the Pyrenees. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

Napoleon at this time was again attempting, with the aid of Spain, Russia, Denmark, Holland and Venice, to reorganise a naval force capable of disputing with England. He addressed a series of letters to Admiral Decrès on this subject. He said in one letter, "I count upon having four line of battle ships at Rochefort, and four at Lorient and six frigates; two frigates at St. Malo,

two at Bordeaux, two at Nantes, and one at Cherbourg; that the *Austerlitz* and *Denaworth* will be launched at Toulon. Thus, at the end of September, I shall have eight French ships and two Dutch frigates at Flushing; eight Dutch ships and two frigates at Texel; five ships and four frigates at Brest; four ships at Rochefort and four at Toulon; eight French and fifteen Spanish ships at Cadiz; and at Toulon twelve ships. In all seventy-four ships. This with an army from Bayonne to Cadiz, one at Lisbon, one at Brest, one at Texel, will give us a good chance against the English. The twelve ships at Toulon can be augmented by the *Superbe* at Genoa, and two Russian ships which are at Elba."

In another letter we see that sailors were to be obtained at Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck and in Denmark, that more ships were to be laid down in France, and that the Emperor of Russia had placed his squadrons at the disposal of Napoleon.

On the 1st April, Napoleon, still at St. Cloud, wrote to Murat saying that he would probably be at Bayonne on the 6th. He said: "My guard must have marched some time ago for Madrid. My horses, the detachments of my house and my mouth (household and cooks) must have also started for Madrid. You must install all that (*tout cela*) where I am to lodge. I do not know if the Prado, which is a country house of the King of Spain, is large enough for me. If it be not large enough, perhaps it will be well for me to go to the Escorial. . . ."

On the 3rd April, Napoleon wrote a terrible jobation, four printed pages in length, to the King of Holland, who had been weak enough to grant a reprieve to some "brigands" who had attacked and massacred some custom-house men. This was a terrible crime, and King Louis was told that in protecting smugglers he was fighting the battle of England, and his imperial brother entered into the whole history of the continental blockade which was to ruin England to the great advantage

and prosperity of the Dutch and his Majesty's other vassals.

On the 6th April Napoleon wrote to Murat from Bordeaux, where he remained several days, saying: "The sword of Francis Ist was not worth all the fuss made over it. Francis Ist was King of France, but he was a Bourbon. Besides, he was not taken by the Spaniards, but by the Italians."

And on the 9th: "I see that you attach too much importance to the opinion of Madrid. I have not united such large armies in Spain to follow the fantasies of the populace of the capital. . . . It is desirable that the Prince of Asturias should remain at Madrid, or should come to meet me. In the latter case I will wait for him at Bayonne. It would be unfortunate were he to adopt a third course. Savary knows all my plans, and will tell you my intentions. When one knows the end in view, with a little reflection, means are easily found."

And on the 10th: "You can everywhere declare verbally that it is my intention to preserve the integrity and the independence of the country, as well as the privileges of all classes; that I will take an engagement to this effect, that my desire is to see Spain happy and in such a system that she can never be redoubtable for France. . . . You will find in the kindness and utility of my plans with respect to Spain, arguments fit to conciliate all parties. Those who desire a liberal government and the regeneration of Spain, will find them in my system. Those who fear the return of the Queen and the Prince of the Peace can be without alarm, as those two individuals will be without influence and without credit. The *grandees* who wish for consideration and honours, and who did not obtain them in the last administration, will find them. The good Spaniards who are anxious for tranquillity and a good administration, will find all these advantages in a system which will maintain the integrity and independence of the Spanish monarchy."

TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

"BAYONNE, 15th April, 1808.

"I have received your letter with those of the Queen of Naples, of Charlotte, and Zénaïde (Joseph's daughter).

"I reached Bayonne yesterday. The Infant Don Carlos is here also, but I have not seen him, as he fell ill on the evening of my arrival. I am expecting the Prince of Asturias, who has assumed the title of Ferdinand VII. He is on the frontier. I also expect the unfortunate King Charles and the Queen. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO FERDINAND, PRINCE OF ASTURIAS.¹

"BAYONNE, 16th April, 1808.

"MY BROTHER,—I have received the letter of your Royal Highness. From the papers of the king, your father, you must be convinced of the interest I have always borne you. You will permit me, under the circumstances, to speak frankly. I hoped, on arriving at Madrid, to have persuaded my illustrious friend to have granted some necessary reforms in his States, and to have given some satisfaction to public opinion. The dismissal of the Prince of the Peace appeared to me necessary for his happiness and that of his subjects. Affairs in the north delayed my voyage. The events of Aranjuez occurred. I am not a judge of what took place, nor of the conduct of the Prince of the Peace; but what I do know is that it is dangerous for kings to accustom people to shed blood, and to take justice into their own hands; I pray God that your Royal Highness may not one day experience this. . . . The people willingly revenge themselves for the homage which they render us. . . . I have often expressed the desire that the Prince of the Peace

¹ If Ferdinand and my brother, why not the king?

should be removed from affairs; the friendship of King Charles, however, induced me to remain silent, and to turn my eyes away from the weakness of his attachment. Wretched men that we are! Weakness and error, that is our device. But all this may be arranged. Let the Prince of the Peace be exiled from Spain, and I will offer him a refuge in France. As for the abdication of Charles IV., it took place at a moment when my armies covered Spain, and, were I to acknowledge it, I should appear in the eyes of Europe and posterity to have employed all these troops merely to hurl from the throne *my ally and my friend*. . . . If the abdication of King Charles were not forced upon him by the insurrection of Aranjuez, I shall make no difficulty about recognising you as King of Spain. I therefore desire to talk with you on this subject. . . . When King Charles informed me of the event in October last I was painfully affected, and I think that I then contributed to the happy issue of the Escorial affair.¹ That your Royal Highness was in the wrong is proved by the letter which you wrote to me. King, in your turn, you will know how sacred are the rights of the throne; any appeal made to a foreign sovereign by a hereditary prince is criminal. The marriage of your Royal Highness with a French princess I hold to be in conformity with the interests of my people, and, above all, a circumstance which would attach me by fresh bonds to a house of *which I have had nothing to complain since I ascended the throne*. Your Royal Highness should beware of excesses of popular emotions. Some of my isolated soldiers may be assassinated, but the result would be the ruin of Spain. . . . Your Royal Highness knows my most intimate thoughts. You see that I am floating between various ideas which require to be fixed. You can be certain, however, that I shall behave towards you as towards your

¹ When the Prince of Asturias had been thrown into prison on the charge of plotting against his father.

father. Be assured that my desire is to conciliate everything, and to find opportunities for proving to you my affection and esteem.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO MARSHAL BESSIÈRES, AT BURGOS.

“BAYONNE, 17th April, 1808.

“MY COUSIN,—King Charles and the Queen left the Escorial on the 14th, and they should have arrived at Burgos on the 18th. I presume that you rendered them all the honours imaginable. You will escort them, with your whole division, if necessary, in order to clear Vittoria, and to see them safe on the road to Bayonne. You will find inclosed the copy of a letter which Savary is taking to the Prince of Asturias; if the Prince comes to Bayonne it will be well and good; but if he returns to Burgos you must arrest him and send him here. . . . If the Prince of Asturias has passed Burgos on his way to Madrid, you must send after him, and have him arrested wherever he may be found, for, if he refuses the interview which I have proposed, that will be a sign that he belongs to the English party. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO VICE-ADMIRAL DÉCRÈS.

“BAYONNE, 18th April, 1808.

“Study the expedition to Algiers as regards both sea and land. One foot in Africa will give England something to think about. . . . After having studied the expedition to Algiers, study that to Tunis. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

In a letter to King Joseph of the 19th April, Napoleon wrote :—

“The Infant Don Carlos is here. He has several grandees of Spain with him. The Prince of Asturias, who calls himself Ferdinand VII., is at twenty leagues from

the frontier with a large suite. King Charles and the Queen are on the road here. He has protested, and asked me to arbitrate. My troops are at Madrid, Barcelona, and St. Sebastian, and Burgos. The Spanish army is not formidable. General Dupont is at Toledo. I have 100,000 men here who improve every day. They are big children, twenty years of age, with whom I have reason to be satisfied. . . . It is possible that I may write to you in five or six days to come to Bayonne. You will leave the command of the troops to Marshal Jourdan, and the Regency to whomever you like."

Louis had refused the Spanish crown, and rather wished to be rid of the Dutch one.

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG.

"BAYONNE, 22nd April, 1808.

"I approve of your march and all that you have done. I have made known my intentions to five or six grandees who accompany the Prince, and all the advantages which Spain will derive from the consolidation of its independence and integrity under the domination of a prince of my dynasty. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO THE EMPRESS, AT BORDEAUX.

"BAYONNE, 23rd April, 1808.

"MY FRIEND,—Hortense has been confined of a son; this gives me great pleasure. I am not surprised that you should have said nothing about it, as your letter is dated the 21st, and she was brought to bed on the night of the 20th [at the Tuileries]. You can leave on the 26th, sleep at Mont-de-Marson, and arrive here on the 27th.

"NAPOLEON."

This was the child who was destined to reign as Napoleon III.

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

"BAYONNE, 25th April, 1808.

"I have received your different letters on the subject of the language used by the various ambassadors in Paris. I can hardly believe that Count Tolstoy made use of the language attributed to him ; it is a Parisian *quolibet*. You might reply that the first courier from Caulaincourt brought the news of the rupture of the armistice of Moldavia ; the second that of the conquest of Finland ; the third that of the despatch of fresh troops to Moldavia. But the two courts are on the best terms. I can have quarrels with Rome and with Spain ; that has nothing to do with Russia. I am on good terms with every one, and quite prepared to be on bad terms with any one who wishes it. My system must be completed. I am not in the habit of remaining half way. However, ask Count Tolstoy to dinner now and then. . . . The Prince of Asturias is here. I treat him very well. I accompany him to the top of the staircase, and receive him in the same way ; but I have not recognised him. The King and the Queen will be here in two days. The Prince of the Peace is to arrive this evening. The unfortunate man is to be pitied. For a month he was between life and death. During that time he never changed his shirt. . . . The Spanish nation exhibited an inhumanity without example. . . . Have some articles written, not to justify the Prince of the Peace, but depicting in strokes of fire the misfortune of popular riots. . . . I am continuing my military dispositions in Spain. This tragedy, if I am not mistaken, has reached the fifth act ; the *dénouement* will soon appear.

"The King of Prussia is a hero compared to the Prince of Asturias. He has not yet said a word to me ; he is indifferent to everything ; very material, eats four times a day, and has no idea of anything.

"NAPOLEON."

Even Junot was accused of allowing English goods to enter Portugal, and on the 25th April the Emperor wrote to brother Louis, saying :—

“I send you a list of the persons who drive a contraband trade in Holland, and who infest my frontiers. They indulge in veritable hostilities against me. I cannot permit this scandal any longer. . . . The damage which they do to commerce is such that there are people who have gained twenty million francs in these frauds.”

TO CHARLES IV., KING OF SPAIN.

“CHÂTEAU DE MARRACH, 29th April, 1808.

“I have received all your Majesty’s letters. . . . I have not recognised, and never will recognise, the Prince of Asturias as King of Spain ; I have had him officially informed of this. I look forward with pleasure to seeing your Majesty, but I regret to hear that you are unwell. You can rely upon my desire to be agreeable to you, and to give you proofs of the interest and friendship with which you have inspired me.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

“BAYONNE, 1st May, 1808.

“The Spanish ambassador has written a ridiculous letter to complain that the papers say King Charles was forced to abdicate. You must tell him that I have seen the king and the queen, who received their son very badly ; that they were ‘under the poinard’ for several hours, and that they would have perished if the king had refused to sign his abdication. . . . The Prince of Asturias is very stupid, very bad-hearted, and a great enemy of France. . . . I had his couriers arrested, and found upon them letters which breathed hatred against the French ; he several times speaks of them as those cursed Frenchmen. . . . The king and queen dine with me to-day. The

Prince of the Peace resembles a bull ; he is like Daru. He is beginning to recover his senses ; he has been treated with unexampled barbarity ; it will be well to acquit him of all lying imputations, but to leave him covered with a slight coating of contempt.

“ NAPOLEON.”

There can be little doubt about the king having willingly abdicated, although he afterwards changed his mind, probably at the instigation of the queen and the Prince of the Peace. Lord Holland, in his account of the matter, says :—

“ Charles IV., on the evening of the day he abdicated, spoke cheerfully of the step he had taken. He told the diplomatic corps that he was tired of business, grown old, and that it was fair his son should take the burden of affairs upon him. But the next morning his tone was entirely altered,” &c.

“ ‘As my habitual infirmities no longer permit me to bear the weight of the government of my kingdom, and standing in need of a milder climate and private life for the re-establishment of my health, I have determined, after the most mature deliberation, to abdicate the crown in favour of my well-beloved son, the Prince of Asturias, and I desire that this, my free and spontaneous act, be fully carried into execution.’ ”

On the following day the king informed Murat of his resignation, without alleging any other reasons for it than those given above.

TO M. FOUCHÉ.

“ BAYONNE, 1st May, 1808.

“ You have seen in the *Moniteur* the direction which must be given to the newspapers. You must not, however, go so far as to praise the Prince of the Peace, whose administration has revolted all Spain. . . .

“ NAPOLEON.”

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG.

"BAYONNE, 2nd May, 1808.

" It is probable that I shall send you my act of mediation to-morrow. But it is necessary that the Queen of Etruria, Don Francisco, and above all, Don Antonio, should start without delay for Bayonne, and that you see that the crown jewels are not stolen. . . . I am very well pleased with King Charles and the queen. They are very happy here.

"I intend the King of Naples to reign at Madrid. I wish to give you the kingdom of Naples or that of Portugal. Reply at once what you think of this, for it must be done in a day. In the meantime you will remain lieutenant-general of the kingdom. You will say that you would prefer to remain with me ; that is impossible. You have a large family, and besides, with a wife like yours, you will be able to absent yourself should war require your presence with me ; she is quite capable of being at the head of a Regency. . . . If you could induce the inhabitants of Madrid to ask for the King of Naples, that would please me, and would spare their *amour-propre*. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND.

"BAYONNE, 3rd May, 1808.

"I congratulate you on the birth of a son. I wish the prince to be called Charles Napoleon.

"NAPOLEON."

The child was christened Charles Louis Napoleon.

On the 4th May Napoleon was able to send to Murat two documents signed "I, the king," in which he virtually handed over the reins of government to his good friend and ally, the French Emperor.

One document was a proclamation to the Spanish

people, the other a letter to the Supreme Junta. To the people his Majesty said :—

“Those who speak to you against France thirst after your blood ; they are the enemies of your nation and the agents of England. . . . Obey the authority which I hold from God and my forefathers ; follow my example, and be convinced that the Spaniards can find prosperity and safety in the friendship of the great Emperor alone, who is our ally.”

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG.

“BAYONNE, 5th May, 1808.

“ The Prince of Asturias asked for an interview yesterday as *Majesty*, and I refused it ; he then asked for one as *Royal Highness*, which I granted. The canon spoke for a long time. . . . You must send away the Infant Don Antonio and the other princes, and make your authority felt. The Junta recognised Charles IV. ; that prince has appointed you his lieutenant, and he must be obeyed. Let it be understood that in default of this the greatest misfortunes will occur. . . . See that the crown jewels are not stolen.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG.

“BAYONNE, 5th May, 1808.

“ The Prince of Asturias is still here ; he can make up his mind to nothing. Sometimes he wishes to recognise his father, and then he refuses. . . . Bessières writes to me that the idea of a change of dynasty had spread through Biscay and old Castille. Everywhere people promise to remain quiet. . . . I re-open my letter. Your despatch announcing the insurrection at Madrid arrived at four o'clock. I am glad to see that you acted with vigour. On receiving your letter I went to see King Charles, and sent for the two princes. The king and the queen spoke with the greatest indignation. As for myself,

I told them that if before midnight they had not recognised their father as their legitimate sovereign, they should be treated as rebels. To-morrow the Prince of Asturias and his father will be far from Bayonne. I have proofs, by intercepted despatches, that the insurrection was got up by Don Antonio and the Junta. . . . Administer with vigour. . . . If there are any Englishmen at Madrid have them arrested. I have sent into Biscay. No one will stir. Catalonia is well guarded. You command the Spanish troops; get them to fraternise with the French troops. Let the Swiss in the service of France ask the Swiss in the service of Spain to eat and drink. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

“BAYONNE, *6th May*, 1808.

“. . . . I may tell you confidentially that I intend to give King Charles Compiègne for a residence for life, together with the castle of Chambord, the forest, and a pension of 30,000,000 reals. By the same treaty he cedes me his rights to the throne of Spain. King Charles is an excellent man. The king will start to-morrow, and will pass a week at Fontainebleau. The Prince of Asturias inspires no interest; he is so stupid that there is no drawing a word from him. . . . I look upon the rough part of the business as finished. Some agitations may take place, but the lesson given to Madrid, and since then to Burgos, will quickly decide matters. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

On the same day Murat was informed that the Prince of Asturias had renounced the crown in favour of his father. This he did in the most grovelling terms, being perfectly convinced that if he held out any longer he would be treated like the Duc d'Enghien. His abdication was certainly obtained by violence, and was not voluntary.

On the 9th May Napoleon sent instructions to Mollien to pay King Charles 30,000,000 of reals a year in monthly instalments. "You will pay each of the Infants 400,000 francs (16,000*l.*) a year; I think there are five of them." In fact the whole amount to be paid to the royal exiles was estimated at 10,000,000 francs (400,000*l.*). "All these sums," concluded the Emperor, "will be refunded by Spain!"

The next day Napoleon gave fresh instructions to his Minister of Finance, who was told to draw 6,000,000 francs from Portugal to meet the expenses of the Spanish army. This sum was to be sent through Paris in order "to favour commerce and to re-establish the exchange on Lisbon!"

M. Thiers quotes the following strange letter on the subject of Valençay, which does not appear in the official correspondence :—

"I desire that these princes be received without any external show, but *honestly*, and that you do everything possible to amuse them. If you have a theatre at Valençay there would be no harm in sending for some comedians. You might take Madame de Talleyrand and four or five ladies there. If the Prince of Asturias becomes attached to a pretty woman there will be no harm, especially if she can be depended upon. I have the greatest interest that the prince should not commit himself. I wish him therefore to be amused and kept occupied. It would have been good policy to have sent him to Bitchie or to some state prison; but as he threw himself into my arms, as he has promised to do nothing without my order, and as everything is going on in Spain as I desire, I have determined to send him into the country and to surround him with *pleasure* and *supervision*. Let this last through the month of May and a part of June, Spanish affairs will then have taken a decided turn and I shall see what is to be done. As for you, your mission is sufficiently honourable. To receive three illustrious persons in order to amuse them is quite in character both with the nation and with your rank."

And this was the malicious way in which M. de Talleyrand was treated for having vainly endeavoured to impress upon his imperial master the danger and folly of attaching Spain. At St. Helena Napoleon said that it would have been in his interest to have had Ferdinand VII. and his brother assassinated, and that Talleyrand advised him to get rid of the princes in that manner !

On the 10th Napoleon also wrote to Murat saying : "The Prince of Asturias, the Infant Don Carlos, and the Infant Don Antonio start to-morrow for Valençay. King Charles, the Queen, the Queen of Etruria, and Don Francisco leave for Fontainebleau. When you receive this letter there will be no more Spaniards at Bayonne. . . . I will send you the letter in which King Charles cedes me all his rights. After that I shall allow a few days to pass so as to give people time to calm down. Then I shall issue a proclamation to the Spaniards announcing that I have appointed the King of Naples King of Spain. . . . When I am satisfied with the state of public opinion I will go on to Madrid."

Then comes a bit of advice similar to that given to Junot before he entered Lisbon : "I recommend you to push delicacy to scrupulousness ; nothing must be abstracted in this country, neither horses nor anything else. In fact we must not appear to have come here to eat up the country. . . . Send some one to Solano, to whom you must write very often."

Napoleon then wrote to Junot complaining that he had sent him no reports : "I have no list," he said, "of the diamonds, furniture, and crown property found in Portugal. . . . There is a still more important affair ; you receive ships which pretend that they come from America while they really come from England. Trade is carried on between England and Portugal. . . . You ruin France and Holland. . . . You render the conquest of Portugal useless. . . . I have heard with pain of necklaces, diamonds, and other baubles sent to Paris. . . ."

The same day his Majesty wrote to brother Joseph telling him what had passed at Bayonne ; how Charles IV. had first abdicated in favour of Ferdinand ; how Ferdinand had abdicated in favour of his father, and how Charles IV. had abdicated in favour of Napoleon. He added :

"The nation by the voice of the supreme council of Castille asks me for a king. It is for you that I destine this crown. Spain is not like the kingdom of Naples ; it contains 11,000,000 inhabitants, and a revenue of 150,000,000 francs, without counting the immense colonial revenues and the possession of 'all the Americas.' It is a crown which installs you at Madrid, at three days from France and which covers one of its frontiers (*sic*). At Madrid you are in France. Naples is at the end of the world. . . ."

And Joseph was forced to accept the throne of Spain as Louis had been forced to accept that of Holland. He reluctantly quitted Naples, and with the idea of returning there ; but he had to deal with a will far stronger than his own, and when he reached Bayonne he found himself no more able to refuse the proffered throne than Charles IV. and Ferdinand were able to refuse to abdicate.

Having despatched the above important letters and others on the 10th, his Majesty the next day turned his attention to naval affairs, and wrote no less than eight letters to his Minister of Marine all dated the 11th May. In one of these letters, in the midst of a quantity of technical matter one finds : "The manner in which Bordeaux is allowed to be blockaded is ridiculous. It costs the King of England only one frigate to cut off all communication between Spain and Portugal and Bordeaux. Another frigate intercepts communication between Brest and Bordeaux. This is too much of a good thing."

And in fact it is easy to understand the annoyance caused by these two frigates to the organiser of the continental blockade.

In addition to the eight letters to Admiral Decrès the Emperor wrote four to Murat. In the first he sent him a copy of the letter in which Charles IV. ceded all his rights to his friend and ally. In the second he said: "There is at Madrid a large quantity of maps and papers concerning a voyage in Egypt, Africa, and Asia Minor, made since 1803 by a Spaniard, who has just arrived here, and who travelled under the name of Ali-bey-el-Abassi. These maps and papers are in the house of one Amoros, secretary to the king, or in the offices of the Prince of the Peace. Have these papers, which no doubt contain useful information, taken."

In the third letter his Majesty said, among other things: "Let me know if it be true that the Spaniards have at Rio Janeiro a depôt of several million piastres." And—"You will see by the inclosed treaty which I have concluded with the Prince of Asturias, that he cedes me all his rights."

TO THE INFANT DON FERDINAND, PRINCE OF ASTURIAS.

"BAYONNE, 14th May, 1808.

" The treaty which has been ratified having smoothed all difficulties between us, I adhere to the demand made by you, and, as soon as possible, we will conclude the marriage which you desire to contract with one of my nieces. I hope that you will find happiness, &c.

"NAPOLEON."

And to Murat: "Information on which I can place implicit reliance convinces me that the movement which took place at Madrid was ordered by the Prince of Asturias and by his friends. 'Risk any extremity rather than accept the terms of the Emperor; massacre all the French,' those were the orders of the Prince."

On the 16th May we find in a letter addressed to Murat a list of the Spanish ships now at the orders of the Emperor, or so he thought—six at Toulon, three at

Carthagena, twelve at Cadiz, and seven at Ferrol; only twenty-eight in all. His Majesty desired to see Mazerredo on this subject. How could these vessels be manned and got ready for sea?

On the same day Napoleon said in a letter to Prince Eugene: "The reports which you send me are laughable. I cannot even see how many men are detached in Spain. This is quite ridiculous. For my French army the minister forwards to me twice a month more than eighteen volumes in 12mo and in 4to, which show me the exact position of the army. . . ."

TO M. DE CHAMPAGNY.

"BAYONNE, 17th May, 1808.

"Write to Laforest saying that I regret the weakness shown by my ambassador; that he should enlighten the Duke of Berg and not pander to him; act as a counterpoise and not lead him to commit follies; that the Junta and the council of Castille are sharper than my lieutenant-general; that their hesitation in demanding a king arises from the fact that they were not aware of the renunciations of King Charles and the Prince of Asturias; that there is not one voice in favour of the grand duke (Murat); that the nation is still in a state of hatred and humiliation into which recent events have plunged it; that it desires the grand duke less than any one. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

On the 17th, in a letter to Decrès, we find the Emperor saying: "There is not much news from India. England is in great penury there, and the arrival of an expedition would ruin the colony from top to bottom. The more I reflect upon this matter the less inconvenience I see in undertaking the expedition."

And two days afterwards, in a letter to Murat, his Majesty wrote: "I tell you once more that money must be found for the armaments of Cadiz, of Carthagena, and of Ferrol

When the nation learns that everything is in motion in these ports that will be my best proclamation. Besides, myself, I cannot afford to waste time; I must have ships, for I intend striking a heavy blow before the end of the season."

In a further letter to Murat, dated the 21st, we see that in addition to forcing our blockading squadrons at several points, Napoleon was intent upon sending troops to India and to Buenos Ayres, and Brazil, recapturing Trinidad and seizing on Tunis and Algiers.

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND, AT VALENÇAY.

"BAYONNE, 24th May, 1808.

"Prince Ferdinand, in writing to me, calls me *Cousin*. Try and make M. de San-Carlos understand that this is ridiculous, and that he ought to call me simply *Sire*.

"NAPOLEON."

We see that as early as May Austria was beginning to stir once more. On the 28th of that month the Emperor wrote to Champagny to know if there were any truth in the report that the cabinet of Vienna had ordered a levy of 150,000 men. The French ambassador in Austria was to protest against any extraordinary armament, and to say that Napoleon would consider such levy directed against him, and would take measures in consequence. If Count Andréossy did not receive satisfactory explanations, he was at once to leave Vienna.

After ordering Murat more than once to obtain money, Napoleon had to write to Mollien on the 3rd June, directing the Bank of France to advance 1,000,000*l.* to the Bank of Spain at six per cent. on the security of the crown jewels. There were partial risings, too, in various parts of the country, and a serious one at Miranda, which Marshal Bessières was to put down. On the 3rd June Napoleon wrote to the commander of the Imperial Guard a letter on this subject, in which he said: "I am led to believe that

the Bishop of Santander, or Santa Cruz, and his brother-in-law Miranda, are at the head of this revolt; it seems to me extraordinary that men of sense can compromise their position in this way; if this be the case they must not be spared." Generals Merle, Verdier, Lasalle, and Loison were immediately in motion, for, as Napoleon wrote—"Santander must be crushed and the Asturias subdued." The hornets' nest was beginning to stir.

TO THE KING OF WESTPHALIA.

- "BAYONNE, *3rd June*, 1808.

"I see with pleasure the good feeling which animates your people. The immense expense which I am obliged to incur in order to reconstruct my fleets, will not permit me to grant your demand. The province of Magdeburg is the richest of all, and it must pay like the others. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

"BAYONNE, *2nd June*, 1808.

"I received your Majesty's letter of the 28th April, and learned with pleasure the success obtained by your arms. The capture of the Swedish flotilla is very important, and very precious for your Majesty.

"Spanish affairs will detain me here for a month longer. Afterwards I shall be able to go wherever your Majesty may judge necessary for an interview, so as to conciliate the different interests of our two empires.

"Spain changes sovereigns. I keep nothing for myself. The grandeur of France will gain nothing with the exception of more security for the future. In a few days I will write to your Majesty on all these matters. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

By a letter of the 4th June, addressed to Murat, one sees that a deputation of *grandeos* and deputies had arrived at Bayonne, and that Napoleon had laid before them the

proclamation of the chief of the rebels of Aragon, and that "an example must be made of Saragossa."

On the other hand, Napoleon received a fulsome letter of submission from Cardinal Louis de Bourbon, Archbishop of Toledo, while the deputies of the General Junta and the Supreme Junta called on the people to accept the new order of things.

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND.

"BAYONNE, *9th June*, 1808.

"The King of Naples arrived here yesterday. He has been acknowledged King of Spain, and is about to leave for Madrid. He has already received the oath of several grandees of Spain who are here, of the Council of Castille, the Council of India, of the Inquisition, &c.

"There are movements in several provinces, and General Dupont, with 15,000 men, has entered Seville, where the standard of revolt has been raised. Saragossa has also revolted. . . . The arrival of the king will put an end to all these disturbances, and will restore tranquillity. . . . The death of the King of England has excited great joy here. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

The next day Napoleon wrote to Murat, saying—"I suppose that you have marched troops against Saragossa and Valladolid. I expect with impatience news from Cordova," [where Dupont was].

And on the 13th, in a letter to Decrès, he expressed the fear that "the effervescence in Spain, unless it calms down quickly, will extend to the colonies, and then I shall require ready-made expeditions to seize upon some colonies."

The insurrection did extend to the colonies.

TO JOSEPH NAPOLEON, KING OF SPAIN, AT BAYONNE.

"BAYONNE, *16th June*, 1808.

" . . . The Junta is coming to-morrow with an address ; prepare your answer. You must speak of the grief caused

to you by the disturbances in Spain, which necessitate the employment of force to repress them ; say that you long to find yourself in the midst of your new subjects, and begin your reign by some acts of pardon and clemency. . . .

“ NAPOLEON.”

On the same day his Majesty informed Murat that General Duhesme had marched from Barcelona against the rebels, had captured their guns, killed 1,500 or 1,800, and burned six large villages. “ General Chabran also burned three villages. . . . A great number of Spanish officers, priests, and monks, were found among the dead.”

TO GENERAL CAULAINCOURT.

“ BAYONNE, 16th June, 1808.

“ Several *artistes* have fled from Paris, and taken refuge at St. Petersburg. I beg that you will ignore this bad conduct. We have no lack of ballet girls and actresses in Paris.

“ NAPOLEON.”

On the 25th June the Emperor once more wrote to Champagny on the subject of Austria, which was to be informed indirectly that the *Grand Armée* still existed, was 300,000 strong, all Frenchmen, and could be easily raised. Count Andréossy was to keep a sharp look out on all the intrigues between Russia and Austria on the subject of the Porte.

In a letter to Decrès, the Emperor wrote that “ the affairs of Spain having become very bad, I shall not be able to decide before the 15th July if I can detach any considerable force from Europe ; ” and, “ I am not without some anxiety respecting my squadron at Cadiz, General Solano having been assassinated near that place.”

On the 7th July the Emperor conferred titles on several persons connected with King Joseph. In announcing

this, he added—"As for Marshal Jourdan, I fear that were I to give him so high a title as Duke of Fleurus, and a settled fortune, that he would want to return to Paris. You must allow him to come to Madrid. Tell him that I have ten duchies at my disposal, and thus gain a few months. He will serve you in Spain, and will get accustomed to it."

TO THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

"BAYONNE, 8th July, 1808.

"I send your Majesty the constitution which the Spanish Junta has drawn up. The disorder in this country had reached a pitch difficult to conceive. . . . In the new situation Spain will, in reality, be more independent of me than ever. . . . I have reason to be satisfied with all persons of rank, fortune, and education. The monks alone who occupy half the territory, foreseeing the destruction of abuses, and the numerous agents of the Inquisition, foreseeing the end of their existence, agitate the country. . . . If I had considered only the interest of France, I should have extended my frontiers at the expense of Spain; every one knows that the ties of relationship enter for very little into political calculations, and become null after twenty years. Philip V. waged war against his grandfather. A province like Catalonia or Navarre added to France would have done more for her power than the change which has taken place, which is really useful to Spain. . . . Austria is arming with all her might, and appears to be concentrating troops on the confines of Servia and Hungary. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

In some military notes which Napoleon addressed to Savary, who was on a mission at Madrid, his Majesty said—"Should General Dupont experience a check, that will be of little consequence, he will merely have to recross the mountains; but a blow struck at Marshal Bessières would

be a blow aimed at the heart of the army, and would produce tetanus. This is why it is unfortunate that all my orders have not been carried out. . . . The real way to reinforce Dupont is not to send him troops, but to send troops to Marshal Bessières. . . . The object of all the efforts of the army should be to hold Madrid. There lies the question.¹ . . .”

Writing on the 14th July to King Joseph on various military measures, the Emperor concluded his letter thus—
“Be gay and content ; take care of your health. Troops are arriving here from all sides.”

To M. BARBIER (*Librarian of the Emperor*).

“BAYONNE, 17th July, 1808.

“The Emperor wants a portative library of a thousand volumes in 12mo., printed in good type, without margin, and composed as nearly as possible of 40 volumes on religion, 40 of epics, 40 of plays, 60 of poetry, 100 of novels, 60 of history, the remainder, to make up the 1,000, of historical memoirs.

“The religious works are to be the Old and New Testament, the Koran, a selection from the works of the Fathers of the Church, works respecting the Arians, Calvinists, a Mythology, &c.

“The epics are to be Homer, Lucan, Tasso, Telemachus, the Henriade, &c.”

Among the novels were to be the masterpieces of Fielding and Richardson.

To EUGENE NAPOLEON, VICEROY OF ITALY.

“BAYONNE, 17th July, 1808.

“I see with pleasure that you have made Cardinal Gabrielli go to Milan. When you see him you must ask .

¹ Napoleon soon discovered his error. Holding Madrid did not make him or Joseph master of an inch of ground outside the capital.

him if he will take the oath prescribed by the Concordat. If he refuses shut him up in a monastery and sequester his temporalities, half of which you can give to the hospitals, and the other half to repair churches. Let all this be accomplished without noise, and see that not a word is said about the matter in any newspaper.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO KING JOSEPH.

“BAYONNE, 17th July, 1808.

“I have just received your letter announcing the victory of Medina de Rio Seco. This victory is very glorious. Make known your satisfaction to Marshal Bessières by sending him the Golden Fleece.¹ This is the most important event of this war, and gives a decided colour to our affairs. General Dupont must now be supported. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO MARSHAL JOURDAN, AT NAPLES.

“BAYONNE, 17th July, 1808.

“You must leave for Madrid by post, passing by Bayonne. You will take the command of the army of Spain under the King, with the title of Major-General. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

On the 18th, Napoleon, elated by the success of Marshal Bessières, said, in a second letter to King Joseph: “After the victory of Medina de Rio Seco, General Dupont can turn his attention to the destruction of General Castanos.”

A third letter, written on the 19th, began thus—

“I see with pain that you are so much affected. This was the misfortune which I feared. Troops are coming in from all sides. You have a great number of partisans in Spain, but who are intimidated; they are all honest

¹ When the Emperor's letter arrived King Joseph had been driven from Madrid, and Marshal Bessières never obtained his order.

men. I none the less consider your task as fine and glorious. The victory of Marshal Bessières, who totally defeated Cuesta, has greatly bettered our affairs. . . . You should not think it anything extraordinary to conquer a kingdom. Philippe V. and Henri IV. were obliged to conquer theirs. Be gay, do not allow yourself to be affected, and do not doubt that things will finish better and more quickly than you think.

“Everything is going on well at Saragossa.

“NAPOLEON.”

No wonder that Joseph was affected when he discovered the true state of the country. In July he wrote to Napoleon that there was not a single Spaniard in his favour with the exception of a few attached to his household. His other adherents, frightened by the unanimous opinion of their compatriots, had hidden themselves. And “To maintain the prince, condemned to reign over the Spaniards, it would be necessary to have a hundred thousand scaffolds permanently established.”

And on the 22nd July—“If your Majesty would write to General Caulaincourt¹ that you are acquainted with the pillage of the churches and houses of Cuenca, organised in cold blood, you would do well. I know that the fact of the sacred vases having been put up to auction in Madrid has done great harm.” He implored his brother to recall the robbers, adding, “I have for enemies a nation of brave inhabitants, exasperated to the last degree.” And, “You are mistaken to suppose that the honest people are more in my favour than the scamps.”

And what did Napoleon reply on the 31st July—“The style of your letter does not please me. It is not a question of dying, but of living, and of being victorious; you are and you shall be so. I shall find in Spain the columns of Hercules, but not the limits of my power. . . . Caulaincourt acted quite right at Cuenca. That town was pillaged

¹ This was the brother of the ambassador to St. Petersburg.

in accordance with the laws of war, as it was taken by assault. . . . Your position may be painful as a king, but it is brilliant as a general."

On the 21st July Napoleon left Bayonne, and on the 25th he wrote to King Jerome from Toulouse, saying—

"Austria is arming; she denies this; she is therefore arming against us. She has spread the rumour that I wish to deprive her of some provinces; she therefore wishes to excuse a measure as gratuitously offensive as it is insane on the ground of legitimate defence. Our relations with Austria, since the peace of Presburg, have been constantly friendly. . . . Russia is no less astonished at these armaments than we are. . . . Since Austria is arming, we must arm. Therefore I have ordered the Grand Army to be reinforced. My troops are concentrating at Strasburg, Mayencé, Wesel. I beg that your Majesty will have your contingent ready. If there be a means of avoiding war, it is by showing Austria that we are ready to pick up the glove. I repeat to your Majesty that there is no cause of difference between Austria and myself, that I ask her for nothing, and that I am arming simply because she is arming.

"NAPOLEON."

Austria in fact doubted the intentions of Napoleon and the Czar, and no doubt she would have been attacked and despoiled but for the turn taken by affairs in Spain.

Prince Metternich had just written home that—

"Measures on the part of Napoleon, as false as unfortunate in their execution, deliver us from the embarrassment in which we should have found ourselves but for the noble effort of the Spaniards."

Russia herself had afterwards reason to appreciate this "noble effort."

On the 28th the Emperor wrote to King Joseph saying that an English Gazette had reported the capture of "my

vessels by the insurgents. It is the English who say this. It appears that everything is going on well at Lisbon. As soon as General Dupont learned the victory of Marshal Bessières, I hope that he pushed forward."

And on the 1st August, writing from Bordeaux, to his brother, he said—

"The report of the officer of cuirassiers who brought me your letter makes me perceive that the corps of Dupont is about to be attacked and obliged to retreat. That is past all conception. No matter what reverse you may hear of, do not be uneasy; you will soon have over 100,000 men. . . . You shall reign, and you will have conquered your subjects in order to be their father. Good kings have passed through this school. . . . Above all health, gaiety, that is to say, strength of mind.

"NAPOLEON."

Several days before the above letter was written Dupont had been forced to lay down his arms with some 20,000 men. The consequences of this disaster were terrible to the French, and would have been worse had Castanos followed up his blow. Joseph was forced to leave Madrid; Admiral Rosily was obliged to surrender the remnant of the French fleet which had managed to escape destruction at Trafalgar, and had ever since been lying at Cadiz. A great impulse was given to what Napoleon called the insurrection in Spain, the siege of Saragossa had to be raised, and Pius VII. was emboldened to protest against the acts of the despoiler, and Austria to push on her armaments with increased vigour.

If the conduct of Dupont has been generally blamed by most military critics, it is not less certain that Napoleon himself was in a measure responsible for the disaster by constantly refusing that general reinforcements until it was too late, and this in spite of the earnest entreaties of Savary, who, without orders, had despatched him Gobert's

division. Napoleon had constantly insisted that the best way to reinforce Dupont was to send troops to Bessières. Once Bessières safe, Napoleon then turned his attention to Dupont and realised the danger which threatened him, a fact which certainly removed a good deal of responsibility from the shoulders of that general. The Emperor acknowledged that he had been placed in a critical position. On the 21st July, that is to say, the day after the capitulation of Baylen was signed, Napoleon wrote "The battle of Medina de Rio Seco has placed the affairs of the army in a better situation. Marshal Bessières no longer gives any uneasiness; all care must now be turned to the side of General Dupont." And, "The only important point to-day is General Dupont. If the enemy manages to seize upon the defiles of the Sierra Morena, it will be difficult to drive him out; General Dupont must be reinforced so as to have 25,000 men."

According to Lanfrey, Napoleon was alone to blame for not allowing Dupont to recross the Sierra Morena. However, it is certain that Dupont might have done better, especially if he had sacrificed some of his ill-gotten plunder. His force is said to have resembled a detachment guarding an immense convoy, so heavily was it encumbered with 500 baggage waggons.¹ As Comte Miot

¹ Referring to Dupont's position on the 18th, Lord Londonderry, in his *Story of the Peninsular War*, says: "As Dupont carried along with him vast quantities of waggons, his march was necessarily slow and straggling. Though the head of his column quitted its ground at ten o'clock, dawn was beginning to appear when the last sections moved off; and when the moment of trial came the former were found to be at nearly three leagues distance from the latter. It was well for the Spaniards that Dupont had deemed it expedient to bestow so much care on the preservation of his plunder. Had the French moved in compact order their enemies could hardly have withstood the shock The French fought as an army always fights which is taken in detail, and one part was utterly destroyed before the other could render assistance." The next day Dupont attacked, but "he found the Spaniards superior in numbers, in position, in quantity and weight of cannon, and the French, though they performed prodigies of

de Melito says, Cordova had been sacked, the churches, convents, and public offices pillaged, the inhabitants despoiled, and some of them massacred. Dupont himself was accused of having taken 10,000,000 reals. One of the most damaging accusations brought against him was that while trying to carry off the Cordova plunder he left his sick and wounded behind him. Those critics who excuse Dupont point out that at Baylen he was sick and wounded, and that his army, composed of mere lads, was exhausted from heat and thirst. At St. Helena, Napoleon himself declared that Dupont had been more unfortunate than guilty.

On learning the fate of Dupont, Napoleon wrote thus to War Minister Clarke on the 3rd August :—

“I send you the reports for yourself alone; read them map in hand, and you will see if since the world existed there has been anything so stupid, so foolish, and so cowardly. Mack, Hohenlohe, &c., are now justified. It is perfectly clear from General Dupont's own report that all that happened was the result of the most inconceivable incapacity. He seemed to do all very well at the head of a division; he has done horridly as a chief. When this fatal blow occurred everything was prospering in Spain; . . . the siege of Saragossa was going on well. This loss of 20,000 picked men without causing the enemy any considerable loss, and the moral influence which it will exercise on that nation, have induced the King of Spain to fall back in the direction of France. I do not suppose that it will be necessary to make any great preparations at Rochefort [where the prisoners taken at Baylen were to be sent], because the English will never permit these idiots valour, were foiled in every effort. At last it was felt by all the officers present that the case was hopeless. . . .”

There was, after all, not very much difference between the Baylen and the Cintra affairs except in their execution. Had the Spaniards stuck to their terms, and allowed Dupont and his troops to return to France, the probability is that Castanos would have hanged, and that the French general would not have remained long in disgrace.

to pass, and because the Spaniards will never restore their arms to men who did not fight. . . . I wish to know what tribunals should judge these generals, and what penalty the law inflicts for such a crime. . . .”

And to King Joseph : “ The knowledge that you have been called upon to deal with events for which neither your habits nor your natural character suit you, afflicts me, my friend. Dupont has stained our flag. What incapacity ! What cowardice ! These men will be captured by the English. Events of this nature render my presence in Paris necessary. Germany, Poland, Italy, &c., are all connected. My grief is really great to think that I cannot be with you at this moment in the midst of my soldiers. . . . I am sending Ney to Spain. He is brave, zealous, and, above all, has a good heart. You shall have 100,000 men, and Spain shall be conquered by the autumn . . . I think that, as far as your private taste is concerned, you do not care to reign over the Spaniards. . . . Tell me that you are gay, in good health, and performing the duties of a soldier. You have a capital opportunity for studying them. I have written to the queen to go to Paris.”

In another letter, written on the 9th from Nantes, the Emperor said to Joseph : “ I can but repeat, once for all, that nearly the whole of the Grand Army is on the march, and that between this and the autumn Spain will be inundated with troops. You must try and hold the line of the Douro in order to keep up communications with Portugal. The English are not of much account ; they never have a quarter of the troops they announce. Lord Wellesley has not 4,000 men. Besides, he is going, I think, to Portugal.”

TO M. DE CHAMPAGNY.

“ NANTES, 10th August, 1808.

“ . . . I have received an extraordinary courier from Caulaincourt, with a letter of the 20th July, in which the

Emperor Alexander informs me that in the event of a war with Austria he will aid me ; he shows a good deal of anxiety with regard to affairs in Spain. The step taken by that prince is full of good feeling. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE PRINCE OF NEUCHÂTEL (BERTHIER).

“ST. CLOUD, 15th August, 1808.

“You will find inclosed the copy of two letters from Spanish officers which have been intercepted. Send them to the Prince of Ponte-Corvo (Bernadotte), and tell him that I suppose he has taken steps to break up the Spanish corps, or to send it to a distance from the coast. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

The Spanish troops in North Germany, which Charles IV. had been obliged to furnish to his dear friend and ally in 1807, no sooner heard of what had happened in Spain than they swore fidelity to their country ; by a well-contrived plan between Admiral Keats and General Romana, 10,000 Spanish troops, stationed at Funen, Langland, Zealand, and Jutland, managed to get on board the British fleet, and were eventually landed at Corunna.

Napoleon first caused it to be stated in Paris that Romana's corps, on learning what had happened in Spain, had come forward voluntarily, and had sworn allegiance to King Joseph. In his reply to General Morla at Madrid he said, to prove his generosity, that he had preferred allowing the Spanish troops in his service to escape on board the English ships to having them disarmed.

Lord Holland says that Romana had a strong predilection for everything English, that he rescued his army from Denmark with great address, and was always a favourite with the soldiery because he cheerfully shared their hardships, and sincerely partook of their antipathy to the French.

In a letter to the Viceroy of Italy, dated the 17th, the Emperor wrote: "The affairs of Spain are becoming serious; the English have disembarked over 40,000 men in that country."

TO GENERAL CLARKE.

"ST. CLOUD, 25th August, 1808.

"I send you the examination of Villoutreys, which throws a light upon the horrible affair of General Dupont. You will see that Vedel and Gobert were not in the affair, and that those cowards accepted the capitulation in order to save their baggage. Good God! Frenchmen capable of such cowardice!

"NAPOLEON."

It turned out that poor Gobert was slain in action!

In a note on Spanish affairs dated the 31st August we find this observation: "In war men are nothing; it is a man that is all. Up to the present we have found these examples only in the history of our enemies; it is unfortunate that we cannot find them in ours to-day."

Murat having accepted the throne of the two Sicilies, the Emperor wrote to him, urging him to go to Naples as soon as possible, as he felt uneasy with regard to the tranquillity of that country.

In a message to the Senate of the 4th September his Majesty made this declaration: "I am determined to push on the affairs of Spain with the greatest activity, and to destroy the armies which England has landed in that country. . . . My alliance with the Emperor of Russia leaves England no hope for the success of her plans. I believe in the peace of the Continent, but as my neighbours are increasing their armies, it is my duty to increase mine. . . . I impose with confidence new sacrifices ¹ on my people."

¹ These new sacrifices meant a levy of 160,000 men!

TO MADAME LA ROCHEFOUCAULD.

"ST. CLOUD, *6th September*, 1808.

"General Marescot having dishonoured himself by affixing his name to an infamous capitulation, has obliged me to deprive him of his employment; under these circumstances it is impossible for Madame Marescot to remain a lady in waiting, no matter how innocent she may be.

"NAPOLEON."

The crime of General Marescot, who was in no way responsible for the disaster of Baylen, was having affixed his signature to the capitulation, and thus lent the sanction of his name to that act. He paid dearly for this piece of generosity.

TO THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

"ST. CLOUD, *7th September*, 1808.

"General Caulaincourt informs me that your Majesty will leave for Erfurth on the 12th. I send Marshal the Duc de Montebello (Lannes) to meet your Majesty on the Vistula, in order to express, a few days in advance, the pleasure it will afford me to meet you.

"NAPOLEON."

TO MARSHAL SOULT, AT STETTIN.

"ST. CLOUD, *10th September*, 1808.

"You will see by the papers how they speak of the letter of Stein. I have demanded his dismissal from the Ministry, without which the King of Prussia shall not be allowed to return home. In addition, I have sequestered his property in Westphalia.

"Austria is far from wishing to go to war. . . . I am sure of Russia. . . . You must announce that there will be no war with Austria, because I do not wish it; speak of her armaments with contempt as the result of fear. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

Napoleon did not gain much by insisting that Stein, like Hardenberg, should be removed. Scharnhorst carried out those military reforms which brought about the regeneration of Prussia, and the seeds of the *Tugendbund* were too widely sown to perish when their protector was driven into exile. Stein, after spending some time in Austria, took refuge at St. Petersburg, and is said to have powerfully contributed towards inducing the Czar to join the coalition formed against France in 1812. Stein, in fact, was made a more bitter and a more dangerous enemy than ever.

On the 14th Napoleon wrote to brother Jerome thus :—

“SIR, MY BROTHER,—The Emperor of Russia and I are going to meet at Erfurth on the 27th to discuss the state of affairs in Europe, and to take measures for putting an end to the troubles of the world, and to re-establish general tranquillity. Knowing the interest which your Majesty takes in all that concerns me, I have thought it fit to inform you myself of this event.

“NAPOLEON.”

Similar letters were addressed to the kings of Wirtemberg, Bavaria, Saxony, and other vassals.

TO THE KING OF PRUSSIA, AT BERLIN.

“ST. CLOUD, 14th September, 1808.

“I reply to your Majesty’s letter of the 3rd. I am as pleased as you are that all our business is terminated. I desire the old relations which existed between your Majesty and myself to be re-established, and the recollection of the tempests which marked the epoch of our separation to be effaced from my mind. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

With Spain in such a ferment, and Austria arming, the Emperor was anxious to keep Prussia quiet by means of a few concessions and soft words.

TO THE QUEEN OF PRUSSIA.

"ST. CLOUD, 14th September, 1808.

"MADAM, MY SISTER,—I am delighted with the return of your Majesty to Berlin, which realises my dearest wishes. It will depend only on the king and your Majesty for our countries to resume the sentiments which existed previous to late events. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO THE KING OF SPAIN, AT MIRANDA.

"ST. CLOUD, 17th September, 1808.

"I do not reply to your letter in which you display bad temper; it is a principle upon which I have acted with you for some time. You have too much intelligence not to understand that this is the only thing which I can do when you write to me thus. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

In fact, the letters which Joseph wrote were even more doleful than those of Louis, filled with the same kind of remonstrances, and not at all to the taste of the Imperial and imperious brother.

PROCLAMATION.

"SOLDIERS,—You have triumphed on the banks of the Danube and of the Vistula; you have passed through Germany by forced marches. To-day I make you march through France without giving you a moment's repose.

"Soldiers, I have need of you.¹ The hideous presence of

¹ Prince Metternich (vol. ii. p. 242) wrote home on the subject of this proclamation: "It is no longer the nation which fights. The present war is the war of Napoleon—it is not even that of the army. . . . He wished to win over the army by flinging himself into its arms; accustomed to conquer under him, the presence of the chief of the State is no doubt necessary to his troops; but the sovereign who declares to *his people* that his army is equally necessary to him reveals a terrible secret—he is no longer the father of his people, he is the chief of his army."

the leopard (England) defiles the continents of Spain and Portugal; at your aspect let him fly away in terror. Let us carry our triumphant eagles to the pillars of Hercules; there also we have insults to avenge.

"Soldiers, you have surpassed the renown of modern armies, but have you equalled the glories of the armies of Rome, who in the same campaign triumphed on the Rhine, the Euphrates, in Illyria, and on the Tagus?

"A long peace and durable prosperity will be the price of your labours. . . .

"ST. CLOUD, 18th September, 1808."

On the 27th September Napoleon announced his arrival at Erfurth to Cambacérès, adding—

"The King of Saxony came here yesterday, and a number of princes will soon arrive."

The treaty of Erfurth¹ may be said to have completed and confirmed the treaty of Tilsit. Prince Metternich relates in his *Memoirs* that he wished to accompany the Emperor to Erfurth, but that his demand was refused. "In fact," says Prince Metternich, "this journey was undertaken with the explicit view, on the part of Napoleon, of inducing Russia to adopt active measures against Austria. . . . Talleyrand, on the contrary, endeavoured to bring about more cordial relations between us. . . . On the first

¹ By the treaty of Erfurth it was stipulated that France should make common cause with Russia should Austria oppose the occupation of the Principalities, and that Russia should make common cause with France should Austria go to war with Napoleon. Russia was to recognise the new state of affairs in Spain, to which she joyfully consented, seeing that this new state of affairs tied the hands of France, and made Napoleon, whose good faith the Czar had reason to doubt, more pliant. At Erfurth, too, Napoleon instructed Talleyrand to make overtures to the Czar for the hand of his sister Catherine. Alexander eluded this awkward demand by saying that it would first of all be necessary to overcome the repugnance of his mother to such an alliance. He expressed himself highly flattered, and hoped that it would some day be possible to arrange the matter. This alliance would have saved Moscow.

day of his arrival he went to see the Emperor Alexander, and addressed to him these memorable words : ‘Sire, what have you come to do here? It is for you to save Europe, and the only way of doing this will be to resist Napoleon. The French are a civilised people, their sovereign is not ; the sovereign of Russia is civilised, his people are not. It is then for the sovereign of Russia to be the ally of the French people.’” Talleyrand afterwards said to Prince Metternich in Paris that “nothing but an intimate alliance between Austria and Russia can save what remains of the independence of Europe.”

The fact is, that a great many of the intimate advisers of Napoleon were tired of war, and were beginning to think more of their country than of their master ; and the same was the case with not a few of the marshals, who wanted to enjoy their wealth and their honours.

On the 2nd October we have the first mention of the convention of Cintra in a letter written to General Clarke, which concluded thus :—

“As soon as the Duc d’Abrantes (Junot) and the other officers have disembarked, you will inform them that I have heard of the convention, but that I do not know if I should approve of it. However, there is nothing in this convention contrary to honour, since the troops did not lay down their arms and returned with their standards. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

The French Emperor, though displeased with Junot, was not so dissatisfied as England was with the convention of Cintra. What Napoleon probably most felt was the surrender of the Russian fleet in the Tagus, which, after what took place at Copenhagen and at Cadiz, must have completely destroyed his hopes of being able to meet England once more at sea. The English general thought himself justified in granting favourable terms to Junot, and getting him and his 20,000 men out of Portugal,

because they might have offered a prolonged resistance in Lisbon, Elvas, and Almeida.

Napoleon, on his side, blamed Junot for not having entrenched himself, and waited for reinforcements; and he was about to bring his lieutenant to a court-martial, when, as he said, "The English got the start of me by sending their generals to one, and thus saved me the pain of punishing an old friend." It was the case of Calder and Villeneuve over again.

It is not said that Napoleon blamed Junot for his rapacity in Portugal, and for not obeying his instructions to act with a delicacy equal to his own. What that rapacity was may be imagined from the fact that Junot had the presumption to ask for five vessels to convey his plunder to France. He even seized upon two carriages belonging to the Duke of Sussex, and restored them only on the threat of being detained as a hostage.

TO THE EMPRESS.

"ERFURTH, *9th October*, 1808.

"MY FRIEND,—I have received your letter. I see with pleasure that you are in good health. I have just been shooting over the battle-field of Jena. We breakfasted at the spot where I bivouacked for the night.

"I was present at the ball of Weimar. The Emperor Alexander danced, but not I; forty years are forty years.

"My health is good at bottom in spite of a little ailing.

"NAPOLEON."

On the 12th October the convention of Erfurth was concluded. It is mentioned in Article V. that the recognition of Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia forming part of the Russian Empire, is the absolute condition upon which peace was to be concluded with England. The new order of things established in Spain was also to be recognised by England. Russia declared that she could

recognise the integrity of the Ottoman Porte only on the condition of annexing Moldavia and Wallachia. The article on this subject was to be kept secret.

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND.

“ERFURTH, 12th October, 1808.

“. . . . I have no Englishmen in my service, and an Englishman of the Windham faction alone ought to be received in Holland. All the Frenchmen, either in your service, or merchants, complain of your ministry. None of the blockade laws are observed ; more than a hundred ships pass every month between England and Holland. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE KING OF SPAIN.

“ERFURTH, 13th October, 1808.

“I have concluded all my affairs with the Emperor of Russia. I start to-morrow for Paris, and I shall be at Bayonne before a month. Send me a report on the exact situation of the army. . . . The war may be brought to a close by a single manœuvre skilfully combined, but I must be there for that.

“NAPOLEON.”

On the 14th Napoleon wrote to the Czar saying that he had diminished the contribution levied upon Prussia by 20,000,000 fr., and to the Emperor of Austria declaring that he never supposed for a moment that hostilities would be resumed between France and Austria. His Majesty was asked not to believe any malignant rumours touching the danger which was said to threaten his monarchy, and was informed that—“With a straightforward and simple conduct your Majesty will render your people happy, and will yourself enjoy that repose which you must stand in need of after so many troubles. . . . The best policy to-day is simplicity and truth. Confide your anxieties to me, and I will dissipate them at once.”

On the 19th Napoleon delivered judgment on the Convention of Cintra. He wrote to Junot that there was nothing dishonourable in what he had done—"You bring back my troops, my eagles, and my guns," he added, "I had, however, hoped that you would have done better. . . . This Convention, you have gained it, by your courage, not by your plans, and the English are quite right to blame the general who signed it." Then after scolding Junot, and pointing out his errors, Napoleon added—"To-day I have publicly approved of your conduct ; I write this to you in confidence and for you alone." And further on—"A man like you ought to die or to return to Paris master of Lisbon. Besides, you shall form the advanced guard, and I shall be in your rear. Before the end of the year I desire to re-establish you myself in Lisbon."

When Junot received this letter he was at La Rochelle in command of the eighth corps of the army of Spain. Napoleon did not get to Madrid until December, and never got to Lisbon.

At the opening of the Legislative Body on the 25th October, Napoleon said among other things—"A portion of my army is marching against the forces which England has disembarked in Spain. It is a peculiar gift of that Providence which has constantly protected our arms, that passion has so blinded the English that they renounce the protection of the seas, and at last present their armies on the Continent. In two days I shall start to place myself at the head of the army, and with the aid of God, I shall crown the King of Spain in Madrid, and plant my eagles on the forts of Lisbon."

TO GENERAL LACUÉE.

"PARIS, 29th October, 1808.

"I have received your letter. A man who works as you do requires a home. I shall see your marriage with pleasure, and I hope that you will soon have children worthy of you.

"NAPOLEON."

TO THE KING OF SPAIN.

"BAYONNE, 3rd November, 1808.

"I have just arrived here. Your troops are too scattered. I recommend you to write to us twice a day so that I may know where my corps are. Having ridden at full gallop across the Landes I am tired.

"NAPOLEON."

On the 4th the Emperor wrote another letter to Joseph, saying that he was at Tolosa, that he would arrive the next night at Vittoria, and that he had dictated his orders to Moncey, Ney, and Berthier.

A series of defeats now overtook the Spanish arms. Castanos was beaten at Logrono, Blake at Durango, and Regnosa and the Count of Belvidere at Burgos, and other reverses soon followed.

On the 11th November Napoleon entered Burgos, where he remained for several days directing operations and dictating many letters. To General Dejean he wrote—"Your clothing department is composed of idiots. Your Paris contractors are swindlers like those of Bordeaux. I spend a great deal of money to be badly served. The fact is that there is a great deal of embezzling."

And to Murat, King of the two Sicilies, who had managed to take Capri, and capture Sir Hudson Lowe and his garrison—"Before building schools and other establishments of that sort which can be done in time, have my troops paid the arrears which are due to them."

At Burgos scenes of the most terrible description took place under the eyes of the Emperor, who was either unwilling or unable to put a stop to them. The following description is borrowed from the pages of Count Miot de Melito, who was attached to King Joseph :

"The houses were nearly all deserted and pillaged, the furniture broken and lying in pieces in the mud ; one quarter was on fire ; an unbridled soldiery was smashing in doors and windows ; the churches were despoiled and

the streets encumbered with dead and dying; in fact all the horrors of a town taken by assault, and yet Burgos had not been defended! The cathedral, one of the finest monuments of Gothic architecture, was spared merely because the gates were kept closed. But the Chartreuse and the principal convents were sacked; that of Huelgas, the richest and most noble of Old Castile, was converted into a stable; the tombs in the chapel and cloister were torn open in search of treasures, and the bodies of the women they inclosed, dragged in the dust, were abandoned on the pavement which was covered with bones and shreds of winding sheets."

No wonder that King Joseph, sick in body and mind, shut himself up in his quarters, and talked about renouncing his throne.

In a letter to the Minister of the Interior Napoleon wrote on the 19th November—"The Duke of Infantado and the grandees of Spain possess half the kingdom of Naples, and it is not too much to value their property in that country at 200,000,000 francs. In addition to this they have possessions in Belgium, Piedmont and Italy, which it is my intention to sequesterate. This is merely a first idea." As a fact, this *first* idea had been preceded by a decree of proscription which ordered that ten of the most wealthy grandees of Spain should be tried by court-martial, condemned, and executed, and have their properties confiscated. This act of proscription his Majesty called "decree of amnesty" because the Spanish people were informed that all those persons who would swear allegiance on the Holy Sacrament within a month after the Emperor's entry into Madrid would receive a full and free pardon.¹

¹ These and other decrees so affected Joseph that on the 8th of December he wrote to his brother, saying:—"I blush in presence of my pretended subjects. I implore your Majesty to receive my renunciation of all the rights which you have given me to the throne of Spain. I shall always prefer honour and probity to power purchased at such a price."

It is rather remarkable that several bulletins issued between the 16th November and the 4th December, holding up the Spaniards to ridicule and contempt, should have been omitted from the "Correspondence." In one of these bulletins his Majesty showed the value at which he rated the intelligence of the French by treating them to such nonsense as this.

After drawing attention to the lies circulated by the monks respecting the total defeat of the French army, and the capture of the Imperial Guard, his Majesty went on to say—"The reign of the Inquisition is over; those revolutionary tribunals will no longer torment any country in Europe; in Spain as in Rome the Inquisition shall be abolished, and the fearful spectacle of the *auto da fé* shall not be renewed. This shall be operated in spite of the religious zeal of the English; in spite of the alliance they have contracted with lying monks who have made the Virgin Del Pillar and all the saints of Valladolid speak. England has for allies, monopoly, the Inquisition, and the Franciscans. Everything suits her purpose provided she can spread dissension among nations, and steep the Continent in blood."

Having shifted his quarters to Aranda, his Majesty wrote thence to Cambacérès on the 26th November, saying:

"At the Madeleine I have erected a monument to the glory of the Grand Army. The Legislative Body must erect a kind of Temple of Janus on the heights of Montmartre. In this temple the first solemn publications of peace will be made. . . . It will not cost less than 40,000,000 francs. The Legislative Body must present me with a petition soliciting a law by which each member of the electoral colleges (they are about 40,000) must be invited to subscribe from 1,000 to 3,000, according to his fortune. . . ."

Had this scheme been carried out the temple would not have been closed under the Empire. After the disastrous war with Germany in 1870 and 1871, the French Catholics

determined to erect on the same heights of Montmartre, not a temple to a heathen divinity, but a temple to the true God on the part of penitent France, and dedicated to the Sacred Heart.

TO GENERAL CLARKE.

“ARANDA, 26th November, 1808.

“The battle of Tudela forms the pendant to that of Espinosa. The army of Andalusia, commanded by Castanos; that of Aragon, commanded by Palafox; those of Valentia and New Castile, are destroyed and dispersed. Their guns, baggage, and a great number of prisoners have been taken.¹ . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

And on the 30th the Emperor was able to announce to King Joseph the victory of Somo-Sierra, in which the Polish lancers of the Guard carried a Spanish battery which defended the pass. The road to Madrid was now open, and on the 2nd December Napoleon issued his first bulletin to the army of Spain dated in that capital. Two days afterwards came four decrees. The first abolished all feudal rights. The second abolished the Inquisition. The third reduced the number of religious houses. The fourth abolished the custom-houses between the various provinces.

¹ It is related by Lord Holland that Ferdinand had the baseness to write to Napoleon in order to congratulate him on the victory of Tudela, and that “he renewed at the same time his solicitation for a matrimonial alliance with the House of Bonaparte. Many of the imperial councillors were for printing the letter in the *Moniteur*, with the hope of disgusting the enthusiastic partisans of that prince, but the Emperor observed that not only the knowledge of the transaction might be inconvenient hereafter, but the immediate object of the publication would be defeated by the very baseness they hoped to expose. It was so bad that it would be disbelieved and imputed as a forgery to him, the Emperor. He suppressed it.”—*Reminiscences*, p. 115.

On the 5th December the Emperor issued his second bulletin, in which he gave a description of the capitulation of Madrid, which, once the Retiro had been taken, could not well be defended. When General Morla appeared before him in order to treat, Napoleon reproached him bitterly with the violation of the capitulation of Baylen.¹ "What have the English done," he said, "who are far from piquing themselves on being strict observers of the law of nations? They complained of the Convention of Cintra, but they carried it into execution. To violate military conventions is to renounce civilisation, and to place yourselves on a level with the Bedouins of the desert. . . ."

Napoleon, following his usual method, then tried to create discord between the Spaniards and the English. At the conclusion of his bulletin he said: "The conduct of the English is shameful! On the 20th they had 6,000 men at the Escorial. They talked of nothing less than of crossing the Pyrenees and establishing themselves on the Garonne. Their troops are superb and well disciplined. The confidence which they inspired in the Spaniards was inconceivable. Some hoped that this English division would go to Somo-Sierra, others that it would help to defend the capital of so dear an ally. None of you knew the English. No sooner had they learned that the Emperor was at Somo-Sierra than they retreated in the direction of the sea."

¹ When Dupont complained that the terms of the capitulation had been violated, General Morla replied—"What right have you to claim the execution of a treaty concluded in favour of an army which entered Spain on the pretence of friendship, who imprisoned our king and his family, sacked his palaces, assassinated and robbed his subjects, ravaged his country, and usurped his crown? If your Excellence desires to avoid drawing down upon yourself more and more the just indignation of the people, endeavour by your conduct to palliate the sensation caused by the horrors committed at Cordova. . ."

Napoleon, on gaining possession of Madrid, at once proceeded to violate the terms upon which it had opened its gates.

Then followed an imaginary conversation between a French officer and a Spaniard, in which the former proved that the English always deserted their friends, and that they had already betrayed Spain.

On the 7th Napoleon issued a proclamation to the Spaniards, informing them that they had been led astray by perfidious men. "The defeat of your armies," he said, "has been the affair of a few marches. I entered Madrid. The laws of war authorised me to make a great example, and to wash out in blood the insults offered to me and to my nation. I listened to the voice of clemency. A few men, the authors of all your troubles, shall alone be punished. I shall soon drive from the Peninsula that English army which has been sent to Spain, not to help you, but to inspire you with false confidence and to lead you astray. . . . Spaniards, your destinies are in my hands. Reject the poison which the English has spread among you: let your king be certain of your love and your confidence, and you will be more powerful and more happy than ever. I have destroyed all that was opposed to your prosperity and greatness; I have broken the fetters which weighed upon the people; a liberal constitution gives you, instead of an absolute, a tempered and constitutional monarchy. It depends upon you that this constitution shall become law. But if all my efforts prove useless, and if you do not respond to my confidence, it will only remain for me to treat you as conquered provinces, and to find my brother another throne. I shall then place the crown of Spain on my own head, and I shall know how to make the wicked tremble, for God has given me the power and the will necessary to surmount all obstacles."

Having been complimented by the *Corrégidor* of Madrid, Napoleon gave a list of the benefits he had already conferred upon Spain, and those which would be the reward of due submission to his will. He said, too, "The Bourbons

can no longer reign in Europe. *The divisions in the royal family were brought about by the English.*"

On the 12th December Napoleon directed Berthier to send various newspapers published in Madrid to Blake, Romana, "and others," by a Spanish officer who had come in with a flag of truce. Several thousand copies of the Madrid *Gazette* were also to be distributed through the country. These newspapers could have exercised but little influence on the minds of the people and Spanish-born generals, but with Blake it may have been different. Few of the people could read, and they trusted entirely to their priests. Of General Blake, Lord Holland says that, of Irish extraction, he was greatly prejudiced against the English, and "fomented in Spaniards the ill-timed jealousy of their allies which long impeded and nearly counteracted all success against the common enemy."

ORDER TO THE ARMY.

"CHAMARTIN, 12th December, 1808.

"The Emperor is displeased with the disorders committed. Pillage destroys everything, even the army which indulges in it. The peasants desert ; this has the double inconvenience of making irreconcilable enemies who revenge themselves on isolated soldiers and who go to swell the ranks of our enemies by degrees as we destroy them ; it deprives us of information so necessary in making war, and of all means of subsistence. The peasants who came to market have been frightened away by the troops, who stopped, plundered, and beat them. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

This order of the day was of about as much avail as the instructions to Junot, and came well after the Burgos, Cordova, and Cuenca affairs.

In a letter to the Minister of Justice of the 14th December, the Emperor wrote that it was his intention to

have Generals Dupont, Marescot, Chabert, and Vedel brought before the high court, and this without delay.

In a letter written from Madrid on Dec. 15th to Murat, King of Naples, one finds the following paragraphs:—

“You do not second me in the war with England. That Power drives a public trade with you. The result is that you will never get Sicily.”

“I must say that I am extremely hurt at your perpetual declamations against the king your predecessor (brother Joseph), who had all the thorns while you have merely to reap the fruit. . . .”

On the next day the Emperor wrote to the Viceroy of Italy, who was instructed to have prayers offered up and *Te Deums* sung through Italy in honour of the victories in Spain. The bishops were to implore the Almighty, “from whom everything emanates, to continue to bless our arms, and to remove from the Continent the malignant influence of the English, who are the enemies of all religion and of the repose and tranquillity of nations.”

In his *Right of War* Voltaire complained that the clergy in his day did not lift up their voices against war, “which unites all that is perfidious and cowardly, the most infamous robbery on the part of contractors, and of brigandage, pillage, &c., &c. On the contrary, these good priests bless the standards of murder, and for money sing Jewish songs when the earth is inundated with blood.” And so it was in 1808.

On the 21st December Napoleon wrote to his War Minister saying that his army was 148,000 men short, and telling him to prepare a decree for the calling out of 80,000 conscripts of the year 1810! He then found time to busy himself with public works in Paris.

TO M. CRETET (*Minister of the Interior, Paris*).

“MADRID, 21st December, 1808.

“I see by the papers that you have laid the first stone of the fountain of the Bastile. I suppose that the

elephant will be in the middle of a large basin filled with water, that he will be very fine and of such dimensions that one will be able to enter the tower on his back. See how the ancients placed their towers and what use they made of the elephants. Send me a plan of this fountain. Have the plan of a fountain made to represent a handsome trireme, that of Demetrius for example, which must have the same dimensions as the ancient triremes. . . Not only must the architects make researches for the construction of these fountains, but they must come to an understanding with the antiquaries and the savants, so that the elephant¹ and the galley may exactly represent those used by the ancients.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE EMPRESS JOSEPHINE.

“MADRID, 22nd December, 1808.

“I am just starting to manœuvre against the English, who appear to have received reinforcements. The weather is fine, my health is good ; have no anxiety.

“NAPOLEON.”

On the same day his Majesty sent the following note to Paris for publication to tranquillise the public :—

“The English have at last given signs of life ; it appears that they are abandoning Portugal to take up another line of operations. They have marched on Valladolid. For the last three days we have been manœuvring to get to their rear. Interesting events may soon happen. If the English do not fall back on the sea and do not outstrip us it will be difficult for them to escape, and they will pay dearly for the enterprise they have dared to undertake on the Continent.”

¹ Although Haroun al Raschid made a present of an elephant to Charlemagne, and the King of Portugal gave one to Louis XIV., it was only very recently that those animals were familiarly known in France.

TO THE EMPRESS JOSEPHINE.

“BENAVENTO, 31st *December*, 1808.

“MY FRIEND,—I have been pursuing the English for several days, but they fly terrified. They have abandoned the *débris* of Romana’s army so as not to lose half a day. Over a hundred baggage waggons have been taken.

“NAPOLEON.”

CHAPTER VI.

THE YEAR 1809.

THE year 1809 was destined to witness many important events. In January Napoleon, baulked of his prey in Spain by the hasty retreat of Sir John Moore in a very bad temper, began to prepare for another war with Austria, which he had rendered inevitable by a series of humiliations inflicted on the Court of Vienna. What Austria had to complain of was not only the treaty of Presburg, which she had been forced to sign, but the policy which had followed that treaty. All the vassals of France on her frontiers had been called to arms; she was subjected to continual threats, she was forced to accept the Continental Blockade, she saw Prussia, Spain, Tuscany, the Papal States, Portugal, Moldavia and Wallachia, disposed of without any reference to her; she had been excluded from the Conference of Erfurth, and Napoleon had called on her to acknowledge his brother Joseph as King of Spain. In March Prince Metternich, who had long before warned his Court of what was coming, told M. de Champagny that the measures adopted by Napoleon had forced Austria to place her armies on a war footing. War now became necessary, for neither country could stand the tremendous strain on their resources caused by these armaments. Austria required peace and security, and France required more plunder, as the Spanish business

was bringing no funds into the Imperial Exchequer. Shortly afterwards the Archduke Charles issued a stirring address to his troops, which was a virtual declaration of war, and on the 10th of April the Austrians crossed the Inn, five days before Napoleon expected them to move, while he was still in Paris, and before he had concentrated his forces. Had the Archduke Charles acted with vigour and rapidity he might have taken advantage of the gap of thirty leagues which separated Davoust and Massena, and have beaten the French in detail; but he had hardly accomplished anything when Napoleon appeared on the scene of action, repaired the blunders of his lieutenants, and by a series of brilliant manœuvres cut the archduke's army in two, and reached Vienna before him. Then followed the desperate battles of Aspern and Essling, in which Napoleon was foiled in his attempt to cross the Danube and carry the Austrian position. Prince Metternich, who had been detained as a prisoner, and who was at this moment at Strasburg about to be exchanged, says in the *Memoirs*, that on his arrival the Empress, who had accompanied Napoleon as far as that city, sent for him, told him that the Emperor had been defeated, and that in all probability he would meet him on the road returning to France. Had Napoleon followed the advice of his marshals he would have retreated, but he was of sterner stuff, and his tenacity was rewarded by the victory of Wagram. Again, the French owed their escape to the Archduke Charles, who seemed perfectly paralysed in the presence of Napoleon, and who took no advantage of his victory. Writing about Aspern and Essling, Lanfrey says—

"Night approached and the archduke ordered fighting to cease. With another effort he would probably have tumbled the French army into the Danube. But that Prince was deficient in obstinacy; he made war with all the *nonchalance* of a great noble; he prided himself upon an excessive courtesy, and he appeared to consider that it

would have been ungenerous to push his advantage further." And with regard to the second day's fighting—"The Archduke Charles showed himself as gallant a soldier, a brilliant general, on this day ; but it was not in his power to repair the fault of the previous evening."

After Wagram came negotiations for peace, which Austria dragged out in the hope that Russia might yet interfere in the question of Galicia. At first Napoleon refused to abate his demands, but in the end he consented to reduce the war indemnity, and this concession is said to have been due to the attempt of Staabs to assassinate him on the 12th October. On the 15th the Emperor left Vienna, declaring that peace had been concluded. This was not the case, but the joy that the announcement caused was so great that the Austrian government had to accept it.

The conduct of Russia during these events requires a few words. The Czar had good reason to doubt the sincerity of Napoleon ; both Austria and England implored him to join the common cause ; the Emperor Francis had sent Prince Schwartzenberg to St. Petersburg to demand the hand of the Czar's sister for an archduke ; the King and Queen of Prussia too had paid Alexander a visit, and would have gladly joined him ; Blucher declared himself able to raise an army of 150,000 men ; all Germany was ripe for revolt ; Turkey had broken off relations with France, and Spain was giving plenty of occupation to 200,000 men. In addition to this the French alliance was extremely unpopular in Russia. The Czar was in fact the arbiter of Europe, but although he was several times on the point of quarrelling with Napoleon, he was too much afraid of losing Finland and the Danubian principalities to act boldly. He determined therefore to remain a passive spectator of events, to concentrate an army corps on the Galician frontier, and to keep Prussia quiet. He reaped his reward.

In 1809 Napoleon at last seized on the Papal States

and was excommunicated. His Holiness was arrested and taken to Grenoble; but the excitement caused by his presence in France was so great that he was sent back to Savona. This event was kept as secret as possible in France, where it was generally supposed that Pius VII. had excommunicated the Emperor from the balcony of the Quirinal, that he had then rushed through the streets, crucifix in hand, exciting the people against the French, and that the Vatican had been carried by assault.

Along the road from Grenoble to Savona the greatest enthusiasm prevailed, the journey was one long ovation, the people crowded round the pontiff's carriage to implore his blessing, and the villages through which he passed were decorated with flags. The authorities were in the greatest alarm lest he should be torn from their clutches. No wonder that strict orders were given to keep these matters secret, and that it was found necessary to circulate such a lying official report as this—

“The Pope did everything to render his presence at Rome useless, and some of his partisans might, in spite of him, render it dangerous. He quitted Rome on the 6th July, unknown to the Emperor, and went to Savona, where his Majesty caused him to be received, treated, and established with all the respect due to his misfortunes.”¹

Sir Arthur Wellesley landed in Spain on the 22nd April; on the 12th May he crossed the Douro and beat Soult, and in July he beat King Joseph and Marshal Victor at Talavera, a battle which Jomini says “at once restored the reputation of the British army, which had been declining.” In fact, 22,000 British troops had fought on two successive days, and had finally defeated 45,000 Frenchmen. It is true that we had on our side the army of Cuesta, which was held in check by 10,000 Frenchmen, which did little or nothing in the way of fighting, and after the battle behaved shamefully.

¹ Vide *l'Eglise Romaine et le Premier Empire*, vol. iii. p. 141. Comte d'Haussonville.

The spell of French invincibility was now completely broken ; they had experienced such reverses as Maida, Baylen, Vimers, the Douro, and Talavera. Flushing had been captured, as also Martinique, Guadeloup, the Isle of Bourbon, and the Ionian islands. In 1809 Lord Cochrane burned French ships in the Basque Roads, and Lord Collingwood destroyed a French squadron on its way to relieve Barcelona. In the Tyrol, Lefebvre had suffered a severe defeat at the hands of Hofer ; and the Duke of Brunswick, after taking Dresden and Leipsic from Napoleon's allies, had, like Romana, managed to get on board an English squadron with 2,000 of his men.

It is true, however, that if Lord Chatham and Sir Richard Strachan took Flushing, and greatly alarmed France, they did not take Antwerp as Napoleon feared they would, and that the fatal Walcheren expedition cost England a great many thousand pounds sterling and many thousand valuable lives, and came all too late to relieve our faithful Austrian allies of the pressure brought upon them, or to have any influence on the terms imposed by Napoleon on the Court of Vienna.

With respect to our military and naval forces for this year, Alison says that the British fleet in 1809 consisted of 240 ships of the line, and nearly 1,100 smaller vessels ; that this force blockaded every hostile harbour in Europe, chased the Toulon squadron ashore at the mouth of the Rhone, burned the Brest fleet amid the shallows of the Basque Roads, drove the Russian navy under the cannon of Cronstadt, and dealt a redoubtable blow at the fleet in the Scheldt. With 100,000 regular troops England maintained her vast colonial possessions ; with 190,000 more she kept her 70,000,000 subjects in India in subjection ; with 400,000 militia she provided for the safety of the British isles, while another 100,000 gallant soldiers were available for carrying on war on the continent.

As for French policy, it was shaped almost entirely by hatred of England, and a persistent desire to ruin her by

means of that continental blockade which was weighing so heavily on all the countries of Europe, which caused great distress in the manufacturing towns of France, and was so bitterly felt by consumers, or would-be consumers.

TO COMTE DE CHAMPAGNY.

“BENAVENTE, 1st January, 1809.

“It is the custom of the pope to send tapers to different powers. You must write to my agent at Rome that I will not accept one. The King of Spain, too, does not want one. Write to Naples and to Holland to refuse them. They must not be received, because the papal court had the insolence not to offer any last year. This is the course I wish to be taken as concerns me. My *chargé d'affaires* will make known that at Candlemas I receive tapers blessed by my *curé*, that it is neither the purple nor power which gives a value to those kind of things. There may be popes as well as *curés* in hell; therefore the taper blessed by my *curé* may be quite as holy as that of the pope. I will not receive those given by the pope, and all the princes of my family should follow my example.

“NAPOLEON.”

The Emperor was becoming more and more irritated with the pope, who, on his side, was driven to despair, and was becoming reckless.

On the 2nd January, referring to the retreat of the English, Napoleon wrote to King Joseph, saying: “It is probable that by this time half the English army is in our power; this is the opinion of the English themselves. As for Romana, his corps has been entirely destroyed. . . . Have guns fired in honour of our successes over the English.”

The above-mentioned letter was written from Astorga, beyond which town the Emperor did not like to continue his pursuit of Sir John Moore, being convinced that he

would not be able to overtake him. For this, and perhaps for other reasons, he determined to return to France.

Lanfrey is of opinion that the real motive which induced Napoleon to leave Spain was exasperation at not having been able to subdue that country in three months, when it had taken him only a week to break the resistance of Prussia. However, the motives alleged were, that Austria was arming, that Fouché and Talleyrand, who had been at daggers drawn, had become bosom friends, and that a conspiracy against Napoleon was being hatched in Paris under the auspices of those two ministers, and with the connivance of Murat, King of Naples. It appears, however, that there were no extraordinary armaments going on in Austria at that moment,¹ and that the conspirators had done nothing more than take council as to what should be done in the event of Napoleon losing his life in Spain.

The Emperor hurried back to Paris with a speed which seems to show that he apprehended danger at home. He accomplished the journey in a week ; he left Valladolid on the 19th January, and he entered the Tuileries on the 23rd, and in very bad humour, the weight of which fell upon Talleyrand, who was accused of being responsible for the war with Spain, *and of having advised the execution of the Duc d'Enghien in writing*. Talleyrand lost his key of grand chamberlain, and Madame de Chevreuse was banished forty leagues from Paris.

In another letter, dated the 6th January, and addressed to King Joseph, the Emperor said—"I have no hope that Europe will be pacified this year. I have so little hope of this, that I yesterday signed a decree to raise 100,000 men. The hatred of England, and events at Constantinople, show that the hour of repose and tranquillity has not yet struck. As for you, it seems to me that your kingdom is being pacified. The provinces of Leon, Asturias, and

¹ Napoleon to Prince Eugene, 26th January, 1809—"Austria is not making any movements, but we must be on the alert."

New Castile demand repose. I hope Galicia will be pacified as soon as the English *abandon* that country. Saragossa cannot fail to surrender soon, and General St. Cyr, with 30,000 men, should be able to settle matters in Catalonia."

TO PRINCE EUGENE.

"VALLADOLID, 8th January, 1809.

"MY SON,—Battaglia, who has just arrived, tells me that Augusta has given us another princess. I hope that the next time she will give you a boy.

"NAPOLEON."

On the 9th January the Emperor addressed two letters to the King of Spain. In the first he said—"Take all your measures for your entry into Madrid. Try and let it be solemn, and that you may be well received by the inhabitants. Summon all the councils afterwards, and let your ministers set to work to administer the country well."

In the second letter the Emperor gave a description of the flight of the English army and the capture of a convoy laden with money. "The English," he added, "fly in the most fearful disorder. The granges in the villages of Galicia are filled with Englishmen, hung by the peasants in revenge for the terrible way in which they pillage." . . .

Before leaving Spain, Napoleon addressed to his brother Joseph a series of military and political instructions which certainly do not redound to his honour. Several of the letters in which they are contained are altogether omitted from the *Correspondence*, but they are to be found in their place in the *Memoirs of King Joseph*. Writing from Valladolid on the 10th January, Napoleon complained that he was not satisfied with the police arrangements in Madrid.

"Belliard," he added, "is too mild ; with the Spaniards one must be severe. I have had fifteen of the worst characters arrested, and I am going to have them shot. Have thirty

arrested at Madrid. When treated with kindness this *canaille* considers itself invulnerable. When a few of them have been hung they begin to get tired of the game, and become as humble and submissive as they should be."

On the 12th, Belliard, having evidently commenced to obey orders, Napoleon addressed a second letter to King Joseph, in which he said :—

"The operation performed by Belliard is excellent. You must hang twenty of the worst characters in Madrid. To-morrow I am going to have seventeen men, well known for their excesses, hung. If Madrid be not freed of a hundred of these ringleaders, nothing will have been done. Out of the hundred have twelve or fifteen shot, and send the remainder to the galleys. I did not obtain tranquillity in France, and restore confidence, until I had arrested 200 ringleaders and assassins, and transported them. Since then the tone of the capital has entirely changed."

And on the 16th his Majesty wrote once more to Joseph, saying :—

"The court of the Alcades at Madrid has acquitted, or only condemned to prison, some thirty scamps whom Belliard arrested. A military commission must be appointed to judge them again, and to have the guilty shot. Here, every possible effort was made to obtain pardon for the bandits who were condemned. I refused ; I had them hung, and I have learned that those who implored their pardon were inwardly very pleased that I did not listen to them. I consider it necessary, especially in the first moments, for your government to show a little vigour against this *canaille*. The *canaille* loves and esteems only those whom it fears, and the fear of the *canaille* can alone make you loved and esteemed by all the nation."

At the same time Joseph was recommended to take from the convents and confiscated houses some fifty masterpieces of the Spanish school, which pictures were wanting to the museum in Paris. After the sanguinary came the predatory instincts.

In a letter of the 11th January to war minister Clarke, the Emperor said :—

“I am going to call up fresh conscripts. Some of the army corps are still weak and will receive a good many. You will understand that if the conscripts of the last levy are without clothing when the fresh conscripts arrive at their depôts, it would be just as well as if I raised no conscripts at all, and this would much annoy me.”

On the 11th January, Napoleon, in a long letter to Joseph, in which he expressed regret at not being able to go beyond Astorga, said :—

“Have a dozen individuals at Madrid hung ; scamps are not wanting there.”

And the next day the war minister was directed to publish further documents on the Baylen affair, but not to say anything about Morla's calumnies.

TO COMTE FOUCHÉ.

“VALLADOLID, 13th *January*, 1809.

“We are in 1809. I think it would be well to have some articles written, comparing the misfortunes which afflicted France in 1709 with the prosperity of the country in 1809. . . . Louis XIV. occupied himself with building Versailles and hunting lodges. Now Paris is being improved from water-works to palaces, from markets to the Temple of Victory and the Bourse. . . . In 1709 the Edict of Nantes was revoked and the Protestants persecuted ; Marshal Villars threw away his talents in the Cevennes ; Père Lachaise tyrannised over the conscience of the old king. In 1809 the altars are re-established and religions tolerated. As regards morals, the bishops no longer go to nor wait in ante-rooms, but remain in their dioceses. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

And the next day his Majesty informed his minister of police that the Sire St. Simon had been condemned to death, adding :—

"His affair is before the privy council. Have him transferred to the castle of Lourdes or Joux, as his affair will probably drag on for a long time, and as it is my intention to commute his penalty into one of imprisonment."

On the 15th January Napoleon thus began a letter to the Viceroy of Italy:—

"MY SON,—The news which reaches me from all sides shows me that Austria is stirring. Russia is as indignant as I am at all these fanfaronnades."

And to the King of Spain:—

"Circumstances will oblige me to go to Paris for twenty days. Should nothing hinder me, I shall return here towards the end of February. . . . The major-general will acquaint you with my plans for entering Portugal by way of Oporto and Galicia at the same time. . . . You must not think of Valentia until you take Saragossa. . . . I have left the command of the provinces of Leon, Old Castile, Biscay, and Santander to Marshal Bessières. . . . Pay attention to the newspapers, and have articles written to show that the Spanish people are submissive and submit. . . . The court of Vienna has behaved very badly and may repent of it. Do not be uneasy. I have forces enough, without touching my army in Spain, to go to Vienna in a month.

"I have very few cavalry generals. I beg you will send me General Montbrun, whose gallantry I esteem, and who may be useful to me. He must not know why I want him. Should I require other generals I shall write for them. You must make it believed in the army that I intend to return in twenty-five days. Besides, my very presence in Paris will cause Austria to enter into nothingness, and I shall be back before the end of October. I shall be in Paris in five days. I shall ride as far as Bordeaux day and night. During that time things will calm down in Spain. . . . I think that as soon as Saragossa surrenders you can send for the queen and your children. . . . I consider it useful for the general affairs of Europe that

the queen should go to Marracq after the carnival. The preparations for her departure will create a good effect.¹ . . .”

On the same day Napoleon wrote letters to the Kings of Westphalia, Saxony, Bavaria, and Wirtemberg, to the Grand Dukes of Baden and Hesse Darmstadt, and to the Prince Primate of the Confederation of the Rhine, complaining of the extravagant, the inexplicable conduct of Austria, who was rushing to destruction, announcing his victories in Spain, and calling upon his vassals to prepare their contingents. He declared that he would enter Austria himself at the head of 400,000 Frenchmen.

TO VICE-ADMIRAL COMTE DECRÈS.

“PARIS, 20th January, 1809.

“You must order thirty rounds of cannon to be fired on all the coasts where there are British cruisers, in honour of our victory over the English and their expulsion from Spain. You must give the same orders to my squadrons, and announce that an English army of 40,000 men, commanded by Generals Moore and Baird, which had formed a junction with the Spanish army, was pursued for 150 leagues; that we have killed 2,000, and captured 7,000 men. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

On the 13th the Emperor had estimated the British force at 15,000 men, which he said was far from 30,000, and he had directed the expedition “which covered England with shame,” to be turned into ridicule.²

¹ As fate would have it, the Queen of Spain and her children never crossed the Pyrenees, and it was not until Joseph had been forced to seek refuge in France that this royal couple again met.

² Napier, in his *History of the Peninsular War* (book iv. chap. vi.), quotes the opinions of Soult, Wellington, and Napoleon, on the retreat of Sir John Moore. According to Soult the British commander took every advantage offered by the country for opposing an active and

On the 2nd February, Napoleon addressed this short note to Fouché—"Send me a report on Bourmont and how he conducted himself in Portugal."

TO KING JEROME.

"PARIS, 7th February, 1809.

". . . Your demand for money is an indiscreet request at a moment when I have to meet enormous expenses, when my armies of Spain bring me in nothing, and when I have to pay other armies.

"Diminish your luxury by half. Reduce your civil list in order to augment your military establishment. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

"PARIS, 14th February, 1809.

"Count Romanzoff is returning to your Imperial Majesty. No one was more fitted than this minister by his talents and consummate prudence to realise what we conceived for the happiness of the world. I hope that he will enjoy the confidence of your Majesty when circumstances permit us to renew this affair. Since my return

vigorous resistance, and he ended by falling in a battle which should for ever honour his memory. Napoleon afterwards, more than once, declared that if Sir John Moore committed a few trifling errors, they were to be attributed to the position in which he found himself placed, and that the talent and firmness of that officer had alone saved the English army.

Napoleon at the time tried to make out that Romana considered that he had been betrayed by the English. If so, it may be asked, why did the Spanish general set up a statue to Sir John Moore, with this inscription :

"A la Gloria
DEL GENERAL INGLOS MOORE,
Y sus valientes Compatriotas,
La Espagna Agradecida."

On the other side :—

"Memoria del Dia, 16 de Enero, 1809."

from Spain I have conversed daily with Count Romanzoff. We had some little discussions on the subject of Prussia. I shall treat that country perfectly well if its sovereigns will listen to the advice and good lessons given to them by your Majesty. Permit me to refer you to Count Romanzoff on the subject of our position with Austria, and the necessity of remaining tranquil upon that side, so that we may finish with England. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

In a long letter dated the 21st February, Napoleon gave the King of Saxony a sketch of the situation. He said, among other things—“Austria is being dragged to her ruin. Her understanding with England becomes more and more clear. England has made peace with the Porte through the good offices of Austria, and the English have been received in triumph at Constantinople by the inter-nuncio, which has very much annoyed the Emperor of Russia and myself. . . .”

TO KING CHARLES IV.

“PARIS, 25th February, 1809.

“SIR, MY BROTHER,—I thank you for the interest you have taken in my happy return to my capital, and I have received with pleasure your congratulations on the new victories of my armies. I should have liked to hear at the same time that your Majesty was in good health.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO QUEEN LOUISA.

“PARIS, 25th February, 1809.

“MADAM, MY SISTER,—The interest which you are good enough to take in the success of my arms in Spain is most agreeable to me, and I thank you for the sentiments you express on that occasion. I am sorry to learn that the health of the king is not good, but I think with you that the return of spring and the waters of Geroux will have a salutary effect.

“NAPOLEON.”

This was on a par with Ferdinand congratulating the French Emperor on the victory of Yudela. Our James II. manifested a very different spirit when Admiral Russel, by defeating the French fleet at the Hague, destroyed the exiled monarch's last chance of recovering his crown. One can well imagine all the scorn Napoleon must have felt for these drivelling Bourbons.

A curious letter which Joseph wrote to his brother at this period, shows that there was not much reason for congratulation. No wonder the Emperor soon gave up replying to such unpleasant missives.

JOSEPH TO NAPOLEON.

"19th February, 1809.

"I see with regret that you listen to persons who are interested in deceiving you. . . . I have not a farthing to give to any one. . . . My guard wear the same tunics which were served out to them four years ago. . . . I am thwarted by a number of persons who are vexed that I did not adopt their system. I am accused of being too lenient. Were I to be severe now, and to hand them over to the tribunals, they would be dishonoured. You have sequestered the property of ten families. This measure has been extended. There are 2,000 servants of sequestered people in the streets asking for charity; the boldest try to rob and assassinate my officers. . . . Heaven has accorded me everything necessary to overcome difficulties, but not to support insults. . . . I am King of Spain merely by the force of your arms. I might become king by the love of the Spaniards; but for that I must be allowed to govern after my fashion. Every animal has his instinct which he should follow. . . . A Spaniard has communicated to me an order which he received to give an exact account of my conduct every day to Marshal Duroc. It is complained that I have recalled five counsellors from Castile. Why? Because their houses were pillaged in their absence. . . ."

On the 2nd March the Emperor directed the minister of war to write to General Mathieu-Dumas to inspect the Portuguese regiments lying at Grenoble in order to see if they could be employed in a war in Germany.

TO THE VICEROY OF ITALY.

“PARIS, 3rd March, 1809.

“MY SON,—Cesarotti has left behind him a history of the popes ; ask for information about that work, and if it tends to make known the harm which popes have done to religion and to Christianity, have it published without delay.

“NAPOLEON.”

On the next day the Emperor wrote to his vassals in Germany once more saying that the news from Vienna was of such a character that it was necessary to prepare their contingents without delay.

TO KING LOUIS OF HOLLAND.

“PARIS, 6th March, 1809.

“I hasten to inform you that I have deemed fit to create the Prince Napoleon Louis, your son, Grand Duke of Berg.

“NAPOLEON.”

King Louis was much vexed at this creation, made without consulting him, and by which his son became an independent prince.

On the 20th February, Saragossa fell after a resistance so heroic as to render the name of that unfortunate city for ever memorable. It is a stain upon the character of Marshal Lannes who at last took the place, that he at once violated the terms of the capitulation, and had two of Saragossa's most gallant defenders executed. An attempt was afterwards made to prove that there was no capitulation ; but King Joseph writing to Napoleon on the 27th

February, said that he had received the act of capitulation which was published in the *Madrid Gazette*. In reply to this letter, Napoleon wrote, on the 11th March—"My brother, I have read the article in the *Madrid Gazette* giving an account of the taking of Saragossa. In it those who defended that city are praised. Of a truth this is strange policy! There is certainly not a Frenchman who has not the greatest contempt for the defenders of Saragossa." And consequently the *Moniteur* had orders to run down Palafox, who was overwhelmed with abuse and accused of cowardice—Palafox, who was found dying in Saragossa, who was sent a prisoner to France, and thrown into Vincennes where he remained till the fall of the Empire. The only wonder is that his life was spared.

TO KING JOSEPH OF SPAIN.

"PARIS, 16th March, 1809.

"I cannot understand how it comes that the pay is in arrear. I have, however, a good deal of money at Bayonne. How is it that the paymaster does not forward it? He must be a dolt.

"Everything betokens war. Russia is with us against England, Spain (so called), Austria, and Turkey.

"NAPOLEON."

TO COMTE DE CHAMPAGNY.

"LA MALMAISON, 21st March, 1809.

". . . Write to Caulaincourt and let him know the true state of affairs. You will send him the proclamation of Prince Charles, which is a sort of declaration of war, and you will inclose the four last despatches which you have received from Munich and Vienna. You must tell Caulaincourt that the Russian *chargé d'affaires* at Vienna ought to receive orders to leave that capital should the Austrian troops leave their territory. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO KING LOUIS OF HOLLAND.

"LA MALMAISON, 21st *March*, 1809.

"I have received your letter of the 6th. War appears imminent. The best thing you can do is to assemble as many troops as possible, so as to be able to defend your country, and to be of some use to the common cause. This is the first time that you have asked my advice. Had you asked it sooner I should have counselled you not to disband your army; I should have repeated that nothing was terminated in Europe, and that while you were disarming I was calling up more conscripts and reinforcing my army by 150,000 men. . . . Austria has received subsidies from England, and thinks that she can attack me because my troops are in Spain. . . . She is rushing to destruction. However, hold your troops ready.

"NAPOLEON."

On the 20th March the Emperor addressed page after page of instructions to Berthier for the march on Vienna.

Writing to General Clarke on the 1st April, the Emperor sent orders for the concentration of his troops in Spain, where for the moment he intended to content himself with holding Madrid and keeping communications open between that capital and Bayonne. Although the total destruction of Romana had been several times announced, the attention of King Joseph was to be called to the fact that if Romana continued any longer to hold his own between Galicia, Portugal, and Old Castile, mischief might ensue; that if Romana were not destroyed, the English might land at Vigo and seriously compromise Marshal Ney.

TO MURAT, KING OF NAPLES.

"PARIS, 5th *April*, 1809.

"I have given orders for Roman affairs to be settled and for that nest of insurrection to be destroyed. The correspondence between the agents of the court of Rome and

the English prove that the pope is using his influence to excite the Italians. On the receipt of this letter despatch some columns to the frontier, to march afterwards with the rapidity of lightning on Rome. I have given the same orders in Tuscany. Let Salicetti remain in Rome to advise General Miollis, who is to organise a new government. You can give assurances that the pope shall remain a bishop, and will no longer meddle with temporal affairs.

“NAPOLEON.”

Sister Eliza, who was now Grand Duchess of Tuscany, was no more allowed the absolute control of that country than other members of the family the control of the countries over which they were supposed to rule. In March Napoleon sent his sister a present of one Dubois, a police inspector, who was to reside in Florence, and in April she was informed that the isle of Elba, which was in her government, would form part of the twenty-ninth military division. On the 6th April the Emperor thus addressed the grand duchess:—

“MY SISTER,—Take care that no kind of gambling be permitted at Florence. I do not allow any either at Turin or in any portion of the empire; it causes the ruin of families and sets a bad example. I tolerate it only in Paris, because in that immense city it cannot be prevented, and because it is turned to account by the police. But I will not permit gambling in any other portion of my empire.”

TO MARSHAL BERNADOTTE, AT DRESDEN.

“PARIS, 8th April, 1809

“I have received your letter. The unfortunate King of Sweden finished as every one thought he would. The major-general has no doubt informed you of the extent of your command, and what you are to do in the event of hostilities which will break out without a declaration of war.

“NAPOLEON.”

On the 10th April, writing to King Joseph, the Emperor said that the King of Sweden had been deposed, and that the Duke of Sundumania had sued for peace. . . . Sweden was obliged in the end to consent to very large territorial sacrifices and to adopt the continental system. The king had been superseded by his uncle for wishing to go on with a hopeless war.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER, AT AUGSBURG.

“PARIS, 12th April, 1809.

“It appears from a letter by Otto that the Austrians have crossed the Inn and declared war. I presume that you are at Augsburg, and that you have centralised all my army on the Lech. . . . I shall be at Strasburg on the 14th.

“NAPOLEON.”

Berthier did not get to Augsburg until the 16th, a matter which sadly compromised the campaign.

In Prince Metternich's *Memoirs* we find the following, which strongly contrasts with the dilatory way in which things were conducted in Austria where there were no telegraphs. Poor Josephine little thought, as she stepped into the carriage, that the result of the campaign just opened would be her divorce, and the marriage of Napoleon with the Archduchess Marie Louise, then lying ill at Vienna.

METTERNICH TO STADION.

“PARIS, 18th April, 1809.

“The Emperor, warned by telegraph at 10 P.M. on the 12th April of the crossing of the Inn by the Austrian army, five hours afterwards was on the road to Strasburg, which he reached on the 15th. The Empress, aroused by the noise in the apartments of the Emperor, went up stairs and implored permission to accompany him; her Majesty set out, followed by a single lady's maid. . . .”

On the 15th the Emperor wrote from Strasburg to his foreign minister, telling him to have articles written in the papers showing the base conduct of Austria in attacking France when she declared that she desired to remain on the defensive, and before the legations had been recalled. He was to see that Prince Metternich did not escape.

On the 17th Napoleon was at Donauworth, where he issued the following proclamation to the army :—

“Soldiers! the territory of the Confederation has been violated. The Austrian general wishes us to fly at the sight of his arms, and that we should abandon our allies. I arrive in the midst of you with the rapidity of the eagle.¹

“Soldiers! I was surrounded by you when the sovereign of Austria came to my bivouac in Moravia. You heard

¹ STRENGTH OF RIVAL FORCES.

French.

Lannes	50,000 men.
Davoust	60,000 „
Massena	50,000 „
Lefebvre	40,000 „
Angereau	20,000 „
Bernadotte	50,000 „
King Jerome	12,000 „
Bessières	20,000 „
The Guard	22,000 „
Army of Italy	100,000 „
	<hr/>
	424,000 „

Austrians.

Archduke John	50,000 men.
Archduke Ferdinand	40,000 „
Archduke Charles	180,000 „
Two detachments	20,000 „
	<hr/>
	290,000 „

The militia in Hungary and round Vienna, 150,000.

him implore my clemency and swear eternal friendship. Conquerors in three wars, Austria owes everything to our generosity ; three times she has perjured herself! Our past successes are a certain guarantee of the victory which awaits us. Let us march then, and at our sight the enemy will recognise its conquerors."

TO MARSHAL MASSENA.

"VOHBURG, 20th April, 1809.

"The reports received this morning show that the enemy is retreating as fast as he can. The battle-field is covered with dead. . . . I am about to get on horseback in order to examine the situation, to attack the enemy if he occupies certain positions, and to pursue him if he is falling back. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO THE KING OF SAXONY.

"ROHE, 21st April, 1809.

"I wrote to your Majesty from the field of battle. The days of the 19th and 20th were for the Austrian army what the day of Jena was for the Prussians. . . . If you have not left Dresden I think you can remain there in security. I shall shortly be in Vienna. God has been pleased to grant a startling protection to the justice of my cause, and to punish the ingratitude and perfidy of the court of Austria.

"NAPOLEON."

In a proclamation to the army it was declared that all the corps of the Austrian army were crushed ; that twenty generals had been killed or wounded ; one archduke killed, and two wounded, and 30,000 prisoners captured.

Napoleon had gained some decisive advantages, and had entirely repaired the blunders of his lieutenants, but still his bulletin was a tissue of exaggerations.

In another proclamation, dated from Ratisbon, 24th April, the Emperor said—

"Soldiers! You have justified my expectations. You have made up for numbers by your bravery. You have gloriously shown the difference which exists between the soldiers of Cæsar and the armed mob of Xerxes. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

In his first bulletin to the army of Germany, the Emperor related the successes gained at Thann, Abensberg, Landshut, Echmul, and Ratisbon. There was, however, one gloomy spot in the picture, Prince Eugene and his Italians had been beaten. On the 30th, Napoleon, in a long letter to his stepson, said—"War is a serious game in which one may compromise the reputation of one's country. . . . I know that in Italy you affected to despise Massena; if I had sent him there, what has happened would never have occurred. Massena has military talents before which one must bow the head; one must forget his defects, for all men have some. I ought to have sent Massena to Italy, and have given you the command of the cavalry under him. . . . If circumstances become pressing, you should write to the King of Naples [Murat] to join the army. He might hand over the government to the queen. . . ."

TO THE EMPRESS JOSEPHINE.

"ENNS, 6th May, 1809.

"MY FRIEND,—I have received your letter. The bullet which touched me did not wound me. It barely shaved the tendon Achilles. My health is very good; you are wrong to feel uneasy. My affairs are going on well here. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

Napoleon had not been wounded since the siege of Toulon, when he received a slight prod from a British bayonet.

TO PRINCE CAMBACÉRÈS.

“SCHÖENBRUNN, *12th May*, 1809.

MY COUSIN,—We have entered Vienna. The order of the day will acquaint you with the state of affairs; you can have it printed and read in all the theatres.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO COMTE DE CHAMPAGNY.

“SCHÖENBRUNN, *12th May*, 1809.

“We are masters of Vienna. As you are at Munich, come on here, but do not allow it to be supposed that there is any question of peace. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

The next day Napoleon wrote to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, saying—“You must give orders for Prince Metternich to be escorted here by the gendarmery, so that he may be exchanged against the French legation, which was arrested and sent to Pesth.

In the seventh bulletin the Emperor gave an account of the capitulation of Vienna. A month after the Austrian army passed the Inn, he was at the gates of the capital which was commanded by the Archduke Maximilian, a presumptuous young prince, who had opened registers to receive the names of the inhabitants who wished to defend the city. Only thirty individuals inscribed their names; all the others refused with indignation. . . . The Duc de Montebello (Lannes) sent an aide-de-camp to summon the city to surrender, but some butchers and other low ruffians, satellites of the archduke, fell upon him and wounded him. The archduke ordered the wretch who committed this crime to be taken through the city in triumph, mounted on the horse of the French officer. . . . During the bombardment the archduke lost his head. As weak and pusillanimous as he had been arrogant, he was the first to fly. It was only by the flight of the

archduke that the respectable General O'Reilly learned that he was invested with the command of the place. . . .

In a proclamation to the army of the same date, Napoleon said that—

“The princes of the House of Lorraine have abandoned their capital, not like honourable soldiers yielding to circumstances and the reverses of war, but like perjurers pursued by remorse. In flying from Vienna, their adieux to the inhabitants were murder and conflagration; like Medea, they strangled their children with their own hands. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

An order of the day, dated the 14th May, opened thus:—“The Emperor is sorry to see the disorders committed in the rear of the army; they are such as to attract his whole attention. Bad men endeavour to dishonour the army, and instead of serving with their colours and against the enemy, they remain in the rear, where they commit all kinds of excesses, and even crimes.” And his Majesty had to form a military commission for each column to punish mauraunders.

On the same day another letter was addressed to the librarian Barbier, who had forwarded to his Majesty a number of works, which he found useless. Instead of an *Æneide* and a Milton in verse, he asked for those works in prose; a Tacitus in French, the *Memoirs of de Retz*, a selection of Madame de Sevigne's *Letters*, a Gibbon, a Tasso in Italian and French, a Camoënis, Diodorus Siculus, a poem called *La Pitié* and *Gil Blas*.

On the 15th May Napoleon addressed a proclamation to the Hungarians, in which he said—“I have entered the capital of Austria, and am on your frontiers. It is the Emperor of Austria, and not the King of Hungary, who declared war against me; by your constitution he could not do so without your consent. . . . Hungarians, the

moment has come for you to recover your independence. I offer you peace, the integrity of your territory, &c., &c."

On the 17th May, Champagny was directed to draw up a note for the senate, proving that when Charlemagne made the popes temporal sovereigns, he intended them to remain vassals of the empire, and that now they refuse even to form part of it; that Charlemagne, in his generosity towards the popes, had in view the welfare of Christianity, and that to-day they form alliances with Protestants and the enemies of Christianity, . . . that the chief of the Catholic religion negotiates with Protestants, whereas by the laws of the Church he ought to excommunicate them. (There is a prayer to this effect, which is recited at Rome.)

And after a long letter in the usual tone of menace and invective, mixed up with historical precedents, there came a decree.

Art. 1. The Papal States are united to the French Empire.

Art. 2. The city of Rome, so celebrated as the first seat of Christianity, is declared a free and imperial city.

Art. 3. The remains of the monuments raised by the Romans, shall be preserved and kept in repair at our expense.

Art. 4. The public debt is converted into an imperial debt, and the Pope was not only to enjoy a revenue of 80,000*l.* a year, but was to pay no taxes, &c.

On the same day Napoleon wrote to his Minister of Finance on the subject of the organisation and administration of the Papal States. The decrees were to be kept a secret. Among other things his Majesty said—"You must see that the Pope is treated with the greatest respect. You must leave him his furniture, his pictures, his jewels, and such palaces and property as he wishes to keep. But you must tolerate no opposition. It is not my intention to derive any pecuniary benefit out of Rome. . . . I shall have a palace there. . . . The tribunals must

be organised at once, as well as the marine. You must arrange with the War Minister respecting the organisation of the artillery and engineers, and all that concerns the army."

On the 18th the Emperor wrote a long note on connecting the Louvre with the Tuileries, a work carried out by Napoleon III. He remarked in this note that—"The court resides very little in Paris. The Tuileries and the Louvre arranged will suffice to lodge the sovereigns of France and the foreign sovereigns who may visit them."

As a fact, the palace of the Tuileries, from the time of its construction to the time of its destruction, was seldom inhabited by the court. The Bourbons all disliked Paris, and built Versailles, while Napoleon infinitely preferred St. Cloud or Fontainebleau, where he could stroll about the grounds.

TO GENERAL CLARKE.

"EBERSDORF, 19th May, 1809.

"You have greatly alarmed Paris about the affairs of Prussia. Even if it were true that she had attacked us, Prussia is of no consequence, and could be easily subdued. . . . You have not shown yourself sufficiently prudent in this matter. It creates a bad effect when a power thinks that I am not in a position to fight. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

On the same day, in his ninth bulletin to the army, the Emperor explained the position of the two hostile forces, and said that he was throwing a bridge across the Danube two leagues below Vienna. On the 23rd May he issued another bulletin, in which he described the desperate fighting at Essling and Aspern. It was all over, he said, with the Austrian army when he learned that his bridges across the Danube had been carried away. "The enemy was in the most terrible disorder when he learned that the bridges were broken." "The French remained masters of

the field." The loss of the enemy he set down at 12,000; his own at 1,100 killed and 3,000 wounded. A touching description was then given of the death of Marshal Lannes, who had his legs carried away by a round-shot. On seeing the Emperor he threw his arms round his neck, exclaiming—"In an hour you will have lost one who dies with the glory, and in the conviction of having been, and of being, your best friend." The fighting had lasted for two days, and although the French were obliged to retreat to the isle of Loban, Napoleon claimed the victory.

According to the Archduke Charles, the Austrians lost over 20,000 men in killed and wounded, while 7,000 Frenchmen were buried on the field of battle, and 30,000 were taken into hospital at Vienna.

It was the custom of Napoleon, as before remarked, to place in the mouth of each officer of distinction who fell on the field of battle some last words flattering to himself. Lanfrey, in his *History of Napoleon*, thinks it far more likely that Lannes, instead of pronouncing the words attributed to him in the bulletin, upbraided the Emperor for his ambition, and for gambling away the lives of those who served him. This was the tale which the friends of Lannes told the doctor who embalmed him; and it gathers probability, not only from the fact of the habitual misrepresentations of Napoleon, but because it is well known that at the epoch in question most of the imperial marshals were tired of constantly fighting, and wished to enjoy their hardly-earned, if ill-gotten, spoils.

TO THE EMPRESS, AT STRASBURG.

"EBERSDORF, 27th May, 1809.

"I send you a page to say that Eugene has joined me with all his army, that he has perfectly fulfilled his mission, and has almost entirely destroyed the army opposed to him. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

On the 31st the Emperor sent Fouché a letter in which he said—

“The Danube is still rising. I am busy on the left bank constructing impregnable works. . . . I am not yet sufficiently sure of my bridges to attack and overthrow the army of Prince Charles. . . . I have formed my junction with the army of Italy, which obtained some great successes on the road. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

In his fourteenth bulletin, dated the 1st June, Napoleon was able to announce that his bridges were complete. He also said—“Vienna is tranquil. There is an abundance of bread and wine, but meat, which was drawn from Hungary, is scarce. Contrary to all political reasons and all motives of humanity, the enemy do all that is possible to starve their countrymen. . . . This is far from the conduct of our Henri IV., who fed Paris while he was besieging it.”¹

On the 3rd June the War Minister was directed to write to the King of Spain, saying that the Emperor could not understand his inactivity, and calling upon him not to allow Marshal Soult to be overwhelmed.

Writing to General Clarke on the 7th June, Napoleon complained bitterly of Marshal Jourdan, and said that he could foresee catastrophes. “The English,” he added, “have been allowed time to re-form an army at Lisbon. The staff has been guilty of the culpable negligence of leaving Soult three months without communications. . . . The indolence of the staff in Spain is such that it remained for months without any communication with Marshal Ney. . . . It is difficult to conceive such incapacity. . . . An army is nothing without a head, and it must be admitted that there is none in Spain. . . . The English alone

¹ In another bulletin, written at the end of the month, it is said—“Vienna is abundantly supplied with meat.”

are redoubtable. Alone, if the army be not better commanded, they will, before long, bring about a catastrophe." . . .

On the 9th June the Emperor wrote to King Jerome to reassure him on the subject of an apprehended attack on the part of the English, the Duke of Brunswick, and the raids of "that brigand Schill." In this letter Napoleon said—

"Before making a movement one must see clear. . . . Experience will teach you to distinguish between rumours spread by the enemy and facts. Never, during the sixteen years that I have commanded, have I given a counter order to a regiment, because I always wait until an affair is ripe, and that I can understand it before beginning operations. . . . Exercise your troops ; make yourself loved for your economy, order, and a certain good nature, which is the character of the Germans."

Writing again to his brother on the 12th, the Emperor said—"I have not yet received your account of the death of Schill, and the capture of his band."

On the 12th June Napoleon gave orders for the corps of Marmont, Soult, and Ney to operate together and to drive the English into the sea. The command of this force of 50,000 or 60,000 men was given to Soult. If the junction could be rapidly formed it was the opinion of the Emperor that the English might be exterminated and the affairs of Spain brought to a close.

TO THE EMPRESS.

"SCHÖENBRUNN, 16th June, 1809.

"I send you a page to announce that on the 14th, the anniversary of Marengo, Eugene gained a battle over the Archduke John, captured 3,000 men, several guns, four colours, and pursued the enemy a long distance on the road to Buda.

"NAPOLEON."

TO GENERAL CLARKE.

“SCHÖENBRUNN, 17th June, 1809.

“I reply to your letter concerning Carnot and the unfortunate state of his affairs. If he had merely helped to relieve Manberige he would have been entitled to my gratitude and interest. As Minister of War he has a right to a pension. . . . I shall make no difficulty about employing him as he wishes. Let me know the nature of his embarrassments, and what must be done to get him out of them.

“NAPOLEON.”

Carnot, entirely ruined, had applied to General Clarke for employment in the army.

On the 21st the Emperor found time to write a few lines on the subject of Spain to his War Minister. In a post-script his Majesty said—“It appears that the English are being reinforced in Portugal. It is from thence that evil will come if they do not manœuvre well at Madrid.”

In a letter to the King of Bavaria, of the 22nd June, the Emperor said that he had heard of a good many pamphlets being circulated at Nuremberg. And this in spite of the execution of the unfortunate Palm!

Writing to General Clarke on the 27th, the Emperor said—

“You announce the departure of forty-eight artillery cadets, and only fifty remain. . . . All my staffs here are empty, and I shall be obliged, in default of officers, to take the senior sergeants, who are not worth them. . . . It was useless to speak in the *Moniteur* of the artillery broken and lost: that was good only to excite our numerous enemies against us.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO COMTE FOUCHÉ.

"SCHNENBRUNN, 30th June, 1809.

"See who it is influences the Prussian ambassador. It is impossible to conceive the stupidities and the infamies which he sends to his court. Is this man a fool, or cunning, or is he the sport of some Paris intriguer? He writes to Berlin that my affairs are in a desperate condition, and that the discontent in France is at its height; and all this in order to prevent Prussia from paying me. This man must be a fool or very malevolent.

"NAPOLEON."

On the 2nd July appeared the order for passing the Danube dated from *Ile Napoleon*, and the next day, in the twenty-fourth bulletin the Emperor wrote:—"At last the Danube no longer exists for the French army; General Bertrand has executed works which excite astonishment and which inspire admiration. . . . Now that the passage of the Danube is assured, the fate of the Austrian monarchy will be decided in one affair. . . . Prince Gargarine, aide-de-camp to the Czar has arrived. He brought the news of the march of the Russian army in Galicia."

As a matter of fact the Russians did nothing. As Napoleon complained they allowed the Archduke Ferdinand to take Warsaw under their eyes, while General Gortschakoff actually wrote a letter to the Austrian prince congratulating him on his success.

TO THE EMPRESS JOSEPHINE.

"EBERSDORF, 7th July, 1809.

"I send a page to give you the good news of the victory which I gained at Enzersdorf on the 5th, and that of Wagram gained on the 6th.

"The army of the enemy is flying in disorder. Everything is going on according to my wishes. Eugene is well.

Prince Aldobrandini is slightly wounded ; Bessières had his thigh grazed by a round-shot. Lasalle was killed. My losses were heavy, but the victory was decisive and complete. We have taken over a hundred guns, twelve colours, and a large number of prisoners. I am burned by the sun. Adieu, my friend, I embrace you. A great many things to Hortense.

“ NAPOLEON.”

According to Savary, Jomini, and other authorities, the Austrians did not fly in disorder, but fell back unmolested, leaving behind them no other trophies than a few thousand wounded men and some dismounted guns. In his twenty-fifth bulletin, written upon the 8th July, Napoleon set down the Austrians at 60,000 men ; he captured, he said, 20,000 prisoners, ten flags, and forty guns !

In a letter to General Clarke of the 8th July, Napoleon said :—“ As for Spanish affairs, write to Madrid that the *coup de Jarnac* will come from the English unless matters be better managed. I tremble lest the English *debouchant* from Portugal by Abrantes should surprise the King at Madrid by concealing their movements.”

On the 9th July Napoleon wrote a friendly letter to the Czar announcing his victory over the Austrians and at the same time orders were sent to Caulaincourt to complain of the traitorous conduct of Prince Galitzen in refusing to succour Sandomir, an act which made Napoleon doubt the sincerity of the Russian alliance.

On the 13th July a suspension of arms was agreed upon, and the same day the Emperor wrote a circular to the French bishops, ordering thanksgivings for his victories and referring to his quarrels with the Pope. He said :—“ Our Lord Jesus Christ, although sprung from the blood of David, did not desire any temporal power ; He wished on the contrary that Cæsar should be obeyed in matters concerning this world. He was animated only by His great

object the redemption and salvation of souls. The heir to the power of Cæsar, we are resolved to maintain the independence of our throne and the integrity of our rights." . . .

TO THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORSHIP.

"SCHÖENBRUNN, 15th July, 1809.

"The bull of excommunication is so ridiculous a document that it does not deserve attention. What does deserve attention is to provide for the vacant sees. It is necessary to know what the Pope intends doing . . . if he does not confirm the bishops according to the terms of the concordat he will create a schism in the Church. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

The excommunication had long been drawn up, but Pius VII. was afraid to fulminate it until at last persuaded to do so by Cardinal Pacca. He then declared that "The dark designs of the enemies of the apostolic see have at length been accomplished."

"After the violent and unjust spoliation of the fairest and most considerable portion of our dominions . . . we find ourselves entirely stripped of our temporal sovereignty. . . .

"We reject with the firmest resolution any allowance which the Emperor of the French may intend to assign us," &c., &c.

Afterwards followed the excommunication—

"By the authority of God Almighty and of St. Paul and of St. Peter, we declare you, and all your co-operators, in the act of violence which you are executing, to have incurred the same excommunication which in our apostolic letters we declared to have been incurred by all those who, on the invasion of this city on the 2nd February last year, were guilty of acts of violence." . . .

TO THE KING OF DENMARK.

"SCHÖENBRUNN, 15th July, 1809.

"I have received your Majesty's letter of the 6th. I had anticipated it by thanking you for the proof you gave me of your friendship by sending troops against Schill. I was much pleased with this attention on the part of your Majesty, as also with the good conduct and gallantry displayed by the Danish troops. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO KING LOUIS OF HOLLAND.

"SCHÖENBRUNN, 17th July, 1809.

"You complain of an article in a newspaper; it is France which has reason to complain of the ill-feeling which reigns in Holland. It would be easy for me to name all the Dutch houses which are the trumpeters of England. Your custom-house regulations are badly executed, and all the correspondence of England with the Continent passes through Holland. It may not be your fault, but it is not the less true that Holland is an English province.

"NAPOLEON."

TO COMTE FOUCHÉ.

"SCHÖENBRUNN, 18th July, 1809.

"I have received at the same time the two inclosed letters from General Miollis. I am sorry that the Pope was arrested; it was a great piece of folly. Cardinal Pacca should have been arrested and the Pope allowed to remain quietly at Rome. But there is no remedy; what is done is done.

"I don't know what Prince Borghese has done, but my intention is that the Pope shall not enter France. The best place for him will be at Savona. There is a large house there where he will be comfortable . . . I shall not oppose his return to Rome if his madness be passed. . . .

Let Cardinal Pacca be thrown into Fenestrelle, and inform him that if a single Frenchman be assassinated at his instigation he shall pay for it with his head.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO MARSHAL LEFEBVRE.

“SCHÖENBRUNN, 20th July, 1809.

“You know my intentions concerning an expedition into the Tyrol. I wish you to be at Inspruck on the 1st August. No ridiculous proclamations; be severe; disarm the country; take a large number of hostages and make examples. Act with as much celerity as you can.

“NAPOLEON.”

The war with France was more popular in the Tyrol than anywhere, the people being anxious to shake off the hated Bavian yoke and to be once more united to Austria. It was not until peace had been concluded at Vienna that the French were able to break the resistance of the gallant mountaineers and to capture Hofer.

It will be remembered how anxious Napoleon was that no one should make away with the crown jewels in Spain.

TO COMTE FOUCHÉ.

“SCHÖENBRUNN, 21st July, 1809.

“I see that there is some question of the casket of diamonds belonging to Don Antonio. I should like to have a list of these in order to see if they do not belong to the crown jewels of Spain, which cannot be found. King Charles swears that he left them in Spain. These diamonds are worth about 50,000,000 francs. Have this matter examined, it is most important.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA.

“SCHÖENBRUNN, 22nd July, 1809.

“Prince Leichstenstein has handed me your Majesty’s letter, in which you inform me that that you have appointed negotiators to treat for peace. On my side I have given my instructions and full powers to Comte de Champagne. . . . If the fourth treaty of peace succeeding those of Campo Formio, Luneville and Presburg, can be the last, secure in a durable manner the tranquillity of the Continent and protect it from the clamours and intrigues of England, I shall regard this moment as most fortunate ; for, in the four wars which your Majesty had waged against France, the three last were superfluous, and advantageous only to England.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO PRINCE CAMBACÉRÈS

“SCHÖENBRUNN, 23rd July, 1809.

“It was without my orders and against my will that the Pope was arrested. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

When M. de Champagne was setting out to meet the Austrian commissioners the Emperor handed him a wonderful note. He was to make the following declaration :—

“France has always desired the peace of the Continent, as England has always found it to her interest to foment trouble, divisions and war.

“After the peace of Presburg, that of Tilsit and the expedition to Copenhagen, England could find no other expedient for troubling the continental system established than by wresting Spain from the French alliance, well knowing that France would consider a change of system in Spain as equivalent to a declaration of war. All the efforts of the cabinet of London failed in presence of the constant

friendship of Charles IV. That cabinet then conceived and executed the horrible plan of arming a son against his father. . . . However, all Spain was up in arms and French troops had to be sent there. It was then that the court of Vienna deemed the moment favourable to break the treaty of Presburg. . . . France never envied any of the Austrian possessions. In three successive wars she restored immense territories without any compensation. She hoped in exchange for this moderation to have earned the friendship and gratitude of the sovereign of Austria. The same generosity which the Emperor showed at Presburg he is willing to show again. But his Majesty owes it to his subjects to make sure that the cabinet of Vienna really desires peace and not simply to create a diversion in favour of England."

In a "note" to Cambacérès, dated August 2nd, we see it stated that—"His Majesty has reserved for himself property in Spain. He has reserved [for himself in Germany numerous estates, &c. He has also reserved for himself in the kingdom of Italy and Naples rights having an important value." After pages of details this memorandum goes on :—"It is indispensable to introduce law and order into this mass of property which his Majesty has reserved for himself, which he has given, or intends to give, to his distinguished servants." . .

On the 3rd in a letter to Davoust the Emperor said :—"The enemy is said to be forming an intrenched camp in front of Olmutz ; he has evacuated Bohemia and is marching into Hungary." And in a letter to Bertrand he spoke of placing Vienna in a state of defence in the event of hostilities recommencing.

TO COMTE FOUCHÉ.

"SCHÖENBRUNN, 6th August, 1809.

"I wish that Cardinal Pacca had been arrested at Rome and that they had left the Pope alone. I wish that as the Pope was not left at Genoa that he had been

conveyed to Savona, but since he is at Grenoble I should regret to learn that he has been sent to Savona ; it would be better to keep him at Grenoble as he is there ; it would seem to be trifling with the old man. I did not authorise Cardinal Fesch to send any one to his holiness. I simply informed the minister of public worship that I wished Cardinal Maury and other prelates to write to the Pope saying that if he renounced the Concordat, I, on my side, should consider it null and void. I suppose that you have sent Cardinal Pacca to Fenestrelle. I make a great distinction between him and the Pope, first on account of his position, and then as regards his moral virtues. The Pope is a good man, but ignorant and fanatical. Cardinal Pacca is a well-informed man and a scamp, an enemy to France who deserves no consideration. As soon as I know where the Pope is I shall adopt definitive measures. Be it understood that if you have already allowed him to start for Savona you must not make him return."

Numerous letters were now written on the subject of the Walcheren expedition, which was frequently characterised by Napoleon as a mad and suicidal act on the part of England. On the 6th August he remarked in a letter to Clarke :—" After the advantages which we have gained here I presume that the French will not allow themselves to be insulted by 20,000 Englishmen. I cannot see what the English can do ; they will not be able to take Flushing, as the dykes can be cut. They will not take the squadron, because it can go up to Antwerp."

And again the next day :—" It appears to me that the enemy is intent upon taking the isle of Walcheren. I have ordered General Monnet if he be hard pressed to cut the dykes. Reiterate this order. . . . Flushing cannot be taken, as Monnet can put everything under water."

The day afterwards :—" If the English invest and besiege Flushing I see no means of driving them away by force, Flushing must find safety in inundating the island."

Again on the 9th: "To speak confidentially it is possible, when all this is terminated, that I shall occupy the coasts of Holland in order to close her ports to the English. . . With his force General Rampon could not drive off the English; he would be beaten. Fever and inundation will render an account of the English. . . . As long as they remain in the isle of Walcheren there is nothing to fear. They will lose two months in front of Flushing; fever and inundation will do the rest. . . . Allow them to lash their buttocks in the marshes and pursue the shadow of a prey." . . .

And to Cambacérès on the 10th: "I regret that you have made so little use of the powers I gave you. . . . Do not allow the English to capture you in bed. . . .

An angry letter to the same effect was addressed to General Clarke, who was directed, if the English made any progress, to raise 30,000 more national guards. "It is evident that the English wish to capture my squadron and Antwerp."

Napoleon, on taking the field against Austria, had left the reins of government in the hands of Fouché, Cambacérès, and Clarke. When the English landed in Holland the two latter were afraid to assume a responsibility which Fouché unhesitatingly took on his shoulders, calling out the national guard in the north of France and confiding the command of the army in Holland to Bernadotte.

TO GENERAL CLARKE.

"SCHÖENBRUNN, 7th August, 1809.

"You send me no news about Spain. The king, on the 25th July, wrote that General Wellesley had arrived at Talavera with 25,000 Englishmen, and had formed his junction with Cuesta.

"It is unfortunate that Marshal Soult should have manœuvred so badly, and not have joined the king. I

hope that the king, with 55,000 men, has taken up a position so as to foil any attempt upon Madrid, and that he will order Soult to join him ; he will then have more than 100,000 men. This will be a fine opportunity for giving the English a lesson, and for finishing the war.

“ NAPOLEON.”

On the 18th August Napoleon addressed this short epistle to General Clarke—“I see that there are no letters from Spain to-day. I am anxious for news from that country, and to learn the movements of Marshal Soult. What a fine opportunity has been lost ! 30,000 English at 150 leagues from the coast in front of 100,000 of the best troops in the world ! My God ! what it is to have an army without a chief !”

In a letter of the 20th August, addressed to Champagny, the Emperor said—“As for Spain things are going on well ; Soult is on the rear of the English, who are retreating. The King of Spain is at Toledo. In the battle of Talavera the English had a third of their army put *hors de combat*. They lost 10,000 men.”

The next day, in a letter to his War Minister, Napoleon wrote—“Inform Marshal Jourdan that I am extremely displeased with the inaccuracies and falsehoods contained in his reports of the 26th, 27th, 28th, and 29th July, and that this is the first time in which the government has been so trifled with. He said on the 28th that he had seized upon the field of battle at Talavera, while subsequent reports show that we were repulsed the whole day long. Tell him that this infidelity towards the government is a regular crime, and that this crime might have had fatal results, as the news that the English had been beaten was about to influence my determinations. . . . He may say what he likes in the journal of Madrid, but he has no right to disguise the truth from the government.”

Wellington has been censured for having plunged reck-

lessly into Spain, and for gaining a victory which led to no results.

Napoleon, after blaming the conduct of Soult, said that his march on Placencia was dangerous because the other army beaten at Talavera compromised the security of all his armies in Spain. "While the English had nothing to fear, as in three hours' time they could place themselves behind the Tagus ; and whether they repassed the river at Talavera, at Almaraz, or elsewhere, they had their line of operation on Badajoz secure.

"My best troops and the fate of Spain have therefore been compromised by ignorance of the rules of war, and this without the chance of obtaining any result in case of success. . . . On reaching Talavera, they knew that they were in presence of the English army, and it was the greatest absurdity to have attacked it, without first reconnoitring. . . . My troops were led to the shambles. . . . Having resolved to deliver battle, the attack was weakly made, since my arms have undergone an affront, and that 12,000 in reserve [told off to watch the Spaniards] never fired a shot. . . . It required the union of all these faults for an army like my army of Spain to be braved by 30,000 English ; but as long as they will attack good troops, like the English, in good positions, without making sure that they can be carried, my men will be led to death to no purpose."

In a second letter to Champagny, dated the 24th August, and containing instructions for the French ambassador at St. Petersburg, Napoleon wrote—"You must give M. de Caulaincourt news of the Dutch and Spanish expeditions. You must tell him that the English have been beaten in Spain, although they claim the victory ; and that the proof is, Lord Wellesley has returned to Portugal."

The same day, in a letter to the War Minister, his Majesty said—"You will find inclosed a report from General Sebastiani, forwarded to me by the King of Spain. As soon as I receive that of Marshal Victor, I

shall see what will be suitable to put in the *Moniteur*. You will see by the report of the English General Wellesley, that we lost twenty guns and three flags. Express my astonishment to the king, and my displeasure to Marshal Jourdan, that they send me *carmagnoles* instead of telling me the truth. Who were the gunners who abandoned their pieces, the infantry divisions who allowed themselves to be captured? . . .”

One must turn to the pages of Comte Miot de Melito, who was at Madrid when the battle of Talavera was fought, to realise the panic which reigned in that city, and which would have been justified had Cuesta seconded the efforts of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and had the Junta of Seville not delayed the march of Venegas.¹ Some of the partisans of Joseph took refuge in the Retiro, while the court and the foreign ministers fled to St. Ildefonso. As for the population of Madrid, it crowded to the gates to welcome the victorious armies, and it was not for more than a week that this alarm subsided. The count admits, and so does Lanfrey, that the the British army had to bear nearly the entire brunt of Talavera, and the latter writer very fairly explains the reasons which obliged the British general to fall back after having dealt King Joseph and Marshal Victor so sharp a blow. The letter in which poor Joseph endeavoured to soothe the wrath of his brother contain some curious passages. For instance—

JOSEPH TO NAPOLEON.

“ 31st July, 1809.

“. . . . If I regret anything it is that I did not take the whole English army prisoner. This is what would have happened if daylight had lasted two hours longer on the

¹ Lanfrey says that Venegas was kept inactive at a moment when he might have captured Madrid, and changed the whole face of affairs, and this because the Junta of Seville was jealous of the growing power of Cuesta. Fortunately for the Spaniards, the French commanders were also jealous of each other.

27th." And on the 8th August—" . . . I hope that your Majesty will not be dissatisfied [the British army falling back on Portugal], although I sincerely think that had you been in my place, not a single Englishman would have escaped, and the war in Spain would have been finished ; but I am engaged in a profession which is not learned in a day. . . ."

TO THE COMTE DE CHAMPAGNY.

"SCHÖENBRUNN, 18th August, 1809.

" . . . I send you the despatches from St. Petersburg. There is nothing new. However, you will remark that there is always something obscure as regards the wishes of that cabinet. It might have explained more clearly its intentions with regard to Galicia.

"NAPOLEON."

The fact is, that the French alliance was highly unpopular with the Russians, and there seemed some probability of Alexander sharing the fate of Paul. More than once hostilities had been on the point of breaking out, and but for Wagram they would have broken out in consequence of Napoleon acting with his usual duplicity, and fomenting an insurrection in Galicia.

TO GENERAL CLARKE.

"SCHÖENBRUNN, 24th August, 1809.

"It is repugnant to my feelings to suppose that Flushing has surrendered ; that appears to me impossible. There would be in that conduct an amount of cowardice approaching to treason. Flushing can defend itself as long as it has a morsel of bread. The enemy cannot have destroyed the means of inundation. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

Writing to King Murat on the 27th, Napoleon said that Wellesley had been beaten in Spain, but that he greatly feared Flushing had been taken.

On the 22nd September the Emperor sent orders to the Minister of Marine to station a flotilla in the Gulf of Vado, so as to prevent the Pope escaping by sea. In fact a plot had been discovered for getting his Holiness on board an English frigate, the success of which would have been gall and wormwood to Napoleon.

TO GENERAL CLARKE.

"SCHÖENBRUNN, 4th September, 1809.

"I have seen in the *Moniteur* the details you inserted on the subject of affairs in Spain; they are not sufficient. This manner of enlightening the public does not compensate for the immense relations of the English. You must therefore publish the letters of different generals, effacing all that is intended for the Government only. For example, there are letters from Soult, from Moncey, from Sebastiani, which should be published. Ask Marshal Victor to send you an account of his operations. You must also tell General Senarmont that he has not sent a correct return of his artillery; that the English captured more guns than he admits. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO COMTE FOUCHÉ.

"SCHÖENBRUNN, 5th September, 1809.

"You have no confidence in Abbé de Pradt. I do not know if I told you to distrust that man as the greatest enemy that we can have. He is a profound hypocrite, having neither the morality nor the talent of his condition, and addicted to a kind of intrigue which will one day lead him to the scaffold. I wish you to treat him as usual, and to let this remain secret. . . . I have more than presumptions for believing him to be a diplomatic agent. I had these presumptions before my journey to Spain, which did not hinder me from summoning him there, nor from

seeing him in Paris on my return. I wish to ignore, and I have an interest in ignoring, what I know of the character and intrigues of that man.

“NAPOLEON.”

And consequently the Abbé, who used to style himself the almoner of the god Mars, was employed by Napoleon both in religious and in diplomatic affairs.

On the 6th September Napoleon wrote to the Minister of Police, saying: “I have ordered an inquiry into the surrender of Cayenne, of Fort Desaix, of Martinique, and of Flushing. . . .”

General Monnet was tried and condemned to death by default. The court found:—

“That General Monnet, contrary to his duty, did not fulfil the orders of his Imperial Majesty, in case of being pressed hard by the enemy, to cut the dykes rather than surrender.

“That he surrendered after a bombardment of only thirty-six hours, and when the enemy was still 1,000 yards from the bastion, &c.

“That the general is guilty of cowardice and treason, of extortion and embezzlement, as from the year 1803 to 1806, ten Dutch stivers for each half-anker of gin exported.”

General Monnet, like General Dupont, was reinstated in his rank and honour by Louis XVIII., was degraded again by Napoleon on his return from Elba, and once more reinstated after Waterloo. Some of the charges against him were certainly exaggerated. He did not capitulate until his sea defences had been ruined and every gun bearing on the British fleet silenced, until a lodgment had been effected within musket-shot of the rampart, until the town was on fire in several places while a tempest was raging. Under these circumstances, Monnet, urgently entreated by the inhabitants, surrendered.

TO THE MINISTER OF MARINE.

"SCHÖENBRUNN, 7th September, 1809.

"According to the different accounts of the battle of Trafalgar, Rear-Admiral Dumanoir is accused of not having manœuvred in accordance with signals and the impulse of duty and honour; of not having done all in his power to disengage the centre of our fleet, and particularly the admiral's vessel; of not having attacked the enemy at close quarters, and even of not having approached sufficiently near to take the part in the battle which he should have done; lastly, to have sheered off when able to fight. Being informed that a great number of our officers who were made prisoners have returned to France, we write you the present letter, so that the inquiry we have already ordered may take place without delay. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

TO COMTE FOUCHÉ.

"SCHÖENBRUNN, 11th September, 1809.

"A month's sojourn in the isle of Zeeland has placed half the English army on its back and has exhausted the other half. Without the cowardice of that wretch Monnet, this expedition would have been dishonouring only for the English, and would not have afforded them the shadow of glory.

"I am highly displeased with the Prince of Ponte Corvo [Bernadotte]. The vanity of that man is excessive. I have ordered the War Minister to recall him. His talent is very mediocre. I have no kind of faith in him. He lends a willing ear to all the intriguers which inundate this great capital. During war he is the same. He almost made me lose the battle of Jena; he behaved feebly at Wagram; he was not at Eylau, although he might have been present; and he did not do all he might have done at Austerlitz. . . ."

"NAPOLEON."

On the 14th September Napoleon wrote to Prince Borghese, the husband of his sister Pauline, who was Governor-General of the departments beyond the Alps:—

“I see with pleasure that the Pope gives benedictions and enjoys good health at Savona. Nothing must be neglected in order to render the life of this old man agreeable. I do not wish him to suppose himself in prison. The guard given to the Pope should have all the appearance of a guard of honour. I wish even to place a general officer at the head of it. You might send Cæsar Berthier there to act as governor of the Pope’s household. You can also send a chamberlain to compliment the Pope, and to see that he wants for nothing.

“NAPOLEON.”

On the 15th September Napoleon wrote to Champagny, expressing his discontent that negotiations for peace were not going on rapidly. It was some consolation that in the meantime he was eating and drinking at the expense of the Austrians. He said that he had told M. de Bubna that he could not understand the policy of his court; that they had committed a great fault in offending Prince Charles, who was their best general; that Prince Leichtenstein had no brains; that General Belgarde did not see clear, but that Prince Charles was a skilful commander, who was loved by the troops and enjoyed their confidence. . . .

On the same day Napoleon wrote to the Emperor of Austria a letter, in which he said:—“Of all calamities war is the greatest: woe to those who provoke it! The blood and the tears of the unfortunate will fall upon them;” and professed himself willing to abate some of his demands.

On the 24th September Napoleon announced to M. de Lacépède his intention of creating a new order of knight-

hood, that of the "Three Golden Fleeces," but of this little more was heard.¹ The day following he addressed this note to Josephine:—

"Do not be too confident; I advise you to protect yourself well at night, for one of these nights you will hear a great noise. My health is good; I don't know what people say, but I have not been in better health for years. Corvisart [who had been suddenly sent for] was of no use to me. . . .

"NAPOLEON."

To MARSHAL SOULT, *in command of the Army of Portugal.*

"SCHENBRUNN, 26th September, 1809.

"I am very dissatisfied with your conduct in consequence of this phrase in the circular of the chief of your staff—'The Duc de Dalmatie is to be asked to assume the reins of government, to represent the sovereign, to clothe himself with all the attributes of authority,' &c. &c. This would have been a crime which, in spite of the attachment I bear you, would have obliged me to consider you guilty of *lese-majesty*. . . . How could you have forgotten that the power you exercise over the Portuguese is derived from the command with which I intrusted you?

"In your expedition I have been sorry to see you march on Oporto without having destroyed Romana, to see you remain so long at Oporto without opening communications with Zamora, marching upon Lisbon, or doing something. I have seen with regret that you allowed yourself to be surprised at Oporto, and that my army ran away without fighting, and almost without artillery or baggage. However, after hesitating for a long time, the attachment I bear you, and the services you rendered me at Austerlitz

¹ King Joseph having the Spanish order of the Golden Fleece, Napoleon ordered the institution of the Three Golden Fleeces, but no knights were made.

and elsewhere, have decided me to forget the past, and I confide to you the post of major-general of my armies in Spain, the king having no experience in war.

“NAPOLEON.”

It appears certain that had Soult not been beaten by Wellington that he would have tried to place the crown of Portugal on his own head. At the same time that Napoleon wrote the above letter to the marshal he caused a note to be inserted in the *Moniteur*, saying—“The insulting reports spread with regard to the Duc de Dalmatie are false. His Majesty has never ceased to repose confidence in his fidelity ; he has given him a new proof of this by creating him major-general of his army in Spain.”

TO GENERAL CLARKE.

“SCHÖENBRUNN, 2nd October, 1809.

“Write to the King of Spain and say that the English in their reports claim to have taken some guns ; that they state the number of pieces ; that all the letters from the army certify this ; and lastly, that General Senarmont, in his report, says that six guns were taken. Find out how many guns were lost at Talavera, and say that the slightest omission will be criminal ; that it is not for publication, but to know the truth. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

In reality the English appear to have captured seventeen guns.

On the 3rd his Majesty drew up a “note” to this effect:—“The Institute proposes to give the Emperor the title of *Augustus* or *Germanicus*. Augustus fought only the battle of Actium. Germanicus may have interested the Romans by his misfortunes, but his life was illustrated by very moderate recollections (*sic*).”

After remarking that the Roman emperors—Tiberius,

Nero, Caligula, and Domitian—had not left behind them enviable reputations, Napoleon went on to say:—

“The only man, and he was not emperor, who distinguished himself by his character and so many illustrious actions, was Cæsar. If there were a title that the Emperor could wish for, it would be that of *Cæsar*. But so many little princes have dishonoured that title that it now recalls not the great Cæsar, but a heap of German princes as feeble as they were ignorant.

“The title of the Emperor is *Emperor of the French*. He does not wish for the title of *Augustus*, or *Germanicus*, or even of *Cæsar*. . . .”

The statue of Napoleon, with the garb and attributes of the Cæsars, was afterwards set up in the Place Vendôme, on the top of a Trajan column.

In a letter addressed to the Emperor of Russia on the 10th October Napoleon said:—

“I have accorded Austria the most advantageous peace she could hope for. She cedes only Salzburg and a little on the side of the Inn: she cedes nothing in Bohemia, and nothing in Italy but what is indispensable for my communications with Dalmatia. The Austrian monarchy remains therefore entire. This is the second experiment I have desired to make; I have made use of moderation when she had no right to expect it.

“I send your Majesty the last English papers; there is a revolution in the ministry. There is no name for the folly and incoherence of the cabinet. It has allowed 30,000 men to perish in the most detestable country in the world; it might as well have thrown them into the sea. In Spain they have lost a large number of men. General Wellesley has committed the extreme imprudence of plunging into the heart of Spain with 30,000 men, having on his flanks three army corps forming 90 battalions and 50 squadrons, while he has in front of him the army commanded by the king. It is difficult to imagine such presumption.”

On the same day his Majesty wrote to General Clarke,

telling him to inform the King of Spain that he had offended against principles in representing the insurgents as 120,000 strong, whereas he had only 40,000 ; this was discouraging the French soldiers, and giving the enemy a poor opinion of them, and diminishing French credit in Europe. "I repeat," added the Emperor, "that in war *moral* and opinion are more than half the reality. The art of great captains has always been to make the enemy believe that their troops were very numerous, and to make their own army believe that that of the enemy was very inferior. . . . When I conquered the Austrians at Eckmühl I was one to five, and yet my soldiers believed they were equal to the enemy. . . . Far from admitting that I had only 100,000 men at Wagram, I endeavoured to persuade every one that I had 220,000. . . ."

TO THE EMPRESS.

"SCHÖENBRUNN, 14th October, 1809.

"I send you a line to say that peace was signed two hours ago between Champagny and Prince Leichtenstein.

"NAPOLEON."

The next day his Majesty wrote thus to the Emperor of Austria :—

"I have received the letter of your Imperial Majesty of the 25th September. I saw with pleasure Field-Marshal Prince Leichtenstein. His mission met with the success which your Majesty desired, and peace was yesterday signed between us. Your Majesty could not have sent me a more agreeable minister nor one more fit to arrange your affairs. The fourth war between your Majesty and myself is terminated. I am about to leave Vienna, and I leave it in the hope that all our differences have been settled, that peace between us may be perpetual, and that war will not

again break out. Let your Majesty confide your affairs to ministers who are acquainted with the respective positions of the two countries. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO THE EMPRESS.

“NYPHENBERG, *21st October*, 1809.

“I arrived here yesterday in good health. I shall stop for a day at Stuttgart. You shall receive twenty-four hours' notice of my arrival at Fontainebleau. It will give me great pleasure to see you again, and I await the moment with impatience. I embrace you. . . .

“NAPOLEON.”

TO COUNT ALDINI.

“FONTAINEBLEAU, *28th October*, 1809.

“I beg that you will write me an historical sketch tending to prove that—The popes have always been the enemies of the power predominating in Italy. When the Germans triumphed they called the French; when victory rendered the French masters they leagued with the Germans to drive them out.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO COMTE D'HAUTERIVE.

“FONTAINEBLEAU, *28th October*, 1809.

“Draw up a report of the conduct of Prussia during the present war, in the formation of camps, in the affair of Schill, of his officers, of the Prince of Orange, and other complaints of that nature, so that these materials may serve to guide my conduct.

“NAPOLEON.”

TO GENERAL CLARKE.

“PARIS, *21st November*, 1809.

“Inform the King of Spain that if Marshal Ney had not been recalled from Salamanca my army would not have

undergone such an affront ; that General Marchand is not capable of commanding in chief, and that when I employ marshals it is that I feel the necessity of it, and that there is no system pursued in the conduct of the campaign in Spain.

“ NAPOLEON.”

The Spaniards, commanded by the Duke del Parque, had managed to beat the French and take possession of Salamanca.

TO THE VICEROY OF ITALY.

“ PARIS, 22nd November, 1809.

“ I see with pleasure that you have arrived at Milan. You have written a work on your Italian campaign. I beg you will send it to me. I have found my financial affairs here in great disorder. The English expedition cost me 2,000,000*l*. The new levies and the immense armaments that I am making for Spain continue to ruin me. You will therefore understand that I cannot lighten the burdens of my kingdom of Italy.

“ NAPOLEON.”

TO KING LOUIS OF HOLLAND.

“ PARIS, 23rd November, 1809.

“ I have received your letter, in which you make known your desire to see me. You are at liberty to come to Paris.

“ NAPOLEON.”

On the 3rd December Napoleon, in a message to the Chambers, said that he was marching upon Cadiz and Lisbon, when he was forced to retrace his steps in order to plant his eagles on the ramparts of Vienna. “ Three months,” he said, “ had sufficed to terminate the fourth Punic war. The English army, led by the good genius of

France, terminated its destinies in the pestilential marshes of Walcheren. . . . Frenchmen, all who resist you shall be conquered. Your greatness will increase with the hatred of your enemies. You have long years of glory and prosperity before you. You have the force and the energy of the Hercules of the ancients. I have united Tuscany to my kingdom. . . . History has indicated the conduct which I should observe towards Rome. . . . It has been demonstrated to me that the spiritual influence exercised in my states by a foreign sovereign was contrary to the independence of France, and to the dignity and security of my throne. However, as I acknowledge the necessity of the spiritual influence of the descendants of the first of the pastors, I have been able to conciliate these great interests by cancelling the donation of the French Emperors, my predecessors, and by uniting the Roman States to France."

In this way the pope would no longer be a foreign sovereign.

His Majesty afterwards said—"I shall protect the Porte if the Porte severs itself from the baneful influence of England." And, "My friend and ally, the Emperor of Russia, has united to his vast empire Finland, Moldavia and Wallachia, and a district of Galicia. I am jealous of nothing good which can happen to that empire." And, for his Majesty thought of returning to Spain—"When I show myself on the other side of the Pyrenees the terrified Leopard will seek the ocean in order to avoid the shame of defeat and death. The triumph of my arms will be the triumph of the genius of good over that of evil, of moderation, order, and morality, over civil war, anarchy, and evil passions. I hope that my protection and my friendship will restore happiness and tranquillity to the Spanish people."

On the 9th December Napoleon, in a letter to Champagne, pointed out that Russia should be satisfied with

his message and the manner in which he had acted, seeing that she had not drawn the sword against the Austrians, who were all along convinced that they had nothing to fear from the Czar.¹

On the 22nd December, while at Trianon, the Emperor drew up a note on the subject of the affairs of Prince Eugene, from which it appears that at the date in question he enjoyed a revenue of 60,000*l*, which amount he might save up, as it did not include his official salary, which was ample enough for all purposes. In six years he would have 80,000*l*, and, added his Majesty, "as everything leads to the belief that he will keep his viceroyalty for another twenty years, he will invest thirty million francs in France, and with compound interest forty millions, which will give him a revenue of from three to four million francs."

There was evidently a good deal of misgiving on the part of the Czar in spite of the declarations contained in the message of the 3rd December, as is shown by the following letter :—

TO THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

"PARIS, 31st *December*, 1809.

"SIR, MY BROTHER,—I have received a second note from Chancellor Romanzoff; it afflicts me. Why return to affairs which were settled by my Vienna letter? I have declared my intentions in the face of Europe not only with regard to the Duchy of Warsaw, but even about Moldavia and Wallachia. I do not know what is required after all this; I cannot destroy chimeras and fight against clouds. I leave your Majesty to judge whether your language or mine is most in accordance with alliance and friendship. To show distrust is already to have forgotten Tilsit and Erfurth.

"Caulaincourt tells me that your Majesty is at Moscow; you are indefatigable.

¹ *Vide* letter to Empress after divorce.

"I have been living a retired life, being really afflicted by what the interests of my monarchy obliged me to do. Your Majesty is aware of my attachment for the Empress. Will your Majesty permit me to refer you to Caulaincourt for what I have to say concerning my policy and my true friendship? He will never be able to express all my feelings towards you.

"NAPOLEON."

END OF VOL. II.

